Why is the United States always meddling in the back yards of other major powers? Doesn’t anyone on Washington’s Think Tank Row ever wonder if the US may be destabilizing the world? An email notification I got this morning from Foreign Policy Magazine set me to thinking.

3:01 AM Athens, Greece time. Gmail notified me that I have a mail from Andrew Sollinger, who’s the publisher of the magazine. It’s about an upcoming Virtual Dialogue aptly titled “Great Power Plays In the South Caucasus.” The mail reads, in part:

“The South Caucasus region is a critical battleground for great-power players in Eurasia—and one where the United States has been losing ground. Russia, China, and (increasingly) Turkey have been pursuing strategic interests across the region.”

The announcement goes on, but essentially puts forth the question of what the United States’ and Europe’s strategy in Georgia should be. My immediate thought, and perhaps yours was; “How about leaving Georgia alone?” But, Foreign Policy thinking would have to stop, if the United States ever did that. Then it hit me, perhaps because I was notified by Google. Just how far is this region from America, anyhow? As it turns out, quite a ways.

According to Google Earth, Washington D.C. is 5,778.61 miles (9,299.77 km) from Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. That is, if you travel by spacecraft or airplane over the North Pole. On the other hand, you can walk to Moscow through the beautiful Caucasus Mountains, 59.74 miles (96.14 km), and be in Russia. You can even put on your hiking boots and head to Moscow itself, it’s only 1,022.48 miles (1,645.52 km) to Russia’s Kremlin, where geostrategy is strangely about the local neighborhood. I wonder if the “thinkers” slated for this coming policy talk ever use Google Earth?

All of the “thinkers” involved have exactly the same nonsensical view that Russia is somehow being aggressive, rather than defensive, in this whole border militarization scare over Ukraine. And all this comes on the heels of John Herbst and the likes of him jumping up and down, screaming the latest propaganda nonsense about “Invasion, Invasion, Invasion.” If you read Herbst, you’ll find a lot of lunacy there. The man thinks Russia will be broken soon, and that in 20 or 30 years, the biggest country on Earth won’t even be significant.

Then there’s Mamuka Bakhtadze who was the CEO of Georgian Railway LLC, the state-owned railway company of Georgia before rising to the exalted position as Washington puppet in Tbilisi. It’s also worth mentioning that he resigned as PM after only one year in office because the people of Georgia got fed up with him and launched massive protests. I am not sure if his joint press conference with NATO’s commander had anything to do with this.

You don’t need Foreign Policy Magazine emails to find out that America intends to stir every pot in the borderlands around Russia and China, and any other perceived competitor on the world stage. End of story.

Phil Butler, is a policy investigator and analyst, a political scientist and expert on Eastern Europe, he’s an author of the recent bestseller “Putin’s Praetorians” and other books. He writes exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

On November 28, the 15th Summit of the Leaders of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Member-States was held in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, with the participation of the heads of state and governments of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, the countries that are members of the organization.

The ECO summit agenda included further expansion of multifaceted cooperation within the organization in such priority areas as trade, investment, “green” economy and innovation, digital technologies, transport, logistics, tourism, etc.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation (ECO) is a regional interstate economic body established in 1985 by the Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries. It is the legal successor of the Organization for Regional Cooperation for Development operating on the basis of the Izmir Treaty signed by the three founding countries — Iran, Pakistan and Turkey on March 12, 1977. It was later joined by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

As President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov stressed out in his speech, the development of cooperation in the transport and energy areas is among the most important priorities of the ECO, since these spheres are effectively defining the trends of global economic growth. In keeping with the practical implementation of these initiatives, ECO has proceeded with the large infrastructural projects. The latter include, in particular, building of transmission lines Turkmenistan — Afghanistan — Pakistan, the railway from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, the gas pipeline Turkmenistan — Afghanistan — Pakistan — India. Strong emphasis has been also made on the activation of transport and transit communication along the East–West and North–South lines and, in particular, on the creation of transport corridors Uzbekistan —Turkmenistan — Iran — Oman, as well as Afghanistan — Turkmenistan — Azerbaijan — Georgia — Turkey. In this context, it is essential to establish a goal-oriented dialogue between the ECO and such interstate associations as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. “The implementation of major infrastructure projects with the participation of ECO member-states, without exaggeration, means a qualitative breakthrough in establishing a new geopolitical and economic space on the continent; it offers great opportunities for cooperation, attracting large external investments and tackling a number of important social challenges,” Turkmenistan’s president said.

Speaking during the Forum, the leaders of the ECO member-states, as well as the Secretary General of the Organization emphasized that the current summit, as well as the Organization itself in general, has become an effective platform for making decisions on topical and key aspects of regional economic cooperation in the ECO space.  The Organization has put in place all conditions for the further development of multilateral regional cooperation, for the socio-economic growth of the member countries, as well as the expansion of effective mutual cooperation in the field of trade, industry, transport and communications, agriculture, energy, health care, education, science and culture. Following the results of the ECO Summit, the Final Document was adopted.

The Iranian President was very active during the 15th ECO Summit, announcing Tehran’s position and proposals regarding strengthening regional and international relations, as well as removing obstacles and increasing the level of cooperation between ECO member-states. He also held meetings with his foreign counterparts in order to explore the possibilities of expanding bilateral ties. As the spokesman for the Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) said earlier, the country’s value of trade with ECO member-states from March 21 to October 22 (which corresponds to the first seven months of the Iranian year) increased by 48.5% amounting to 20.3 million tons of goods worth $9.2 billion. The share of Iran’s exports in this figure totaled 17.4 million tons of goods valued at $6.03 billion while the exports of ECO member-states amounted to 2.88 million tons, which corresponds to $3.3 billion in value terms.

