On November 28, the 15th Summit of the Leaders of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Member-States was held in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, with the participation of the heads of state and governments of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, the countries that are members of the organization.

The ECO summit agenda included further expansion of multifaceted cooperation within the organization in such priority areas as trade, investment, “green” economy and innovation, digital technologies, transport, logistics, tourism, etc.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation (ECO) is a regional interstate economic body established in 1985 by the Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries. It is the legal successor of the Organization for Regional Cooperation for Development operating on the basis of the Izmir Treaty signed by the three founding countries — Iran, Pakistan and Turkey on March 12, 1977. It was later joined by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

As President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov stressed out in his speech, the development of cooperation in the transport and energy areas is among the most important priorities of the ECO, since these spheres are effectively defining the trends of global economic growth. In keeping with the practical implementation of these initiatives, ECO has proceeded with the large infrastructural projects. The latter include, in particular, building of transmission lines Turkmenistan — Afghanistan — Pakistan, the railway from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, the gas pipeline Turkmenistan — Afghanistan — Pakistan — India. Strong emphasis has been also made on the activation of transport and transit communication along the East–West and North–South lines and, in particular, on the creation of transport corridors Uzbekistan —Turkmenistan — Iran — Oman, as well as Afghanistan — Turkmenistan — Azerbaijan — Georgia — Turkey. In this context, it is essential to establish a goal-oriented dialogue between the ECO and such interstate associations as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. “The implementation of major infrastructure projects with the participation of ECO member-states, without exaggeration, means a qualitative breakthrough in establishing a new geopolitical and economic space on the continent; it offers great opportunities for cooperation, attracting large external investments and tackling a number of important social challenges,” Turkmenistan’s president said.

Speaking during the Forum, the leaders of the ECO member-states, as well as the Secretary General of the Organization emphasized that the current summit, as well as the Organization itself in general, has become an effective platform for making decisions on topical and key aspects of regional economic cooperation in the ECO space.  The Organization has put in place all conditions for the further development of multilateral regional cooperation, for the socio-economic growth of the member countries, as well as the expansion of effective mutual cooperation in the field of trade, industry, transport and communications, agriculture, energy, health care, education, science and culture. Following the results of the ECO Summit, the Final Document was adopted.

The Iranian President was very active during the 15th ECO Summit, announcing Tehran’s position and proposals regarding strengthening regional and international relations, as well as removing obstacles and increasing the level of cooperation between ECO member-states. He also held meetings with his foreign counterparts in order to explore the possibilities of expanding bilateral ties. As the spokesman for the Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) said earlier, the country’s value of trade with ECO member-states from March 21 to October 22 (which corresponds to the first seven months of the Iranian year) increased by 48.5% amounting to 20.3 million tons of goods worth $9.2 billion. The share of Iran’s exports in this figure totaled 17.4 million tons of goods valued at $6.03 billion while the exports of ECO member-states amounted to 2.88 million tons, which corresponds to $3.3 billion in value terms.

As part of the deepening ECO cooperation, the 9th meeting of Iran-Pakistan Joint Trade Committee was held in Tehran on November 6 –7. During the talks both sides agreed to expand trade exchanges to $5 billion and create a barter trade mechanism. In the follow-up to this agreements, on November 24, Islamabad negotiated the purchase of Iranian liquefied gas through the barter system. At the same time, Iran agreed to meet the energy needs of Pakistan through the implementation of the gas pipeline project.

Meanwhile, Jeyhun Bayramov and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Iran, met on the sidelines of the summit. The sides discussed the current regional situation, as well as the Sochi declaration that had been adopted following the meeting of the leaders of Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia. The ministers also touched upon the implementation of trilateral statements, as well as the importance of cooperation in the “3+3” format.

A day earlier, on November 27, Ashgabat hosted a business forum of the ECO member-states. The business forum was attended by representatives of the ECO Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the Asian Development Bank, CCIs of ECO member-states, the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, the Turkish-Pakistani Chamber of Commerce and Industry as well as by relevant ministries, public organizations and various companies. About 300 foreign representatives participated online; bilateral meetings were set up in a range of sectors: oil and gas industry, chemistry, agriculture and food industry, textile industry, trade. The ECO business forum saw the signing of contracts worth more than $35.5 million. Within the framework of the ECO business forum, a Memorandum was signed with the purpose of increasing cargo shipping through the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway corridor, with Turkmenistan companies signing contracts for the export of confectionery products to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan. Deals were also struck on the supply of equipment from Turkey for the production of furniture in Turkmenistan, grain supplies from Kazakhstan, etc.

Vladimir Platov, expert on the Middle East, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is well known for his resounding appeals built on the political doctrine of Pan-Ottomanism, which emerged in Turkey in the 1970s, according to which all subjects of the Ottoman Empire are members of a single nation, the Ottomans. However, such verbal passage has been recently increasingly followed by actual actions, which, without a doubt, can be regarded as an attack on the territorial integrity of other states.

To understand the reasons behind Erdogan’s behavior, it is worth recalling that the current Turkish President was born in Istanbul in 1954 in the family of a coast guard worker, Adjarian Lazs, who migrated to Istanbul from the Caucasus province of Rize in the northeast of Turkey. As his family was poor, he had to earn his keep since high school by selling lemonade and buns in the lower streets of Greater Istanbul. The same street has fostered many qualities in Erdogan.

As a child, he got into religion. For his religiosity at school, he was called ‘hoca’. At the age of 19, in 1973, he graduated from the Istanbul Imam-Hatip Madrasa, becoming imam and hatib (head of the collective prayers, which is responsible for prayers in Islam). Subsequently, this religion was transferred to politics, which he got involved in during his University days, joining the National Student Association at the age of 20. Three years later, he headed the district youth cell in the Islamist National Salvation Party and, after that, all of Istanbul.

The 1980 military coup led by Ahmet Kenan Evren deprived Erdogan of his party and his job. In 2014, the Erdogan government convicted Evren Kenan for life for crimes against the state. Remarkably, Kenan Evren’s reign was accompanied by massive political repression (178,000 people arrested, 64,000 sent to prison, 30,000 stripped of their citizenship, 450 died under torture, 50 executed, and thousands missing), something the rule of Erdoğan has become increasingly similar to, who has already imprisoned many people accused of complicity in the coup attempt in 2016 in the last five years alone, not counting punitive military operations against the Kurds, both in Turkey and neighboring Syria and Iraq.

