A series of recent events involving China, Japan and India allows us to revisit the theme of the growing influence of these three leading Asian countries on the nature of developments in the Indo-Pacific region.

This fact is of particular importance against the backdrop of the continuing decline of the US role in the world in general and in the region in particular. Which, incidentally, is in the national interest of the country. That is, the process is quite objective in nature and does not depend on political rhetoric about the “return” (to somewhere and for some reason) of the next American administration.

This is evidenced by its own statements about the rejection of scenarios of forceful intervention in internal political perturbations of other countries, about the continuation of the policy of the previous administration on the military withdrawal from Afghanistan and in general the reduction of the American military presence in the Greater Middle East.

As for the “return of America” to Europe, the problems arising from it can already be seen with the naked eye. For example, in connection with contradictory signals from Washington about the Nord Stream 2 project. For the price of the issue is not so much this project and the (pseudo)problem of the “Russian challenge” in general, but rather the relations with Germany, the leading European country. And, consequently, this “price” includes a very likely problematization of NATO, which is the main instrument of maintaining the military and political presence of the United States in Europe.

It is unlikely that the trade and economic (quite extensive) sphere of Euro-Atlantic relations will undergo significant changes. But this is a completely different format from what they had during the entire Cold War period.

So far, no such progress has been seen in US relations with its key Asian allies. Mainly because Asia is now the place where the principal geopolitical opponent of the United States is located, in the form of China. Therefore, efforts are being made to, first, strengthen the long-standing bilateral alliances here, and, second, to create something akin to a multilateral (Asian) counterpart of NATO in the IPR.

Japan remains a key US ally in the region, and Washington has given it an equally important role in a (hypothetical) “Asian NATO”. The current forum-based QUAD of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, whose first (video) summit was held on March 12 this year, is seen as a kind of leaven for such a politico-military alliance.

Once again, we note that this event, too, did not dispel the dense fog that originally surrounded the prospect of a full-fledged multilateral military-political alliance with an anti-Chinese orientation in the region. Mainly because there is no more or less common perception of the PRC as a source of threat to national interests in Asian countries today. This is fundamentally different from the situation in Cold War Europe. Beijing still has problems of varying degrees of importance in its relations with almost all of its neighbors. This is mainly due to territorial disputes that have their origins in both relatively recent and rather distant history. This kind of problem can only be solved on the basis of the goodwill of the parties directly involved and is unlikely to be resolved within the framework of current international law.

This is illustrated by the zero significance of the decision of the Arbitration Court in The Hague in the summer of 2016 regarding China’s claims to ownership of 80-90% of the South China Sea. It has had no effect on the complex situation in the Southeast Asian subregion, but can be taken advantage of by some “problem solver” as a legal justification for the use of force here.

So far, the main (external, it is important to emphasize) “solver” in this regard is Washington. But lately some of the Europeans have decided to join the US for some reason. Which continues to amaze, for it is completely incomprehensible why Europeans are multiplying the number of their own problems by getting into the anthill (already going through turmoil) that is on the other side of the globe.

And there are no threats to their trade and economic ties with Southeast Asia, China, Japan, South Korea… That is, in the area in which postwar Europe so excelled and what accounts for its current standing in the international arena.

And in which postwar Japan was no less successful. However, its increasing presence in the IPR is not at all surprising. For Japan is an inseparable and one of the most important elements of the region.

Europe and the United States may well be present here, too. But rather in the role of guests (invited, which is important to emphasize), not as the hosts. Who are suffering from obviously inflated self-esteem, the consequence of which is their current ridiculous position as teachers in the field of “human rights”. However, they have been taking that stance for completely understandable political and practical purposes.

As for Japan, it could not be excluded from the IPR (and SEA) even if it wanted to. In this regard, the second (since 2015) Japan-Indonesia meeting in Tokyo on March 30 in the “2+2″ format, that is, with the participation of foreign and defense ministers, was rather notable. Judging by the comments of its results, the parties have found common ground on a wide range of issues.

Indonesia is one of the main countries of Southeast Asia and the ASEAN regional grouping, with the world’s leading players vying for influence. Without exception, all ASEAN members seek to move beyond the format of the objects of the game of “big players” and to position themselves in one way or another in relation to each of them without really “offending” any of them. Since it’s really more trouble than it’s worth.

In this regard, the trip of Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi along the Tokyo-Beijing route looked quite natural. During her talks with her Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, the (no less broad) range of topics was discussed: from cooperation in combating the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic to security issues in Southeast Asia.

There is a noteworthy recent trend in Chinese foreign policy aimed at reducing its notorious “assertiveness” while increasingly striving to develop mutually beneficial relations with its neighbors. Without this, both the success of China’s key Belt and Road Initiative project and the extremely difficult role of the global power, whose interests go far beyond some local turmoil and conflicts, will be impossible.

In this context, it is difficult to overestimate the positive significance of stopping and possibly reversing one of the most serious conflicts in recent decades between China and India, that is, with one of the members of the regional strategic triangle identified above.

With Japan, the matters are much more complicated. Especially after the US-Japan “2+2″ talks in mid-March, which will be followed up by a visit to the United States by Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. Washington’s commitments to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, recorded after the first event, were granted to Tokyo, of course, “for a reason”. They could turn out to be chains, constraining Japan’s freedom of maneuvering in the space of regional politics. As happened a few years ago, when the instrument of issuing such commitments was used by Washington in order to disrupt the process of building relations between Tokyo and Moscow.

However, a positive factor for Sino-Japanese relations remains the signing late last year (after years of negotiations) of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership with the participation of 15 IPR countries, chief among them China and Japan. Let us note, though, a negative aspect of the negotiation process on this topic, due to the withdrawal of India from it at the last moment.

No less important for Sino-Japanese relations may be the realization of Beijing’s recently announced intention to join another Japanese-led regional association, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which includes 11 countries of the same IPR.

Once again, if the many regional problems are to be solved at all, it will only be with the growing participation of the three leading regional powers that make up the China-Japan-India regional strategic configuration. Helping its participants with advice and deeds could be done only at their own (joint) request.

There are nuances in the positions of each of them on the increasingly important situation in Myanmar, a Southeast Asian country and member of ASEAN. But none of the three mentioned are hysterical about the “crimes of the military junta,” in contrast to the hysteria in which almost immediately and unanimously (after the famous events in this country) all the major Western capitals found themselves. Instead, the press of leading Asian countries is turning to the very complex history and current state of Myanmar in order to get to the bottom of what happened in that country on February 1 this year.

It would be very appropriate and timely for Asia to collectively address these capitals: “Guys (and gals as well)! Forget the old colonial times and deal with your own current problems. You have just as many, and they are just as serious. And we’ll deal with our own, this time without you.”

Let us add to this (hypothetical) address by saying that Asia is forming its own “solvers” of regional problems.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“.

During a meeting between Foreign Minister of PRC Wang Yi and President of Iran Hassan Rouhani in Tehran on March 27, the former said that China opposed the unilateral sanctions against Iran and firmly supported “Iran in opposing hegemony and safeguarding” its national sovereignty and dignity. According to the head of the executive department responsible for PRC’s foreign relations, these sanctions violated international law and caused “harm to the Iranian people”, and the international community needed to “work together to oppose any acts of bullying by powers”. He also stated that China stood “ready to work with Iran to defend the legitimate rights of the two nations and other developing countries”.

In Tehran, Wang Yi met with practically all of Iran’s top officials: President Hassan Rouhani, counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif and Ali Larijani, an Advisor to Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei. Apparently, the latter does not often take part in diplomatic talks. Wang Yi and Mohammad Javad Zarif agreed to start a new chapter of China–Iran relations.

A key outcome of the Foreign Minister’s visit was the signing of a bilateral 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (“in areas such as economy and culture”). In fact, its primary focus is on collaboration in the economic sphere. Although neither Iran nor the PRC made the details of the agreement public before the signing, according to experts, it was largely unchanged from the 18-page draft obtained the previous year by The New York Times.

In general, China is one of Iran’s key trade partners and an important buyer of Iranian oil. In addition, for the PRC, cooperation with Iran is vital for its New Silk Road initiative. In 2016, trade between Iran and China was worth approximately $31 billion (i.e. the next year after the historic multi-party Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program was signed). However, after ex-President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear deal in May 2018 despite opposition to the move from its other signatories, such as Russia, China, Great Britain, France and Germany, and imposed tough sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, trade between the former and the PRC declined.

The words “strategic partnership” in the concluded agreement clearly caused quite a stir. After all, the signed bilateral pact could become a prelude to a fully-fledged alliance (also in the military sphere) between the two countries. The author would like to remind his readers that as far back as last year, former Crown Prince of Iran in exile in the United States, Reza Pahlavi (the son of last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi), expressed his opposition to the 25-year economic and security deal valued at $500 billion, which China and Iran were supposedly close to signing. There were also rumors at the time that “the deal included the transfer of some Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf region to China for military exercises”. A year ago, such news elicited concern among US officials.

