Political commentators have noted a number of current large-scale trends, which are likely to transform international relations over the coming decades. It is expected that developed countries will see their population decline by up to 25%, and the developing world, the former “third world” will see a corresponding increase in economic might.

Given this tendency, India is attracting a lot of attention: not only has it become a leading participant in the new Space Race, but it has set itself another ambitious goal: to join the select club of leading world powers. The Indian state, and Indian society, can boast of a number of important achievements in recent years, including rapid social and economic development, an increase in living standards, and growth in the science and technology sectors.

“Asia has become the world’s main engine of economic growth. We are in what many are calling Asia’s Century,” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in 2018.

According to United Nations figures for 2019, India’s population is currently 1.37 billion. Thus, it has the second largest population in the world, after China. And, according to forecasts, India may well overtake China and become the world’s most populous nation within eight years.

The budget presented by Narendra Modi’s new government demonstrates its determination to cut India’s fiscal deficit while boosting spending on infrastructure and social projects. In recent years India has seen annual growth of 7%, more than any other key developing economy. According to the PwC auditors, this year India is set to become the fifth largest global economy overtaking the UK. Based on other accounting criteria, it could even become the number three economy after the USA and China. If it maintains its current steady progress, then within 15 years its GDP will be the same as China’s is now.

But India’s recent ambition to achieve a leading status in international affairs is based on more than just economic indicators. It has started to play an important role in world politics, and its authority as a serious international player is growing, its status as a member of the G20 is established and talks are under way to include India in the G8. India’s relations with the countries that most political observers see as the “leading triangle” of world politics, the USA, Russia and China, are thus of great interest.

As readers may remember, bilateral relations between the USA and India only really got going a relatively short time ago. During the Cold War India was one of the world’s leading non-aligned nations, although it had close links with the USSR, and Washington viewed it with what could be described as “cautious suspicion”. Relations improved in the 1990s, but then took a turn for the worse in 1998, when the USA imposed sanctions on India in response to its nuclear tests.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 US President George W. Bush followed a new policy in relation to India, seeking both to maintain good strategic links with Pakistan (they were essential to the military operations in Afghanistan which formed a core part of his global “War on Terror”) and to find a counterweight to the rapidly growing might of China, which he saw as the most serious challenge to US interests in Asia, and, in the long term, worldwide. It was the latter factor that prompted Washington to seek better relations with India, and in 2006 the two countries signed the Civil Nuclear Agreement, even though India is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This nuclear treaty enabled the two countries to embark on a hitherto unthinkable strategic rapprochement. Certain observers, perhaps rather naively, believe that the USA sees India as playing an “exceptional” role in the new state of international relations.

Narendra Modi’s diplomatic policy, as it has evolved over several years, can be briefly summarized as follows: India is a unique country and we can remain uninvolved in conflicts between the other world powers (such as the USA, China and Russia) And those closest to the Indian Prime Minister would go still further, and express it like this: India needs to set out its own red lines, to make clear its demands, its concerns and its preferences. India is in fact the only Asian country that can act as a counterweight to China (and not just for the USA) and it cannot be treated like other countries.

Relations between the USA and India have been stagnant for many years. And on the very day when, following his reelection, Narendra Modi began his new term of office, the USA ended India’s de facto most favored nation status and imposed trade tariffs  – in effect, US sanctions. And, to judge by a number of US government publications, Washington hoped to see Narendra Modi lose the most recent elections, given the “failure of his economic policies and his departure from core principles that have formed the basis for Indian society since the country’s independence in 1947.”

The current US sanctions are a clear warning that things may get worse in the future. The US’s main complaint relates to Iranian oil: Iran is a neighbor and key partner of India and a participant in several investment projects. But the USA is known to have presented India with a number of other demands: to open up the Indian market to US milk products, lift restrictions on its import of medical equipment and lift all protectionist measures in the area of advanced technology, etc. In effect, the existing relations between the two countries must be completely restructured for the benefit of the USA alone. However, in view of the fact  that India is a country in which the workforce increases by 7.5 million people every year, how can it accept all the US’s demands? That would not only represent a failure of Narendra Modi’s ambitious “Make in India” program, and other policies, it would be a disaster for the country as a whole.

In recent months, the above behavior has reinforced the view of the USA as an unreliable partner which seeks to impinge on India’s interests and sovereignty. In the past, such a change in public opinion has been evident every time relations between the USA and India have cooled.

In response, India has followed a policy of making use of the USA’s economic potential to further its own interests, just as it has done with China and Russia: taking the best of what others have to offer without committing itself to an alliance with any of the major world powers. Narendra Modi’s policy is a sign of India’s determination to become the leading nation in the South Asian region, and maintain good relations with its neighbors, including China, and to become a center of advanced technologies while nurturing the unique qualities of its ancient civilization.

Valery Kulikov, expert politologist, exclusively for the online magazine ‘New Eastern Outlook’.

Recently, the NEO has been looking at the situation in and around Hong Kong from different angles. It is hard to disagree with the viewpoint that the external chaos of recent months in the streets of Hong Kong (which is, among other things, one of the world’s financial centers) has increasingly shown signs of a hybrid war waged against the Second World Superpower.

However, we cannot exclude the multi-layered motivation for initiating these events. In particular, one such motive may be due to the struggle between some of the major financial groups. In this regard, one can note the report on certain problems that suddenly arose in the Hong Kong branch of the financial conglomerate HSBC Holdings.

However, the author in no way considers himself an expert in the organization of the global financial system, as well as its (behind-the-scenes) management, and therefore will refrain from any comment on this message. As a fundamental postulate, let us only assume that the infamous global financial backstage is not only unable to control the historical process, but is also unable to exert any significant influence on it at all. Quite the opposite.

What is certain though is that the situation in Hong Kong is built into the overall picture of increasing global competition between the two world’s leading superpowers, and this competition, in turn, is at the center of the current stage of the Big World Policy (Game).

Last time the author touched upon the Hong Kong issues was a month ago. Back then, some of the expected events of that very game gave one hope that the intensity of the protest rallies in Hong Kong would gradually fade away.

Let us remind the reader that the current stage of the US-Chinese relations focuses on the US claims against China in the trade and economic sphere. Attempts to find a compromise in the negotiations, which turned into a full-fledged exhausting one-year-long 12-round boxing match, were unsuccessful.

Any hopes regarding the meeting of the leaders of both countries, which took place in late June at the regular G20 summit in Osaka, did not come true. After a pause, with some alleged non-public contact between the two leaders, the US President announced on August 1 his intention to introduce tariffs for the entire second half of the Chinese import to the US as of September 1. Previously these goods remained outside the scope of the measures taken between April 2018 and May 2019.

The following day, the Chinese Global Times published an editorial in response, the main message of which was to assert that the new tariffs would not increase the sale of American soybeans to China by as much as 1 kg. This information response was a targeted painful blow for D. Trump, taking into account the election campaign de facto unfolding in the USA.

