Following Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow’s decision that he will hand over power to a “younger generation”, Turkmenistan’s transit has become a highly debated topic.  Experts note that outside powers such as Turkey, Pakistan and the US, which would like to draw Turkmenistan into their orbit of influence, to the Taliban (a movement banned in Russia), which has its traditional spring and summer offensive starting on March 1, may try to take advantage of the transit. Groups in northern Afghanistan also pose a threat, and there is almost no one to stand against them in Turkmenistan.

However, the possibility of the influence of Afghanistan’s internal instability zone from Herat to Badakhshan on Turkmenistan is low today, since the Taliban leadership has so far had a peaceful relationship with Ashgabat, but the jihadists could well play “the role of fuse”. The Taliban are unlikely to go beyond the borders of Afghanistan, as they are not interested in doing so today, and there is infighting between warlords within the country itself. The countries are also attempting to establish economic cooperation; Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov meets regularly with the Taliban; Ashgabat and Kabul hold talks on electricity supply, the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline project and railway expansion.

As for the “problem of the transit of power”, it has arisen in almost all the former CIS republics in recent years, especially in Central Asia – everywhere there is a change of elites, a new generation of 30-40-year-old politicians comes who are not related to the Soviet era. Thus, in addition to Turkmenistan, a similar father-son transfer scenario has already taken place in Azerbaijan, quite successfully due to the personal qualities of the successor: a strong leader, a strong son. A similar transit of power is expected in Tajikistan, where the country’s leader, Emomali Rahmon, has ruled the country since 1991 – longer than anyone in the former Soviet Union. Uzbekistan’s experience with the division of Islam Karimov’s legacy clearly does not suit Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow; in Kazakhstan, there has essentially been no transit, but a “civilized divorce”.

Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow cited reaching the Prophet’s age of 63 (according to the Koran, the Prophet Mohammed died at 63) as the reason for his decision.

According to the current legislation, only a citizen over 40 years of age, who has lived in the country for the last 15 years and has no criminal record can occupy the post of head of state. The two latter criteria immediately disqualify opposition candidates living abroad, such as Nurmukhamed Khanamov, leader of the opposition Republican Party of Turkmenistan, who lives in Austria.

The only son of the Turkmen leader, Serdar Berdimuhamedow, who just turned 40, the minimum age for the presidency, has long been tacitly appointed as successor. Exactly one year ago, his father appointed him as “deputy prime minister”, even though there is no prime minister in the Turkmen government; the head of government is the president himself. It is noteworthy that Berdimuhamedow senior himself was also deputy prime minister in 2006, when President Niyazov died.

That is, in fact, Serdar has already become the deputy of his father, who has put his son in control of Turkmenistan’s energy sector, the most important sector of the local economy.

Serdar, who has long been called “Prince” by Turkmens (incidentally, his name means “commander ” in Turkmen), has had a boost in his career since his father became president 15 years ago. Serdar began his active “working life” in the diplomatic service in 2008-11 when he worked as a minister-counsellor at the embassy in Moscow, where he also received a diplomatic degree, which he did not have at the time of his appointment. After graduating from the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy, he was sent to Geneva as a counsellor to the Permanent Mission of Turkmenistan to the United Nations, where Serdar came with his family, sending his children to one of the most elite schools in Switzerland. He then returned to work at the Turkmen Foreign Ministry, where he was responsible for foreign policy on the European track, having served as a member of parliament and as the republic’s minister of industry.  Since becoming deputy prime minister, Serdar has intensified his diplomatic activity: as chairman of an intergovernmental commission he has worked with Russia, supervised economic cooperation with Japan and made several visits to China and Uzbekistan, which was certainly a test of the willingness of Turkmenistan’s partners to accept Serdar as the future president.

Turkmenistan’s election race officially began on February 14, with polling day set for March 12. The candidates have not yet been announced, except it is known that the president’s son Serdar has submitted documents to the CEC. By the way, in the last elections, in 2017, nine candidates were registered.

Although it is not yet fully certain that Serdar will succeed in following in his father’s footsteps, it is nevertheless expected that neither foreign nor domestic policy is likely to change; the country will continue its policy of neutrality. Although Berdimuhamedow junior attended the EEU meeting in Kazan in May 2021 as deputy prime minister, Ashgabat is unlikely to join the EEU or the CSTO anytime soon. Berdimuhamedow senior will retain the post of speaker of the upper house of parliament, almost replicating the Kazakhstan’s model of having an “elder wise comrade” over the president. The current president is expected to continue to oversee all general policies, especially foreign policy, giving his son a full load primarily in economic affairs, economic management and social issues. In fact, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow will rule on behalf of his son until Serdar “gets the feel of it” and makes all other actors in domestic and foreign policy respect him. The transit of power will happen quite smoothly and quietly, there should be no internal problems with the tribal factor.

Among the big players, China, Russia and Turkey are the most interested in special relations with Turkmenistan. And, of course, the US, especially after losing its regional position with its hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan. Therefore, Washington will no doubt actively seek to “gain trust” of the new future president of Turkmenistan, using for this purpose the entire range of already known tools – from the flooding of various NGOs, to “super-beneficial” offers on behalf of USAID, CIA.

With 10% of the world’s gas reserves, Turkmenistan is a very important country in providing gas to its neighbors, especially China and Iran. But Turkey and Western Europe also want Turkmen gas very much. However, Ashgabat cannot yet decide how best to get it there: to lay a pipe under the Caspian Sea (which now requires the consent of all the Caspian Sea countries and any of them may block this issue for their own various reasons), or to join the Soviet-era pipeline that goes to Europe via Russia?

As for Turkey, it certainly has its eye on Turkmenistan as an important link in Erdoğan’s revival of the Ottoman Empire, the Organization of Turkic States. However, it is unlikely that Erdoğan will succeed in this regard, since despite his common religion and Turkic origins, this country has a cult of a president who frankly does not need any “outside” competitors.

It should not also be forgotten that Turkmenistan is a very closed country, comparable in some respects to North Korea: information from the country is extremely scarce, almost exclusively official and only on the most important occasions. The fact that Turkmenistan has recently experienced difficult economic times is only evident from anecdotal evidence in the form of reports of huge bread queues that occasionally appear in various cities of the country.