More recently, certain US media outlets have already reported on the improving relationship between the PRC and Iran by stating that the deal could deepen China’s influence in the Middle East and undercut American efforts to keep Iran isolated. In such a context, at a meeting with Chinese officials in Alaska, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated: “I said that the United States relationship with China will be competitive where it should be, collaborative where it can be, adversarial where it must be”.

On March 28, in an interview given in Delaware and broadcast by the American TV, US President Joe Biden mentioned that the latest alliance between Beijing and Tehran is a challenge to US.

According to a report published by an Israeli newspaper Haaretz, the strategic pact with China has given “Iran breathing room at a critical time”.

A number of journalists have referred to the recently concluded 25-year agreement between the oil-rich nation of Iran and globally powerful China as a potential game changer in the Middle East. A March 29 article published by the Strategist, a website of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, stated that the agreement was the culmination of growing economic, trade and military ties between the two countries since the advent of the Iranian Islamic regime following the revolutionary overthrow of the Shah’s pro-Western monarchy in 1979. Deeper and wider cooperation between China and Iran, especially when considered in the context of their close ties with Russia and the trio’s adversarial relations with the US, carries a strong potential for changing the regional strategic landscape. “So far, China has been careful not to partner with Iran to an extent that could jeopardize its lucrative relations with the oil-rich Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Iran’s regional arch-rival) and its Arab allies,” the report also says. Another reason why the PRC leadership must have avoided showing public support for Tehran before is that China enjoys reasonable military and intelligence cooperation with Israel, another main regional adversary of Iran.

Beijing’s conclusion of the deal with Tehran is bound to deeply concern the Gulf Arab states, Israel and indeed the US, as these countries were already troubled by a perceived Iranian threat, given Tehran’s expanding influence across the Levant (Iraq, Syria and Lebanon) and Yemen as well as its support for the Palestinian cause against Israeli occupation. The US is also concerned by Iranian leverage in Afghanistan, where American and allied forces have been fighting the Taliban-led insurgency [an organization banned in the Russian Federation] for two decades without much success, and from which Washington wants to extricate itself with some face-saving measures as soon as possible.

Western observers also point out that combined with Iran’s close ties with Russia, the China–Iran deal potentially generates a strong axis that can only boost Tehran’s regional position and bargaining power in any negotiations with the Biden administration regarding the JCPOA.

It is worth noting that Wang Yi’s trip to Iran was part of his tour of the Middle East, which includes visits to the UAE, Oman and three other nations that the Iranian leadership has highly problematic relations with: Bahrain, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Undoubtedly, the head of China’s Foreign Ministry tried to safeguard Tehran’s interests during meetings with officials from the three latter nations.

In Tehran, Wang Yi and top politicians from Iran showed their willingness to jointly oppose sanctions imposed by the West, as stated earlier in the article. In fact, on March 22, during an interview before his visit to the PRC, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, criticized Western countries for resorting to the use of sanctions. A day later, following the meeting with Foreign Minister of the PRC Wang Yi, Sergey Lavrov stated  “Moscow and Beijing stand for developing interstate relations on the principles of mutual respect and a balance of each other’s interests, justice and non-interference in others’ internal affairs… We noted the growing importance of the joint activities of Russia, China and a wide range of other countries to preserve the current system of international law in the context of the increasing Western attempts to promote its concept of a rules-based international order.”

In any case, the signing of the agreement between Iran and the PRC is an important step for their bilateral relationship, which will not only consolidate China’s position in the Greater Middle East but also facilitate Tehran’s interactions with its regional rivals, i.e. Sunni majority Arab nations.

Valery Kulikov, political expert, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The US-China standoff in South-East Asia threatens to turn into a more dangerous, on the brink of an open war, confrontation: The US has announced that it intends to deploy “high-precision missiles with enhanced survivability” along China’s eastern maritime border.  This project, prepared by the US Indo-Pacific Command, provides for the deployment in the coming years of short- and medium-range land-based high-precision missiles without nuclear warheads on Taiwan, the Philippines and the Japanese island of Okinawa.

Pentagon officials explain the need for this step by saying that “without a thorough and credible conventional deterrent, China will have the courage to take action in the region and on the international stage to supplant US interests”. In order to prevent this, the US military, in addition to high-precision missiles, is going to deploy the so-called second echelon of deterrence — install air defense systems in the western Pacific Ocean — on islands stretching from southeastern Japan to Guam and Indonesia. The US military is also planning a radical change in the way it deploys troops, moving toward a strategy of dispersal in active cooperation with allies and partners. This would allow the US military presence in the Indo-Pacific region to be deployed everywhere, rather than concentrating it on a few key bases as it is now. Large forces clustered in one place are vulnerable to a preemptive missile strike in the event of an open conflict with China.

To implement all these plans, the Pentagon is asking the US Congress for additional funding, and the cost of the entire “deterrence” program is now estimated by the US military at more than $27 billion.  Without this money, as Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, said in a speech at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington think tank, “within the next six years, China could try to change the status quo in the region”.

It is hard to doubt that US lawmakers will remain deaf to the Pentagon’s pleas, especially given the fact that Joe Biden’s first major foreign policy document, the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, identifies China as the principal global adversary of the United States.  This document states that China is “the only rival that can combine its economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to erect sustainable obstacles to a stable and open international system”. On the basis of this document, the administration of Joe Biden plans by the end of this year to prepare a new US National Security Strategy, which will replace the one that was developed under President Donald Trump in December 2017.

But already today we can say that not all of Trump’s “legacy” will be thrown into the “trash dump of history”.  A key project such as the construction of the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) with a core of four countries – the United States, Japan, Australia and India – proposed by the US administration back in 2017 to “contain the PRC,” is now experiencing a “second birth”.   On March 12, 2021, the leaders of the United States, India, Japan and Australia had their first-ever video conversation. Prior to that, the so-called Quartet met regularly only at the working level and at the level of foreign ministers, and the March 12 talks were evidence that, despite the departure of President Trump from the political arena, the project he founded continues to develop. And with the same goals and in the same direction as before — strengthening military cooperation between the four countries in order to “contain China.  Jake Sullivan, assistant to the US President for National Security, said this frankly at a briefing for journalists at the White House after talks between the four leaders. He noted that “the four leaders did discuss the challenge that China poses”. And they made it clear that none of them have any illusions about China”.

All of this implies that threats to China’s security will inevitably increase in the coming years, which will naturally cause Beijing to retaliate, which in turn will be forced to further strengthen its position, build new bulk islands in the South China Sea and deploy missile systems and air force and naval bases there.  This will inevitably trigger a new arms race in East and Southeast Asia, and the region itself will increasingly become a potential new “hot spot” divided by the “red lines” drawn in Washington and Beijing.

In such circumstances, the plan for the integration of ASEAN countries into the Indo-Pacific space is of particular relevance. It was adopted in June 2019 at the summit in Bangkok and is aimed at expanding not military but economic ties, at the need to develop primarily economic cooperation, to form a new global free trade zone, to include in its membership states that wish to participate in it, including China.  However, it is very doubtful that under current conditions, the ASEAN initiatives will be able to reverse the trend towards the formation of a military-political bloc in the IPR, directed against China. In this regard, Russia, which is also strongly opposed to the formation of a new military bloc based on the IPR, can support the efforts of ASEAN countries to reformat the IPR project from a military and anti-Chinese one to an economic and global one. This will strengthen Russia’s authority and credibility throughout the region.

Dmitry Mosyakov, Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Director of the Centre for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Two factors have the greatest impact on the development of relations between the two countries: the coronavirus pandemic, which is hitting economic ties very hard (the closure of borders has caused more damage to the North Korean economy than international sanctions), and the international situation, which continues to position the tactical alliance of the two countries as an unbreakable friendship of two socialist countries and brotherly parties.

In October 2020, Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping exchanged congratulatory letters. On October 10, Xi congratulated Kim on the 75th anniversary of the founding of the WPK and promised to make efforts to further develop relations between the two countries and support the North’s struggle to advance its socialist agenda.

On October 22, 2020, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Volunteers’ entry into the 1950-53 Korean War, Kim Jong-un visited a cemetery in Huchang County, South Pyongyang Province, and paid his respects to the fallen. A separate basket of flowers was laid on the grave of Mao Anying, son of Mao Zedong, who died during the conflict. Kim sent another basket to the Friendship Tower in Pyongyang, which symbolizes the ties between the two countries.

On October 25, the Rodong Sinmun editorial also noted that the participation of the volunteers was an expression of friendship and camaraderie between the two countries bound by fate.

Note that attention to the war is increasing on the other shore as well. As Xinhua News Agency reported on Sept. 19, the Memorial Hall for the Resistance to American Aggression and Korean Support in the Korean War was reopened in Liaoning Province in northeastern China. The exhibition area has been expanded from 5,400 to 23,845 square meters, and the number of exhibits has grown from just over 700 to more than 1,600.

On October 29, President Xi thanked Kim for his congratulatory message on the occasion of the 71st anniversary of the founding of the PRC. Xi reiterated that “China and Korea are connected as rivers and mountains, friendly neighbors.”