That is, both of the world’s top boxers assumed a fighting stance yet again. And immediately after that, the protests in Hong Kong intensified, with rallies becoming increasingly audacious (if not impudent). The city airport (with a hub status) repeatedly gets closed and reopened, the first Molotov cocktail is thrown into the police station (one of the policemen suffers burns and is hospitalized), a correspondent of the aforementioned Global Times is abused. There are signs of serious economic costs for the city, whose business is based on social and political silence in the streets.

As in any color revolution, the intensity is gradually increasing, and the nature of the protesters’ demands is also changing. It seems that the initial demands have been forgotten, that is, the apparent reasons for the whole current pell-mell in Hong Kong. And it would be a good idea to remember them.

Thus, it all began with a proposal to introduce a provision to the local legislation allowing for the surrender of persons suspected of having committed crimes (sic!) on the continental territory and hiding in Hong Kong, to the courts of mainland China.

The author does not see in this draft law any meaningful contradiction even with the Sino-British Declaration of 1985, which refers to the continual effect of the judicial and legislative system of the British period in the history of the city (for 50 years after the accession to the People’s Republic of China) on the territory of Hong Kong. When including this section in this document, the parties must have (by default) had in mind Hong Kong residents, rather than fugitives from the continent.

Hardly anyone could have foreseen at the time (and therefore in any way stipulated in the Declaration) the possibility of the current absurd situation when the state authorities would be unable to take the necessary action against the persons suspected of having committed crimes in one part of the country and then fleeing to another part.

But, again, today, the whole story is no longer of interest to those who hide behind the backs of the Hong Kong protesters. After removing the abovementioned draft bill from the agenda, the demands for the unconditional release of all individuals detained during the street riots were first made, followed by the demand for the resignation of the Chief Minister of Hong Kong, Ms. Carrie Lam, and then by the demand for an early dissolution of the local parliament and holding early elections.

There is also an expert opinion that the ultimate goal of the next upsurge of turmoil in Hong Kong is to revise the Basic Law adopted in China in 1997, that is, immediately after the accession of the former British colony. This document regulates the process of gradual integration of Hong Kong into the uniform, country. Hong Kong received the status of a Special Administrative Region (along with Tibetan, Xinjiang Uyghur and Inner Mongolia). This opinion is particularly noteworthy given the popularity of the slogan Hong Kong is not China among the protesters.

It seems that the supporters of this slogan have reliable guarantees of their impunity, while Beijing has (so far) lacked a strategy for an appropriate response to the events in the city. Mainly because of the lack of clarity on the power balance within Hong Kong itself, as well as the condition and prospects of the relations with the main geopolitical opponent.

Meanwhile, the latter generates contradictory signals. On the one hand, some congressmen claim that violence against the protesters is unacceptable, while others suggest that Hong Kong may be stripped of its special status when conducting trade and financial transactions in the US.

Such threats fit into the scenario of the trade war that Washington is waging against China. Therefore, the US position on the Hong Kong events in general is described as gangster diplomacy in Beijing. The use of which by Washington in connection with the events taking place in different countries under similar scenarios, levels out the officially declared goals of encouraging democratic processes.

However, on August 13, it was reported that D. Trump decided to postpone the introduction of the import tariffs on a number of Chinese goods from September 1 to December 15. The resumption of the negotiation process at the ministerial level is also reported. It is said that the reason was the growing dissatisfaction in the US itself (mainly among farmers) with the prospect of problems in the relations with China.

That is, Beijing is given a reason for indecision in the matter of reacting to the Hong Kong events. Which might explain why the tanks and armored personnel carriers, allegedly located (by the satellites) on the way to Hong Kong, have not been deployed in the streets of the city yet.

In conclusion, it would seem appropriate to make two general statements. The first concerns the brushwood of all the color revolutions of the recent years, i.e. young people (including teenagers) who are the main victims of the activities of political crooks who initiate the fight between good and evil.

It is unlikely that most of the Hong Kong protesters, among whom the British flag is so popular, are aware of their country’s recent tragic history. In particular, the fact that Hong Kong was under the shadow of the said flag as a result of one of the biggest crimes against humanity in history: the so-called Opium Wars.

Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997 was an act of historical justice that should be welcomed by all the Chinese regardless of where they live. And also of the fact that today’s China relatively lags behind the UK in terms of the welfare of the population.

All the Chinese have a right to be proud that they live in the second most important world superpower, which has demonstrated tremendous success in state building.

The second statement is due to the fact that only North Korea and Pakistan have so far publicly expressed their unequivocal support for Beijing in connection with the events in Hong Kong.

Is there no one else willing to do the same for their strategic partner at a difficult time?

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The hegemony that the United States enjoyed during the transition period in the wake of the Cold War has ended. The bipolar world is on its way back and China is beginning to play an increasingly distinct role of a superpower in it.

The aforementioned fact pains Washington a great deal, especially the ongoing strengthening of the Chinese Armed Forces, which, despite the constantly increasing US military budget expenditures, are trying “not to lag behind” the development of the US Armed Forces.

The military expenses of the two countries already exceed those of the other states. By 2023, the US defense budget may reach $800 billion, with the Chinese one possibly exceeding $300 billion, while no other world power will spend more than $80 billion a year for its armed forces.

The People’s Republic of China’s defense expenditures exceeded $200 billion in 2018, showing a triple growth since 2002. China redirected the financing and effort in order to receive military technologies at all costs. The Chinese Armed Forces will own the cutting-edge offensive and defensive systems in the near future. The world’s second largest economy achieved this landmark as a result of the boisterous modernization of the recent years, whose strategic objective is a qualitative increase in the fighting capacity of the Chinese army. It is stated in the report of the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published on January 15.

Therefore, scrupulous tracking of Beijing’s progress in the improvement of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) has been the focus of attention of the US military intelligence lately, so that the US does not miss any novelties in the equipment and activities of the CPLA, and there has been a lot to note in recent months alone.

Thus, Washington paid special attention to the recent CPLA statement about the large structural changes aimed at transforming the Chinese army into a modern fighting force. They are caused by the fact that, in modern conditions, the role of land fighting, which used to define the outcome of any conflict throughout most of the twentieth century since World War II, is declining. At the same time, the Navy, the Air Force and new strategic divisions dealing with the reflection of hi-tech threats, such as cyber war, are becoming critical. For this reason, the number of the Chinese land forces was reduced in favor of other types of military forces, within the framework of the so-called strategic structural shift. The changes in question are so considerable that the number of the Navy, the Air Force, the missile troops and strategic support forces responsible for such spheres as cyber war exceeded 50% of the total number of the CPLA.

In this light, the US is deeply concerned with the possibility of China to counteract the US in space and wage war there. In this regard, in January 2019, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published the report Challenges to Security in Space and estimated the possibilities of the Celestial Empire. The report acknowledges, in particular, that Beijing’s current priority issue is that of transforming China into a space superpower in all its aspects. China has the second place after the US by number of actively operating satellites. The Beijing space programme includes civil and military components. The CPLA Command understands space superiority as an ability to control the information space and to prevent the opponent from getting similar data, which is the key element of modern warfare. The Chinese military leaders consider defensive space operations as a form of containing the US Armed Forces and countering their possible offensive operations in the regional military conflicts during which the Americans, by destroying and capturing the Chinese satellites and other space facilities, significantly hinder the use of controlled weapons.