Another fact worth mentioning is that in 1998 Erdogan was sentenced to 10 months in prison by a Turkish military court for reciting an Islamist poem at a rally. But in 2011, Erdogan’s Turkish justice would send the then Chief of the Turkish General Staff, Ismail Hakki Karadayi, to the dock, clearly recalling his involvement in the fate of current Turkey’s President in 1998.

Nevertheless, at 45, Erdogan returned to politics and started with a clean slate: He headed the reformist wing of the new Fazilet (Virtue Party), which in its short history, from 1997 to 2001, became the third party in Parliament in 1999. When it was abolished for its “jihad sympathies” and attempts to impose sharia law in the country, Erdogan united young politicians into his party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Over the years, Erdogan’s imperial ambitions have only grown stronger. Erdogan pays special attention to the Islamic factor in his expansionist policy, capturing the general trend of increasing the role and significance of Islam in the world and the emerging process of Islamization of the planet. During his rule, Turkey visibly “turned green,” away from a Kemalist, secular republic into a Muslim regional power. Erdoğan is seriously claiming the role of the leader of the Sunni Muslim branch of Mohammedanism. He is trying to use this factor in his national and foreign policies with the support of “his loyal Turkish army,” whose capacity and loyalty to the current government he has always attached great importance to.

Therefore, Erdogan has emphasized using the Islamic factor in his expansionist policy with the support of the military. And this is evident, particularly in Erdogan’s desire to replace Assad’s pro-Iranian regime in Syria with a pro-Turkish one under the auspices of moderate Islamists from the country’s Arab Sunni majority and Turkomans.  Hence the active reinforcement of the Turkish leader’s grouping of troops in this direction, the increase of his stationary observation posts, the provision of opposition fighters and groups of radical Islamists with a new shipment of weapons and ammunition, including ATGM and MANPADS.

The Turkish leadership does not reduce its interest in neighboring Iraq, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean and does not hide its plans to conquer the pearl of the former Ottoman Empire, Egypt. All the more reason to march victoriously across the Maghreb, across North Africa, to the borders of Morocco, as well as to actively seek to implement its expansionist plans in the Transcaucasus and Central Asian countries.

It is clearly demonstrated by the Turkic Council Summit that took place on November 12 in Istanbul (with participation of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and, of course, Turkey, while Turkmenistan and Hungary have the status of observers), which Erdogan wants to present as an absolute triumph: the participants decided to rename the Turkic Council into the Organization of Turkic States. This wording suggests a higher level of “cooperation” under the direct auspices of Ankara, which is also documented: the summit adopted a Turkic World Vision 2040. Also noteworthy is the decision taken at this summit to “form a common alphabet.” Given that Turkey uses the Latin alphabet and some Turkic countries like Kyrgyzstan use the Cyrillic alphabet, the motion vector is clear – strengthening the separation of post-Soviet states from Russia, including through the abolition of the Cyrillic alphabet adopted in Russia.

Thus, the coordinating body evolved into something more politically significant. Erdogan has previously stated that his dream is the emergence of six states and one nation.

This consolidation by Turkey of the post-Soviet republics, which are allies of Russia in the EAEU and the CSTO, is taking place with Ankara’s increasing military cooperation with these states. This is particularly evident in Turkey’s military aid to Kyrgyzstan after the conflict with Tajikistan, and Turkey’s military involvement in the recent events in Karabakh, where the Shusha Declaration, signed by the victorious countries, laid the foundations for Turkey’s future expansion.

One cannot remain silent about Erdogan’s openly hostile stance on Crimea, Prime Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu participation in the Crimean Platform summit in Kyiv, and Ankara’s declaration of Ukrainian ownership of the peninsula, with the explicit aim of Turkification of the peninsula.

And the cherry on top for Russia was Erdogan’s recently demonstrated map of the “new Turkic world,” which includes a large part of Russia, including Siberia. In particular, several Russian regions, from Dagestan and the Orenburg region to Altai and Yakutia, could be identified. Ankara’s “new world” includes Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, the Balkans, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, part of the territories of Mongolia and Iran, Europe.

Time will tell how far Erdogan will go in realizing his ambitions to recreate the Ottoman Empire in modern terms and conquer Europe and other countries. However, in any case, the mentioned expansionist policy of Erdogan can hardly be regarded otherwise than as an attack on territorial integrity. And the states on the map of “Erdoğan’s new world” will undoubtedly demonstrate their official assessment of such actions to him.

Valery Kulikov, political expert, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

After the failed US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the coming to power in Kabul of the Taliban (a terrorist group banned in the Russian Federation), the regional security system in Central Asia began to undergo rapid reformatting. New players, the USA, Turkey, and China are trying to enter the traditional zone of influence and responsibility of Russia in the territory of the former Soviet republics.

The United States and Turkey, formal allies in the NATO bloc, have become particularly active, becoming direct competitors even in recent attempts to expand into Central Asia. In this matter, Ankara is trying to actively use its pan-Turkic tactics, strengthening ties with the region’s countries by promoting the idea of “Great Turan.” The USA still hopes to remain in the region by placing its military bases in some Central Asian countries. Although the USA already has experience of a military presence in Central Asia, after the events of 2014, Moscow has managed to squeeze US military bases out of its underbelly.

Dissatisfied with this policy of Russia to limit the influence and penetration of the USA and Turkey into Central Asia, both countries are monitoring China’s activities in the region with particular zeal, trying through their capabilities to limit and even compromise it. Naturally, the United States has been particularly active in this area, using its information capabilities to smear China’s regional policies, publishing numerous political “fakes,” and allegedly compromising China’s actions.

Thus, one such provocative activity was publishing information by some American media outlets about China allegedly establishing a number of military bases in Tajikistan. Specifically, according to the Washington Post, a secret Chinese military base allegedly appeared as early as 2017 in the Murghob District of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region in Tajikistan, close to the borders with Afghanistan. According to information published by the American media, Chinese soldiers from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region are allegedly serving there.

However, the USA failed to cause a quarrel between Russia and China with such insinuations, as China had earlier arranged its actions with Russia through diplomatic channels, explaining them not for military purposes but with logistical aims to control the possible movement of Uyghur militants from Afghanistan to China and back. The military facility in question is minimal in size, where in addition to the Tajiks, representatives of the Chinese and Afghan sides were present.

Everything changed after the Taliban came to power in Kabul and the need to strengthen containment measures on the Tajik-Afghan border in the Murghob District of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region and build a new military base for the needs of Tajik special forces.