The model of succession in Turkmenistan will now certainly be watched in many countries, especially in Central Asia. In the country itself, the situation is likely to remain frozen at the current level: Serdar will be gaining experience in running the state under his father’s guidance, and following his advice he is unlikely to make major changes in foreign policy. All the more so because the family of the head of the republic is satisfied with the current situation, including the country’s closure from the outside world. This situation is likely to continue, following the example of Saudi Arabia, until Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow dies, or until Serdar manages to lock all local clans into himself by starting to conduct “independent politics”.

So far, it is difficult to imagine that internal or external risks have had a significant impact on the continuation of Berdimuhamedow senior’s line.

Valery Kulikov, political expert, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

In the current situation, after the withdrawal of the US military contingent from Afghanistan and the Taliban (the movement is banned in Russia) came to power in this country, Washington is actively making adjustments to its strategy in Central Asia. As can be seen from the changes in the actions of the White House, on the one hand, Washington is not ready to come to terms with the loss of influence in the region. On the other, it seeks to turn Central Asia into a geopolitical confrontation with Russia, China, Iran and several countries in solidarity with them. At the same time, the US is striving to preserve its monopoly on managing extensive cross-border processes its intention to dominate world politics.

Washington’s updated strategy for Central Asia today includes counteracting the activity of China and the influence of Russia in the region, ensuring regional isolation of Iran to remotely control the situation in Afghanistan, creating or maintaining a hotbed of tension in the center of Eurasia and the SCO space. The main goal of these actions is to export destabilization from Afghanistan, for which there are tremendous opportunities: drug trafficking, the growth of religious extremism and terrorism, etc.

As part of the long-term work of the US in the Asian direction, there is a desire to create a Washington-London-Tel Aviv-Doha-Islamabad axis to annex the capitals of individual Central Asian countries. In general, it reflects the well-known concept of Greater Central Asia voiced by Professor Frederick Starr.

To strengthen aggressive actions, the NATO bloc is activating in the West. The Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) is in the East, with the desire to entice India into the anti-Chinese military-political link. The creation of AUKUS, a trilateral defense alliance of the United States, Great Britain and Australia, is also aimed at this.

After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, for the loss of the possibility of conducting technical intelligence in the territories of neighboring countries of Central Asia, Iran, Pakistan by the United States, military-diplomatic activities are unfolding on the development of new facilities for conducting legal, technical intelligence in the direction of Afghanistan and adjacent regions on the territory of one of the countries of Central Asia, as well as Pakistan. The US began searching for new opportunities for the deployment of the US Army, particularly in Central Asia, right after the withdrawal of the armed forces from Afghanistan on August 31, 2021. Information about this was already appearing in The Washington Post and several other American media outlets. Although Russia, like the Central Asian republics, initially opposed such desires of the US, American diplomats persistently continued to explore various options for restoring access to bases in Central Asia, including facilities in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where they were previously located. So, these aspirations of Washington can be traced in its negotiations with Uzbekistan. It is proposed to bypass the legislative ban on the deployment of military bases of foreign states on the territory of this country by creating the so-called “counter-terrorism centers.” American representatives are making similar attempts in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan.

To implement its updated strategy for geopolitical confrontation with Russia, China, Iran and some countries in Central Asia, Washington began to actively involve Asian states close to it, especially South Korea and Japan, using them to slow down Eurasian integration. In particular, it was evidenced by the example of Mongolia, which, under the influence of Washington, rather quickly signed two agreements on free trade zones (FTZ) with South Korea and Japan, which complicated its conclusion of the same deal with the EAEU. Similar aspirations can be traced concerning Uzbekistan as part of the preparation for a similar agreement on creating a free trade zone with South Korea, which may also become a deterrent in its legal rapprochement with the EAEU.

An essential aspect of the adjusted US strategy in Central Asia is the preservation of instability in Afghanistan using various proxy resources and anti-Taliban forces. And here, according to Washington’s plans, the use of American private military companies would play an important role. In early December, the meeting in Dushanbe between the leader of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, Ahmad Massoud and the founder of the US private military company Blackwater, Erik Prince, was clear proof. Previously, Massoud had appealed to what he called “Afghanistan’s friends in the West” to speak for him in Washington and New York, in Congress and Joe Biden Administration.

According to the New York Times, in mid-September, Ahmad Massoud Jr., the leader of the new anti-Taliban resistance, hired a public relations company in Washington to help him gain military and financial support from within the United States. At the same time, the publication quoted the representative of Massoud in Washington, who confirmed the fact of signing a contract with the lobbying firm Robert Strike. According to him, the main goal is to stop any attempts by any government to give legitimacy to the Taliban or anyone else, apart from Massoud as the legitimate leader of Afghanistan.

At the same time, Politico reported in September that Republican Senator Lindsay Graham had declared his support for former Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh. To bolster the legitimacy of the anti-Taliban resistance as part of a revised White House strategy in Central Asia, Graham linked Saleh and Massoud to prominent British and Indian diplomats and important media figures.

Valery Kulikov, political expert, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

On November 28, the 15th Summit of the Leaders of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Member-States was held in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, with the participation of the heads of state and governments of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, the countries that are members of the organization.

The ECO summit agenda included further expansion of multifaceted cooperation within the organization in such priority areas as trade, investment, “green” economy and innovation, digital technologies, transport, logistics, tourism, etc.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation (ECO) is a regional interstate economic body established in 1985 by the Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries. It is the legal successor of the Organization for Regional Cooperation for Development operating on the basis of the Izmir Treaty signed by the three founding countries — Iran, Pakistan and Turkey on March 12, 1977. It was later joined by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

As President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov stressed out in his speech, the development of cooperation in the transport and energy areas is among the most important priorities of the ECO, since these spheres are effectively defining the trends of global economic growth. In keeping with the practical implementation of these initiatives, ECO has proceeded with the large infrastructural projects. The latter include, in particular, building of transmission lines Turkmenistan — Afghanistan — Pakistan, the railway from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, the gas pipeline Turkmenistan — Afghanistan — Pakistan — India. Strong emphasis has been also made on the activation of transport and transit communication along the East–West and North–South lines and, in particular, on the creation of transport corridors Uzbekistan —Turkmenistan — Iran — Oman, as well as Afghanistan — Turkmenistan — Azerbaijan — Georgia — Turkey. In this context, it is essential to establish a goal-oriented dialogue between the ECO and such interstate associations as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. “The implementation of major infrastructure projects with the participation of ECO member-states, without exaggeration, means a qualitative breakthrough in establishing a new geopolitical and economic space on the continent; it offers great opportunities for cooperation, attracting large external investments and tackling a number of important social challenges,” Turkmenistan’s president said.