In its recent reports on the strategic military intentions of Beijing, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)  comes to some shocking and disturbing conclusions regarding the rather rapid progress of China in the field of advanced military technologies, in particular, in the field of creating hypersonic weapons, where the US has fallen behind a great deal.

Besides, the US military experts gave a high estimate of the tests of the new Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile which showed that the US aircraft carriers are in real danger as reported by Washington Free Beacon at the beginning of July. The tests took place in the South China Sea, where, in particular, the US Navy ships are deployed. It is specified that the use of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) requires hi-tech surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting systems. According to the Pentagon, China has already deployed all of those. The US has no missile systems of the kind, and the possibilities to counteract them are limited, according to the website.

What hurts Washington even more is the fact that the US Administration has not yet managed to eliminate the serious vulnerability of the US Army as far as China in concerned. And the latter has a great leverage on its strategic opponent thanks to the control over the supply of critical materials. It is acknowledged that the whole arsenal of the US modern weapons, from Tomahawk missiles to F-35 fighters, completely depends on the production of components which are made with the use of rare-earth elements and almost exclusively manufactured in China. At the same time, the Chinese threats about the termination of rare-earth element shipments for the first time voiced by Beijing at the end of May have not ceased yet. Therefore, Washington is forced to acknowledge that the military opportunities of the US are to a great extent in hands of the country which is now considered by the US national security agencies as a strategic rival. So far, the US does not know how to resolve its rare-earth dilemma.

In this regard, against the backdrop of the recent exacerbation of the US-Chinese relations fueled by Washington, many experts rightly consider that the US  realized this too late after having deciding to force China to kneel, since, in order to vanquish Beijing, it would have to not only begin a total economic war, but also resort to combat action. Even the US hawks lack courage to implement the second scenario today. Both countries are nuclear superpowers with sufficient economic and military resources, and any military collision between them will lead to the assured destruction not only of these two countries, but of the whole world.

Valery Kulikov, expert politologist, exclusively for the online magazine ‘New Eastern Outlook’. 

The latest events in the South China Sea show that the long-standing conflict has still smoldered here, and it occasionally flares up. Recently we have got used to seeing such events take place when the Americans send another destroyer assigned to deliberately cross the border of the forbidden waters designated by China around the artificial islands in the South China Sea. The whole world at such moment literally stands still afraid that one accidental shot can start a conflict between the great superpowers.

However, lately, there has been another reason for increased attention to the South China Sea: China sent a research vessel assigned to establish the availability of oil and gas in the water area that, according to all international regulations belongs to Vietnam. And it was made quite unexpectedly, approximately following the same scenario as in 2015.

Back then, China sent a drilling rig to the Vietnamese territorial waters, which caused a huge international resonance and a long-standing conflict. In its course, the Vietnamese and the Chinese vessels watered each other from fire pumps, rammed one another and held precariously on the verge of a military collision for several weeks.

At the time, Vietnam even saw a rise in spontaneous anti-Chinese rallies began, and the tension in the relations of the two countries reached the limit. It took a great deal of diplomatic effort to avoid most serious consequences at the time.

In 2019, everything began as last time, but developed in an absolutely different way. The Chinese vessels appeared in the Vietnamese waters and left them quickly enough. No fire pumps, journalist crowds or demonstrations this time around. The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry submitted an official protest, specifying that “over the last several days, the Chinese survey ship, Haiyang Dizhi 8 and its escorts conducted activities in the southern area of the East Sea that violated Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.” The statement emphasized that this site is located within the territorial waters of Vietnam, and it was demanded that the Chinese vessel stop its illegal activities and left the Vietnamese waters.

The Chinese MFA Spokesperson Geng Shuang, in response to this statement, said that Beijing “hopes that the Vietnamese party will be able to respect the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of China over the corresponding waters and will take no actions that could exacerbate the situation.” After making this statement and thus preserving the national prestige, the Chinese ships were ordered to leave the Vietnamese waters. Thus, in August 2019, the possible conflict between Vietnam and China that the Americans had counted so much on was over.

Washington did not even try to hide its disappointment with this outcome, as it sought to kindle this conflict in every possible way. It gave numerous leaks to the press with reference to certain analytical centers that the Chinese and the Vietnamese ships “had clashed” for several weeks. The interest of Washington to triggering the conflict is quite clear: the worse the relations of Vietnam and China, the more chances the US gets to exploit the conflict of the two neighboring countries to its own advantage.

Thus, the US is obviously disappointed that both Hanoi and Beijing showed patience and common sense and acted quite differently from the situation in 2015.

It is most likely that the leaders of the two countries, without involving the press, spontaneous rallies and general excitement, simply had a quiet discussion of the current situation via the interparty channels closed from the press and reached a certain compromise. As a result, the Chinese research vessel entering the Vietnamese waters caused neither a long-standing opposition, nor international attention, and, by now, it has become one of the historical moments, which there have been plenty of throughout the history of the conflict in the South China Sea.

The conflict has not been resolved, both parties retain their positions. But we see now that there is a new efficient way to avoid armed confrontation, however strong the desire of Washington to see action might be.

Dmitry Mosyakov, Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Director of the Centre for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

The series of events in the “a tanker for a tanker war” between Iran and the West in the Strait of Hormuz, the most important strategic part of the Persian Gulf, has been watched by the world’s leading politicians, political scientists and media for several weeks now. Analyses of the reasons, changes in the positions of the parties involved, their short-term and long-term goals and objectives, scenarios of withdrawing from the tense situation are very ambiguous. Some saw in it the aspiration of Washington to wreak havoc in this region, since it is easier “to catch a goldfish” in the muddy water. Others understand it as the desire to found a coalition for establishing new (anti-Iranian) rules of navigation and to pin down the obstinate Iran with various sanctions.

At first (before B. Johnson’s election as Prime Minister), a cunning trap laid by US for London with the purpose to show the UK its place was considered, as the latter showed some independence at a decidedly unsuitable time for its own political change and attempted to carry out the Brexit as soon as possible, etc.

It would be undesirable to repeat the unexpected and drastic turns of events: they are already abundant on the pages of all serious media worldwide. On the one hand, it is probably worth taking a broader look at them, as they certainly will have long-term effects for the whole world because of a possible “oil deficit” and a changed strategic arrangement of forces in the region. And, on the other hand, one had better focus on analyzing the role and attitude of Britain, which, for some reason or other, became one of the centers of the conflict. In our opinion, it needs to be made, considering several important circumstances.

First, in the course of events which started with the US threats to begin military operations against Iran, the Pentagon’s fighting spirit disappeared. The US plan to send 120,000 soldiers to Iran seemed unfeasible since they would be met by more than 650,000 soldiers of the Iranian armed forces. This despite the fact that, in 2018, the Pentagon designed the document OPLAN 1002-18 on capturing a number of ports in the Persian Gulf and the Khuzestan Province where 80% of the Iranian oil and gas reserves are located and where separatist sentiment is strong. It is essential that this province is close to the partially controlled Iraq, not far from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which contains the possible countermeasures of Iran, but also makes those 120,000 troops sufficient for such action in case of possible support of the aircraft and the fleet from the bases of these adjacent countries.