This circumstance and the explicit unwillingness of the Central Asian states to permit the stationing of American military bases in the region have led the USA to launch a new propaganda campaign alleging the construction of another Chinese military base. If, for example, to believe the data of the Tajik editorial board of Azattyk (this is the US-funded Central Asian Radio Liberty. The media, recognized in Russia as a foreign agent), Dushanbe allegedly gave the green light to construct a new Chinese military facility on its territory. It offered China full ownership of the existing base and was ready to transfer it with complete control.

However, this latest claim of the USA was quickly spotted by the official announcement of the Tajik authorities, who announced that China would indeed build a base in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, bordering China and Afghanistan. Still, it will belong to a special unit of rapid reaction Regional Department for Organized Crime Control of Tajikistan’s Minister of Internal Affairs. Although the number of personnel of the future base has not been announced yet, according to military experts, the contingent may consist of 300~500 servicemen, several light armored vehicles, and possibly Unmanned Areal Vehicles (UAV). Amid a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, this secure facility will be built as part of an agreement between Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry and China’s Ministry of State Security. The cost of the facility is estimated at $10 million, and the construction will be implemented at the expense of funds allocated on a gratuitous basis by China, which assumes the responsibility for providing the necessary machinery, equipment, and materials for the project.

The plan to build this military base emerged amid tensions between Dushanbe and the new Taliban government. Tajik President Emomalî Rahmon has refused to recognize the Taliban government, calling for a better representation of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups, of which Tajiks are the second largest. According to Reuters, the Taliban has allegedly forged an alliance with an ethnic Tajik militant group based in northern Afghanistan that seeks to overthrow Emomalî Rahmon’s government.

Undoubtedly, having decided to build the base in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, China primarily pursues its own interests since the region has always been of concern to the Chinese authorities. Through this base, Uyghur militants of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (banned in Russia) can enter China and organize sabotage. If necessary, China intends to use this base of the Tajik Interior Ministry to protect its borders from attacks by armed groups in Afghanistan. In addition, the presence of such a military base on the border with Afghanistan will be an additional trump card in China’s negotiations in cooperation with the new authorities in Kabul.

In addition, this base could undoubtedly be Beijing’s response to the active foreign expansion in Central Asia of Turkey, which seeks to create a kind of logistical superpower on the route between Asia and Europe and become the leading transit country for Chinese goods to the European market.

The mentioned role of China in building a new military base in GBAR may also be a definite step of Beijing to prevent the expansion of India’s influence in Tajikistan, which, in particular, is trying to create a specific position in the activities of the Farkhor Air Base in Tajikistan. China and especially its current ally Pakistan certainly would not want this.

As for China’s assumption of financial expenses for constructing a new Tajik military base, it should be recalled that China has allocated funds for Tajikistan’s defense sector before. For example, China had previously been awarded a grant to strengthen security along the Tajik-Afghan border. It planned to build three commandants’ offices, four frontier stations, four frontier posts, and one training center. In 2016, the House of Officers was built in Dushanbe with the financial support of China for $19 million. In November 2018, a Centre for Combating Terrorism, Extremism, and Separatism was opened in the Tajik capital with Chinese money.

Vladimir Platov, expert on the Middle East, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, has received a noticeable increase in media attention in recent reports.

Numerous media covered in detail the celebration of the 30th anniversary of state independence of Tajikistan, which ended on September 9 in Dushanbe with a grand celebratory fireworks display and a colorful concert program.

On September 16-17, the Tajik capital will host the jubilee summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), when it celebrates its 20th anniversary. The SCO is a regional international association whose full members are Russia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Four states have observer status – Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and Mongolia; another six countries are in the organization as dialogue partners: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey. Since 2004, SCO has been an observer at the UN General Assembly. In 2021, Tajikistan holds the presidency of the organization. This year’s Dushanbe summit will be attended by many leaders of the organization’s member states. Their meetings on the margins of the summit are envisaged and agreed upon, making the Tajik capital a prominent venue for important international organizations meetings and discussions of not only current regional issues. During the forthcoming summit, it is expected that the procedure of inclusion of Iran as a full member of the SCO will begin.

However, especially frequent mentioning of Tajikistan in various mass media lately is conditioned by events in Afghanistan as well. Tajikistan is the only country bordering Afghanistan that has taken a stubborn stand against the current regime in Kabul, which consists entirely of Taliban fighters (a terrorist organization banned in Russia).

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon said recently that to solve the neighboring country’s political problems, “an inclusive government with the participation of all national minorities should be established.” Tajikistan firmly believes that Tajiks, who makeup about 40% of the Afghan population and constitute the largest ethnic group in the country after the Pashtuns, should also be represented in it. But in the already announced Taliban government, with one exception, only Pashtuns are represented. Therefore, national minorities held mass protests in Afghan cities against the cabinet announced by the Taliban. In the Panjshir province, Tajiks, under the umbrella of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, organized the fight against the Taliban groups.  Against this backdrop, Tajikistan is increasingly becoming a centre of an anti-Taliban struggle to a certain extent. The active and very loud Tajik youth is sympathetic to the Afghan Tajiks. It clarifies that they will not accept any decision from their authorities other than support for the resistance forces. Social networks are even calling for troops to be formed and sent to help the Panjshiris.

However, according to information coming out of Afghanistan, Taliban militants have managed to establish control over all provinces of Afghanistan, including the rebellious Panjshir. A Taliban flag has already been hoisted in the provincial capital. Afghan resistance leader Ahmad Massoud, son of legendary Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Masood, an ethnic Tajik, did not surrender but retreated to an unknown direction and called for resistance. But most likely, he, together with his group and civilians, have gone into the mountains, which the Taliban will not be able to fully control. Ali Nazary, head of foreign relations for the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, told the Financial Times that the resistance in Afghanistan’s Panjshir Province had decided to change tactics and switch to guerrilla warfare against the Taliban.

However, such guerrilla resistance is impossible without external support, especially with the onset of cold weather. The representatives of the Front had already sent a call to the international community to provide the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan with any assistance, but so far, nothing has come of it. According to some experts, this was due to a large extent because the rapid development of events in Afghanistan came as a surprise to all, even for America, which has been trying to build its own scheme of developments in this country for the last two decades. After all, it was the US that made the Taliban such a powerful force when they abandoned their positions in strategic areas of Afghanistan without warning to the Afghan authorities while leaving the latest and most advanced weapons here that the Taliban would simply come and take. It was also at Washington’s request that the movement’s leaders were recently released from prisons in Pakistan and Afghanistan, in the apparent expectation of forming a force that would be under their influence once they left the region. No doubt there were agreements with Taliban leaders and Ashraf Ghani to shift power after US soldiers left the country, but the US failed to implement it in time.