Speaking during the Forum, the leaders of the ECO member-states, as well as the Secretary General of the Organization emphasized that the current summit, as well as the Organization itself in general, has become an effective platform for making decisions on topical and key aspects of regional economic cooperation in the ECO space.  The Organization has put in place all conditions for the further development of multilateral regional cooperation, for the socio-economic growth of the member countries, as well as the expansion of effective mutual cooperation in the field of trade, industry, transport and communications, agriculture, energy, health care, education, science and culture. Following the results of the ECO Summit, the Final Document was adopted.

The Iranian President was very active during the 15th ECO Summit, announcing Tehran’s position and proposals regarding strengthening regional and international relations, as well as removing obstacles and increasing the level of cooperation between ECO member-states. He also held meetings with his foreign counterparts in order to explore the possibilities of expanding bilateral ties. As the spokesman for the Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) said earlier, the country’s value of trade with ECO member-states from March 21 to October 22 (which corresponds to the first seven months of the Iranian year) increased by 48.5% amounting to 20.3 million tons of goods worth $9.2 billion. The share of Iran’s exports in this figure totaled 17.4 million tons of goods valued at $6.03 billion while the exports of ECO member-states amounted to 2.88 million tons, which corresponds to $3.3 billion in value terms.

As part of the deepening ECO cooperation, the 9th meeting of Iran-Pakistan Joint Trade Committee was held in Tehran on November 6 –7. During the talks both sides agreed to expand trade exchanges to $5 billion and create a barter trade mechanism. In the follow-up to this agreements, on November 24, Islamabad negotiated the purchase of Iranian liquefied gas through the barter system. At the same time, Iran agreed to meet the energy needs of Pakistan through the implementation of the gas pipeline project.

Meanwhile, Jeyhun Bayramov and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Iran, met on the sidelines of the summit. The sides discussed the current regional situation, as well as the Sochi declaration that had been adopted following the meeting of the leaders of Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia. The ministers also touched upon the implementation of trilateral statements, as well as the importance of cooperation in the “3+3” format.

A day earlier, on November 27, Ashgabat hosted a business forum of the ECO member-states. The business forum was attended by representatives of the ECO Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the Asian Development Bank, CCIs of ECO member-states, the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, the Turkish-Pakistani Chamber of Commerce and Industry as well as by relevant ministries, public organizations and various companies. About 300 foreign representatives participated online; bilateral meetings were set up in a range of sectors: oil and gas industry, chemistry, agriculture and food industry, textile industry, trade. The ECO business forum saw the signing of contracts worth more than $35.5 million. Within the framework of the ECO business forum, a Memorandum was signed with the purpose of increasing cargo shipping through the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway corridor, with Turkmenistan companies signing contracts for the export of confectionery products to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan. Deals were also struck on the supply of equipment from Turkey for the production of furniture in Turkmenistan, grain supplies from Kazakhstan, etc.

Vladimir Platov, expert on the Middle East, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov strictly adheres to the policy of his predecessor, Saparmurat Niyazov. The present leader of the country, who bears the official title of Arkadag, translated as patron from the Turkmen language, does his best to ensure that the state entrusted to him remains permanently neutral.

The policy of neutrality has led Turkmenistan to minimize contact with other countries. As a consequence, the Turkmen economy has been badly affected. Due to the fact that citizens of Turkmenistan are tacitly forbidden to travel abroad. Legal Turkmen labor migrants cannot be found in any country of the world. It is also difficult to find goods that are made in Turkmenistan outside the state. To keep the country viable, the Turkmen authorities actively export energy resources. It is the supply of oil and gas that forms the bulk of Turkmenistan’s national income.

In December 2015, a very important and significant event for the entire Central Asian region took place in the Turkmen city of Mary: the construction of the Turkmen section of the TAPI gas pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) began. The agreement between these countries on creating a gas pipeline was signed back at the end of 2010. The almost 2,000 km long pipeline will run from the gas-rich southeast of Turkmenistan, home to one of the world’s largest, the Galkynysh Gas Field, to the Indian town of Fazilka near the India-Pakistan border. More than 200 km of the pipeline will run across the lands of Turkmenistan. On the territory of Afghanistan, the gas pipeline should pass through the cities of Herat and Kandahar.

Under the 30-year agreement that the State concern “Turkmengas” has signed with the Afghan Gas Enterprise, Pakistan’s ISGS, and GAIL (India) Limited, Turkmenistan will supply up to 33 billion cubic meters of gas per year, or 90 million cubic meters per day, through TAPI. Out of this amount, 38 million cubic meters will go to India and Pakistan each, and 14 million cubic meters to Afghanistan. Construction completion was initially planned for 2019, but the pipeline’s start date has been postponed several times. The cost of the project, according to various expert estimates, should be approximately $12 billion.

Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan are experiencing energy shortages amid ever-growing demand, and therefore the importance of the TAPI project for these countries is extremely high. Pakistan and India have their own gas fields, but they barely have enough for their own needs. In India, gas consumption exceeds production many times over, and the country has to import liquefied gas delivered by sea.

In addition to the original participating countries, Bangladesh is also interested in joining the project. In recent years, Dhaka representatives have not made any official statements regarding the purchase of Turkmen gas.

As for Turkmenistan, TAPI is part of an ambitious program to diversify export routes for gas export. Most of Turkmenistan’s gas pipelines were built under the Soviet Union and targeted to supply gas to Russia. To date, Turkmenistan continues to sell its gas to Russia’s Gazprom, but Ashgabat has recently sought new partners to boost its revenues.

Particular attention should be paid to the fact that a significant part of the pipeline should run through the territory of Afghanistan, which was severely damaged during the war and recently found itself under complete control of the Islamist movement “Taliban” (banned in Russia). When the Taliban seized power, Turkmen diplomats recognized the new Afghan leadership not to suspend such an ambitious project. Ashgabat is aware that the new leadership of Afghanistan, like the previous one, is interested in implementing the TAPI project, as the country needs energy resources for the stable growth of the economy.

Supporters of TAPI gas pipeline construction believe the gas pipeline running through Afghan territory will significantly improve the economic situation in the country. For their part, skeptics question whether there is a realistic possibility of securing the construction and continued operation of the pipeline in today’s Afghanistan, especially in dangerous regions such as Herat and Kandahar.