Secondly, for the purpose of ensuring a greater reliability of its actions, the USCENTCOM designed the multinational naval operation Sentinel, and the US Administration officially urged Germany, France and the UK to join the naval mission for “ensuring safe navigation” through the Strait of Hormuz and “countering Iran’s aggression.”

Germany rejected this request: it has to be approved by the Parliament first. Almost all leading political forces of the country are against participating in any missions of the US against Iran. Germany is not really interested in the events in the flashpoints, since its energy security does not depend on the disputes with Iran, as it receives most of its oil from the Russian Federation or from other suppliers who do not transport it through this strait.

France is somewhat hesitant concerning participation in the initiative of the US. However, since France receives most of its oil from the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia is its largest supplier), it is in its best interests that the situation in the region should not be tense.

The UK, more than any other state, is inclined to partake in the US mission, since Iran held a British tanker, and Saudi Arabia is the main supplier of aviation fuel to the country. Without having sufficient forces in the Persian Gulf, the UK, it would seem, would support the US cause. But this purpose required the rise of the still mysterious and unpredictable Boris Johnson as the country’s Prime Minister.

Thirdly, soon after he was appointed Prime Minister, B. Johnson abandoned T. May’s doubts and, on August 5 of this year, the accession to the alliance with Washington was officially declared on the one hand. And on the other, probably, in order to strengthen the positions within the country and in the world in general, he was the first to present the idea to create a European naval coalition for ensuring the security of vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. The idea was then approved by France, the Netherlands and Italy, interest was expressed by Spain, Sweden, Poland and even Germany. It was decided that the ships of the UK Naval Forces would accompany cargo vessels under the British flag in the Strait of Hormuz and, for this purpose, the destroyer Duncan already entered the waters of the Persian Gulf.

Fourthly, the Russian Federation MFA made a number of proposals for strengthening the security in the region. In particular, establishing the Organization for Security and Cooperation which would include the Persian Gulf States, Russia, China, the US, the EU, India, etc.; compliance of the regional participants with international law; transparent cooperation in the military sphere; taking steps on transforming the region into an area without weapons of mass destruction; abandoning permanent foreign bases and gradual reduction of the military presence of the non-regional players. It is possible to establish a collective security system by carrying out consultations on a bilateral and multilateral basis, including those with the participation of the League of Arab States and the UN.

Fifthly, it is necessary to keep in mind that the UK had, has and will have  its own interests and positions both in the Persian Gulf, and in its vicinity, in the Indian Ocean. It is necessary to acknowledge that, before the 2010s, there was practically no mention of the Indian Ocean region, or the Indian Ocean Rim (the regional structure of cooperation, IORA for short) during the debates of the British parliament. However, according to the plans unveiled at the end of 2014, the UK announced placing large military platforms, aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, other support ships, planes of the Royal Naval Force and the Royal Air Force on the modernized base Mina Salman in Bahrain (the necessary sum of $23 million for expanding its operation opportunities was provided by both parties). The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Philip Hammond emphasized that this measure was designed to stabilize the situation in the Persian Gulf and to protect the British interests in Libya and the neighboring areas. In our opinion, it marked the beginning of London’s gradual return to the east from the Suez Canal.

During Theresa May’s time as Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth adopted the slogan “Global Britain” with 3 priorities of interests around the world:

• North America, especially the US and Canada;
• Europe with allies and partners;
• Asia, a center of economic and political growth, maintaining the influence in which will become the key success factor of the slogan.

If the UK returns to the east from the Suez Canal, to Asia, then it has to be done by sea, through the Indian Ocean where, according to the forecasts made by the Asian Development Bank, the growth in the Asian Age directed by China, India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand will reach 90% of the Asian GDP and 53% of the global GDP. This will certainly become the drive of a global economic spurt as well. It is indicative that the next two decades will see an enormous increase in the volume of container transportation both in the Indian Ocean and in the Asia Pacific Region. The UK, seeking to reserve its title of a trade empire, will hardly miss such opportunities.

Apart from its economic interests, the UK, for its own purposes, obviously wants to meet the new strategic challenges and risks by an increasingly active participation in securing the trade waterways, establishing order on the sea by carrying out joint maneuvers, including the South China Sea, its possible accession to the Big 4 v. 2.0 and the IORA and strengthening its role in the Indo-Pacific Region (which is underway) in general. It would seem that the events in the Strait of Hormuz, the initiatives on their resolution and the desire to look more self-sufficient could urge the British interest in the region of the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pacific Region. However, whether or not it will be able to realize them on its own (without its main ally, the US) with an ambitious yet unpredictable Prime Minister is a big question. It is no accident that London recently held a thorough discussion of the insufficient level of the military budget (2%), the Naval Force profile, the merchant fleet, etc., which has on numerous occasions been noted by the New Eastern Outlook. It seems that there are problems requiring debate in the new government and in the Parliament.

Meanwhile, on August 5, the British Foreign Minister Dominic Raab wielded the Big Stick again, stating that he intended to create another (stronger) alliance for ensuring the international law and order and for meeting the British security challenges. Raab believes that the new alliance would become the answer to “the menacing behavior of Iran and the destabilizing actions of Russia in Europe,” and its member states would counter both “terrorism and climate change,” among other things.

However, is the British stick big enough? Or is the British rhetoric as strong as always?

Nina Lebedeva, Candidate of Historical Sciences, leading research fellow at the Centre of Indian Research, part of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

There was an atmosphere of euphoria in Pakistan, and flattering epithets met Prime Minister Imran Khan during his official visit to Washington in July 2019. At the height of the trade war with China, tough economic sanctions and military threats in Iran, tense relations with Russia, the prevailing uncertainty in the negotiations with the Afghan Taliban, the US-Pakistani relations appeared to be an island of wellbeing in the region. The staged bilateral agreement of Washington and Islamabad was the result of a tough compromise where the national security interests of the two nuclear powers clashed. The first urged its former off-NATO ally to provide support in convincing the Afghan Taliban to sign the Peace Treaty in order to end the 18-year-long antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan, while Pakistan insisted on resuming the military and financial aid, recognizing its role in antiterrorist action, as well as bilateral cooperation on an equal basis. The achievement of this objective, according to I. Khan, promoted the improvement of Islamabad’s image before the international community and strengthened its positions both in the region and in the whole Muslim world.

Everything happened… verbally. The scenarios were put down. But the US is known to ditch its situational allies as soon as they are no longer needed, and the East is always about subtlety.

Prime Minister I. Khan held negotiations with President D. Trump in the White House on July 22, 2019. The leaders of both states had not officially met since 2015; for the 45th US President this was the first handshake with the Pakistani Prime Minister who took the position in July 2018.