On the day of the U.S. presidential election, Pyongyang demonstrated the friendliness of its relations with Beijing. The November 4, 2020 edition of the Thonil Shinbo published an article talking about the special relationship and the strength of friendship.

On January 12, 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on his election as general secretary of the ruling party and expressed his will to “protect regional peace and stability, development and prosperity, strengthening relations at a time of “turmoil and change.”

On February 3, 2021, the Minju Joseon newspaper published an op-ed titled “China-US Confrontation Becoming More Explicit” on the sanctions against 28 high-ranking U.S. officials of the outgoing administration.   The text shares Beijing’s position that the decision demonstrates China’s determination to defend its national interests, noting that representatives of the new administration (the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the head of national intelligence) “unanimously called China the main threat to the United States”. This leads to the conclusion that “the current U.S. administration will further increase pressure on China, and the latter in turn will fight back hard. Consequently, the Sino-American confrontation, which has shown itself, will continue in the future”.

It is also worth noting the staff appointments. Kim Sung-nam, the new head of the WPK Central Committee’s international department, is a sinologist. Then, Ji Jae-ryn, who had been ambassador to Beijing since 2010, was succeeded by Lee Yong-nam, who served as minister of trade in 2008 and minister of foreign economic relations until 2016. Until recently, he served as North Korea’s Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Trade. According to the ROK, the appointment may be aimed at strengthening economic ties and cooperation with North Korea’s largest trading partner.

As for economic ties between the two countries, on the one hand, the share of China as a trade partner is growing, but on the other hand, due to the tightening of border controls imposed to prevent the outbreak of COVID-19, the total volume of trade between North Korea and China has decreased significantly. According to data, provided by China Customs, released on February 12, 2021, it was $539 million 100 thousand dollars in 2020, down 80.7% from the previous year. North Korean imports from China totaled $491 million 100,000, down 80.9 percent from 2019. North Korean shipments to China totaled only $48 million, down 77.7% from a year earlier.

It is noted that since last summer there has been virtually no truck or train traffic between China’s Dandong and North Korea’s Sinuiju.

The NKNews portal claims that supermarkets and stores in Pyongyang have been short of foreign-made staples, including coffee, cocoa, and chocolate, for months, and the Rodong Sinmun warns against “importomania”.

According to World Health Organization and UNICEF officials, shipments of medical and agricultural aid, normally made through the Dandong-Sinuiju land route and the Dalian-Nampo sea route, have been largely suspended since the summer of 2020. At that time, Kim Jong-un stated that the country could not accept aid related to flood damage because these supplies might be contaminated by a virus.  Unfortunately, there are reasons for this fear – there has indeed been talk of contamination by the virus among far-right renegade organizations.

Rumors that communication between the countries would resume appeared periodically, but remained rumors. On October 26, 2020, the Daily NK news portal reported that Pyongyang and Beijing had reached an agreement to resume train traffic across the border. However, according to Yo Sang-gi of the Ministry of Reunification of the ROK, the situation did not reveal any noticeable changes.

That said, there are examples to the contrary. According to military technology analysts who spoke to NK News, North Korea likely violated international sanctions by importing Chinese drones to film its massive military parade on October 10. For example, while watching a North Korean broadcast of a military parade, they spotted at least one Chinese-made DJI Mavic 2 drone.

The cessation of exports to China primarily affected custom-made items such as watches, wigs, shoes, and other goods. At the same time, exports of co-generated hydropower and graphite in small quantities did not stop, despite the COVID-19 pandemic. Imports of food and medical goods from China were suspended, while imports of raw materials and construction materials continued in small quantities.

China’s share of the North’s foreign trade rose from 17% in 2001 to 90% in 2014, and last year it reached 95%.

Even though KDI says North Korea’s total trade with China reached $2.8 billion in 2019, less than half the $5.8 billion in 2016 — before sanctions were tightened, KOTRA says trade with China rose to 94.8 percent of the North’s total foreign trade.

How will events develop next? The author very much hopes that when Pyongyang receives the vaccines, they will be able to use them for both quarantine station staff handling goods from abroad and for specialists traveling abroad. After that, the “self-blockade” will be lifted and trade both with China and other countries will begin to recover.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

In December 2020, the Japanese press published classified diplomatic documents that were made in preparation for the 1989 G7 Summit, which took place in Paris on July 14-16. These documents show that already at that time there was a crack in the informal bloc of countries, which is still often referred to by the generalized term The West.

A major disagreement between Japan and the other G7 participants has arisen over changes to the original agenda of this calendar event. They, for their part, were introduced because of the sudden need to outline the G7 position on the measures taken in early June 1989 by the PRC leadership to resolve the acute internal political crisis, which gradually escalated from mid-April to early June. In the aftermath, everything that accompanied this crisis became known as the “Tiananmen Square protests.”

To recall what exactly we are talking about. During the above-mentioned period of time in 1989, demonstrations were held in Beijing’s main square, the participants of which were guided by a wide variety of motives and ideas, of which the conditionally “pro-democracy“ ones were professed by groups of students of the capital’s universities.

Apparently, the organizers of the global “perestroika“ with its subsequent “end of story“ included the demolition not only of the USSR, but also of China. In this regard, we note that in some texts back in the late 1970s the term Reconstruction referred to a certain global process, only an important element of which was the task of radically reformatting the USSR and China.

However, Beijing has found leaders worthy of the centuries-old history of its great country. In order to end the unrest, the army was deployed on the night of June 3 to 4, 1989. Several hundred people, including dozens of soldiers, were victims of the clashes that erupted. The latter, as well as witness accounts, point to a thoroughly detailed study of the essence of the anti-state rebellion, about the real organizers of which hypotheses of varying degrees of plausibility are still being constructed.

Be that as it may, the drastic measures taken saved China. Meanwhile, the USSR descended into a catastrophe that proved to be one of the worst in the country’s millennial history.

The outcome of the “Tiananmen Square protests“ was extremely upsetting for the leaders of the very generalized “West,” which was still showing signs of life at the time. The plan to “end the story“ was only half done. The key to its “continuation“ was China’s subsequent rapid transformation into a second world power.

The decisiveness of the measures taken by Beijing served as an occasion for the West to express its criticism, which the particularly dissatisfied tried to indicate on the platform of the G7 summit, which gathered one month after the end of the aforementioned “events.”

As follows from the just published documents of the Japanese Foreign Ministry at that time, in the process of preparing the final Joint Statement of the next G7, Tokyo initially opposed not only the inclusion of sanctions measures against China, but also any mention of these “events“ themselves.

In doing so, the Japanese leadership was guided by two main considerations. First, these measures could lead to the political (self-) isolation of a rapidly developing country, reducing the space for external influence on it. Secondly, it was rightly believed that with the Japanese economy starting to stagnate, it was too costly to lose the huge Chinese market for manufactured products.

Under pressure from the other six G7 participants, the Japanese delegation agreed to some palliative wording in the final document. A year later, however, Japan abandoned any sanctions against China. A similar path was soon followed in the United States and Europe.

The split in reaction to the aforementioned “events“ in the PRC by the main components of the West (Japan, Europe and the United States) was perhaps the first bell that rang in this particular category itself. Since then, each of these components, while rhetorically committed to certain (no less fake) “Western values,” has been increasingly engaged in its own political games.

The most recent evidence of this was the signing of the Mutual Investment Agreement on December 30, 2020. One can understand Beijing’s barely concealed jubilation at the positive conclusion of many years of negotiations on the subject, which seemed to have no end in sight. Equally understandable is Washington’s bitter disappointment. Matthew Pottinger, National Security Advisor to the Presidential Administration, reported about the “overwhelming impression“ that the news of the Agreement made in the United States.

By the way, for the author of this article, this fact itself was quite a surprise. The NEO has repeatedly drawn attention to the seriousness of the problems in relations between China and the EU, which, however, did not disappear completely with the conclusion of this agreement.

Note that the increasingly obvious collapse of the West is by no means a consequence of the activities of certain bearers of “ill will“ or “stupidity,” i.e. the notional “Xi Jinping-Putin“ and “Trump.” This process is no more than one manifestation of the radical shifts that have been taking place over the past three decades on the global political map.

That is why, in fact, it is highly doubtful that anyone (for example, the new president of a leading world power) would be able today to “return everything to the way it was before.” It is not at all obvious that such an intention will be shown at all (despite the pre-election rhetoric) by the new American leadership. Notable in this regard is the prediction by Jan N. Bremmer, founder of the Eurasia Group consulting company, stating that the US will no longer serve as the “world’s sheriff.”

Note, by the way, that the worse things get in the generalized West, the more aggressive the attempts to bring its own problems to the international arena become. This includes organizing an increasingly fierce propaganda war against China and Russia, in the course of which even lowbrow information attacks are initiated, involving more or less random freaks (both in China and Russia).

An important consequence of the “Tiananmen Square protests“ was Beijing’s awareness of the current-situational nature of the previous period of China’s political rapprochement with the United States and quarrels with the USSR, largely (but not entirely) determined by the realities of the Cold War. In essence, these “events“ ushered in a new period in Sino-Russian relations. The need for their further successful development was confirmed by the leaders of both countries during their mutual greetings on the occasion of the New Year 2021.