It’s worth remembering that Pakistan is also in the operative sphere of the Taliban, and the construction of a pipeline on Pakistani territory is only marginally safer than in Afghanistan. In April 2021, the country faced massive protests by supporters of radical Islamism, and many Pakistani localities have incredibly high levels of terrorist threats. However, the Pakistani government is officially recognized by the entire international community, and unlike the Taliban, irrational decisions are less likely to be expected from it.

In addition to security, another factor that raises doubts among some analysts is the economic feasibility of the TAPI project. Building such a long pipeline through turbulent territories would require considerable funds, which Turkmenistan may not be able to afford. There is a perception that it will take too long before the TAPI gas pipeline covers these costs and will threaten the project’s existence. However, Ashgabat remains interested in successfully completing its project to have additional markets for its energy resources.

On July 16, 2021, during an international conference in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Russia is considering the possibility of participating in the construction of the TAPI gas pipeline. According to Sergey Lavrov, the development of oil and gas projects will positively affect the entire region’s economic growth.

The TAPI project continues to be very important for Turkmenistan. Through its implementation, the country will increase its profits and begin to play a more significant role in the region.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Central Asia occupies a very important place in US foreign policy, primarily because of its geographical location next to the largest states of Eurasia — Russia and China, which Washington has already officially begun to call its main strategic adversaries. In recent years, the attractiveness of Central Asia for the global agenda has also been due to a major geopolitical shift in the region in the 2010s, which resulted in the growing influence and importance of Asian countries, as well as Washington’s presentation of Iran to the international community as a “violator of international peace”.

In its Central Asia Strategy, Washington usually makes revisions every five years, skillfully setting the points of focus and changing the nuances depending on US interests in the region. So, in previous versions of the document, the Americans sometimes considered Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan as part of South Asia, or introduced a special concept of “Greater Middle East” or “Greater Central Asia” to link the post-Soviet region with the neighboring Muslim world. In the latest Strategy 2020 there is a red thread running through the neighborhood of Central Asia with Afghanistan and an appeal to the republics to take partial responsibility for its reconstruction.

The United States, as part of its increased presence in Central Asia, has sought in recent years to pay undeniable attention to Turkmenistan, with which it established diplomatic relations on February 19, 1992. Over the past 29 years, connections have been established in industries such as oil, gas and chemical industry, computer technology, energy, agriculture, transport and logistics. In 2008, the Turkmen-American Business Council was even formed.

Turkmenistan also remains in the field of vision of the Pentagon, whose “neutral” status does not prevent the Americans from promoting their political-military programs here, which, one way or another, can influence the foreign policy sympathies and antipathies of the leadership of this republic. These include International Military Education and Training (IMET), the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), and several others. This also includes a training plan for Turkmen servicemen to “fight international terrorism and provide security” for their homeland, which they undergo on a rotational basis at the Pentagon’s regional centers.

In addition to the Pentagon, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy, co-sponsored by the US federal budget, also play an active role in Washington’s efforts to “unite” with Turkmenistan. Many are well familiar with the agency’s leading role in organizing “colored revolutions” in many countries. It is well known that the main implementers of the US “color programs” in the world are transnational Western NGOs, foreign foundations and the media. In Turkmenistan, in particular, the US has long been trying to secure the Soros Foundation, Radio Liberty, the Institute for War and Peace, the Eurasia Foundation, Internews, etc. Various Turkmen organizations are involved in carrying out NPO tasks: news agencies, sociological services, educational institutions, labor associations, law firms, and ethno-religious communities.

All these facts show the increasing importance of the states of Central Asia and, in particular, Turkmenistan in the realization of Washington’s global “interests” not only in this region, but also in Afghanistan, the Middle East, the Caspian Sea and Transcaucasia. Maintaining Afghanistan in a state of “controlled chaos,” for example, gives the Americans a formal pretext for “imposing” their military presence in Central Asia, presenting themselves as “guarantors” of peace and security for the states located there. At the same time, the calculation is undoubtedly made to provoke tension in the relations of the Central Asian countries with their proven political ally — Russia, which is a partner of most of them in the CSTO and the Eurasian Union. Those very integration associations, whose collapse and complete discredit has been a “dream” of the occupants of the White House for many years, regardless of their party affiliation.

In this context, the recent increased interest in Turkmenistan is largely due to the fact that it shares 744 kilometers of border with troubled Afghanistan and more than 990 kilometers of border with Iran, which Washington particularly cares about. At the same time, of course, one should not forget the active desire of Washington to limit by any means the flow of Russian gas to Europe, and in order to achieve this goal, the United States has been supporting attempts to direct the flow of Turkmen gas in the western direction for more than 20 years.

Given the very wide range of such truly military-strategic tasks, the previous Trump administration sent a kind of military landing party to Turkmenistan in 2019, represented by US Ambassador Colonel (ret) Matthew S. Klimow and his wife, Major (ret) Edie Gunnels Klimow, to lead the US diplomatic mission in Turkmenistan. Matthew Klimow’s entire previous career was inextricably tied to service in the US Army, having commanded infantry units from platoon to brigade, and held senior positions during Operation Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

However, all this expertise never allowed Klimow to achieve any significant result in the field of “the work” in Turkmenistan. Moreover, he was at the center of Washington’s current fiasco in this country over the demolition of the new US embassy building already built in Ashkhabad, because its borders went beyond the so-called “red line”.

Back in September 2014, the US Department of State signed a $196 million contract with Caddell Construction, the main contractor for overseas construction projects, to build the US Embassy building in Ashkhabad by July 2018. It was planned that the significantly increased number of employees of various US services and agencies working at scattered addresses in recent years could be gathered under one roof of the new embassy building on a plot of land located at the intersection of Arçabil Avenue and Atatürk Street. This site was leased to the US Embassy back in 1998 for 99 years.

According to the rules in force in Turkmenistan, buildings in Ashkhabad must be faced with white marble and aesthetically aligned along a single “red line”. However, as it turned out, the US Bureau of Foreign Buildings Operations did not bring the project in line with this rule, and Caddell Construction never received a construction permit from the Turkmen authorities. As a result, in July 2016, construction, on which $26 million had already been spent, was frozen by the authorities of Turkmenistan.