As part of the deepening ECO cooperation, the 9th meeting of Iran-Pakistan Joint Trade Committee was held in Tehran on November 6 –7. During the talks both sides agreed to expand trade exchanges to $5 billion and create a barter trade mechanism. In the follow-up to this agreements, on November 24, Islamabad negotiated the purchase of Iranian liquefied gas through the barter system. At the same time, Iran agreed to meet the energy needs of Pakistan through the implementation of the gas pipeline project.

Meanwhile, Jeyhun Bayramov and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Iran, met on the sidelines of the summit. The sides discussed the current regional situation, as well as the Sochi declaration that had been adopted following the meeting of the leaders of Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia. The ministers also touched upon the implementation of trilateral statements, as well as the importance of cooperation in the “3+3” format.

A day earlier, on November 27, Ashgabat hosted a business forum of the ECO member-states. The business forum was attended by representatives of the ECO Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the Asian Development Bank, CCIs of ECO member-states, the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, the Turkish-Pakistani Chamber of Commerce and Industry as well as by relevant ministries, public organizations and various companies. About 300 foreign representatives participated online; bilateral meetings were set up in a range of sectors: oil and gas industry, chemistry, agriculture and food industry, textile industry, trade. The ECO business forum saw the signing of contracts worth more than $35.5 million. Within the framework of the ECO business forum, a Memorandum was signed with the purpose of increasing cargo shipping through the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway corridor, with Turkmenistan companies signing contracts for the export of confectionery products to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan. Deals were also struck on the supply of equipment from Turkey for the production of furniture in Turkmenistan, grain supplies from Kazakhstan, etc.

Vladimir Platov, expert on the Middle East, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Recent weeks have seen a significant military escalation on the border between Azerbaijan and Iran. With belligerent statements made by both sides, Iranian troops are being transferred to the border with their northern neighbor. Explaining the move, Brigadier-General Mohammad Pakpour, commander of the Ground Forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), said: “We will not tolerate the presence of Israel in our back yard.”

Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel are indeed a constant irritation and tension to Iran, which is, in effect, in a state of undeclared war with Israel. Iran is frankly afraid that Israel will establish an outpost on its northern border, which will serve as a base for intelligence and special operations such as the drone attack in which Iranian General Qasem Soleimani was assassinated on January 3, 2020. With that attack in mind, Tehran has been particularly closely monitoring Azerbaijani troops’ use of Israeli-made drones, missiles, anti-tank missile systems and other weapons during last year’s war in Nagorno-Karabakh.

“The relations between Azerbaijan and Israel are much deeper that they appear, like an iceberg, most of which is hidden from prying eyes.” These words of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev were contained in a telegram sent from the US Embassy in Baku to Washington, and became widely known following their publication by Wikileaks. The high level links between Azerbaijan and Israel – the two countries have exchanged visits by senior officials – are based on geopolitical and economic factors.

At the geopolitical level, Iran is the most important factor bringing the two states closer together. Azerbaijan’s relations with neighboring Iran are far from friendly. Azerbaijan accuses Iran of persecuting its ethnic Azeri minority, which numbers 20 million, while Tehran accuses Baku of using this population as a lever to interfere in its internal politics. As for the relations between Israel and Iran, since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, they have been not merely cold, but openly hostile. This situation has long provided both Israel and Azerbaijan with a reason for adopt shared strategies against Iran. Thus, the two countries cooperate closely on intelligence sphere, and Israeli special forces train their Azerbaijani counterparts, including those serving on the border with Iran, while Israeli defense companies provide Azerbaijan with both military hardware and intelligence support which enables it to monitor Iran.

During the events in Nagorno-Karabakh last year, Azerbaijan used both Turkish Bayraktar drones, and also several hundred Israeli-made kamikaze drones, including Aerostar, Orbiter 2M, Orbiter 3, Orbiter 1K, Hermes 450, and Heron 1 models. In fact, a significant proportion of the military equipment and drones that led Azerbaijan to victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 were purchased from Israel.

It should also be borne in mind that Azerbaijan is a very important supplier of oil to Israel. According to a report by the US Energy Information Administration, 40% of Israel’s oil requirements are provided by Azerbaijan. According to the Israeli newspaper Hareetz, the Aliyev family has invested almost USD 600 million in Israel’s economy, in sectors ranging from healthcare to the stock exchange.

Azerbaijan’s Jewish population, numbering about 7 thousand and based largely in Baku, is particularly involved in promoting good relations between Azerbaijan and Israel. Nevertheless, despite the shared geopolitical and economic interests, Azerbaijan tries to avoid openly taking a pro-Israel stance – Baku is clearly afraid of an anti-Israeli reaction from the Muslim world as a whole. With this in mind, Baku has also supported pro-Palestinian projects and proposals in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and Israel has greeted these initiatives with understanding.

However, the “Israeli factor” is not the only cause of the deepening rift between Iran and Azerbaijan. The increase of Turkey’s influence in the region is also clearly contributing to the tensions. Unfortunately, it appears that may influential political figures in Iran are may be dissatisfied with the results of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. In the past this area played a strategic role in international power play, and Tehran was one of the countries with influence over the region. Until fairly recently Turkey’s influence in the region was limited – a situation that suited Tehran. But the balance has changed: following last year’s conflict most of Nagorno-Karabakh is now controlled by Azerbaijan, and Turkey has gained in importance as a major regional power. It was Ankara that was Baku’s main ally in that war, providing it with military hardware, including Bayraktar TB2 drones, as well as consultancy services and, according to some reports, foreign militants, who serving as mercenaries.  As a result, despite all Tehran’s efforts, Ankara has in effect deprived Iran from playing any role in the post-war reconstruction of Nagorno-Karabakh, and, under the Shusha Declaration about Alliance, signed in June between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Turkey is permitted to expand its network of military bases in the disputed region.