As for the current situation in Afghanistan and Panjshir, Washington has so far been clearly not showing its position, preferring to be limited to monitoring developments and the actions of the Taliban. However, the US is unlikely to have forgotten that they conducted a counter-terrorism operation in Afghanistan in 2001. With the support of the Northern Alliance, overthrew the Taliban regime, who moved into Pakistan, established the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan in 2006 and were in a military struggle with the Americans and their proxies in Kabul.

In the conditions mentioned above, Panjshir was left alone, and all the external players took time out to comprehend the new realities and the balance of power in the country. The Taliban have used this momentum to consolidate their power across the country. So far, only Dushanbe has been overtly critical of the Taliban. However, whether Tajikistan will militarily support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan forces remains to be seen.

In any case, given the evolving situation in Afghanistan, as well as the fact that Dushanbe on September 16 will host not only the anniversary summit of the SCO but also another session of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the capital of Tajikistan will not once again appear in media reports as a platform for active discussion of Taliban activities and policies, as well as of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan in that country.

Vladimir Platov, expert on the Middle East, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Today, the Islamist terrorist movement Taliban (banned in Russia) completely controls the Afghan side of the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The government of Tajikistan, a small Central Asian country with a population of 9 million, has every reason to worry about peace and security in its borders, as the tense situation in Afghanistan becomes a greater threat every day. For the past few months, the Tajik authorities have been taking measures to reinforce their troops.

On July 5, 2021, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon ordered Defense Minister Lieutenant General Sherali Mirzo to mobilize 20,000 reserve troops into the armed forces. The emergence of a major trouble spot forced the state authorities to begin strengthening the country’s defense capabilities.

Before the destabilization of Afghanistan, the Tajik army had only 8,500 soldiers. Such a low military strength can be explained by the fact that, first, the state can hardly be called economically stable, and thus is not able to maintain too many military facilities. Second, before the Taliban took over Afghanistan, Tajikistan had no potential adversaries in the region threatening its statehood. In May 2021, Tajikistan had a territorial dispute with Kyrgyzstan, which led to a border conflict that claimed the lives of several dozen people. However, hostilities quickly ceased, and by and large the conflict seemed to be local in nature and of no strategic importance to the national security of the two countries. Third, Tajikistan is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and in case of any serious threat, Tajikistan can count on the help of its allies.

The Armed Forces of Tajikistan are facing an acute shortage of professional personnel. Private and sergeant officers are predominantly citizens fulfilling the compulsory two-year military service. The reason for the exceedingly low number of contract servicemen is the small defense budget. It is easier for the authorities of the country to staff the army through conscription, since it costs drastically less to maintain conscripts than it does to maintain professionals.

Unfortunately, the Tajik army is currently equipped with outdated equipment. The state does not have a developed military-industrial complex, and its arsenal is represented either by imported combat vehicles or significantly obsolete weapons left in the country since Soviet times.

Sanitary and material provision of most military units is also far from satisfactory. As a result, many Tajik youth are trying to avoid conscription by all means. Many conscripts are forced to pay for their own uniforms.

Tajikistan’s geographic features play an adverse role in strengthening its defense capabilities. Most of Tajikistan’s territory is covered by mountains, which impairs the efficiency of the logistics infrastructure. Weak logistics prevent the full supply of military units and significantly increase the cost of military services.

The most combat-ready military formation in Tajikistan is the 201st Russian military base with more than 8,000 personnel. It is staffed exclusively by professional servicemen who have had a positive track record while serving in the Russian Federation. This unit of the Russian Armed Forces is equipped with the latest models of equipment and weapons. This is largely due to the fact that the Russian Defense Ministry pays increased attention to its military facilities abroad, and the Tajik-Afghan border area is one of the most dangerous places where such facilities exist.

On August 16, 2021, CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas stated that the organization will do everything possible to help Tajikistan in case of a threat from Afghanistan. Zas also reported that at the moment the Tajik leadership is in full control of the situation on its side of the border and does not need urgent help from its allies. However, the CSTO leadership is closely monitoring the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border and, if necessary, is ready to immediately activate the Collective Forces of the Organization.

On August 23, 2021, 201st Military Base personnel conducted training exercises with attack and transport helicopters in mountainous terrain. The Russian military command is aware of the high risk of escalation of the conflict in the Central Asian region, and has therefore ordered the military to increase the level of combat training.

On August 24, 2021, the press service of the Central Military District of Russia, which includes the 201st base in Tajikistan, reported that the base was equipped with Kornet modern anti-tank missile systems. In the light of recent events, the Russian authorities decided to reinforce their military units stationed near Afghanistan.

One would hope, however, that the Taliban would not try to attack Tajikistan. The Taliban want the world to stop regarding them as terrorists. The Taliban hope that sooner or later the international community will recognize it as the new government of Afghanistan.

But even if the Taliban do not aim to attack other states, this still does not make the situation any less stressful. Afghanistan faces unprecedented levels of tension, and there is a possibility that at some point new terrorist movements could emerge within its territory and try to change the balance of power both at home and in other countries. In the country recently overrun by the Taliban, there are many weapons left over from the US to the now defunct Afghan army. If the aggressive formations gain access to US weapons, the situation could deteriorate dramatically.

Summarizing the above, we can assume that Tajikistan will probably not have to face a full-fledged war, yet the country still needs to remain vigilant: there is a high probability that conflicts will break out in the border areas. The authorities of Tajikistan should also be prepared for the fact that illegal armed groups, including those planning to destabilize the state and sabotage the armed forces of the country, may try to infiltrate their lands. And in this regard, an undoubted positive factor for Tajikistan is its focus on strengthening the combat capabilities of its army and continuing close cooperation with Russia and other members of the CSTO.

Petr Konovalov, a political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Recently, more and more often in various media reports one can find information about the increased terrorist threat to Tajikistan coming from Afghanistan.

To objectively understand the emerging situation, it is necessary to recall that Afghanistan and Tajikistan have quite close relations, due to a largely common historical past, traditions, culture and religion, as well as a common language. The length of the shared border is 1,344 km.