This does not necessarily mean giving a confrontational and anti-Western orientation to Sino-Russian cooperation. Moscow and Beijing retain their own preferences in their relations with each component of the West. So far the only point is that the coordination between China and Russia should completely rule out the possibility of carrying out the same kind of combination that during the Cold War led to a confrontation between China and the USSR.

However, in case of the prospect of increased pressure on Moscow and Beijing (both at once or in turn) by all the components of the West (for example, on the platform of the forthcoming NATO summit, whose area of responsibility is expected to move beyond the Euro-Atlantic) the task of forming a full-fledged political-military-economic alliance between China and Russia may turn out to be quite relevant.

In this regard, it would be very appropriate to organize a Sino-Russian summit in the timeframe of the NATO event mentioned above. It seems desirable for India and Japan to move to a “neutral ground“ in the current international political field, and both Moscow and Beijing should contribute to this in any way they can. But this will not be easy, given both objective reasons and the presence in Indian and Japanese politics of serious forces that are aimed more at confrontation with China. Both of these circumstances are also discussed more or less regularly in the NEO.

Finally, we note the strange impression made by the military activism (with obviously anti-Chinese overtones) in the Indo-Pacific region of the leading European countries. It is still unclear how this fact and the aforementioned Agreement are intended to combine Europeans in a single, more or less consistent strategy.

Or do they, like magicians on a stage in front of the grinning audiences, make unrelated, mesmerizing political passes? But if so, what for?

However, these questions may not be correct at all, because it is possible that different EU bureaucratic offices form their own “passes“ without considering it necessary to coordinate it with the “creativity“ of the neighboring one.

In this case, Brussels’ entire foreign policy process can be described in the words of a movie character: “I fight because I fight.”

Vladimir Terekhov, an expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The reason for the latest scandal in Sino-Australian relations was when an official representative from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted a cartoon on Twitter about, to put it mildly, the “serious costs” incurred by the “limited contingent” of Australian armed forces during their stay in Afghanistan.

Throughout this period, which can be counted as starting in November 2001 (that is, almost immediately after the notorious “9/11 events” in the United States) and going up to the end of 2014, about 26,000 Australian troops have toured this country. Several hundred of them are still staying in Afghanistan with the official status of “instructors”.

It is worth clarifying that the author is not referring to the entire Australian “contingent”, but only to the special forces that were included in in (the Australian Special Forces, or ASF); the “costs” of their behavior were the subject of an investigation by the legal department (Inspector-General of the Australian Defense Force, IGADF) that reports directly to the Australian Minister of Defense. How the “contingent” behaved as a whole has simply not been examined that thoroughly yet. Not to mention all the other armed bearers of “European values” who have toured Afghanistan.

In particular, the key issue for virtually the entire reckless scheme in Afghanistan that awaits researchers is the following: is the fiftyfold increase in drug production that occurred over the course of it merely a coincidence, or is there a direct cause-and-effect relationship between these two facts? The author suspects that the latter version is correct, and consideration about “gaining a strategically advantageous position in the face of the prospect of China becoming a global power” was just a baited hook that US leadership back then fell for.

The official investigation into ASF activities in Afghanistan began in 2016. The impetus for that, apparently, was an earlier private investigation into the possible causes behind a series of suicides committed by former ASF employees that was conducted by having conversations with some of their colleagues. That was the time when shocking combinations of words like “baptism by blood” or “absolute psychopaths” originated.

On November 19 this year, Minister of Defense Linda Reynolds commented on the “unclassified interim” part of the investigation. What is remarkable is that the time period when the ASF toured Afghanistan that was identified by the minister as the subject of the IGADF’s investigation covers 2005-2016. That means it is also for those two years when only Australian “instructors” were supposed to remain in Afghanistan.

Several dozen instances have already appeared in the press about which it can be stated with absolute certainty that they had no connection with any combat operations, and either unarmed prisoners of war, or simply civilians – including women and children – fell victim to them. Nevertheless, it is still too early to draw ultimate conclusions (including about the instances indicated), since the purely legal component of the entire official “case” that began in 2016 is only just getting off the ground. This follows directly from the words uttered by that same Linda Reynolds concerning creating a special group of attorneys for this purpose that would report directly to the Ministry of Defense.

Succinctly put, this is the factual background against which the cartoon mentioned at the beginning appeared. The author has no desire to participate in popular debate about the rights that particular civil servants have, as they say, to speak out in various ways on various privately-run information platforms “in their free time” on various problems that are sore points for other countries. But it was the form, and not the substantive aspect, of the investigation mentioned that turned out to be the target of anti-Chinese maneuvering on the part of the Australian government – something which immediately received support from various representatives from “democratic” countries.

In the wake of the mushrooming scandal, the Chinese Global Times posted an article published by the official government newspaper in Kabul (the Afghanistan Times Daily), accompanied by its own illustration. The latter harshly, but mostly accurately, reflects the hypocritical nature of current “human rights advocates”, especially those at the national level. They offer services “pulling out the specks” from the eyes of geopolitical opponents (in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet), while completely ignoring the “logs” that wound up in their own eyes – and not only during their colonial legacies, but following very recent operations in Iraq, Libya, and that very same Afghanistan.

The only point of criticism that could be raised with the Global Times illustration is that the poster with the inscription “Human Rights” should hardly have been placed in the hands of a soldier whose image is meant to depict nothing more than the harsh realities of our immoral world. But in the hands of some pique waistcoat-wearing hoodlum (with some kind of national insignia on a jacket lapel) this poster would have seamlessly blended in.

It is also worth noting that the next upwelling of politically motivated, anti-Chinese hubbub initiated by Canberra represents nothing more than one another episode in the overall process of deteriorating relations with Beijing. Which began almost immediately when the government of Scott Morrison came to power in mid-2018, but accelerated sharply starting in the spring of 2020 when a certain eagerness was demonstrated, (and apparently not while thinking straight), in the bounds of a campaign initiated by Washington to hold Beijing fully responsible for the various negative consequences following the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. Including demands for financial compensation for losses that people have incurred.

Was it really difficult to foresee that sooner or later “countermeasures” would follow in the area of trade with China, an extremely important and beneficial one for Australia? If so, then this is the “seal of quality” for its ruling elite.

The NEO has repeatedly reported on how this set of measures adopted has already had a very tangible impact on the Australian economy. In early December, the subject of discussion by the Australian newspaper the Sydney Morning Herald was the issue of the problems with selling wine after Beijing increased its duties (up to 212%) on wine imports. Meanwhile, China used to buy about 40% of the entire volume of this good that Australia made.

And here, in the political arena, one of the main allies of the “Western world” in the region has taken shape in the form of the current Taiwanese leadership. On December 3, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen said that the islanders would “stand with the Australians, who are under tremendous pressure.” The article in the Taipei Times that cites these words, is accompanied by a photo of (strangely) smiling members of the Taiwanese ruling Democratic Progressive Party leadership, each holding a bottle of Australian wine.

Nine bottles is something nice. But obviously not nearly enough. Moreover, it is unlikely that all those out of 24 million Taiwanese who are not averse to, as they say, “imbibing” for one reason or another (or even when there is no reason) would be able to drink the entire volume of Australian wine that has been imported so far into China, with its one-and-a-half billion people.

Meanwhile, they will still have to eat American pork with ractopamine, which Washington intends to sell to Taiwan “as a package” with artillery, missiles, and fighter jets designed to strengthen the island’s defense against a possible attack from the “mainland”.

This way, during the process of expressing its gratitude to its allies, as well as standing with them “side by side”, it does not take long before the health of its own population becomes jeopardized. Which health has so successfully been preserved in the framework of the coronavirus pandemic that hit everyone hard – and in a variety of ways – but mainly affected Taiwan’s key ally.

It follows from the same article in the Taipei Times that even the Vatican is ready to help Australia in its time of yet more troubles. And this is where wine really is used “for the purpose of providing services.” But, once again, those are not the kind of volumes that Australia needs. In addition, Italy is filled to the brim with its own wines.

The author does not have the slightest doubt that the emerging market of a “shared enemy” will, without any hesitation, become filled with Californian wine from the US, meaning a country that is now Australia’s main ally.

During any period of large-scale, collective insanity, hellish laughter always resounds. Today, the world as a whole is falling into a state of madness, but at the same time each of the more significant world players is showing off its own specific traits in this process.

As it turns out, Australia also has them, and it is really behaving vis-a-vis its main economic partner in the way that has been captured in “cartoons”.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

]]> https://journal-neo.org/2020/12/13/the-cartoon-incident-in-sino-australian-relations/feed/ 0 https://journal-neo.org/2020/12/04/australia-faces-new-challenges-in-its-relationship-with-china-2/ https://journal-neo.org/2020/12/04/australia-faces-new-challenges-in-its-relationship-with-china-2/#comments Fri, 04 Dec 2020 20:00:58 +0000 https://journal-neo.org/?p=147201

The relationship between Australia and China has deteriorated markedly over recent months. Each side is blaming the other for the deterioration, and amid the flurry of frankly anti-China propaganda emerging from most of the major Australian news outlets it is difficult to establish what went wrong and who precisely is to blame.