Tensions in border areas have been further inflamed by the recent Unbreakable Brotherhood 2021 exercises held jointly by Baku and Ankara in Nakhichevan, and the Three Brothers-2021 in the Caspian Sea, in which the two countries were joined by Pakistan. The latter exercises were of particular concern to Tehran, which claimed that the use of this sea for military activities was a violation of the Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea, as countries other than the Caspian Littoral States, as named in the Convention, cannot have a military presence there.

In response, Iran deployed additional forces – two missile divisions and reinforcements from the 16th Tank Division based in Qazvin – to its border regions, stepped up drone surveillance of its north-western borders and put its air defense systems on high alert.

However, there are grounds for hopes that the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan will not escalate any further. Significantly, while troops were gathering on the borders, Kazem Sajjapour, Iran’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Baku. He expressed interest in the development of partnership and took part in negotiations with Azerbaijani and Turkish diplomats on future cooperation between the three nations. According to media reports, while in Baku he also participated in a number of meetings with representatives of local authorities, focusing on the reduction of tension between the two countries.

Vladimir Platov, expert on the Middle East, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The Republic of Azerbaijan, a former Soviet state that is now a member of the CIS, is a long-term partner of Russia. Although it is not a member of such important (from Russia’s perspective) international organizations as the EAEC (Eurasian Economic Union) and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), Russia and Azerbaijan nevertheless work together closely, and this cooperation means a great deal to both nations and the whole wider region.

Among the important sectors in which Russia and Azerbaijan cooperate is the automobile industry. Naturally, given the nation’s status as a former Soviet republic, Soviet and Russian-made cars have been in common use in Azerbaijan for decades and continue to play an important role in the national economy. And, with their low cost and high quality, Azerbaijan sees no reason to stop using them.

Russian trucks made by the KAMAZ factory are particularly popular in Azerbaijan. For several decades, they have been the main goods vehicles used in Russia and the other former Soviet republics. KAMAZ trucks are also sold in many other regions, and are currently in use in more than 80 countries, with some states, such as South Africa, manufacturing them under license. Azerbaijan has also expressed an interest in manufacturing KAMAZ trucks in its territory.

In December 2014 KAMAZ and the Ganja Auto Plant (the largest car manufacturer in Azerbaijan) signed an agreement on the supply of complete sets of KAMAZ components to Azerbaijan, as well as a license agreement granting the Azerbaijani company the right to assemble the vehicles in its facilities. The assembly of KAMAZ trucks in Azerbaijan began in April 2015. It was announced that these vehicles would be supplied to state construction organizations, as well as municipal and transport bodies – a clear indication of how highly the country’s government rates these Russian trucks.

If KAMAZ is the leading Russian manufacturer of heavy goods vehicles, then GAZ occupies a similar position in the light and medium goods vehicle sector. Like KAMAZ trucks, GAZ goods vehicles are very popular outside Russia, due to their high quality, reliability and reasonable cost. They are exported to more than 30 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe. GAZ vehicles have long been manufactured under license in Kazakhstan and Turkey. And as a long-term importer of large numbers of these vehicles, Azerbaijan also decided to start manufacturing them under license.

In April 2018, GAZ and the Azerbaijani company Azermash agreed to start the assembly of GAZ vehicles in a new factory in the Azerbaijani town of Hajigabul. According to the announcement on the deal, once production of the standard models has been launched, the company will use these models as a basis for the manufacture of special purpose vehicles such as ambulances.

The plant in Hajigabul began production in April 2021. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was present at the opening ceremony. Ever since production commenced, the company has assembled nine different GAZ models: trucks, vans and minibuses. The company currently aims to assemble 1 500 vehicles a year, and its capacity will be gradually increased to what is, in terms of the national motor vehicle manufacturing industry as a whole, a significant level. Neither the Russian nor the Azerbaijani party to the agreement have any doubt that these production volumes will be attained: GAZ vehicles are popular in Azerbaijan, and when they are assembled in the country they will be cheaper than when they were imported from Russia, as no customs duties will be payable. It is certain that the plant in Hajigabul will account for a significant share of the national market. And when demand on the national market is fully satisfied Azerbaijan plans to export vehicles assembled in the Hajigabul plant to Iran and Turkey.

At the end of July 2021 a Russian trade delegation from the Russian Export-Import Bank, a state bank established to support Russian trading ventures, visited Azerbaijan. On July 23, in Baku, the Azerbaijani capital, there was a meeting in which many representatives of major Russian firms held talks with their Azerbaijani counterparts on issues relating to cooperation in a range of different areas, including the development of transport infrastructure, the construction of residential property and the overall increase of trade between the two countries. According to participants in the talks, Russia and Azerbaijan are in a good position to develop bilateral trade and other types of economic cooperation.

The motor vehicle manufacturing industry was among the sectors discussed: according to Rashad Nabiyev, Azerbaijan’s Minister of Transport, Communications and High Technologies, who took part in the talks, the government is seeking support from Russia in upgrading its fleet of vehicles. Getting straight down to business, while the meeting was still under way KAMAZ and the Ganja plant signed a memorandum of understanding on expanding the manufacture of KAMAZ trucks in Azerbaijan.

Russian vehicle manufacturers feel comfortable doing business in Azerbaijan, and it is anticipated that that country’s demand for goods vehicles will soon significantly increase. During the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, which took place in autumn 2020, Azerbaijan occupied much of the unrecognized republic. Now Azerbaijan has to develop its new territory, which will involve a great deal of work. The government plans to construct a railway, several airports and approximately 1 000 kilometers of roads in the region. This work will certainly require a large number of trucks.

In December 2020 Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, announced that under international law Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan. Naturally, Azerbaijan appreciates these words of support. With this new factor in mind, and given the fact that, as mentioned above, Russian vehicles are popular in Azerbaijan, it seems clear that Azerbaijan will be using a large number of Russian vehicles in its upcoming building project, and that this will boost the growth of vehicle manufacturing companies and strengthen relations between Russia and Azerbaijan.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The more you read, and read again, the same material but with the titles changed, the more disillusioned you become. It is as if the pundits just don’t get it, even to the extent of calling the South Caucasus part of Europe.