The 2019 White House reorienting towards Islamabad was a public recognition by the Oval Office of its miscalculations 2 years prior:

• D. Trump, even before his inauguration in January 2017, called Pakistan “a terrorism sponsor state” and discontinued the economic assistance via the Coalition Support Fund ($1.3 billion). The call on Islamabad to take drastic action against the terrorist groups was the explanation. While waiting for the response, Washington suspended its assistance to Pakistan in the security area; in 2018 the US refused to sell weapons and blocked the traditional admission of Pakistani military personnel for training in United States Military Academies;
• During the Afghan crisis in August 2017, just like in 2009, the Pentagon relied on a military solution and rejected the diplomatic approach;
• the US started considering India as “… a loyal friend and partner in the solution of problems around the world.”

Already in 2017, US think tanks recommended that the White House thoroughly revise the information on Pakistan’s involvement in terrorism.

In 2019, it is retrospectively obvious that many plans of Washington failed without support in the region:

1. Time adjusted the Washington Administration’s objectives in view of the coming US presidential election campaign, the Department of State and the Pentagon reoriented to expanding the US interests in Western Asia with a new mission: to maintain stability in the region.
2. The US recognized the role of China and Russia in the political settlement promoting peace, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan and the whole region in 2018-2019.

III. The US, as well as China and Russia, welcomed Pakistan’s participation in consultations on Afghanistan, considering that it could play an important role in promoting peace in Afghanistan.

Recognizing the role of Islamabad in the negotiations with the Afghan Taliban, Washington has insisted on its hands-on assistance in signing the Agreement between the US and the Afghan Taliban with the control date of September 1, 2019, proceeding from the fact that the arrangements resulting from eight rounds of negotiations in Doha have to provide guarantees of a safe withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan (via the territory of Pakistan).

The US also expects Pakistan to take security measures, including those against the terrorist organizations. Islamabad heard this repeated call on the eve of the visit and, in response, wasted no time putting H. Saeed, the leader of the outlawed Jamaat-ud-Dawa organization, under house arrest stating that it was made for the benefit of Pakistan.

In exchange for Islamabad’s responsiveness, President D. Trump promised economic and investment support and the resuscitation of commerce. The trade volume between the two countries reached a record $6.6 billion in 2018. Pakistan remains an attractive market for the US considering “… its favorable demography, English language skills, low cost of labor and local natural resources.” Of course, now and then, there are indications of jealousy that China is the largest importer to Pakistan. But D. Trump is planning to transfer certain American production facilities to the Pakistan’s territory.

In Washington, Pakistan’s objectives were to establish, at last, a long-term partnership between the two countries on the basis of mutual respect, trust and shared values; resume the provision of financial aid from the US and the IMF; get its assistance and avoid Islamabad being put on the Financial Action Task Force black list in 2019 (in 2018, Pakistan was put on the gray list of the organization).

During his visit to Washington, Prime Minister I. Khan assured President D. Trump that Pakistan, as the responsible state, would do its best for promoting the Afghan peace process, however he reiterated that Islamabad would only promote it, but would not become the guarantor of the Afghan Peace Agreement at the same time emphasizing that “… the Afghan issue remains our shared responsibility.” The discretion of Islamabad’s statements was dictated by the disagreement of the parties (the US and the Afghan Taliban) on the terms of the US troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. Washington is planning to end the antiterrorist campaign by 2020 stating that an early withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan would be a strategic mistake. The Afghan Taliban insist on the deadline of ten months for the occupational troops to remain in their homeland.

What Pakistan achieved in the negotiations:

• The US leadership recognized the contribution of the Pakistani army to the war against terrorism and its role in the peace process in Afghanistan;
• The renewed cooperation of the Defense Ministries. General M.A. Milley who had been recently appointed Chief of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed his objective to maintain the defense relations between the US and Pakistan. All this means that Washington will have to consider the interests of Pakistan;
• Washington scrapped its accusatory rhetoric regarding Islamabad as a sponsor of terrorism.

In its turn, Pakistan assured the US that its cooperation with China (the Chinese-Pakistani Economic Corridor project) would cause no damage to the US interests in the region. Moreover, it would pave a way for the American and other Western investment into the CPEC and the energy sector and for the participation of US companies in infrastructure projects.

What price the US paid to Pakistan for the latter’s assistance in resolving the Afghan military campaign issue:

The answer is simple: India. Islamabad has lately kept assuring Washington of the impossibility to consider the situation on its Eastern border separately from the other issues, while “the Indian aggression, according to the statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, is affecting the Afghan peace process.” In July this year, President D. Trump agreed to mediate the settlement of the Kashmir conflict between Islamabad and New Delhi. The Foreign Ministry of Pakistan welcomed the decision, viewing it as a withdrawal of the US from its former stance that the problem of Kashmir was a bilateral dispute between the two neighbors with nuclear weapons and that they are the only ones who can find the best solution. The Indian party immediately reacted to D. Trump’s statement regarding mediation. New Delhi adheres to its traditional policy of a bilateral settlement of the Kashmir crisis. The Kashmir mini-crisis of February 2019 when the two countries made air strikes against each other’s territories, confirmed the importance of developing a conflict de-escalation mechanism which has two dimensions: bilateral and international. The White House head’s statement made in August 2019 and confirming its mediation intentions undermines the positions of India in the region. If Pakistan plays its cards right regarding Afghanistan, it will probably manage to convince the US to change its relations with India, and, thus, achieve a diplomatic victory in Kashmir.

Natalia Zamarayeva, Ph.D (History), Senior Research Fellow, Pakistan section, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

Cancellation on August 5 this year of the fundamental provisions of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution became one of the most important recent political events in the Indo-Pacific Region. It de facto means the elimination of the special status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with mainly Muslim population (about 70%). From now on, the state is divided into two allied territories under the full control of the central government.

The legislative act to this effect was adopted by the lower house of Parliament by a majority vote (351 in favor, 72 against from a total of 545 deputies in the house).

Before trying to analyze what it can mean for the political situation in India, in the area around it and in the Big Global Game now unfolding, let us briefly dwell on the history of the issue.

Article 370 was adopted nearly 10 years after the adoption of the Constitution of independent India (in 1957). This article, first, legalized the de-facto control of the Indian army over 60% of the former principality of Jammu and Kashmir and, second, stated Delhi’s claims to the remaining part.

The Article 370 provisions on the de-facto independent status (except for the issues of defense and foreign policy) of the new Indian state represented a compromise in the negotiations of the leader of the then leading political force in the territory of Kashmir, sheikh Abdullah, with the Prime Minister of the central government Jawaharlal Nehru. This compromise was what allowed sheikh Abdullah to package the process of legislative-based accession to the Republic of India into a way that was, more or less, acceptable for the population of the state.

Over the recent 20-30 years, there has been an increasingly active movement in the Indian political circles which considers that modern India is the successor of British India with all territorial claims implied by this stance. Attempts of nationalist forces to bring clerical (Hinduism-based) elements to the originally secular Republic of India are in a way connected to the aforementioned movement.