It is possible however to point to a series of significant events and infer that at least one of them, and more likely several, were the origins of the problem. Such analysis is not welcome in Australia which has opted for the role of being an innocent party unjustly accused. How true is that?

China is certainly a critical part of the Australian economy, and has been so for a lengthy number of years. Some of the current lamenting accuses the country’s political leaders of being too ready to take the Chinese view, and too little to ensure that the country diversified is markets. Such lamenting is fruitless. At the time it was happening all parties were happy to sell the Chinese as much as it could be persuaded to take. If there were any voices five, ten or fifteen years ago urging caution they were remarkably quiet.

Now there is a plethora of voices publicly questioning Australia’s dependence upon the Chinese market, and dependence it certainly is. In 2019, the last year for which non-Covid related figures are available, approximately 40% of all of Australia’s exports were sold to China. That was a figure that had been rising steadily for decades, and in the growth years there was no shortage of persons willing to share the largess created by such a market.

It was not however, just the export industries that welcomed the Chinese boom. In 2019 China was also the largest source of foreign tourists to Australia, and the tourism industry, a multi-billion-dollar earner, could scarcely contain its excitement.

Tourism was not the only industry to welcome ever increasing numbers of Chinese visitors. The education sector, but particularly the universities and other tertiary establishments, also welcomed Chinese students in record numbers. They were far and away the largest group of foreigners to seek further education in Australia. This year, thanks primarily to Covid, the numbers crashed, leaving the universities with too many staff and too few paying customers to support a continuation of their numbers.

Large scale redundancies have already been announced and it may safely be assumed that more will come. Again, the assumption had been that the good times would continue to roll. Now they are facing harsh reality.

One sector that appears to be holding up, at least relatively, is Chinese investment in Australian companies, although here the trends are also not good. An increasing number of applications for Chinese companies to invest in Australia have been turned down in recent months. This has not received the publicity given to the fall in foreign tourists and foreign students, but it is significant and potentially very damaging.

The best-known example, announced in 2019, was prime minister Scott Morrison stating that Chinese technical giant Huawei would not be permitted to operate in Australia. He appears to be the first Western political leader to make this decision. The ostensible reason for the ban is that Huawei’s products, especially the telephone technology, is in fact part of a giant Chinese scheme to spy on western communications.

The decision was clearly a political one. There is no evidence that Huawei is a backdoor conduit for Chinese spying. That is more than can be said of the United States telecommunications giants whose record of using their product as a mechanism for spying on its users’ communications is now widely known. The complete silence from the Australian political authorities on these revelations is hugely significant. How can, until recently, secret American spying on our communications be any better than the alleged spying of a country such as China. The hypocrisy of the Australian stance has not gone unnoticed in Beijing.

The proverbial straw that broke the Chinese back was however, the ill-judged and indeed profoundly stupid public questioning of China as the source of the coronavirus currently plaguing the world. In February of this year Australian Prime Minister Morrison publicly questioned China’s alleged role in unleashing the virus upon the world. He was the first political leader to do so.

The Chinese were understandably furious. The city of Wuhan, location of the first Chinese cases of the virus had been the city where the World Military Olympics had been held in the second half of October 2019. The Chinese believed that the virus had been introduced to China by foreign participants in those games. The western world did not want to know about possible sources. United States President Donald Trump made, (and continues to make) a giant play of what he calls the “China virus”.

Recently published research in the peer reviewed journal Microorganisms by Teresa Rito and others puts Europe centre stage as the main source of the virus (www.mspi.com October 2020). Morrison has been conspicuously silent on this research although it is now well over a month since it was published.

Since the ill-considered questioning as to the virus’ origins, it has been all downhill from then in the China-Australia relationship. Morrison does not seem to have learned anything from his experience. Last week he suddenly flew off to Japan for a highly publicised but essentially meaningless meeting with the new Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga.

Morrison returned from Japan apparently having learned nothing. He told business leaders in a virtual appearance following his return from Japan that he was always willing “to pick up the phone” but that he was not prepared to agree to any meeting with the Chinese leadership that would “trade away” Australia’s interests.

In short, he has learned nothing from Australia’s experiences with its trade with China over the past year. Signalling that a meeting with your country’s largest trading partner can only happen on your terms is the antithesis of re-establishing a good working relationship.

China has now imposed restrictions on Australian exports in copper, barley, timber, coal, sugar, wine and lobsters. The collective value of these exports runs to tens of billions of dollars. There are no ready-made alternatives waiting to take China’s place. Part of the irony is that the United States is exporting all of those products to China. The Australian gesture, definitely in support of the United States, may turn out to be to the United States’ advantage and Australia is the one that suffers. The incoming Biden administration will not alter that reality and in fact it is more likely to improve the China-United States relationship then was true under Trump.

There are a lot of hard times ahead for Australia, due in no small part to the inept handling of the relationship with China. For that, they have no one to blame but themselves.

James O’Neill, an Australian-based former Barrister at Law, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

NEO has previously already raised the issue of whether South Korean President Moon Jae-in is a stooge of Beijing. However, the reasoning for such a plan is constantly disclosed by conservatives, and, in the author’s opinion, propaganda stories on “Chinese dominance”, “Beijing Internet trolls” working for Moon, or absolute connivance of the authorities to the actions of “Chinese illegal immigrants” are added to the real issues of relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea. This is a reason to analyze a number of issues in more detail.

Illegal Migrants

Illegal immigrants get into South Korea periodically, and they are caught with the same frequency. For example, on June 13, six Chinese citizens suspected of having entered South Korea illegally, using small lifeboats to cross the waters between the two countries, were detained. The search for illegal immigrants began in April, when an unregistered lifeboat was found ashore. Items found on the boat suggested the boat was from China. It was later revealed that the boat had carried a total of five illegal immigrants, each of whom paid between 10,000 and 15,000 Chinese yuan (US $2,120) for an unauthorized boat ride to South Korea. They entered the country to illegally get jobs at farms or construction sites and were gathered together by a broker via the Internet.

On August 5, the South Korean Coast Guard arrested all 18 Chinese citizens who secretly entered the country by sea in April and May, as well as a Chinese man who allegedly organized three such illegal boat rides. Three other Chinese nationals were also arrested for allegedly helping the 18 people while they were on the run after arriving in the South.

Chinese Poachers in the Waters of the Republic of Korea

According to Hong Moon-pyo, a spokesman for the main opposition People Power Party, the number of cases of either arrest or expelling of Chinese fishing boats operating in South Korea’s western waters reached 6,543 in 2019. This is more than doubling from 3,074 in 2017, and according to Hong, the authorities’ response became weaker than it should be, as number of arrests of Chinese vessels has been dropping constantly (from 278 in 2017 to 195 in 2019), and the authorities prefer expulsion, quite often even without any penalties (from 2,796 to 6,348). Only five boats were arrested from January to August of 2020. According to Hong, by arresting and imposing fines on illegal fishing boats, the government can eradicate illegal fishing. But the government is merely heeding potential retaliation from China.

However, as officials said on October 23, South Korean Coast Guard is enhancing its crackdown on Chinese fishing boats illegally operating in its waters, including the resumption of seizure operations. Expulsion without arrest was previously due to the fact that it was required to avoid in-person contacts during the coronavirus pandemic. Coast Guard officers will wear protective clothing and follow anti-infection guidelines in the process of arrest and investigation.

More interesting is another piece of news: on November 6, 2020, South Korea and China agreed to cut the number of their boats fishing in the two country’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs) from this year’s 1,400 to 1,350 in 2021, as the parties seek to preserve maritime resources.  South Korea and China also discussed ways to prevent Chinese boats’ illegal fishing in waters near the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the de facto inter-Korean sea border. If the South Korean Coast Guard provides information on Chinese fishing boats returning home after illegal fishing in the seas of North Korea, China will agree to inspect those vessels and punish them under Chinese laws if they are found to have illegally fished in the North’s seas.

Invasion of the Korean Air Defense Identification Zone and Exclusive Zone by Chinese Warships and Military Aircraft

On June 24, the Chinese plane, presumed to be a Y-9 aircraft, entered the South Korean air defense identification zone (KADIZ), prompting Seoul to get a fighter jet into the air. In response to the protests, China said it was carrying out a regular exercise with the surveillance plane.

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff data released by Rep. Kim Min-ki of the ruling Democratic Party on October 16, Chinese war vessels crossed the tentative median line in South Korea’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around 290 times last year. The figure has been on the rise from some 110 times in 2016 and 2017 to 230 in 2018. As of August this year, the comparable figure stood at 170.

There is an another problem with the “median line.” Seoul has demanded that the EEZs of South Korea and China be demarcated by drawing a median line between the two countries’ overlapping areas. Beijing has then demanded that such EEZ line be drawn by taking into account coastlines and the population along them.

It bears reminding that the air defense identification zone is NOT the country’s airspace, no matter how much Seoul would like to privatize it, and problems with the EEZ begin not when a warship sails there (as opposed to the country’s territorial waters), but when resources begin to be extracted there.