The US side repeatedly proposed to the Turkmen authorities various options to remedy the situation, which would have allowed the building not to be demolished, but all options were rejected. At his first meeting with Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov in 2019, US Ambassador Matthew Klimow, whom Washington had pinned its hopes on, among other things, to resolve the problem of the construction, tried to persuade him not to demolish the building. However, the head of state said that the “red line” was introduced by the legislation of Turkmenistan, and its laws must be respected.

Thus, this Central Asian state, small in size and potential, has publicly shown Washington that insolence and disregard for the laws of others cannot always bring victory to the United States, even to such an authoritative military landing force in Ashkhabad as the Klimow couple.

So Matthew Klimow will have to continue to run Ashkhabad (until he is inevitably replaced soon) in the familiar camp conditions of his former army service, rather than in the new embassy building. Now the main office of the American diplomatic mission is a building on Pushkin Street (crossing Makhtumkuli Avenue), which was built as a temporary building and was to be used for 10 years, and since then 25 years have passed. There is not enough room for all the employees, so the embassy has to rent additional space at different addresses.

Apparently, with Klimow’s departure, Washington will have to cut some of the other employees of the US diplomatic mission, which has lately grown unjustifiably, because of “insufficient conditions”.

Vladimir Platov, an expert on the Middle East, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

]]> https://journal-neo.org/2021/02/18/the-public-fiasco-of-us-military-landing-in-ashkhabad/feed/ 0 https://journal-neo.org/2019/07/29/what-does-the-future-hold-for-turkmenistan/ https://journal-neo.org/2019/07/29/what-does-the-future-hold-for-turkmenistan/#comments Mon, 29 Jul 2019 05:59:29 +0000 https://journal-neo.org/?p=117878

According to the World Happiness Report — 2019, which is published on a yearly basis by the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network, Turkmenistan, quite a resource-rich player in the Caspian region, ended up in 87th place, thus becoming the unhappiest nation among its Central Asian neighbors based on this ranking. Assessment criteria, such as GDP per capita, life expectancy, social support and the effect freedom and corruption have on important decision making processes, were used. A 10-point scale was employed to rate each of these indicators, and then an average was calculated for each nation.

This country has approximately 10% of the world’s proven natural gas reserves (it has the largest natural gas deposits in the world and is in fourth place in terms of proven reserves) and access to the Caspian Sea. Hence leading world players focus a great deal of their attention on this nation.

According to global rating agencies, the potential for economic growth in Turkmenistan, as well as in other Central Asian countries, is significantly limited by the fact that these countries are not well integrated into the world trading system. In addition, the global trade-associated costs that Central Asian economies have to bear are comparable only to those of African nations with no ocean access. This is why Turkmenistan and other countries in Central Asia have actively supported China’s ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ initiative and its lending policy to implement this project in the region, in the hope that on its completion, Central Asia, due to its location and wealth of resources, would be the biggest beneficiary.

Based on various estimates, Turkmenistan’s external debt amounts to from $9 to $11.16 billion. However, official agencies do not provide detailed information on who this nation owes money to or the size of these debts. All the economic initiatives in Turkmenistan, which Ashgabat defines as vitally important, are first and foremost in China’s interests. For example, more than 90% of Turkmenistan’s entire natural gas exports go the PRC. And the sale of this natural resource is the largest source of income for Ashgabat. Moreover, the lion’s share of the profits is used to pay off these Chinese loans. As a result, in its push towards independence from Russia, Turkmenistan has become increasingly indebted to China. And it is hard to say whether it will be able to escape from the debt trap.

In recent months, Turkmenistan has experienced hyperinflation, and more disturbingly a countrywide food shortage. Experts at the Cato Institute believe that the level of inflation in this nation was at 294% in June 2018.

Turkmenistan does not have a large population, and if sensible economic policies were employed, it would be possible to feed all these people. According to analysts at the World Bank, the population of Turkmenistan was 5.7 million in 2017. However, many experts believe that the actual number is substantially lower, amounting to approximately 3.3 million Turkmen citizens, and more than 1.5 million Turkmens in the past 10 years have supposedly left the nation.

A failed harvest dealt a serious blow to the country’s economy. Since wheat and barley crops were severely damaged by a flood, there was a shortage of flour in a number of regions and even in the capital. And, currently, its sale to the residents is restricted to no more than 5 kg per person a month. Even with this rationing, there is not always enough bread for everyone. As a result, every day there are long queues in front of shops, where serious fights break out and overcrowding leads to jostling. There have even been a few casualties (at least two people were killed while queuing for bread in March and April). Several observers partially attribute the flour shortage to the foreign policy gesture made by the nations’ President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, who sent humanitarian aid to certain neighboring Afghani provinces where locals were also affected by the spring floods. But this aid did not come from reserves but instead from stocks meant for Turkmen citizens.

Many experts have been talking about the crises in Turkmenistan. For example, the Al Jazeera Media Network published an article entitled Hyperinflation and hunger: Turkmenistan on ‘edge of catastrophe’, which stated (with a reference to Britain’s Foreign Policy Centre) that Turkmenistan was facing the worst economic crisis in the last 30 years.

The International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) and the Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights (TIHR) accused the leadership of Turkmenistan of concealing the state of the economic crisis in the nation. The published report states that there is no official information about the economic situation, and that experts have not been allowed into the nation.

Observers have noted that rising discontent has not turned into anti-government protests as yet, which is, in large part, accounted for by the political behavior specific to Turkmenistan and the presence of powerful punitive structures in the nation.

According to a number of experts, the internal crisis in the country may very quickly transform into a large-scale catastrophe, mostly because of the recent rise of Daesh (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation), which has been consolidating its forces in Afghanistan. It is common knowledge that this terrorist group is currently searching for a ‘home base’, where extremists could try and establish themselves and form new cells. After all, Daesh tends to flourish in places where there is a socio-economic crisis and ingrained social issues, and where governments are unable to meet even their most basic social obligations which, as a rule, any state bears towards its citizen. Increasing radicalization of citizens stems from a high level of poverty, unemployment, a large percentage of young people within the population, as well as an ideological vacuum, corruption and low levels of religious education.

Turkmenistan, as well as other Central Asian countries, is already in the sphere of influence of three geopolitical rivals in the Muslim world: Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. For example, Turkey is lobbying for a faster unification of nations where Turkic languages are spoken, and is, at the same time, trying to consolidate its role as one of the new centers in favor of progressive Islam.