In that particular case even Wikipedia is more accurate than most:

Transcaucasia, also known as the South Caucasus, is a geographical region on the border of Eastern Europe and Western Asia, straddling the southern Caucasus Mountains. Transcaucasia roughly corresponds to modern Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

This region is more than a crossroads, it is a pitch for geopolitical intrigues, and these have far-reaching consequences: events in Turkey, the Syrian civil war, refugee flows, the rise and funding of ISIS (banned in Russia), all these events swirl around and around to provide the force for political conflict with international players.

But nowhere are America’s failed intentions more obvious than in a region that few can even find on the map. The South Caucasus was effectively a part of the Middle East, at least as far as Westerners were concerned, for most of its history. From now on it may again be so, at least when it comes to the price of oil in the BIGGER scheme of things.

Maps no longer matter

Give the region whatever geographical label you like – maps no longer matter but interests do, and unintended consequences are paramount. The very parts of it where the Western powers wanted to exert the maximum influence and the ones where this tactic is working the least.

Iran was long made out to be the bogeyman, then the good guy provided the US approved its every move. No combination of stick and carrot has worked. Iran-US relations are at their lowest point ever. Not since the Iranian hostage seize have things been more difficult.

Biden at one time wanted to ease sanctions, closing ranks with those in the Trump administration. But like most of his generation he has never got over the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Iran does not want to go back to the moot nuclear deal in return for easing up, so this must as usual be evidence of some congenital Iran evil, a strain of diplomatic COVID for which there is no known cure.

The United States has now imposed more sanctions on companies in Iran, China and the United Arab Emirates for doing business with the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, and on three Iranian entities for furthering conventional arms proliferation, as if the US has never done that.

But at the same time Iran gets the job done by using shell companies in Azerbaijan and Georgia, especially for transfers illegal under the sanctions regime, with no consequences because the West uses the same mechanisms, often at the same time, and the interest of these deals has a cross-pollinator effect.

Energy for those who don’t need it

The US and Israel are covertly arming Sunni groups in the South of Iran for a civil war that will likely never happen. The ideology behind this is less political than pragmatic, at least when it comes to the price of oil, and what regional resources can be skimmed off the top.

Aramco, the Saudi State Oil Company, wants to pay high dividends derived by riding the American wave of geopolitical meddling. Saudi Arabia will need a high oil price to pay this dividend, and this is what is driving the current dispute in OPEC with the UAE.

The UAE is the holdout against a new price agreement, and it feels that it should be able to produce at higher levels. But if the risk is that Saudi Arabia may both profit more from its association with Uncle Sam the Great Satan, and gain more political capital from complaining about the things which it gave it that advantage, the Emirates will soon be brought into line.

The now-beleaguered Aramco has turned into something of a Ponzi scheme, after falling in line with US attempts to crash oil prices against the Russian Federation under the last US administration. Through a combination of a Biden White House and high oil prices, I guess they are keeping the Ponzi scheme going and paying out dividends to friends and foes alike.

Higher oil prices (and gas exports, whose price is tied to oil) should be favourable for Russia. I see OPEC leaning toward a lower production, higher price scenario. However, things are not going all too well, and not only for Russia, it should be noted “that oil was the biggest loser in a broad market selloff after OPEC+ agreed to boost crude supply as a resurgent virus shook investor confidence in the global economic recovery.”

Historically Saudi Arabia has been the one who advocated for moderate prices whereas others have wanted higher prices, but the markets and political/economic instability is what determines the price of oil. It was first thought, assuming COVID-19 resurgence does not derail demand, a hundred dollar a barrel oil could be likely next year – but that may now be wishful thinking.

All this is being noted back in Tehran, and among its new found strategic partners. The same goes with Russia and Saudi Arabia’s tacit arrangement over oil production increases. America’s lame attempt to destabilise the Russian Federation through an oil war, in cahoots with Saudi Arabia, has been forgotten, bygones being bygones.

Greenerbacks

OPEC countries were hoping to gain a windfall from efforts to make Americans pay more for energy in the name of going green. Theoretically this should raise the importance of the South, Caucasus, that well-known transport and production hub.

However, with Iran, Russia, and other players on the same page, the long-standing geopolitical importance of the South Caucasus is diminished, and it is not even to be counted as a significant player in the New Great Game, largely because oil interests are shifting.

We have read it so many times, “the key importance of the South Caucasus lies in its crucial geographical location at the crossroads of both east-west and north-south transport and trade corridors.”

But little benefit has come to either the region or other players from all the efforts of international companies to utilise these advantages. The main function of the region has been to supply lots of oil off the books to clients like Israel.

Projects involving Western multinational companies, ostensibly about developing the oil and gas resources of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, have been more geopolitical than based on profit and loss statements, as the BTC pipeline project so well reflects. Regional countries are not at the table in any of these projects, except as beggars hoping the projects may lead to more support, even though the strings attached to that support render it unattainable or useless.

Instead of bringing stability the opposite has occurred. Dutch Disease is running rampant in Azerbaijan, and little has been learnt in the effort to diversify its economy. Hence the economic and political independence of the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia is at a low point.

The flow of foreign payments has allowed authoritarian leaders to consolidate their hold on power, and buy more arms, which in turn, as in the case of the Azeri-Armenia war, has put both Russia and Turkey in a stronger geopolitical position.

The creation of the pipeline system connecting Azerbaijan’s energy resources via Georgia to Turkey and beyond did not live up to its billing. It is likely that Central Asian states are benefiting more than Azerbaijan, especially at this late stage. The oil and gas revenues paid for the weapons needed to retake much of Nagorno-Karabakh, but that money could have been better used to promote economic diversity and social programmes, if these didn’t have the habit or persuading people they also have the right to an opinion.