Both of these political trends share a great respect for a certain historical figure:  Vallabhbhai Patel (dubbed the Indian Bismarck) who, during his time as the first deputy of J. Nehru, indeed played an outstanding role in the crucial moment of the formation of independent India. He died in December 1950 and, according to his present followers, would have never allowed the de-facto independent status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

However, this is anybody’s guess, because V. Patel simply had no chance to participate in the resolution of the legal part of the Kashmir issue, while J. Nehru, as the author of this articles believes, proceeded from the extremely difficult internal and external circumstances that existed back then.

Let us only mention the preservation of the religious component in the difficult situation in the country (today, there are about 180 million Muslims in India no more than 6-7% of whom live in the state of Jammu and Kashmir), the consequences of recently completed first war against Pakistan (also essentially caused by an interreligious conflict), the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) troops reaching the 4,000 km long borders with India high in the mountains, the US (the most reliable ally back then) involvement in the Korean war.

The amendments to Article 370 caused various reactions in India. It is clear how Muslims reacted, while the Hindu community of the (now former) State of Jammu and Kashmir is exulting.

As for secular commentators, the author mostly came across guarded stances of various degrees. Discussing the prospects awaiting Kashmir, India in general and the situation outside the country, highly colored wording is quite often used. For example, when a comparison to Kosovo is made, it is said that “instead of an Indianization of Kashmir, there will be a Kashmirization of India.”

Let us note that judicial proceedings about the possession of a hectare of land on the hill top in the small town of Ajodhya located in Northeast India are in progress. The aforementioned hills and hectare are sacred both for the Hindus and the Muslims. For the internal political situation in India, the importance of this or that decision can be just as great as the amendments to Article 370. The first court session held on August 7 so far ended with the requirement that the parties produce their argument and the evidence anew.

The need for an urgent strategy for managing the external factors in the wake of the annulment of Article 370 is emphasized by one of the leading Indian analysts Raja Mohan. The intuition of the experienced political scientist does not fail him because those external factors look rather adversely for India so far.

The strongly negative reaction of Pakistan came as no surprise. Let us mention the statement by the General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of the Pakistan Army, on the support of “the Kashmireans in their fair fight” and the “readiness to fulfill our duty” to them. Which was followed by the statement of Prime Minister Imran Khan that he was going to address the UNSC with a demand to condemn the aforementioned decision of the Indian Parliament. Finally, the suspension of diplomatic and trade relations with India was declared.

It is possible that all this will eventually turn out to be a propaganda ritual dance (in the style of a New Zealand rugby team before the match). One thing is certain: one may forget for a long time the positive messages sent by Islamabad to Delhi over the last two years.

The position of the People’s Republic of China concerning the situation with the radical amendments to Article 370 of the Indian Constitution was expressed on August 8 at the traditional briefing with the participation of foreign journalists by the Chinese Foreign Ministry press secretary Hua Chunying. In particular, she urged both parties “to restraint and discreet actions which would not violate the status quo.”

A detailed comment must be made on the position of the leading world player, that is, the US. Actually, so far it comes down to the “mysterious silence” of the US President and a short remark by the Department of State that the aforementioned step of the Indian leadership was in no way coordinated with the US beforehand.

The aforementioned silence is quite clear, as the negative foreign policy consequences of the de-facto annulment of Article 370 will almost certainly aggravate the (already extremely complicated) US game in the region, where certain remarkable innovations appeared over the recent months.

Since the early 2000s, it seemed that, at the prospect of the (already obvious back then) transformation of the People’s Republic of China into its main geopolitical opponent, Washington placed its final bet on a (quasi) union with India, which the US began to consider a natural counterbalance to Beijing. At the same time, it was necessary to sacrifice the relations with Pakistan which were almost those of allies during the entire period of the Cold War as well.

It was followed with the inevitable acceleration of the (long-standing) process of strengthening of comprehensive relations of Islamabad with Beijing at the same time as a gradual degradation of the relations with Washington. After the famous twitter post duel between D. Trump and I. Khan at the beginning of this year, one had a notion that both parties decided to abandon the bilateral relations completely.

In this respect, I. Khan’s visit to Washington 6 months later and the results of his negotiations with the US President could seem almost like a miracle. Which, however, has a rather rational explanation which we choose to omit here.

Let us only note that Washington is not at all going to sacrifice the relations with Delhi, the flaws in which Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan will proceed to correct in the second half of August.

It is quite probable that Washington could already picture a decrease in China’s influence on Pakistan, a cardinal improvement in the Pakistani-Indian relations and (you never can tell) forming a US-India-Pakistan coalition, which requires removing the main splinter in the Pakistani-Indian relations in the form of the Kashmir issue.

Undoubtedly, having at his disposal the information on the nature of the forthcoming decision of the Indian Parliament regarding Article 370, D. Trump, during his meeting with I. Khan, made the last (desperate and extremely clumsy) attempt to prevent the inevitable.

Now, it is quite probable that the US will see Southern Asia reproduce the scenario of Northeast Asia, where the two US allies, Japan and South Korea, are acting with increasing hostility, which, let us hope, will not go beyond the trade and political area. Let us note that peacekeeping missions of the top-ranking emissaries of Washington to Tokyo and Seoul are to no avail.

Here, it would seem appropriate to comment on the key statement of the most radical (and idiotic) branch of the anti-Americanism professed by a certain part of the Russian political circles: “Everything that is bad for the US is good for Russia.”

Nobody in today’s world will manage to capitalize on either the Kashmir issue or the comprehensive opposition between the US and China, the aggravation of the Japanese-South Korean relations, the situations around Taiwan, in the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca, in the Indian Ocean in general and in the Strait of Hormuz in particular.

As for the amendments to Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, the author of this article believes that the Indian Parliament had to choose “between bad and very bad,” rather than “between bad and good.” And the Indian leadership (again, according to the subjective author’s opinion) chose the “very bad” option.

Let us hope that this pessimistic assessment should turn out to be wrong.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The Treaty of Lausanne, which had the 96th anniversary of its signing on July 24, is considered the last treaty of World War I. It stipulated the establishment of the modern Republic of Turkey after the War of Independence against the occupational forces of the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Greece. The treaty recognized the new Turkish borders, as well as the conditions on which the Muslim minorities had to exist in the new republic.

The French-language Treaty of Lausanne was signed in the city of Lausanne, Switzerland. It was the result of the second attempt after the failed Treaty of Sèvres that had been signed by all the parties except for the Kingdom of Greece, however it was later rejected by the Turkish national movement which fought against the former terms and a considerable loss of the territory. The Treaty of Lausanne put an end to the conflict and defined the borders of the modern Republic of Turkey. As per the treaty, Turkey abandoned all claims for the rest of the Ottoman Empire, and the allies, in their turn, recognized the Turkish sovereignty within its new borders.

“Today, we are proud to celebrate the 96th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the founding document of the Republic of Turkey,” said the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in his statement of July 24. “The Turkish War of Independence was fought against the world’s strongest armies and was crowned with the Treaty of Lausanne, the seal of independence of our country,” Recep Erdogan added. However, “the Republic of Turkey, as it was the case a century ago, has also today the strength and determination to eradicate any threat directed towards her independence, survival, and the peace and security of her citizens,” he said.