In comparison to Uzbekistan with its ongoing reforms, Tajikistan, which is undergoing a political transition, and democratic Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan is viewed by many foreign experts (who predict unavoidable changes in it) as an archaic nation. Changes in this country may be brought about, on the one hand, by a severe socio-economic crisis, and, on the other hand, by challenges posed by pro-Islamic movements, which could have consequences for Turkmenistan’s geopolitical players. For example, the attitude towards China may sour if things become worse for the Muslims living in the autonomous region of Xinjiang. A similar reaction may follow in relation to the United States, which has a checkered reputation in the Muslim world.

This is why, rivalry of regional and international interests with respect to Turkmenistan will only intensify in the nearest future.

Valery Kulikov, expert politologist, exclusively for the online magazine ‘New Eastern Outlook’. 

It’s about time to carry on the discussion of the string of appointments of new US ambassadors to various states. In this context, one cannot overlook Washington’s recent attempt to “establish military foothold” in Turkmenistan that occurred on June 25. It’s curious that the role of the “landing task force” in this attempt was played by the new US ambassador to Ashgabat retired Colonel Matthew S. Klimow and his spouse – retired Major Edie Gunnels.

It’s noteworthy that the diplomatic relations between the US and Turkmenistan were established on February 19, 1992. Over the last three decades, the gradual development of bilateral relations between those states led to a number of Western corporations getting engaged in such areas of Turkmenistan’s economy as hydrocarbon production, IT technology, energy production, agriculture and logistics. Among the largest Western players on the local market one can find Boeing, General Electric, John Deere, Microsoft, Caterpillar, and Coca-Cola. Back in 2018, it was reported that there was a total of 156 major projects in development in Turkmenistan where US companies played a major part, with the total worth of those reaching 2.5 billion dollars.

Washington’s interest towards Turkmenistan is guided by two principal factors. For one, Turkmenistan shares an 800 miles long strip of border with Afghanistan, with the Turkmenistani diaspora being second largest ethnic group in the latter state. Then, Ashgabat enjoys close ties with Russia, as it serves home to the 201st Russian military base.

Therefore, its imperative for Washington to maintain close ties with Turkmenistan in order to maintain free access to the territory of Afghanistan and put a foot in the door of economic development of its geopolitical competitors, namely Russia, China, and Iran.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been particularly active in Turkmenistan for years together with yet another entity funded from the US federal budget: the National Endowment for Democracy. The latter is well-known across the globe for the role it played in a number of coup d’etat attempts that it staged across multiple regions. It goes without saying that the above mentioned entities wouldn’t be capable of advancing their agenda without the assistance of a multitude of NGOs and biased media sources. In Turkmenistan, those are the Soros Foundation, Radio Liberty, the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Eurasia Foundation, Internews, and others.

In turn, those are assisted by a myriad of smaller organizations, involving those engaged in polling, educational, and legal activities along with those representing various religious and ethnic minorities. This brings the grand total of officially registered non-governmental organizations operating in Turkmenistan to 3 thousand entities. Against this backdrop it’s hardly a coincidence that USAID has spent some 450 million dollars on various activities in Turkmenistan over the last three decades, with 23.6 million of those spent last year. The total expenditures of the National Endowment for Democracy last year alone in this Central Asian state exceeded 350 thousand dollars. That’s a lot of money for a poor country. However, the United States has so far failed to raise a large pro-Western crowd in Turkmenistan, as it has already done in the neighboring Kyrgyzstan.

If one is to take into account the fact that negotiations about the possible accession of Turkmenistan to the Eurasian Economic Union are still ongoing, one can expect an acute activization of pro-American entities in Turkmenistan in the immediate future. It’s most likely that they are going to be pushing Ashgabat to play a more active role in the regional security efforts or initiate “further democratization” of the government structure.

In addition, we must not forget that Washington has been trying to put an end to Europe’s dependence on Russian gas for years, that is why discussions about the possibility of transportation of Turkmenistan’s gas to the West have been ongoing for more than two decades. Therefore, it is hardly a surprise that Donald Trump urged the new US ambassador to Ashgabat to initiate the discussion of the legal status of the Caspian Sea and investigate the possibility of exporting Turkmenistan’s gas to the West through Azerbaijan via the Trans-Caspian pipeline.

As for the track record of the new ambassador, Matthew S. Klimow served as military advisor to the Secretary of State and on the White House staff as Special Advisor to the Vice President of the United States. It’s been revealed that from 2012 to 2015, Klimow served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary General of NATO in Brussels. He was responsible for management reform and operational planning for the new NATO Headquarters, the largest “public works” project in Europe at the time.

As a servicemen, Ambassador Klimow commanded infantry troops from platoon to brigade, to include the 2,000 paratroopers of the 18th Airborne Corps Combat Support Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He’s a combat veteran that served as a Combat Task Force Operations Officer during Operation Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Additionally, he served as a member of an interagency arms control team that negotiated the START III Treaty framework, contributed to the writing of the NATO-Russia Charter, and participated in peace talks to end the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

It has also been revealed that Klimow served as the Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, he was in the Pentagon and remained in the National Military Command Center with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense, coordinating the Pentagon’s response to the terrorist attacks.

The military experience of the army veteran and his spouse certainly attracts a lot of attention. Undoubtedly, this fact was no small factor in the nomination of Matthew S. Klimow to the post of the US ambassador to Turkmenistan, as there’s a lot of purely military matters that the US wants to address by taking advantage of the position of this Central Asian country. In addition, one cannot exclude the possibility that in Washington’s calculations, his courage may help him succeed in achieving the ultimate goal of Washington’s meddling in Turkmenistan, as a total of seven predecessors have all but failed on this quest. The directness and the strive to cut down to the chase that is often seen in the military men may be more advantageous for this task from the point of view of Washington than the soft language and refined manners of career diplomats. In fact, in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Matthew S. Klimow stated that he would “also work diligently to bolster America’s influence with the government of Turkmenistan.”

Martin Berger is a freelance journalist and geopolitical analyst, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

In accordance with the 30-year agreement signed between the Turkmen state corporation Turkmengaz, Afghan Gas Corporation, Pakistani ISGS and Indian GAIL, Turkmenistan will export up to 33 billion cubic meters of gas annually (90 million cubic meters per day) via TAPI. This volume will be distributed between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, with India and Pakistan receiving 38 million cubic meters and Afghanistan— 14 million cubic meters of gas. The completion of the construction works is scheduled for 2019. According to the estimates, the cost of the project will amount to approximately $12 billion.