Internet Wars and the “Beijing Trolls for Moon” version

Here, rumors and facts are most mixed, but the sharp reaction of Chinese Internet users to what they consider an insult is known from the recent story with Lee Hyo-ri, after the celebrity announced that she intends to use “Mao” as her stage name in a recently televised MBC’s show. A large number of Chinese internet users expressed criticism for her “being disrespectful” towards the communist revolutionary leader Mao Zedong, and eventually Lee announced that she was leaving social media.

This incident prompted a number of experts to state that the criticism was organized from the top, as Korean pop culture attracts interest in China, and its content could work either in favor or against the spread of patriotism in Chinese society. Others noted that 200,000 negative comments are nothing by Chinese standards, given that the total number of online users in China is 600 million. Moreover, the majority of the commentators are most likely Chinese students in the Republic of Korea.

Conservatives respond by stating that about 70,000 Chinese students are enrolled in South Korea, and up to 75% of them are believed to be members of the Communist Youth League, which is linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  Consequently, “Komsomol members are doing the Party’s bidding.” This is also how they explain the conflicts between Korean and Chinese students, when in November 2019, South Korean students posted posters on the campuses of several universities, supporting Hong Kong protesters.

It is not rumors that Chinese cyber fraudsters are active in the Republic of Korea. In September 2020, South Korean police rounded up 24 leaders of a gang based in China, that was engaged in “voice phishing” through fraudulent phone calls and text messages. They managed to steal more than $1.7 million from South Korean victims. The scammers operated out of Huizhou, in China’s Guangdong Province, in a residential apartment.

According to the data provided by the military to the National Assembly, hacking attempts targeting South Korean military networks totaled 10,655 cases in 2019, compared with 1,051 cases detected in 2017, and there have been 7,113 attempts so far in 2020.

However, here southerners usually make a reservation that such hacking attempts, traces of which lead to the PRC, do not necessarily mean that Chinese hackers are involved. North Korean hackers have been frequently blamed for trying to attack South Korea through China.

Much more interesting is the reasoning of ultra-conservatives that Internet speeches in support of Moon are being conducted not from Korea, but from China.

On conservative-owned resources, China has long been known to employ its “50 Cent Army”– a group used to manipulate public opinion by sock-puppetry and trolling on the Internet. Moreover, they use ethnic Koreans who are Chinese citizens (called Joseonjok) and Chinese students in South Korea. It turns out that “a Web user noticed” that Chinese speakers are instructing on the Internet to sign a petition in support of Moon.  Is there any proof? There is a photo showing an instruction in Chinese that “President Moon Jae-in is facing South Korean opposition in the midst of a raging epidemic, and pressure has peaked, but he is still giving China masks, protective suits and support money.” There is an evidence that a Twitter account @comewithmesir instructed its 4,600 followers to click “thumbs down” under an anti-Moon post, and when screenshots of this went online, @comewithmesir made the Twitter account non-public, and then finally deleted it. The same account is credited with using software that allows to multiply the number of “likes” or “dislikes” – the very thing for which the notorious Druking was imprisoned.

As can be seen, conspiracy theories are based on one or two posts from an anonymous source (reminiscent of similar news about horrors in the DPRK), despite the fact that these manipulating accounts may also have home origin. The fact that the President’s cronies have been engaged in Internet manipulation, and continue to do so, is an open secret.

“The Chinese Bought Everything!”

Another rumor is that China is building enclaves in South Korea as part of the One Belt, One Road Initiative. For example, a 1,200,000 square meter fenced-in Chinatown is allegedly being built in Chuncheon City and Hongcheon County in Gangwon Province. This is carried out with Chinese money support with the connivance of Governor Choi Moon within the La Vie Belle tourist zone and looks like a “Chinese Cultural Complex Town”. The estimated project cost is $540 million, and in the future such a “small China” will have to attract both Chinese tourists and investments.

National security experts, unnamed by conservatives, however, are expressing strategic and security concerns.  Less than a 10-minute walk from the complex there are apparently numerous military installations, more precisely, bases for reservists or long-term storage warehouses in case of war. Nearby is also one of the key combined training ranges for the South Korean and US militaries.

In a different part of Chuncheon City, a 15-story luxury hotel is under construction, which apparently has the goal of destroying more than 10,000 prehistoric artifacts during the construction process, refuting Chinese theories that ancient Korea was a part of Chinese history.

Even more massive is the “Chinatown under construction in Jindo.” According to Sisa News, in September 2018, the state-owned China Railway Construction Corporation will develop the island’s port and infrastructure, building both resorts and universities or clinics for medical tourism.  The most important project is to build a South Korea-China university to send Chinese students to South Korea as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, which is not just building infrastructure, but extending China’s influence and control.

Conservatives argue that while Moon Jae-in’s government did not officially announce its involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative, former Prime Minister Lee Nak-yeon met with Premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Li Keqiang on Hainan Island in March 2019, after which the PRC Foreign Ministry stressed that South Korea intended to actively participate in the Belt and Road initiative.  The Loon’s administration then categorically denied this, but in May 2019, Jang Ha-sung, the South Korean ambassador to China, allegedly told Xi Jinping that South Korea wanted to “actively participate” in the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative, which was captured on China’s state television.

To support the Belt and Road Initiative, South Korean-China Business Association was founded in August 2017, and the chairman of the Hong Kong BP group, Lee Jun, became the first chairman, who generously donated $900,000 to the Association.  When an investigative reporter at Chosun Monthly tried to contact BP Group in Hong Kong and its branch office in Korea as listed on its website, he could not reach the BP Group as the phone line was always busy and the emails sent came back unanswered. Moreover, there apparently is no such company at the specified address.

Developing the topic of “enclaves”, South Korean conservatives have discovered 29 hidden Chinatowns in the Republic of Korea, whose representatives voted in the presidential elections in the Republic of Korea and brought Moon to power. China is also suspected of inserting its representatives into the “candlelight revolution” and anti-THAAD protests.

What is the result of all this? According to a survey by the American Pew Research Center, conducted from June to August among residents of 14 countries, including South Korea, 75% of respondents in the Republic of Korea answered that they perceive the PRC negatively. This is the highest this figure has been in recent years. From 2015 to 2017, it increased from 37% to 61%, and last year it was 63%. Only 24% of Koreans surveyed stated a positive attitude towards China.

And if one takes an unbiased look, the pro-Chinese course or the Chinese lawlessness are still nowhere to be seen.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, a leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

August 24, 2020 marked the 28th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and China. The first signs of improving relations were outlined back in the 1970s, when bilateral trade started through third countries. In 1983, a meeting of representatives of two countries was held at the government level. It was triggered by the hijacking of a Chinese civilian airplane that made an emergency landing in the Republic of Korea. However, the strongest impetus for the development of bilateral relations was through sports. In 1986 and 1988, Chinese athletes took part in the Asian and Olympic Games in Seoul, and in 1990, the South Korean national team took part in the Asian Games in Beijing. In the same year, trade missions were opened in both countries, partially taking over consular functions and paving the way for the opening of diplomatic missions in 1992.

The relations between the Republic of Korea and China have turned chilly since the USA deployed the THAAD missile defense system in Korea in 2016.  China banned its tourists from traveling to the Republic of Korea and has taken a number of other measures. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the decline in mutual exchanges.

As noted by the Chinese Ambassador to South Korea, Xing Haiming, China and South Korea are strategic cooperative partners, while South Korea and the United States are in an alliance relationship. China is well aware that both bilateral relationships are important for South Korea, however, “China sufficiently trusts and respects South Korea’s external policy, which it has chosen in light of its national interests, fairness and justice China also would like to work together with South Korea to develop bilateral ties in a sustained, sound and stable manner”.

In late August, in an interview with the Global Times, Director of the Institute for Northeast Asian Studies of the Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social Sciences Da Zhigang said that the Republic of Korea and China maintained good relations during the pandemic, keeping open contacts on trade, investment and exchange at the nongovernmental level. Da Zhigang emphasized that the Republic of Korea, though to a lesser extent than Japan, still actively supported the US pressure on China, but, and there are enough examples of it.

Interaction at the Top and Ministerial Levels

Throughout 2020, South Korea and China have negotiated the organization of Xi Jinping’s visit to Seoul in the first half of the year, especially after Xi Jinping’s meeting with President Moon Jae-in in Beijing in December 2019. The country’s mass media constantly wrote that “the upcoming visit Chinese President Xi Jinping to Seoul would become a new turning point in strengthening bilateral relations.”   Xi last visited South Korea in July 2014, and Moon visited China twice (in December 2017 and 2019), but Xi did not return the love even, even though he has visited Pyongyang.

On the evening of May 13, President of the Republic of Korea Moon Jae-in and President of the Chinese President Xi Jinping held a 34-minute telephone conversation, which was the second such conversation this year and fifth since Moon’s enthronement, during which Xi Jinping confirmed his desire to visit Seoul. In response, Moon Jae-in stressed that the visit would be very important for the further development of bilateral ties (that is, the settlement of bilateral differences caused by the deployment of American THAAD missile defense systems in the south of the Korean Peninsula).