At the same time, the Turkish President did not fail to use this case to express his point of view on a number of the contemporary issues. In particular, he emphasized that the recent Turkish action in the East Mediterranean and Northern Syria, including drilling for natural resources and counter-terrorist operations, clearly showed its determination to protect the rights of both the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Cyprus. No threat of sanctions, be it implicit or explicit, can keep Turkey from what it is entitled to have. “With these thoughts, on the 96th anniversary of the Treaty of Lausanne, I commemorate once again the founding father of our Republic Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, our noble martyrs, and our veterans with respect and gratitude,” Recep Erdogan added.

In only 4 years time, the Treaty of Lausanne will be 100 years old. Although the term of its termination is not specified in the Treaty, the Turkish leaders are sure that, as of 2023, they will not have to observe the duties undertaken in this document, in particular:

• the free passage of foreign ships through the Straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles
• the sovereignty of certain Greek islands in the Aegean Sea;
• recognizing the city of Mosul as part of Iraq and several other points.

The Turkish leadership believes that the Treaty includes confidential points which will be declassified only by 2023.

The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan believes that the Lausanne Peace Treaty, which established the borders between the countries nearly 100 years ago, needs updating. The Turkish leader specified that this question not only concerns the Greek islands, but also the region as a whole, since the Treaty established the territorial borders between Turkey, Iraq and Syria as well. He did not say what specific amendments to the Treaty are necessary, explaining only that the distances between certain islands in the Aegean Sea were “problematic” and adding that the questions connected with the territorial water areas, air space and continental shelf of two states could be easily resolved in his opinion.

To be precise, Turkey is accusing Greece of its intention to make the Aegean Sea its domain. In his book titled Strategic Depth, the former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu notes that these islands are “natural continuation” of the Anatolian land and therefore “must” belong to Turkey. R.T. Erdogan naturally does not mind making these islands and rocks part of Turkey in spite of the fact that he had previously officially stated that Turkey had no territorial claims its neighboring countries, including Greece. Most likely, the incumbent President is tormented by his own conscience for having given the islands to Greece, and the Turkish opposition brings it up at every possible occasion. Now, the Turkish President wants to make amends, which is why he recently began to make hints about his territorial claims concerning Greece.

The latest statements of the Turkish President on the need for revising the Treaty of Lausanne have to do with Syria and Iraq as well. The document established the Turkish borders with Iraq and Syria, but the resolution of the issue of the control over the oil field region of Mosul was postponed until its resolution by Turkey and the UK and, in the absence of an arrangement for 9 months, was transferred to the League of Nations. Now, after the defeat of the ISIS, Turkey certainly wants to get its share “for the contribution to the fight against terrorism” (in fact, Ankara, under the pretext of countering terrorism, established its military presence in the neighboring countries and does not want to withdraw the troops). R.T. Erdogan already gets accusations that, because of his policy, Turkey lost its tiny enclave in Syria. It is about the tomb of Suleyman Shah where the legendary founder of the Ottoman Empire is buried. Under the international treaty of 1921, the place of the burial of the Ottoman Empire founder on the bank of the Euphrates is a Turkish enclave. Suleyman Shah’s tomb was protected by the Turkish army guard of honor, namely about 40 servicemen who were withdrawn in February 2015. By the way, according to the Turkish press, it was the only territory outside the borders of the Republic of Turkey that belonged to it.

Judging by the statements of R.T. Erdogan and other official representatives of the Turkish authorities, it is possible that Ankara will present a territorial claim, first of all, to Syria, and will use the issue of the tomb of Suleyman Shah to this effect. Ankara can not only demand that the Turkish enclave be returned, but also demand a corridor with Turkey “for ensuring the security of the tomb”, “for preventing a repetition of the situation when Turkey had to withdraw its small garrison protecting Suleyman Shah’s tomb.” Turkey would also like to get the control of the Afrin District currently controlled by the Kurds which is like a wedge in the territory of Turkey and can be used as a base helping the Syrian Kurds to reach the Mediterranean Sea.

In 2023, which is coming soon, the Turkish people will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the republic; however R.T. Erdogan wants it to be the New Turkey, rather than the Turkey of Ataturk. He considers himself the father of the new Turkish nation, the father of the New Turkey where there will be no place for M.K. Ataturk. And to enable R.T. Erdogan in a way be compared to Ataturk regarding his merit in the history of Turkey, he has to expand the Turkish territory. Let us remind the reader that the Treaty of Lausanne established the new borders of Turkey, except for the Sanjak of Alexandretta (the Hatay province) given to Turkey only on June 29, 1939. And, although this area is a part of Turkey today, Damascus never reconciled with this loss, which increases the challenge to establishing friendly relations between the neighboring states.

All the latest activities and deeds of the current Turkish President make it clear enough that he is seeking to revive the former greatness of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, the aspiration to carry out an independent policy, to a certain extent separating the country from the US and other countries of the West, the implicit support of Iran in its opposition against Washington and the desire to play the Russian card. The question is whether R.T. Erdogan will have enough time and mainly aptitude to play on the world arena skillfully and only for the benefit of Turkey. And make sure there is no new version of the Treaty of Lausanne.

Viktor Mikhin, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

Middle Eastern media outlets have been actively reporting on the delivery of Russia’s S-400 Triumph missile systems purchased by Turkey.

The authors of these articles have tried to assess the significance of this deal for Turkey, the reaction of Ankara’s NATO allies and the possible consequences in terms of the regional and global balance of power. The headlines of a number of these stories are quite telling: “Could Turkey swing over to the Russian camp?”, “Will Turkey leave NATO?”.

By purchasing Russian artillery, the Turkish leadership has severed whatever remained of the strategic ties that have linked it to the United States for the last 70 years. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan chose not to be intimidated by the pressure and threats from Washington or to be lured by the variety of its temptations, and instead turned his back on the leader of NATO.               Turkey’s attempt to leave the U.S. sphere of influence is a very risky venture for this nation, as the key means of U.S. retaliation is vengeful economic sanctions.

Other experts think that the issue of sanctions the United States has threatened Turkey with is an intricate one. It is believed that, on the one hand, Americans would not want to sacrifice their relationship with a partner like Turkey, because the latter has the second largest army (in terms of size) in NATO and an important geographic location. On the other hand, one should not underestimate the influence of hawkish politicians on the U.S. administration. These officials are eager to punish Ankara for daring to take its relationship with the Russian Federation from the trade and economic level to the military one.

At the same time, there are concerns in the USA that sanctions in the defense sphere could eventually have a negative impact on the United States itself and also on NATO. The author believes that U.S. measures to ban deliveries of F-35 aircraft to Turkey or to prohibit its participation in their manufacturing will not result in Ankara’s capitulation and instead bring it even closer to Russia. After all, Moscow is really offering Turkey a viable choice: to purchase military equipment with a very competitive price to quality ratio.