Since Afghanistan, India and Pakistan have limited energy resources while their requirements for energy are continuously increasing, the significance of TAPI for these countries cannot be overestimated. Pakistan and India have their own gas fields, but the volume of gas they supply barely covers their own needs. The volume of gas consumed in India is many times that of its extraction. Therefore, the country is forced to import liquefied gas delivered by ships. In addition to the countries initially participating in the project, Bangladesh has also expressed its desire to join in. For Turkmenistan, TAPI represents a part of a large-scale program on diversification of the export routes of distribution of Turkmen gas. Most Turkmen gas pipelines were built in the times of the USSR with a focus on Russia, as the main gas consumer. Turkmenistan continues to sell gas to Gazprom to this day, but in the recent years, it has been considering new partners.

For example, a Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline passing through the territory of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan has been operating since 2009. Iran is also one of the importers of Turkmen gas.

The state company Turkmenneftegazstroi is building the Turkmen section of the gas pipeline and infrastructure. The same company is also funding the works. The TAPI Pipeline Company Limited Group of Companies with the participation of gas companies of all interested countries, headed by the Turkmengaz Corporation, is the main contractor involved in the construction of the entire gas pipeline. At present, the parties are working out a financing plan for the construction of the Afghan-Indian section of the pipeline. The project is financed mainly by the Asian Development Bank, which was appointed as the TAPI Transaction Advisor in November 2013 at the decision of the gas companies of the participating states. President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov and Vice-President of ADB Wencai Zhang held a meeting in August 2015. At that time, Mr. Zhang confirmed ADB’s plans to invest funds in large Turkmen projects, including TAPI. The participation of the Islamic Development Bank in the project is currently under consideration.

In May 2016, at the session of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan, Deputy Prime Minister Yagshygeldi Kakayev informed the President that the construction of the Turkmen section of the gas pipeline was progressing according to the schedule, without delays. However, there exist certain obstacles to the further implementation of the project.

The fact that a significant part of the gas pipeline will run across Afghanistan devastated by war and partially controlled by various terrorist groups should not be disregarded. This topic lies at the heart of debates held by both experts criticizing the project and the project’s supporters. TAPI’s proponents assert that the construction of the Afghani section of the pipeline will significantly improve the country’s economic situation mitigating the risk of terrorism in the entire Central Asian region. Skeptics, on the other hand, point out that it would be impossible to assure the safety of both the implementation of the construction works and operation of the gas pipeline in modern Afghanistan, especially in such dangerous regions as Herat and Kandahar. The Indian gas company GAIL, presumably with the support of the governments of the participating states, assumed responsibility for the security of the gas pipeline throughout its entire length (from Turkmenistan to India). So far, nobody can predict how well they will be able to cope with the task. In the past year, the situation in Afghanistan has significantly deteriorated. As of today, Afghan authorities are unable to maintain order and security in the country. At the time when Turkmenistan is implementing its section of the pipeline, future construction sites in Afghanistan remain battlefields. The Taliban movement has significantly strengthened its positions in the past year and is now launching offensives across the entirety of Afghanistan. Whether Afghan authorities will manage to establish order by the time of construction, in order for TAPI not to turn into a profit-losing delayed construction, remains unclear. What’s more, the Taliban is also active in Pakistan and the safety of the construction of the pipeline in its territory is only somewhat better compared to Afghanistan.

In addition to the security issues, some experts raise the question of the economic expediency of the project. Considering the great length of the pipeline and the fact that it is built in high-risk regions, additional investments might be required in excess of the forecast amount. And if Bangladesh joins in, the pipeline will be 500 kilometers longer, which will increase the cost of the entire project even more. Some say that it will take years before investors see a return on the funds invested in TAPI, which will create an additional risk to the existence of the gas pipeline.

Therefore, for the project to be a success, it would be necessary to ensure that forecast costs of the pipeline are sufficient, but not excessive and that the construction sites across the entire pipeline route are not war-stricken. This task is extremely complex. On the other hand, TAPI is still supported by the Asian Development Bank, which, apparently, has confidence in its successful completion. It will be interesting to see what security measures ADB has in store to ensure the safe implementation of TAPI in its most vulnerable sections

Dmitry Bokarev, expert politologist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.“

These states have some features in common with those countries which have fallen victims to the “Arab spring”. Can Turkmenistan become such weak link or will it, on the contrary, become a shield in the way of “jihadists” to the countries of Central Asia and to the Caucasus?

Turkmenistan occupies a special place in the regional safety system. The characteristic feature of its post-Soviet history is its constant neutrality status, recognized by the United Nations, the consequence of the same being the country’s non-participation in any military and political alliances and associations. The absence of potential outside adversaries allows the country’s govermnent to keep insignificant – in terms of their size and strength – armed forces. Ashgabat’s equidistance from all global and regional centers and the country’s stocks of hydrocarbons of global significance allow it also to successfully build mutually profitable trade and economic relations with more than one hundred states of the world; at that, the countries which have become Turkmenistan’s key trade partners are Iran (21.7 %), Russia (18 %), Turkey (16.4 %), and China (10.8 %). The main export item for Turkmenistan remains natural gas, however there is a tendency to diversification of the country’s exports by increasing production of oil and oil products, electric energy, construction materials, cotton and other goods. The USA and EU countries show interest in development of trade economic as well as other relations with Turkmenistan. There are plans to build new gas pipelines, in addition to the existing North – South and East – West pipelines, in particular, TAPI gas pipeline 1,735 km long from Turkmenistan to Afganistan, Pakistan and India. Its project capacity is 33 bn cubic meters of gas per year, the estimated project cost is USD 7.9 bn.

Turkey plays a special role in Turkmenistan’s bilateral relations with other countries. The similarity of culture, language, religion, traditions, morals and customs favour further close approach of the states in all areas. In particular, during the visit of the Turkish President R.Erdogan to Ashgabat in November 2014 attention was drawn to the fact that more than 600 Turkish enterprises and companies work successfully in the country, while the overall cost of the project realized by Turkish companies in Turkmenistan amounted USD 42 bn.