On August 22, during a visit to the Republic of Korea by the head of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee Yang Jiechi (details about the visit are available in a separate section), it was confirmed that Xi Jinping’s visit would take place immediately after the situation with COVID-19 stabilized and the Republic of Korea would become the first country to be visited by Xi Jinping after the re-opening of borders. Yang still avoided a direct question about the date and, as the South Korean President’s Executive Office reported, the parties came to an agreement on the details of the visit during working consultations.

However, according to Director of the Sejong Institute’s Center for Chinese Studies Lee Song-hyun, “Xi Jinping’s visit to South Korea is likely to become a double-edged sword for Seoul. It is not clear what Moon can give Xi in return for the visit, given that Xi is likely to address South Korea’s place in US anti-China initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Strategy, Economic Prosperity Network, and the Clean Network initiative. Moreover, Xi may ask Moon to officially announce South Korea’s accession to the Belt and Road Initiative.

In other words, China is “suspending” the possibility of Xi Jinping’s trip in order to at least force South Korea to remain neutral against the backdrop of confrontation with the USA.

On May 13, 2020, South Korean and Chinese defense chiefs Jeong Kyeong-doo and Wei Fenghe held telephone calls and “agreed to jointly pursue the development of their defense exchanges and cooperation, as well as the creation of military hotlines between their air forces and the naval forces, including taking into account the situation with COVID-19”.

The next telephone conversation of the defense ministers, in which the new head of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Korea Suh Wook took part, was held on October 21 at the initiative of the Chinese side. The parties again discussed issues of intensifying exchanges and cooperation in the field of defense, touching upon the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. Suh Wook explained recent security circumstances to his Chinese counterpart and asked for Beijing to play a “constructive role” for peace and stability on the peninsula.

On July 3, South Korea’s chief nuclear negotiator Lee Do-Hoon met separately with the top Chinese and Russian envoys to Seoul and discussed the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

On August 19, Minister for Reunification Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Lee In-young, met with the Chinese Ambassador to Seoul, Xing Haiming. The Minister noted that “inter-Korean relations had been at an impasse for some time, but we believe that the dialogue should be continued under any circumstances,” and thanked China for the constructive role it plays in supporting inter-Korean dialogue and developing relations with the two Koreas.  From this perspective, Lee called for China to support its plans to “develop inter-Korean relations into a peaceful, economic and biotic community” through humanitarian cooperation and small-scale trade.

In his turn, the Ambassador acknowledged Beijing’s unequivocal and staunch support for denuclearization, peace and possible reunification on the Korean Peninsula, which, as he said, should benefit not only the people from around there, but also the people of China. He expressed his regret that the things on the Korean Peninsula had gotten worse.

On September 10, Lee Do-Hoon held a telephone conversation with Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Luo Zhaohui and explained to him the essence of Seoul’s efforts to bring the DPRK back to dialogue.

As you can see, Seoul is actively trying to persuade Beijing to influence Pyongyang in the “right” direction.  “The most important reason that President Moon wants to have good relations with China is primarily economic, and secondly, North Korea issues, now that US-North Korea relations are virtually frozen. We know that China still has channels of communication with North Korea. Therefore we are hoping that Chinese President Xi Jinping will play a more active role in facilitating the resumption of South-North talks and North Korea-US bilateral talks,” an anonymous senior diplomatic source said.

In October 2020, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi planned to visit the Republic of Korea, but due to the pandemic intensification, the visit was canceled. Official Beijing explains this by the heavy schedule of the Minister. Wang Yi was expected to visit Seoul and Tokyo after the annual plenum of the Chinese Communist Party, which was held on October 26-29 in Beijing, but it’s the middle of November now, and there has been no visit yet.

It is worth noting that all meetings are rather “pointless talking”, just mutual sharing of information and assurances of understanding and assistance. Their purpose is to indicate the very fact of continuing the dialogue, but there is no talk of real cooperation.

However, the active efforts of Ambassador Xing should be noted. On August 25, he donated US $ 20,000 to the International Vaccine Institute (IVI) to be used to develop coronavirus vaccines, and on September 27, he called for South Korea to join the Beijing’s global data security initiative, as opposed to the US project “Clean Network” (The US program seeks to remove what it calls “untrusted” Chinese tech firms and apps, including Huawei, from its telecommunications and other key networks). “Imposing excessive US sanctions on Chinese IT enterprises runs afoul of market principles and international rules but also conflicts with principles of market economy and fair competition,” the Ambassador noted.

Yang Jiechi’s Visit

The most important event of this period, such as the visit of Yang Jiechi, who last visited Seoul in 2018 should be discussed in more detail.

According to Seoul’s official statements, it was planned to “discuss issues of bilateral relations, including cooperation in the fight against COVID-19, high-level exchanges, the current situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the world.” “One of the main items on the engagement agenda will be arrangements for the visit of the PRC President to Seoul.”

On August 21, Yang Jiechi arrived in Busan after his two-day visit to Singapore. As the South Korean press specifically noted, the choice of Busan as the venue was made taking into account Yang’s route and requests and has nothing to do with the spread of the coronavirus.  A visit of courtesy to the President of the Republic of Korea is said not to be planned (although such visit is usually practiced). All the abovementioned immediately attracted close attention from mass media.

Yang’s counterpart was the National Security Advisor to the President of the Republic of Korea, Suh Hoon, who, emerging from four hours of talks (and another two hours at a full-dress dinner), told reporters that the parties “had a very good conversation, spending a lot of time talking about all topics broadly and sufficiently.” Yang said that he had had an adequate and very good discussion. The meeting participants noted the importance of holding a trilateral South Korean-Sino-Japanese summit, scheduled to be held in the Republic of Korea next year. Moon is expected to chair this year’s session, which will be joined by the Prime Ministers of Japan and China. During his meeting with Suh, Yang explained China’s position in connection with the recent Beijing-Washington rifts, which, according to Yonghap News Agency, could be seen as a message that Seoul should not go against Beijing’s stance.

Suh Hoon stressed that the South Korean side would continue efforts for progress in the Korea peace process. For his part, Yang Jiechi promised “constant communication and cooperation” with South Korea for the denuclearization and establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula.

It bears pointing out, once again, that these are mere promises of nothing.

Among other issues discussed were accelerating the second phase of free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations, signing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) within the year and tapping jointly into a third country market.

Moreover, Suh requested China’s cooperation for the prompt increase in the number of flights and visa issuance for South Koreans, and Yang then suggested that two sides should keep cooperating as “important neighbors and cooperation partners.”

 Hong Kong Issue and Other Support for Sinophobic Forces

On May 28, 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea emphasized the importance of Hong Kong’s supporting its prosperity and development under the “one nation, two systems” policy.

On June 2, amid concerns that Beijing’s contentious security legislation could erode the semiautonomous territory’s civil liberties, the Foreign Ministry declared that South Korea respected the 1984 declaration between China and Britain ensuring Hong Kong’s autonomy. The wording of the statement was almost identical:  “Hong Kong is an important region that has close people-to-people and economic exchanges with South Korea, and we believe it is important that Hong Kong’s prosperity and development continue under the ‘one country, two systems’ principle.”

It should also be noted that articles about the persecution against American missionaries in China or reports that in September 2020, the Chinese authorities introduced unified textbooks in Chinese language in the schools of Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture on those subjects that were previously taught in Korean, have frequently appeared in the central national newspapers of the Republic of Korea. Moreover, since 2023, the system of preferential points for representatives of national minorities for enrolling at local universities will be abolished, and university qualifying exams in the Chinese language, Literature and Political Science will be held exclusively in Chinese. Thus the Korean language in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture is fading into the background, which causes Seoul’s concerns about the saving the Korean language in this region.

There are still myths that, in an attempt not to spoil relations with Beijing, Moon did not close the border with China, which caused the epidemic, because every day from 10,000 to 30,000 Chinese visit South Korea.

There is a no less popular myth that in late January/early February 2020, while the country was experiencing an acute shortage of masks and other equipment, Moon secretly sent $5 million to China, as well as 3 million masks, 10,000 protective suits and other medical supplies. And that’s just what went through the state: Samsung gave China 1 million masks, 10,000 protective suits and about $5 million; LG shipped 1.2 million masks, 10,000 protective suits and about $ 450,000; other companies including Hyundai, SK, CJ, POSCO, Doosan, Asiana Airlines, also quickly provided China support. More masks, supplies and money have been sent sent to China since then, despite the shortage of masks and PPEs for doctors and nurses in South Korea, as well as nation-wide shortages of masks for the South Korean public.

This also includes boycotts against Dysney’s “Mulan” after the film’s final credits thanked government of Xinjiang, which is accused of human rights abuses against ethnic minorities. The film’s lead actress Liu Yifei was ostracized for her comments supporting the Hong Kong police’s crackdown against protesters in August last year.

The Declaration of a Global Citizen in Korea, a non-governmental organization working for solidarity with Hong Kong citizens, launched an online boycott campaign, urging social media users to share images calling for the boycott of the film.