According to Lebanon’s Consultation and Research Institute, there is probably a tendency in the USA to complicate the relationship with Ankara in order to cause an economic upheaval of sorts in Turkey. This could lead to a retaliation by Ankara, especially in light of the current confrontation between the White House and Iran. In the present climate, when the balance of power in the Middle East is shifting in a chaotic manner, it is advisable to carefully monitor the relations between Turkey and Iran.

Even if, from a historical perspective, the Ottoman Empire and the Shah-led Iran were at odds with each other in the past, their common interests at present are pushing the two sides towards the path of cooperation with one another.    At the same time, as a counterbalance to Iran’s “Islamic Revolution”, Turkey is offering its moderate form of Islam as a viable alternative that can successfully resolve the issues facing the Arab Muslim world.

Iran played right into Turkey’s hands when it suppressed Kurd’s nationalist sentiments in Iraq and Syria, and when it offered political and economic support to Doha during the conflict between Qatar and the nations of the Persian Gulf. From this perspective, Iran has a similar stance to that of Turkey. In addition, Iran played an influential role in tying Russia’s strategy in the Middle East to Ankara’s goals. And all of these developments occurred despite the differences between these two nations in other areas as well as in ideology and politics.

It is in Ankara’s interests that there is no regime change in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), and Turkey views the increasing pressure applied on Tehran as a tool to change its political system. If this were to happen, Turkey fears the new Iranian regime would follow the West’s lead and could, therefore, be used against Ankara.

A number of experts from Middle Eastern media outlets believe that the US-Turkey crisis, which had flared up because of the purchase of S-400 missile systems by Ankara, was no more than the tip of an iceberg, considering the number of other disagreements on many levels between these two sides. As, for instance, Turkey’s desire to play a more influential role in regional as well as international affairs as it leaves the sphere of influence of the West and the USA.

The purchase of S-400 Triumph missile systems by Ankara ought to be viewed in light of its course forward, which has little to do with NATO’s policies or obligations that Turkey has as a member of this bloc. The military alliance has put Russia on its list of unfriendly nations.

In addition, the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) was signed into law in the United States. In accordance with this regulation, countries that buy weapons from U.S. enemies are subject to sanctions.

Turkey has countered views expressed in the West that the relationship between Ankara and Moscow was being built at the expense of the historical and deeply rooted ties between Turkey, and the West and NATO. In response, Turkey has pointed out that the crises engulfing the regions nearby require that it have the necessary military capabilities in order to defend itself. According to military experts in Turkey, the purchase of Russian missile systems is to facilitate the process of ensuring the nation’s air space is secure, as using scheduled F-35 flights to do so is more expensive when the cost of their deployment is taken into account.

According to TV channel Al Mayadeen, all the signs point to the fact that new regional alliances and coalitions to promote the interests of very powerful nations are being currently established, and that all the options are being weighed very carefully so as to avoid a global confrontation. In addition, countries engaged in this process need to ensure they protect their national security interests and the future of their people.

Former coalitions are not viewed as ‘sacred cows’, which means new organizations formed may seem surprising in light of traditional considerations.

Yury Zinin, Leading Research Fellow at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

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The Japanese-South Korean conflict that we recently discussed is developing, involving other countries and turning into one of the important factors impacting the overall picture of the political situation in Northeast Asia.

Let us reiterate that the Japanese-South Korean relations had always been, to put it mildly, of a somewhat reserved nature. And, the deep historical (that is, comprising several centuries of their shared history) reasons of mutual vigilance are probably something both the Japanese and the Koreans will hardly be able to formulate clearly. In this case, we are probably dealing with processes (concealed and difficult to outline) in the mental and historical unconscious of the bilateral relations system.

However, the fact that, over the last ten years, these relations have continued sliding to the negative (now including not only the political, but also the economic component) is mainly, if not solely, caused by the current political fuss factors.

And here, it is primarily necessary to point out the situation in the Republic of Korea where certain forces are trying to gain political advantage from bringing up the expenses of the history of the Japanese-Korean relations. That is, not its whole history, but only the time span before and during World War II.

Let us note, apropos, that the subject of these ‘expenses’ was formally closed already in 1965, when the diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea were established. However, 10 years ago, someone in South Korea adopted a viewpoint that the comfort women issue (so we will designate it now using the term employed by experts on Korea) still had some political flesh suitable for use today.

One cannot help being surprised by the patience of Tokyo that appeased such moods at the end of 2015 and concluded the well-known Agreement with Seoul. And it had some very sad consequences for Madam Park Geun-hye, the then president of South Korea.

But this patience was over this year, when, first, Seoul ended the Japanese-funded Foundation for providing help for the living comfort women and demanded another apology to them. Moreover, the Emperor of Japan had to perform the apology in person. Besides, South Korea began selling the assets of the Japanese company Nippon Steel accused of compulsory recruitment of Koreans during World War II following a court decision.

Japan decided that this was enough and struck back (as it turned out, the blow was unexpected and extremely painful) in the form of strengthening the control of export to South Korea of materials which have key value in the course of manufacturing end products by a number of the leading South Korean IT companies, first of all, Samsung Group and LG Group.

Seoul understood (probably, too late) that it had gone too far and tried to make an arrangement. But the ministerial level negotiations which took place in Tokyo on July 12 appear to have had no positive result.

The Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, who had spoken two days earlier, once again pointed out the invariance of the new regulations for export control in the trade with South Korea. A week later (that is, after the aforementioned negotiations) a similar statement was made by the minister of the industry Hiroshige Seko.

It is very likely that Japanese action against South Korea will not be limited to economy and may involve information war instruments as well. This is the way the author of this article is inclined to regard the statements made by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and certain members of his office about Seoul’s violating the sanctions regime concerning Pyongyang. Besides, South Korea is accused of instances of exporting strategic materials (which can be used in developing different types of weapons of mass destruction) to some countries of Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

Having failed to resolve the issue in the relations with Japan by negotiations, Seoul declared its intention to bring it up at the regular meeting of the WTO General Council in Geneva which is planned for July 23-24.

The aggravation of the situation in the relations between the closest Asian allies of the US cannot fail to disturb Washington. During the briefing of the new US Department of State spokesperson Morgan Ortagus, it was stated that all possible (public and secret) effort would be made to find ways of strengthening the relations between the three countries, that is, the US, Japan and South Korea.

Let us add that Washington has been working on it for 20 years. The results are described above.

Let us also note that Beijing is also watching the events in the Japanese-South Korean relations closely. However, it is more likely doing that for economic, than political, reasons. The communications between the IT companies of Japan and South Korea are essentially part of the cooperation networks also used by the leading Chinese companies of the industry. Therefore, violating the specified communications is fraught with serious expenses for the IT companies of the People’s Republic of China as well.

Finally, it would appear as appropriate to touch upon the existence (which is obvious for the author of this article) of certain external, along with internal, motives behind keeping up the comfort women issue in South Korea. The point is that keeping this topic hot fits in the activity of one of the most important branches of the world human rights movement aimed at gender equality, the format and borders of which are unclear (which may be intentional). Other branches of this sort are trying to ensure the protection of the rights of juveniles, various minorities and animals.

The South Korean leadership following the aforementioned human rights trend in the century-old problem has led to drastic costs for the country.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.