Certainly, the quite fierce competition remains among the interested countries for the Turkmenian hydrocarbons and the commodity and services market; however this competition is not accompanied by attempts to strengthen any particular country’s, or an alliance of countries, military influence here. The competition is mostly limited to lobbying some gas pipeline routes (to the EU, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, China, India). It looks like all the international players are satisfied with Ashgabat’s neutrality in foreign policy and its accentuated neutral status. The Turkmenian government believes that the country will manage to remain on the sidelines in case of any regional or international conflict, thereby retaining its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

However, it is becoming more and more clear in Ashgabat that the threat to the country’s security may come from non-state actors, too, in the first turn from foreign Islamic groups. It has been established that Turkmen fight together with Afghan and Pakistani Taliban militants in Syria and Iraq, and that “The Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan” and “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan” have been created in the territory of Northern Waziristan (Pakistan). News have come that “the Turkmenian Taliban” has taken under their control almost all the territories in which the TAPI gas pipeline can potentially be constructed (parts in the Afghan and Pakistani territories).

In 2014 attacks on the Turkmenian border control posts in the Afghan-Turkmen border became more often. Hundreds of peaceful citizens were killed, some of them beheaded, their property was looted, their cattle was driven away, dozens of houses were burnt. The Turkmen border control guards not only suffer losses, but they are taken prisoners by the Islamists. One can speak about beginning of “sweeping” operations on the part of the militants, who are ousting the local populations from the areas adjoining the border and preparing corridors for further breaking through deep inside the country. They are controlling the automobile road going along the Turkmenian border and are able, at any moment, to march both to the Murgaba (Bagdis) valley and Andkhoya (Faryab) district. The Afghan and Turkmenian authorities are no longer controlling their common border, in terms of drug trafficking, smuggling and penetrating of Islamic groups, nor are they able to control the movement of local cattle breeders for grazing their cattle on both sides of the border. One should bear in mind that in the period when the Basmachi movement was defeated in the USSR in the 20th-30th years of the last century, a number of large and influential Turkmenian clans fled to Afghanistan, to the regions near the border. They are still lodging claims for return of their ancestral lands, being the subject of constant blackmail against the government of Turkmenistan. The issue has acquired special importance as two large natural gas deposits – the Serakh and Murgab oases – have proved to be near the lands claimed by the Afghan Turkmen. So, there is the ever increasing possibility of attack of Afghan Talibs and “jihadists” of every stripe and colour on Turkmenistan in spring of 2015. The many peoples who are permanently residing there – Hazara, Turkmens, Kurds, Uzbeks and Tajiks – are joined, as of late, by increasing numbers of persons originating from other provinces of Afghanistan and foreign “jihadists”. It is expected that they may invade Turkmenistan from Bagdis velayat along the Murgab River valley. Notwithstanding the fact that the area in this place has strong engineering fortifications and a border guards units is staying there, the Murgab valley is attractive for the militants as the most efficient route for subsequent march to the north. There is civil population there (who might be taken hostages), a lot of cattle, product warehouse, good roads, a large number of vehicles and even arms. From Takhta-Bazar, one can quite easily arrive, by an asphalted road, to the strategically important city of Iolotan, near which is located a large natural gas and oil deposit Galkynysh site – the resource base for “TransCaspiy” to Europe. It is from this place exactly that the new strategic “East – West” gas pipeline towards the Caspian sea-shore.

The Turkmenian government, though with some delay, is reacting to the increased threat from Afghanistan. Prompt measures were taken to strengthen the border control and other defense and law enforcement agencies at this part of the state border, new fortifications are being built. A ditch, four meters wide and five meters deep, has been dug along the Afghan border, reinforced with metal meshwork shields.

Along with that, contacts with potential allies in the fight against Islamists are being developed. Thus, on September 14, 2014, General Khossein Dehgan, the Iranian Minister of Defense, paid a visit to Turkmenistan for coordination of the two countries’ efforts in the sphere of regional security. The main topic of the Iran-Turkmen negotiations became the interaction of Turkmenistan and Iran in case of invasion of “jihadist” militants to Turkmenistan from Afghanistan. The Iranian side expressed its readiness to carry out, within the nearest period, maneuvers of the Iranian army in its north-east province, inviting the Turkmen military as observers.

On September 11, 2014, the President of Turkmenistan G.M.Berdymukhammedov suddenly arrived in Dushanbe to participate in the SCO summit as a guest of honour, though the country headed by him is not a member of this Organisation and earlier has demonstratively distanced itself from any all-regional initiatives. In the course of the summit, the President of Turkmenistan met the Presidents of Iran, Mongolia, the Chairman of the PRC as well as representatives of India and Pakistan. It may be suggested that regional security issues were discussed at these meetings as well.

In August 2014, the Turkmenian government effected “de-Islamisation” of its education system. In the framework of implementation of the bilateral treaty On Cooperation in the Sphere of Education, concluded between the governments of Turkmenistan and Turkey on August 15, 2014, were closed the Turkmenian-Turkish school and the Turkmenian-Turkish University. The Turkish school was left only for children of the Embassy employees and employees of the Turkish companies working in Turkmenistan. The University was converted into a national university, its curricula were revised and substantial (in terms of local estimates) fee was charged for studies.

At the same time, the new treaty concluded between Turkmenistan and Turkey in the sphere of education has fully eliminated any non-state interference. Subjects related to religious studies have been removed from school curricula, the prayer hours (which were obligatory between the classes) have been abolished. All the innovations in the education of children, introduced on the initiative of the well-known Turkish religious scholar Fethullah Gulen, have been liquidated.

Therefore, the government of Turkmenistan is taking preventive measures to defend the state against any possible attempts on its sovereignty on the part of radical Islamist groups from the Afghan direction. Notwithstanding the still preserved authoritarian character of the government in place and some elements of the “Arab spring” inherent in it, one should not expect violent overthrowing of the government and “jihadist” expansion to Turkmenistan in the next few years. The country has formed quite sustained traditions of secular power to which, as of today, there is no visible alternative or organized opposition. The majority of Turkmens practice moderate-tradition Islam, the 5 million population of the country is diversified as per tribal characteristics and lives in a common territory, the necessary life-sustaining minimal wages for all categories of citizens is sustained, the government pays attention to development of industry, infrastructure, housing construction, improvement of education and healthcare systems and other vitally important aspects of social life.

In case of direct invasion of “jihadists” to Turkmenistan, Ashgabat relies on urgent assistance on the part of authoritative international organizations, first of all the United Nations Organisation, as well as great powers (Russia, China, the USA) and its regional partners (Turkey, Iran, etc.).

Stanislav Ivanov, a senior research fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, PhD in history and columnist for the “New Eastern Outlook”.