The transportation of energy resources is much more a joint venture now, and the West’s role has been substantially diminished. All the while, China is charting its own course in the region, starting in Central Asia and via the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline and other projects.

The bulk of Kazakhstan’s oil and Turkmenistan’s gas resources are yet to come online, but the South Caucasus’s further potential to serve as a key corridor for these energy resources is insignificant. Considerable investments have already been made in port facilities in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkmenistan, as well as in railroads across the region, and saturation is a more likely scenario than growth.

Even Iran is expanding its oil export facilities, with Iran planning to ship oil from a port in the Gulf of Omani in the near future; this will be its first crude export from outside the Persian Gulf and beyond the Strait of Hormuz.

Proving your worth to the wrong people

The stability of the South Caucasus will be less of a concern for major Western oil and gas firms from now on. However, in the void you can expect Chinese and Indian encroachment “with-and-without” the full blessing of regional partners, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and some other CIS countries. Collectively, Azerbaijan and Georgia are being brought all that much closer to the Russian Federation. So much so that they are now reorienting their foreign policies, and on a global level. Even Turkey is learning the value of location theory, and that the United States and many European countries are friends, but neighbours “better understand local and regional realities.”

It is important to mention that countries are no longer in one or another camp, at least when the price of oil is concerned, the continuity of supply, and how their business is conducted. The wars in the region and a bit beyond have served as a convenient distraction, as most recently exemplified by the civil war in Syria and conflict in Afghanistan, with Turkish footprints in both cases.

However, Iran is stronger than it has been in years, partly because of US sanctions and increased oil prices. Relations between one-time adversaries will be tempered when both can see themselves on the same plateau.

It will be interesting to see what the US can do to reduce this price and diplomatic windfall, which has occurred largely due to US policies. Maybe the Biden administration is counting on increases from Iran and perhaps Iraq and Venezuela to balance the market, but it can’t bank on it.

The South Caucasus is now a backwater, and has been turned over to the locals, regional players to divvy up. Notice here, no mention in terms of challenges facing this region, and money tells what politicians are not willing to say openly.

It might be ‘good’ to do a reality check and graph the docking of assistance budgets from the West in the region, which show a decrease in interest. USAID spending is way down, and I am sure it is the same for other donors like World Bank, DFID, Kfw, etc.

In conclusion, The South Caucasus is effectively a part of the Middle East, and will continue to be—in spite of any Western or map maker delusion that it is somehow part of Europe. Hence it is a local affair, its future to be decided by regional players and the actual price of oil is decided by COVID and fear.

Henry Kamens, columnist, expert on Central Asia and Caucasus, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The Russia brokered negotiated end of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has laid the basis for a major geo-political transformation of the South Caucasus. While Russia’s role in bringing the military conflict to an end and holding the ceasefire did put it in-charge of the South Caucasus, subsequent developments show how Russia has expanded its role and consolidated its position in its backyard. Its primary importance lies in the fact that no extra-regional and Western powers were or are still involved in that part of the world, which is one reason why ceasefire has not been violated. While Turkey and Iran were involved in brokering the ceasefire, the matter has always been a Russian affair. Also, Russian brokered peace and ceasefire came crucially at the expense of the Minks Group. It has allowed Russia to massively erode US ability to use this region to light fires on its periphery to create conditions for the expansion of the NATO eastward.

Controlling the region is important for the US also because it has emerged as one of the most suitable routes for the extension of China’s Belt & Road Initiative into Europe. The US, by keeping itself entrenched here, would want to control an important artery of the BRI. But the South Caucasus, under the Russian political influence and Chinese economic investment, is rapidly changing into a territory miles away from the reach of the US tentacles.

As the latest World Bank Data shows, China’s economic footprint has massively increased in past few years. Azerbaijan is widely believed to be an important link in China’s New Silk Road routes connecting it with Europe. Since 2005, Chinese trade turnover with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia increased around 2,070 percent, 380 percent and 1,885 percent, respectively.

Azerbaijan has particular importance for China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor, principally the Trans-Caucasus Transit Corridor (TCTC), that connects China to Europe via a network of railways, seaports, roads, and potentially pipelines.

While the current volume of trade between China and Azerbaijan is not high, the recent trends show important upward jump. According to World Bank data, “the trade volume between the two countries was 1.3 billion USD in 2018, about 6 percent of total Azeri trade, and half of that amount in 2013.” The World Bank estimates that the BRI is quote likely to transform the geo-economic capacity of Azerbaijan and that the country’s GDP could increase by a whooping 21 per cent in the long run. Azerbaijan’s participation in the BRI could allow it to tap into global value chains and diversify its economy.

With Nagorno-Karabakh now effectively under Azeri control and being managed under Russian supervision, and with China having recently signed an investment deal with the EU, there is no gainsaying that China will be paying a special attention to build a transit route through this region. China is developing a trade route via Kazakhstan that crosses the Caspian from the Kazakh port of Aktau to Baku. Chinese scholars have described this route as the hub of BRI and extremely pivotal to the success of the deal it has signed with the EU.

The connectivity and business generation opportunity that China is offering is also linked with Russia’s own plans to lay a new geography of trade involving Azerbaijan and Armenia. This was quite evident during the most recent meeting between Russian, Azeri and Armenian leaders in Moscow. The meeting was followed by an announcement to implement “measures involving the restoration and construction of new transport infrastructure facilities necessary for the organisation, implementation and security of international traffic carried out through the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia, as well as transportations carried out by the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia, which require crossing the territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia.”

The plan, as it stands, is to reactivate old “Caucasian Silk Roads” that would allow major countries in the region to connect with Russia and thus open avenues to boost trade, thus leaving no to minimum room for extra-regional powers like the US and France to play their old ‘divide & rule’ politics.