However, Chinese interference in South Korean affairs, where real issues of illegal migration or poaching are mixed with attempts by conservatives to play the “Chinese card”, portraying Moon Jae-in as a stooge of the CCP, is a topic for a separate article.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, a leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

At a time when the confrontation between the United States and China is ongoing, and the nations on the Korean Peninsula are in the process of choosing whose side to take in the approaching conflict, DPRK’s stance appears to be more certain, as evidenced by its political and economic ties during the period in question.

Let us start with politics. On May 8, 2020, the Korean Central News Agency reported that Kim Jong-un sent a recorded message to President Xi Jinping, which commended the latter on successfully combatting the unprecedented pandemic. It also said that the ties between the two parties of DPRK and China had strengthened amid various historical challenges, which had been overcome, and had continued to grow stronger with each passing day.

On May 9, 2020, Xi Jinping replied, noting that China was willing to enhance its joint efforts with the DPRK to fight the pandemic, and to promote the continuous development of PRC-North Korean relations.

On September 9, 2020, in a message congratulating Kim Jong-un with the 72nd Anniversary of DPRK, the Chinese President said he was prepared to continue supporting the development of bilateral ties between Pyongyang and Beijing in order to “promote regional peace, stability and prosperity”.

On October 1, 2020, the North Korean leader congratulated Xi Jinping with the 71st founding anniversary of PRC in a message.  In it, Kim Jong-un stressed that he, “the party and the people of DPRK” would “invariably stand by the General Secretary, the CPC (the Chinese Communist Party) and the Chinese people” in their joint cause of “defending and glorifying socialism” paid for with blood, sweat, and tears.

China has continued to support the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue as well as DPRK-US talks on condition that Pyongyang’s demands are taken into account.  On May 23, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed hope that the United States and North Korea would “resume meaningful dialogue and engagement as soon as possible”. He also said that achieving a genuine settlement would require concrete steps.   The minister reminded his audience that in the last few years, the DPRK had taken some positive steps “toward de-escalation and denuclearization”, which unfortunately, had “not been reciprocated in a substantive way by the US side”. Wang Yi also called on the US and other parties to take the proposal made by Russia and China “into serious consideration and stop squandering the hard-won outcomes of previous dialogue”.

Amid rising tensions between South Korea and the DPRK in June of this year, Beijing urged the two sides to engage in dialogue in order to resolve the issues plaguing the Korean Peninsula. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying said that China, as South and North Koreas’ nearest neighbor, hoped the two countries would “improve their bilateral relationship” via talks. Another Spokesperson for PRC’s Foreign Ministry, Zhao Lijian, made a similar statement.

On June 12, RIA Novosti reported that Hua Chunying called on the US to take concrete actions to deliver what had been agreed in Singapore and to acknowledge Pyongyang’s “legitimate concerns”. She also said that one of the reasons why the talks between the United States and North Korea reached a deadlock was because DPRK’s legitimate concerns had not been addressed, and the denuclearization measures taken by Pyongyang had not merited a “commensurate US response”.

During a regular press conference on June 17, Zhao Lijian said that the DPRK and ROK shared “the same ethnic origin”. He added that as “a close neighbor and friend, China always” remained “committed to sustained peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula”.

In turn, the DPRK leadership has often expressed its support for PRC’s Hong Kong policies and criticized Washington for its anti-Chinese rhetoric.

For instance, on May 30, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson backed China’s measures aimed at “safeguarding the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the country and achieving stability and prosperity of Hong Kong”. The statement also pointed out that the situation in Hong Kong was PRC’s internal matter and that no other country or force had any right to say anything about it.

On June 3, it was reported that a DPRK official criticized comments made by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who, on May 31, stated  that actions by the CPC had suggested it was “intent upon the destruction of Western ideas, Western democracies, Western values”. The spokesperson for the international affairs department of the Workers’ Party of Korea pointed out that it was not the first time Mike Pompeo had said “nonsense about China over the issues of Hong Kong, Taiwan, human rights and trade disputes”. He also noted that it was important not to overlook the fact that the US Secretary of State “slandered the leadership of the Communist Party of China over socialism”.

An article published by the Yonhap News Agency on July 2, stated, citing Rodong Sinmun, that North Korea fully supported China “amid the intensifying rivalry between Washington and Beijing over a series of contentious issues”. It also said that the relationship between the PRC and the United States was deteriorating in an unprecedented manner because the US was pressuring China from all sides, but such efforts were “doomed to fail”.

On July 15, the Yonhap News Agency reported that the DPRK had lashed out at US Secretary of State yet again because two days earlier, Mike Pompeo had said that China’s maritime claims to resources across most of the South China Sea were “unlawful” and had criticized the CPC “for bullying countries in the region”. According to the article, the US official was urged to stop “muddling up public opinion” and making absurd remarks, thus interfering “with affairs of other countries” whenever he wanted to. The report also said that the aim of his attacks on the CPC was “to undermine people’s trust in the party, tarnish its international prestige and overpower China with continued harassment”.

A number of South Korean experts view such efforts to strengthen bilateral relations as a means of restoring economic ties between Beijing and Pyongyang. After all, the COVID-19 pandemic has “devastated” the economy of North Korea, mainly due to its border closures with China, as bilateral trade with the PRC “accounts for about 95 percent of the North’s total trade value”.

On July 2, the Yonhap News Agency reported, citing data from South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, that the value of goods and services traded between the DPRK and China during the first eight months of 2020 amounted to US$510 million, a sharp decrease in comparison to “US$1.71 billion recorded in the same period in 2019”. According to the article, from January to August of this year, “North Korea exported US$41.9 million worth of goods to China” while the imports from its neighbor were worth US$470 million”. The main items the DPRK bought from the PRC in 2019 included “textiles, soybean oil, rice, watch components and flour”. In addition, North Korea imports knitted garments, medical supplies, ceramic tiles, furniture and tires from China.

On June 26, NK Pro wrote, citing public data released by China’s General Administration of Customs (GAC), that “officially reported food exports to the DPRK” had risen modestly in May of this year, “with total trade more than doubling in value and variety compared to April’s historic lows”.

The figures showed that in May, the “PRC sent 73 kinds of food products over the border” (compared to 14 types of items in April), including “fresh fruits and vegetables, pork, tea and coffee, preserved goods, confectionery and alcohol, which had not been imported for over two months”.

On July 3, 2020, KBS World reported that freight transportation along the railway linking the DPRK, China and Russia had resumed. On June 26, a train with 6 cargo containers left Hunchun, a border city in China’s Jilin province, and, in two days, arrived in the Tumangang station at the North Korea–Russia border.  In addition, in a video “obtained by NK Pro”, a Chinese DF5 engine was “shown pulling at least seven wagons of cargo from Dandong to Sinuiju”.

According to South Korean media outlets, the new Tumen River bridge linking the North Korean town of Namyang in the North Hamgyong province and the Chinese city of Tumen in Jilin province was completed late last year. The PRC is accelerating plans to open the bridge and preparing for the completion of a special economic zone in Tumen this year. The new bridge is expected to replace the old, which is only 6.6 meters wide and was built by the Japanese Empire.

It is believed that aside from official distribution channels, there are also grey markets. On June 29, The Chosun Ilbo reported, citing The Asahi Shimbun (a Japanese newspaper), that a large amount of Chinese private capital was “entering North Korea” in contravention of UN sanctions. Chinese investors parked their money in commercial buildings in Pyongyang and other cities, besides China had invested “more than US$10 million each in the construction of a dozen North Korean fish farms”.

In addition, on October 6, NK Pro wrote that Pyongyang Unbangwan, a DPRK-linked eatery, remained open in Beijing despite UN Security Council sanctions.

At this point, some issues plaguing the relationship between China and North Kore are worth pointing out. On August 27, Forex news reported, citing Radio Free Asia, that the DPRK tightened border controls with China, and ordered military units and the police “to shoot on sight anyone” who approached within one kilometer of the PRC-North Korea border. The measure was “said to be a move to prevent the spread of COVID-19 within” North Korea.   According to a number of foreign media outlets, troops from the Korean People’s Army Special Operation Force were also sent to ‘assist’ at the border.

While the “shoot on sight” policy concerns primarily the fight against smugglers, the issue of Chinese vessels fishing in North Korean waters poses a much bigger problem. According to Washington DC-based Global Fishing Watch, a website cofounded by Google, China’s incursion was “the largest known case of illegal fishing perpetrated by a single industrial fleet operating in another nation’s waters”. Reportedly, competition from the Chinese trawlers was also “likely displacing the North Korean fishers, pushing them into neighboring Russian [and Japanese] waters”, where they fish illegally.

In conclusion, it is reasonable to state that, on the one hand, Pyongyang has chosen to support Beijing in its confrontation against the United States, while, on the other, the DPRK is behaving in a fairly reasonable manner, with its leadership seemingly comprehending that in the face of future challenges, North Korea will probably be the least of the world’s concerns.

Konstantin Asmolov, Ph.D. in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

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