The formation of the Republic of Tajikistan (late 1991) actually coincided with the coming to power in Afghanistan of the Mujahideen regime (early 1992), with Tajikistan being one of the first countries to recognize the mujahideen regime, which was also led by ethnic Tajiks.

In recent decades, the countries have tried to develop relations in various directions, among which the largest growth area for joint Afghan-Tajik projects has been hydroelectricity: the very high power generation potential of the two border rivers – the Panj and Amu Darya (on the Afghan-Tajik border section) together is about 160 billion kWh. The construction of bridges over the Panj River is also of great importance: since Soviet times, apart from the famous “Friendship Bridge”, three more bridges have been built. The development of joint gas facilities and the construction of gas pipelines is also seen as promising, but due to a lack of funds, the projects have not yet begun to be implemented. Seeking to use Afghan territory as a corridor to Pakistani ports, Tajikistan is trying to break its transport isolation. Recently, cultural and educational relations between the two countries have been actively developing: Tajikistan regularly sends cultural delegations and musical groups on tour to Afghanistan. Tajikistan’s universities and colleges have a large number of students from the neighboring country, mostly in the medical, engineering, and agricultural faculties. Afghan scientists often come to the Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan for internships.

In October 2001, when Operation Enduring Freedom began, Tajikistan became a transit zone for the International Security Assistance Force into Afghanistan and also regularly sent humanitarian aid to residents of the neighboring country.

Today, the intensification of relations between the two countries largely depends on the socio-political and military situation in Afghanistan; drug smuggling and security problems have become a serious challenge to relations between the two countries. The so-called “Tajik opposition in Afghanistan” has repeatedly been a violator of all possible agreements.

“The Taliban” (a movement banned in the Russian Federation) have always been interested in the post-Soviet space. Back in the 1990s, the Taliban did not conceal their plans to invade Central Asia; some of their leaders promised that after taking full control of Afghanistan, they would then march forward to Bukhara and Samarkand. In the mid-1990s, Taliban fighters fought in Chechnya on the side of the separatists against Russian troops, and showed incredible cruelty to prisoners. After the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, militant leaders changed their rhetoric and began publicly emphasizing their rejection of jihadist expansion beyond Afghanistan’s borders. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Deputy Leader of the Taliban movement, in an online conference organized by the Qatar Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies on December 10, 2020, once again stated that the Taliban are interested in “good relations with their neighbors” and “the Taliban have no intention to interfere in other countries’ affairs.”

However, no one can confirm the Taliban’s sincerity on this issue today, especially since foreign Taliban fighters from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and the Russian North Caucasus have long concentrated their forces in the Jirm and Warduj districts of northern Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, turning it into an entry point for terrorist operations in Tajikistan and other Central Asian republics. According to information published in the Afghan media, this contingent from the former Soviet republics currently numbers at least 500 fighters who are trying to penetrate the Badakhshan districts of Maimai and Nusai to take control of a large segment of the Afghan-Tajik border.

The confirmation of the Tajik Taliban’s plans to move the jihad from Afghanistan to their homeland and begin fighting in Tajikistan was a video message they recently prepared and distributed on social media, titled “Conquest of Maimai district”. It became a kind of jihadist video report of the November 19 destruction of an Afghan police post in the Maimai district (Upper Darwaz) of northern Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, as well as a message to security forces and authorities in neighboring Tajikistan. Citizens of Tajikistan took an active part in this action in Maimai and did not even bother to conceal their faces. The Taliban confirmed on November 21 that their fighters attacked six police outposts in Badakhshan’s Jirm district on November 19, killing and wounding more than 40 Afghan security personnel. Immediately after this massacre of Afghan policemen in the Maimai area, the commander of the Tajik Taliban, standing on the bank of the Panj and addressing the security forces and the Tajik authorities, publicly stated his intention to cross the border river soon and commit similar massacres on Tajik territory.

The deputy governor of Badakhshan province, Akhtar Muhammad Khairzada, also confirmed the Taliban terrorist attack in November and told the Afghan service of Radio Ozodi on December 16 that almost 450 foreign terrorists from various countries of the world were in this mountainous region. They moved from Jurm and Warduj districts to Moymay, Nusay and Registon districts bordering Tajikistan and are now operating there. Although local Afghan authorities confirm that foreign fighters are fighting alongside Taliban units, Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesman, is trying to deny this information by saying that “the Taliban do not need the help of foreign combatants”.

The terrorists who are now along the Afghan-Tajik border are undoubtedly a great concern for Afghanistan and Tajikistan, which makes it objectively necessary to stop these terrorists in every possible way, otherwise they will create problems for all countries in the region. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, in his speech at the summit of CIS countries on December 18, paid special attention to the terrorist threat from Afghanistan, emphasizing that today the drastic deterioration of the situation in the northern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan is indeed a matter of concern. In this regard, the president of Tajikistan noted that Tajikistan plays the role of a buffer on the path of expansion and threats emanating from Afghanistan, so the need to strengthen the borders with this country today is especially relevant not only for Tajikistan, but also for the CIS countries.

Vladimir Danilov, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is an international organization, member states of which include Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. As the name implies, the EAEU aims to integrate Eurasian economies in an economic union work together with all its potential trading partners. The Union’s reach now extends far beyond Eurasia: it has already established a free trade area (FTA) with Vietnam, a temporary FTA with Iran, and FTA negotiations with India and Thailand are underway, while an agreement on trade and economic cooperation has been signed with China, and the EAEU has even began working to increase trade with Cuba.

There are other states however, which are not so far afield — they share common borders, long-standing ties and common interests with EAEU countries — yet they are still not member states. The Republic Of Tajikistan would be one example. Since the EAEU was established (the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union came into force on January 1, 2015), many experts have expected the Republic of Tajikistan would soon join the organization. However, Tajikistan has not taken any noticeable steps in this direction (at least not until the end of 2018), despite all possible benefits it could offer the country.

Different opinions are published by the media, which speculate about the reason why Tajikistan have still not joined the EAEU.

One theory is that for some reason or another, Tajikistan’s leadership believes that becoming a member of the EAEU will make it more complicated for Tajikistan to cooperate with the West. This seems like a strange explanation, given that the EAEU does not prohibit its members from cooperating with other states or organizations. Apart from this, Tajikistan’s main economic partners are not the West anyway, they are the countries in the Eurasian region.