All of these developments also indicate a receding US presence and role in the region. But the US, under the Biden administration dominated by liberal interventionists, is likely to put its house in order and attempt a comeback in some form. In fact, the US is already making its come-back calculations.

The US Congress recently authorized the Director of National Intelligence to submit a report identifying core US strategic interests in the region, including US military assistance to both Azerbaijan and Armenia and how this could be used effectively to serve US interests.

As it stands, Washington is already gearing up for a geo-political struggle in the region around Nagorno-Karabakh. In October 2020, the US House Intelligence Committee head Adam Schiff “urged” the US to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh or the “Republic of Artsakh” as an independent state. The call for recognition as an “independent state” reflects how the US aims to insert itself in the region to play its usual divisive politics.

However, as the details given above show, there is a lot of politics of connectivity being planed and implemented to counter the politics of division the US is gearing up for.

Therefore, as it stands, political and economic agreements being made and implemented will massively reduce the space for a conflict to re-emerge and destabilize the region. It is only through such an occurrence that the US can possibly step in and push for reactivating the Minsk Group.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research-analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

It is still difficult to find out what is actually going on in the NK conflict zone. News outlets are highly selective in their reporting, which is based more often than not on carefully controlled information drips from Azerbaijan and Armenia. The reports being shared back and forth on various sites are little more than versions of whose ox is getting gored the most.

However, there is no doubt that this shooting war would not have got to the level it has without prodding from the Turkish president. What is his game – just self-preservation, or does he really believe in some greater Ottoman shadow?

Erdogan has been especially full of himself and his rhetoric of late, and neither seems to be abating. Many have even taken to calling the sitting president Sultan Erdogan, as his detractors have for years.

But why now? This conflict has been waiting to explode for two decades, with all the powers around wanting to keep it that way. What is Erdogan seeing as an opportunity here, and for whom – his “Turkic Council” or the other side?

Fox and Geese

It is true that the Armenian position is weak, at best, in terms of international law. But it is also true that extreme nationalist Armenians in various countries are willing to rally behind the homeland despite not knowing the facts.

The same goes for the Azeri side, but it has a much smaller international profile. More people have heard of the Armenian Genocide than can name the current President of Azerbaijan, despite one Aliyev or the other having run the place since Soviet times.

Azerbaijan will always be at a disadvantage in terms of international opinion. The fact that Armenia doesn’t just occupy Karabakh, but areas surrounding it where few Armenians live, and is allowed to continue doing so tells you all you need to know.

Erdogan may interpret this as an opening for him to assert himself as Azerbaijan’s “Great Power” protector. He may likewise see it as an existential threat to Turkey itself, which is already struggling as a Muslim country in the Western world.

It would be very typical of Erdogan to think this conflict was all about him. But if he is going to be the strongman at the head of a stronger country, he has to be seen to be doing something about Karabakh sooner or later.

It would be natural for Erdogan to feel that a diplomatic solution is beyond reach, as international law has been ignored in this conflict, but he is actually sating that such a solution is beyond reach for him, because Turkey isn’t as important as he thinks it is, and neither is he.

Things They Don’t Talk About

It is not true that Azerbaijan had no choice but to resort to the use of force. There are a number of territorial conflicts and disputes in the world where the players involved do not resort to force in their resolution, as it’s only the side which fears it will lose out in a diplomatic resolution is the one which resorts to violence.

By deciding to target and kill individuals it considers its own citizens, the Azerbaijani government is violating both its domestic laws and international humanitarian law. The latest violence has simply proven the Armenian contention that the Armenians of Karabakh cannot be assured of secure lives if they live under an Azerbaijani government.

However, Armenians know that they are partly to blame for this, hence their reliance on diplomacy and lobbying amongst people who don’t want a war. The Sumgait pogroms and Khojaly massacre at the end of the Soviet period are black spots on both nations, and such blood spilling has not been forgotten by either side.

Legal and territorial details must be high on the agenda of any negotiations, which is why Armenia is more interested in undertaking this necessarily complicated and time-consuming process to maintain the status quo. If someone finds a simple solution, which can never be maintaining what has existed on the ground since the Armenians occupied the area, Yerevan has very limited agency.

Foreign policy has not really changed since Pashinyan came to power. Pashinyan is just as stuck to Moscow as the earlier leaders, but he cannot turn easily to Russia for help under a security shield in light of his own connections with those in the opposite camp. Indeed, there is speculation in Azerbaijan that the Russians are on board with Kocharyan and his teammates, although fighting a war to drive Pashinyan out would only result in even more Russian influence over Armenia.

All About Russia?

Armenia and Azerbaijan have their own interests, like the pundits who get rich off their conflict. But at the end of the day, it is the interests of larger political powers which will decide what happens in Karabakh, and keeping these balanced is the task all sides have been forced to undertake since day one.

One of the attractions for the Turkish government is that further conflict in Karabakh opens up another front of engagement with Russia. With the West so anti-Russian, this keeps Erdogan sweet with Washington and also gives him the opportunity to avenge the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, like any good Turkish nationalist.

Turkey is already unofficially conducting a proxy war in Libya and Syria. Will Karabakh be used as a bargaining chip? Russia remembers what happened when the aura of Soviet invincibility was shattered in Afghanistan. It will have to tread very carefully to avoid getting involved in more foreign wars, engagements, than it can handle, and achieving outcomes it can defend long term.

This attack has clearly been planned for weeks, if not months, with the July clashes meant as a test or provocation. This suggests a specific military objective is being sought – probably the lower territories by the Arax river, or other points on the northern portion of the Line of Contact within easier reach.

If Turkey is conducting a limited military operation to redraw the line of contact more favourably, it might get away with this. However, there is a great deal of evidence now of the presence of radical militants from Syria, and possibly Libya, in the conflict zone. Erdogan is unlikely to get away with that, unless he then rides in to save the region from the people he inserted to begin with.

Someone Else’s Terrorists?