One of the key areas that Tajikistan cooperates with these countries on is labor migration. Remittances sent home from citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan who work abroad account for a significant chunk of the country’s total income. Most of these labor migrants from Tajikistan leave to find work in Russia and Kazakhstan. In 2018, the Republic of Tajikistan received about $2.5 billion worth of remittances from Russia alone (where about 1.2 million Tajiks are employed), which formed about 35% of the country’s GDP. However, Kyrgyzstan has trumped Tajikistan on remittances, with citizens of Kyrgyzstan earning $2.63 billion in Russia in 2018. One of the reasons why Kyrgyzstan has outperformed Tajikistan is that it is in the EAEU. Since Kyrgyzstan is a member state, Kyrgyz citizens have the right to work in other EAEU countries without having to obtain a migrant work permit or several other documents, which is a time-consuming process. If Tajikistan were to join the EAEU, its citizens would also become eligible for the EAEU’s simplified employment scheme, which could increase the income Tajikistan generates from labor migration.

The fact that Tajikistan is still not in the EAEU despite these attractive opportunities has sparked another theory, which is that some criminal groups with sway in Tajikistan’s government are preventing the Republic of Tajikistan from joining the Eurasian Economic Union. These groups allegedly profit from vulnerable migrant workers and will lose their source of income if the red tape is cut on migration.

There is also another theory that Tajikistan is holding off from joining the EAEU to avoid opening up its market to an influx of imported goods: becoming part of the Eurasian Economic Union would require the reduction of customs duties, which would result in products produced by EAEU partners becoming significantly cheaper in the Tajik market. This could deprive local producers of demand and prevent the country from developing its own industry. As a non-member state however, Tajikistan’s industry is losing out on large foreign investments and the access it would otherwise have to EAEU markets on favorable terms, while in the absence of competition from foreign goods, the quality of the products Tajikistan produces may begin to fall, and if that were to happen, there will still be demand for foreign goods in Tajikistan.

Finally, some observers believe that the Republic of Tajikistan will not join the EAEU as the country is looking to develop a partnership with China instead. This theory seems to be the most plausible. Since the Republic of Tajikistan established diplomatic relations with China in 1992, the Tajiks have been demonstrating their loyalty to China. Between 1999-2011, Tajikistan ceded several disputed areas of land on the Chinese-Tajik border to its Eastern neighbor. Tajikistan was also the first state to sign an agreement with China to participate in the Chinese One Belt, One Road Initiative (OBOR) for global transport and economic integration. As a result, the Republic of Tajikistan started receiving loans and investment from China, and began to develop bilateral trade and work together in other areas. Chinese enterprises began operating in the Republic of Tajikistan, and many joint projects were launched. Among other areas, a large percentage of gold extraction and processing in Tajikistan as well as that of silver and other minerals is controlled by China through joint ventures. In 2017, China has become the Tajikistan’s top foreign investor. Tajikistan currently owes China $1.2 billion. It would be right to say that China is very important for the Republic of Tajikistan, and Tajikistan could be holding back from joining the EAEU for the sake of its relations with China.

In 2018 however, Russia was still Tajikistan’s main trading partner, with Kazakhstan in second place. In recent years, Tajikistan has seen that members of the Eurasian Economic Union are granted distinct preferences by Russia. Those who back the idea of Tajikistan joining the Eurasian Economic Union argue that Tajikistan could receive a boost if goods to and from EAEU member states and other regions were to pass through Tajikistan, and that the EAEU could also provide the Republic of Tajikistan with economic security, protecting its underdeveloped economy from being swallowed up by the economies of other countries and regions.

Tajikistan already has a long-standing and very close partnership with all the EAEU states on security as part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. This shows the high level of mutual trust that already exists between them. Another argument in favor of Tajikistan joining the EAEU is the historical and cultural ties it has with member states, which were formed as far back as the time of the Russian Empire.

In December 2018, the Republic of Tajikistan abolished customs duties on goods imported from EAEU countries and from other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which had signed the CIS Free Trade Area Agreement in October 2011. Many experts interpreted this as a serious step towards towards becoming a member of the EAEU, although as it has been pointed out here, the abolition of customs duties not only applied to imports from EAEU member states, but also from Moldova and Ukraine.

In spring 2019, the media began to re-explore the possibility of the Republic of Tajikistan joining the Eurasian Economic Union after President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon paid a visit to Russia and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in April 2019. This event saw seen as a new step in developing relations between Russia and Tajikistan. The two leaders discussed regional security issues, mainly focusing on the work being carried out at Russia’s 201st Military Base in Tajikistan, which the Russian President says ensures stability throughout the region. The President of Tajikistan was in full agreement with his Russian counterpart (shortly before his visit, Tajikistan had called on the Russian Federation to reinforce its 201st Military Base in light of the growing terrorist threat from neighboring Afghanistan).

Presidents Putin and Rahmon also brought up an important discussion on support for the provision of Russian-language courses in Republic of Tajikistan, and an agreement was signed to construct five Russian-language schools in Tajikistan, where teachers from Russia will work. However, economic partnership was the main topic. The Russian President spoke about the role that the Russian Federation plays in the Tajik economy, particularly given that almost all the petroleum products and oil Tajikistan consumes are supplied from Russia on preferential terms.

The two leaders signed important documents including an agreement on organized recruitment of labor migrants from the Republic of Tajikistan to work in Russia, as well as an agreement on Russian investments in Tajik industry and agriculture, and on the simplifying the import of Tajik agricultural products to the Russian Federation.

During the meeting, Vladimir Putin also said that the Russian Federation welcomes the Tajikistan’s efforts to forge relationships with the EAEU across various different areas. It has been argued that the Russian leader would hardly voice such a direct invitation if he did not expect that it would be accepted. After all, modern Tajikistan still has more experience of working together with Russia than with China. Furthermore, while the Republic of Tajikistan wishes to develop its national economy, the country is also faced with a major security challenges. This is being felt very much so in connection with the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, including in its northern areas which border with Tajikistan. The Russian Federation has more experience than China when it comes to security issues. Therefore, it is fair to assume that whatever investments China may promise, Tajikistan’s interests ensure that the country will prioritize working together with Russia, which will involve working through the EAEU.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

To this day Central Asia remains an arena of struggle for a number of major international players, namely Russia, China and the United States. In this struggle, Washington has now started losing its influence, which resulted in a series of desperate attempts to establish a sound foothold in this region, which could serve as a bulwark against both Russia and China. Against this backdrop, it’s no coincidence that the so-called private intelligence service known as Stratfor would reveal in its forecast for this year that the United States is planning to step up its efforts in Central Asia, especially in those countries that share a common border with Afghanistan, namely Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This service won’t go into much detail about the efforts it’s referring to, but it’s hardly a secret that Washington has been busy redeploying radical Islamists from Syria, where they are getting defeated by the government forces and its allies, to Afghanistan, while making claims about its devotion to the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking.