The presence of these radicals is easier to blame on Aliyev than Erdogan because the latter is theoretically is spectator, whilst the former is directly responsible for his country. Erdogan can present himself as a double Western saviour in return for a free hand at home – not only beating the Russians, but ridding Azerbaijan of terrorists too.

Aliyev cannot be seen to be backing down. Otherwise he and his family will outrage the population which has waited too long for this conflict to unfreeze, and the country to move forward.

Aliyevs father and son have always been able to blame lack of progress, and political and civil repression, on the frozen conflict. However Azeris know that they have both failed to conduct that conflict either well or credibly.

Armenia controls a number of Azeri areas around Karabakh because the all-controlling Azeri state was so desperate for troops during the initial conflict that it was kidnapping young men off the street and sending them to the front without any military training. Dictatorship is supposed to produce strong leadership, instead it produced a humiliation borne of chaos, which a system with greater accountability might have prevented.

The national self-worth of Azeris depends on restoring their territorial integrity, not supporting a regime or ideology, like in Soviet times. Aliyev can’t restore it, so he too has wanted the status quo to prevail. Now he has been stitched up, the question is who else wants to keep him there, regardless of the consequences for his own people.

Brinkmanship Before the Brink

Thomas de Waal, author of the book ‘Black Garden,” maintains that Turkey and Azerbaijan are trying to break the OSCE process and remake it in their favour. He has said in an interview with Yavuz Baydar, the editor of Ahval:

For Armenia, Turkey is the biggest existential threat. It’s been at peace with Turkey since 1920; for a hundred years there has been no shooting war. And now suddenly Turkey comes in on the side of Azeris. [Such engagement] is a source of fear in the Armenian DNA – a huge issue for Armenians.”

This may well have been the offer made by Erdogan to Aliyev, or perhaps the other way round. It is easy to see why Aliyev would be attracted by the idea of bringing in terrorists to help him do what he can’t do himself. Such a scenario is suggested by various media outlets, who quote Sergei Naryshkin, head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, as saying “We are talking about hundreds, even thousands, of radicals hoping to make money in the new Karabakh war.”

Russia has long been concerned by terrorists infiltrating it from neighbouring states. Erdogan is saying in effect, here they are then, I am bringing them here, what are you going to do about it?

Russia’s problem with terrorists is not that they are unpredictable, but that they are Western trained. It cites the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, which has become a safe haven and training base for terrorists recruited by Saudi and US intelligence.

But whichever way you look at this conflict, and why it has heated up again, fingers can only point in one direction. Aliyev doesn’t want more humiliation (or worse), Armenia doesn’t want the status quo upset, other countries don’t want another conflict getting in the way, and reducing their influence.

Only Recep Tayyip Erdogan has anything to gain from moving into Karabakh, and everyone else involved knows this. He has decided, in typical fashion, to push tolerance to the limit to show how important he is.

A frozen conflict is being turned into a “do or die war”, and all those people are dying, simply to protect the Turkish leader from his own population’s scepticism of his boasts about how great he and his country are. He has played his hand well, it must be admitted, but we will have to see how long it is before he oversteps everyone else’s mark.

Henry Kamens, columnist, expert on Central Asia and Caucasus, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

As the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh mushrooms, the Israeli-Azerbaijani arms trade is flourishing, and in this case Netanyahu’s government is being chiefly guided by economic benefits, with political calculations, or rather miscalculations, in second place after those.

It should be pointed out that at present the Israeli economy is experiencing great difficulties due to the pandemic, basically just like other countries. Restaurants, cafes, factories, and plants are temporarily shutting down, and the number of tourists has sharply dropped. Under these conditions, the Israeli government is trying to find some sources of assistance, even temporary ones, for both the economy and the population itself. For these purposes, it is keeping close track of the sales of weapons and high-technology systems.

Presently, in the 31-degree heat at Ben Gurion Airport, it is quiet and calm, without the previous hubbub – civilian flights have virtually ceased due to the rampant COVID-19 pandemic. But cargo flights along the route to Azerbaijan have still picked up recently, and are loaded to capacity. The large number of flights is a direct consequence of the resumption of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. At least four Il-76 aircraft operated by the Azerbaijani cargo airline Silk Way, which serves the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense, landed and then took off from Uvda Air Force Base in southern Israel: two before the start of hostilities, and two afterwards. According to the air traffic rules, this is the only airport from which aircraft loaded with explosives are allowed to take off.

Surveillance of the takeoffs and landings, as well as aircraft traffic throughout the Middle East and beyond the region, is something done by both professionals and amateurs, and therefore the flight paths of the four aircraft have been documented by professionals, and on various public websites that follow air traffic activity. Some of these planes have also flown from Baku to Ankara, and to Istanbul and back again, in recent times. All of this speaks of the redeployment of weapons and military equipment, and therefore that Israel is involved in the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh – and has taken the side of one of the warring parties.

On September 27 fighting resumed, with a surprise offensive conducted by the Azerbaijanis along the entire front. Many people, both those in military uniforms and civilians, have been killed so far. Both sides are using artillery and tanks, and carrying out airstrikes (using helicopters and drones) on cities and villages. People are now in shelters or basements; some have already moved to places that are safer, while others are still in the process of fleeing.

It is difficult to try to correctly – and objectively – describe the behavior exhibited by the various parties involved in this struggle, and their temporary and constant allies. The fact remains that:  Turkey and Israel, which currently harbor animosity toward each other (Recep Tayyip Erdogan just recently, and sharply, stated that Jerusalem belongs to Muslims), are both giving support to Azerbaijan, a Shiite Muslim country. On the other hand, Iran, one-third of whose population is of Azerbaijani descent (including its Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei), supports Christian Armenia and, according to some reports, is delivering armaments to it.  Greece, a strategic ally of Israel, and currently in conflict with Turkey over gas disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, is supporting Armenia.

This is, indeed, a very complex and confusing issue.