In this situation, a relatively small regional player – Tajikistan found itself at the forefront of Washington’s attempt to push Moscow and Beijing out of the region. The US is particularly interested in influencing the foreign policy pursued by Dushanbe due to the two following reasons.

First of all, Tajikistan is not just an immediate neighbor of Afghanistan, but it shares the longest common border with this country out of all of the former Soviet republics – 800 miles in total. Secondly, Dushanbe has been enjoying close ties with Russia, which resulted in Moscow establishing its largest overseas military installation in Tajikistan – the 201st Military Base.

Due to the negligible size of its economy and its relative geographic isolation, Tajikistan can hardly be described as a promising trade partner of the United States, as Western oligarchies would have a hard type justifying investments in this country. So, the only approach that Washington can take in influencing Tajikistan into those decisions that it’s not willing to make is to complain about Dushanbe undermining democratic values, while pursuing closer military cooperation with it. For instance, as it’s been reported by a number of media sources, last year the Pentagon handed out 8 million dollars worth of military equipment to Dushanbe.

However, the situation on the ground may change rather abruptly and unexpectedly at any given moment. For instance, on the back of a long list of complains Washington has made about Dushanbe being “not democratic enough” the West may decide to pursue a regime change in this country, which will result in the CIA and the Pentagon cutting costs on the illegal transit of opiates from Afghanistan.

That is why, in order to achieve its goals, the United States has been actively promoting the notion of establishing a regional young leadership network in Central Asia, under which young activists from Central Asian states would be able to receive education in Western universities together with the offsprings of the regional elites. It goes without saying that after returning home those youngsters would promote Western neoliberal ideas, pedaling American interests like there’s no tomorrow. That is why Washington spends hundreds of millions of dollars on sponsoring various non-governmental organizations in Tajikistan.

In recent years, a large network of various organizations has been working for American money in the country, including, among others, the Soros Foundation, the Aga Khan, the Institute of War and Peace, and so on. In fact, there’s  there’s well over 3,000 non-profit organizations registered  in Tajikistan, with most of them being involved in the promotion of Western interests, including news agencies and law firms.

Back in the early 90s the United States and Tajikistan signed a deal on mutual attempts to facilitate the promotion of humanitarian and technical assistance. It’s hard to say how much money Washington has spent so far while promoting its narrative in Dushanbe, but it’s clear that USAID alone spent some 450 million dollars on such activities in the last three decades alone.

However, a series of “color revolutions” that Washington staged across the globe resulted in a considerable tightening of anti-NGO legislation in Tajikistan, which means that Dushanbe has been steadily increasing its ability to shape the internal situation within the country.

Now the US is testing a new strategy of coercion developed at the Pentagon for Venezuela and a number of other countries that dare to disagree publicly with Washington. It involves the use of a number of leverages, including financial sanctions and offensive online operations against the target country, along with the support of the political opposition and continuous threats of imminent military aggression.

There’s every reason to believe that the United States is going to test this new approach in Tajikistan, combining anti-government street protests with armed “revolutionary” jihad mounted by radical forces and, quite possibly, supported by a rebellion of local criminal groups. At the same time, Washington’s calculations of such developments clearly suggest that the leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, Muhiddin Kabiri would be advertised as the new leader of Tajikistan, while the prominent Badakhshan drug dealers would be tasked with fielding militants to support the runaway Tajik commander of the special forces who defected to ISIS, Gulmurod Khalimov. The Tajik portal Akhbor, in particular, has already announced that the United States initiated the transfer of elite ISIS fighters from Afghanistan that are being led by Halimov, with Saudi Arabia footing the bill for this operation.

Against this background, the arrival of the new US ambassador to Dushanbe, John Pommersheim can only be regarded as a troubling development. Pommersheim is considered to be one of the best experts on Russia in the entire State Department, as he would study Russian in Moscow after obtain scholarship from the US Department of Defense. The man who made a career at the US Information Agency (USIA) back in the 1980s is being transferred to Tajikistan from the US embassy in Kazakhstan. Moreover, Pommersheim is reverted as an expert on Central Asia and the Caucasus. His appointment in Tajikistan further demonstrates Washington’s growing interest in Central Asia. By using Tajikistan as a bridgehead, the United States can inflict extensive damage to both Russia and China, that are being described as the strategic opponents of Washington. In particular, should it succeed in destabilizing Central Asia, Washington would render the entire concept of the One Belt One Road initiative senseless, which implies China reorienting its trade routes to Europe from sea to land.

Of course, it would be naive to assume that John Pommersheim will start staging a “color revolution” in Dushanbe on the day of his arrival. As of now, the US cannot build enough momentum to force Russia or China out of Tajikistan. Instead it’s going to support all sorts of anti-Chinese and anti-Russian sentiments, taking advantage of the network of NGOs, the tactics that Pommersheim managed to master a long while ago.

We are going to follow the achievements of Pommersheim in Dushanbe rather closely, as it seems unlikely that Washington would have sent such a figure to Tajikistan for him just to enjoy the view.

Martin Berger is a freelance journalist and geopolitical analyst, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”  

Even though there were no incidents on the Tajik-Afghan border reported, Tajikistan raised its border guards on high alert, while deploying a number of regular army units to assist those. Over the years the republic grew accustomed to paying a great deal of attention to the situation on the border with its restless neighbor. However, as the security situation in Afghanistan keeps deteriorating, there’s new measures to be taken to ensure stability in the region. According to Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon, in less than a year a total of 80 border outposts was built on the Tajik-Afghan border, while another 100 is being constructed now. At the same time, border guards are getting additional training and equipment on the regular basis. Nevertheless, terrorist groups and drug convoys still have a fair chance of penetrating Tajik border . The government of Tajikistan understands this perfectly clear, so it’s willingly accepting any sort of assistance from its neighbors.

For many years, the situation in Afghanistan remains primary concern of the CSTO. This war-torn country is still one of the centers of international terrorism due to the fact that it remains plunged in a bitter armed conflict. In this respect, Tajikistan plays the role of a shield that defends the relatively calm Central Asia from the Afghan chaos. At the same time, it should be understood that the security of the Central Asian region is directly linked to Russia’s internal security. Since the whole Central Asia is and will be a zone of strategic interests of the Russian Federation, Moscow pays special attention to defense cooperation with Tajikistan, both within the framework of the CSTO, and via bilateral channels.

One must note that Russia’s largest military base outside of its territory, the notorious №201 is located in the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan. There’s a wide range of units being constantly deployed here, starting with aviation, and ending with reconnaissance and tank units.

In September 2016 Russia and Tajikistan conducted a massive antiterrorist drills at the Lyaur military range. A total of 800 servicemen and 200 armored vehicles were deployed to imitate the neutralization of a possible armed incursion.

At the end of September 2016, Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Nikolay Bordyuzha arrived to Tajikistan to hold a meeting with President Emomali Rahmon. Among other issues, the parties discussed the situation on the Afghan border. The officials stressed that situations looks fairly alarming, therefore there is a need to increase the combat readiness of the joint anti-terrorist forces operating in Tajikistan.

In October 2016, Lyaur military range wintessed yet another round of antiterrorist drills. This time it was scout units of the №201 military base that tested their survival and combat skills in difficult mountainous terrain. This drills were followed by a military game that simulated an incursion of 150 radical fighters in the nighttime.

The drills were followed by a meeting of the Chairman of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation Valentina Matvienko, with the speaker of the Lower House of the Tajik Parliament Shukurjon Zuhurov. It was once again stated that Tajikistan need Russia’s assistance to ensure Central Asian security. According to Shukurjon Zuhurov, Russia and Tajikistan should increase their efforts aimed at resolving the complex situation in the region. The activities of various extremist groups, the spread of radical ideology across Central Asia, the threat that Afghanistan presents – those are the challenges that are to be taken seriously. He added that Tajikistan is deeply interested in the creation of collective security mechanisms. At the same time, the speaker of the Lower House of Tajik Parliament stressed his belief that the challenges that Afghanistan faces today can be addressed by both the military and economic measures.

In November 2016, Russia and Tajikistan held a massive joint military exercise codenamed “Shield 2016″. They were all types of units employed, as it’s been reported that a total of 10 thousand men from both countries, and more than 1.5 thousand armored vehicles participated in these drills.

All these facts show that, despite the seriousness of the terrorist threat posed to the Tajikistan by the armed groups operating in Afghanistan, the situation remains under control. As the Tajik border guards are getting stronger and better equipped, they know that they will get the support from the CSTO and Russia at any given moment, since the main goal of the CSTO is to preserve the unity and the spirit of mutual assistance between states for the maintenance of global security.

Dmitry Bokarev, political analyst, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

According to the official data, Tajikistan has more than 70 investment projects the total worth of which barely reaches 3 billion dollars. The amount of foreign investments for the first quarter of the year amounted to the petty 220 million dollars. Out of this sum, more than a half was invested by the powerful neighbor and main trading partner of Tajikistan – China. However, the sum doesn’t look breathtaking, especially for China that is usually bringing billions along with it to assist the development of its trading partners. Perhaps the reason behind Beijing’s cautious approach is the low returns on investments or its reluctance to make this bordering state too strong and powerful.

It would be a viable option for Tajikistan to strengthen the cooperation with its Central Asian neighbors and with the countries of the Middle East, since it shares a set of common cultural and religious traditions with those. Tajikistan has developed close ties with Iran, since the national languages of those states share linguistic similarities and Tajikistan has a common border with Afghanistan, which means that those two share a common interest in establishing peace in this troubled state. Moreover, the mutual trade turnover between Tajikistan and Iran has recently reached the level of 300 million dollars.

It should be noted that Tajikistan share a common religious tradition with a great many of Middle Eastern states, since the absolute majority of the population adheres the Sunni branch of Islam that is pretty widespread in the Muslim states. However, none of the prosperous Sunni states are to be found on the list of major investors, even though Tajik authorities have made some progress in addressing this situation. The greatest success has been reached so far in establishing bilateral relations with the United Arab Emirates. The Republic of Tajikistan and the UAE established diplomatic relations back in 1995, when President Emomali Rahmon made his first visit to the UAE. Since then, the volume of Arab investments in the Tajik economy has been growing steadily. There’s been a growing number of international companies being established and the mutual trade turnover exceeded 43 million dollars back in 2015.

At the beginning of 2016 a delegation of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Abu Dhabi arrived to Tajikistan to open its office in Dushanbe.

In March 2016, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon visited the UAE for the third time. Among other things, he discussed investments in agriculture and mining, construction of hydroelectric power plants, and infrastructural projects with local authorities. He has also discussed joint efforts to fight terrorism with the members of the UAE political elite, which resulted in the signing of an agreement on security cooperation. Before leaving Abu Dhabi, Emomali Rahmon announced that further development of bilateral relations with the United Arab Emirates is among the main foreign policy goals for Tajikistan.

Tajikistan’s relations with the United Arab Emirates, Iran and other Central Asian and Middle Eastern states should be regarded as a series of individual interactions between certain regional states. In fact, what we’re witnessing is the process of Tajikistan’s integration into a huge and complex oriental world with its own rules, its economic and political traditions. The interaction between the two countries professing Islam, the preservation of peace and stability in the Middle East and Central Asian regions, is a matter of great importance in those troubled times. It is no secret that the Middle Eastern region is riddled with a network of extremist and terrorist organizations that remain pretty active, while local authorities are often slow in cooperating against such threats. For instance, according to official figures, about 400 Tajik citizens are fighting in the ranks of ISIS.

However, despite the clear shift of Tajik foreign policy to the East, local political elites recognize the need to mend its well-established ties with its European and Asian neighbors. In particular, to reduce China’s influence, the Eurasian stabilization and development fund allocated 40 million dollars in credits for Tajikistan back in June 2016. At the same time Tajikistan still has strong ties with Russia. Thus, Russia’s Gazprom will continue extracting oil and gas resources on the territory of Tajikistan, while the authorities of the two states discuss migration policy.

It is also important to mention Tajik cooperation with European states. For example, in July 2016 the Tajik government signed a deal with the Italian company Salini Impregilo S.p.A on the construction of the Rogun dam. And as recently as June 2016, the well-known French international group Auchan opened its first hypermarket in the Central Asia in Dushanbe. According to the local media, “the arrival of well-known foreign companies to the Tajik market shows that they have a lot of confidence in the steps that are being taken by the government to improve the investment climate of the country.” And it seems that Tajik journalists have nailed it this time.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.