Another issue that should worry the Israeli government, and everyone else in this country, is that Israel – the state for a people that witnessed six million of its own perish during the Holocaust – refuses to recognize the Armenian genocide committed by the Ottoman Empire during World War I. For many years, it adopted this position so that Ankara would not become annoyed, which for 50 years was Israel’s strategic ally against Syria, and then versus Iran. The Mossad and Turkish intelligence services collaborated with each other, and Israel’s defense industry secretly sold billions of dollars worth of weapons to Turkey. In an ironic twist of fate, the systems that Israel sold to the Turks included drones and technology that helped Turkey build the same kind of industry. Turkish Bayraktar drones now operate on the battlefields in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Turkey, which in the past has declared a zero conflict policy vis-a-vis its neighbors, is currently in conflict with all of them, or at least is taking part in wars that involve them.

Dismantling the strategic alliance between Turkey and Israel is a systematic and purposeful process, and one which was started by Recep Tayyip Erdogan one-and-a-half decades ago. However, Tel Aviv did not use this as an opportunity to fulfill its historical duty, or follow its conscience and values, regarding the Armenian genocide. The reason for this is Azerbaijan itself. At the same time that Recep Tayyip Erdogan began to distance himself from Israel, Azerbaijan and Israel started becoming closer. It soon became clear that the two countries had formed a kind of strategic alliance – one centered on mutual hostility towards Iran. Four years ago, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu paid an urgent visit to Baku, during which Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced that he had signed a series of contracts for the purchase of Israeli weapons worth $5 billion. So that let the cat out of the bag, and told the whole world the truth about the relations between the two countries.

After that, according to foreign sources, the Mossad created a station in Azerbaijan that serves as “its eyes, ears, and a foothold” for monitoring Iran. According to these reports, Azerbaijan has prepared an airfield that would help Israel if it were to attack Iran. Other reports claimed that an Iranian nuclear industry archive, stolen by Mossad agents in Tehran two-and-a-half years ago, was smuggled into Israel via Azerbaijan. According to some reports, the Israeli aerospace industry in the form of Elbit, Rafael, and other, smaller companies sells almost anything to Baku. This includes artillery, missiles, naval vessels, reconnaissance equipment, and a large number of unmanned aerial vehicles. Almost all Israeli companies that manufacture drones, including assault or self-destructing (“kamikaze”) drones, have sold their goods to the Azerbaijani army. According to past statements by Armenian officials, some of these drones, including those made by Aeronautics Ltd., have been shot down during incidents along the border with Azerbaijan. The most recent data suggests that Armenian air defense systems, including the Russian S-300 system, were destroyed by Israeli Harop kamikaze drones, which target the signal when radar is switched on.

On several occasions, Armenian politicians, including the top leadership in Armenia, have expressed their concern over the continued sale of Israeli weapons to Azerbaijan. The previous President of Armenia, Armen Sarkissian, called Israeli President Reuven Rivlin about this, expressing his concern over the continued sale of Israeli weapons to Azerbaijan. Reuven Rivlin was demagogic in how he expressed his regret, and noted that Israel has long-standing relations with Azerbaijan, adding that their cooperation “is not directed against any other country”. It is true that he forgot the old truth that if there is a weapon, then sooner or later it will start shooting and killing people. In this case, the Israeli president was not interested in the fact that his country, while allegedly actively advocating for the cause of peace, is undermining that peace in another part of the world. It should be repeated that the principle of “I’m just straddling the fence” is unlikely to be painless for the Israelis.

It would be difficult to anticipate that Tel Aviv, which has always condemned the launch of missiles against civilians by Hezbollah and Hamas, will now change its methods. Another country could perhaps suspend its shipments, if only temporarily. Concerning anything related to arms sales, the hypocrisy of Israeli governments over the years is nothing new. The current silence kept by its government on this issue speaks volumes, yet it simply does not understand one simple fact: if, at some time in the future, the Israelis start talking about any allegedly illegal arms deliveries to the Palestinians, they will simply be reminded of the behavior exhibited by Tel Aviv, which actively supplied arms to Azerbaijan, and so added a generous portion of fuel to the fire of the military conflict. There is only one truth, if there even is one.

It is interesting how people perceive this problem in Israel itself. The majority of the population is quite skeptical, and they believe that thanks to the sharp improvement in relations between Israel and a number of Gulf countries, they no longer need an “oil for arms” alliance with Baku. For moral and strategic reasons, Israel should now take a look at Armenia.  Israeli-Azerbaijani relations, Israeli media outlets state, have always been based on transactions – and not only in terms of the “oil for arms” deal. Azerbaijan views its deepening ties with Israel as a means of currying favor with Washington, as recently confirmed by Azerbaijan’s ambassador to the United States.  Baku seeks to involve Jewish community groups in the United States in this scheme, positioning itself as a champion of “interfaith dialogue”.

But closer ties with Israel, writes the Israeli Haaretz newspaper, did not prevent Baku from establishing excellent relations not only with Turkey, but also with Israel’s implacable enemy, Iran. The two countries have deepened their relationship in recent years, with Hassan Rouhani making a more substantial relationship with Azerbaijan one of his top priorities. In reality, Azerbaijan has been cooperating with Iran for many years, ranging from selling a 10-percent stake in one of the country’s largest oil pipelines to sending millions of dollars to state-run Iranian companies in a major money laundering scandal (which recently involved IAI, a major Israeli aerospace industry player).  In addition, despite its efforts to develop relations with Israel, Baku has consistently refused to establish full-fledged diplomatic relations with this country, and open up an embassy, due to pressure from Iran, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and Turkey.   Despite trying to constantly appease the regime in Iran, Azerbaijan still seeks to woo both Israel and the West away from Armenia.

When analyzing all these facts, an obvious conclusion offers itself.  Yes, flirting with Azerbaijan and supplying it with the cutting-edge weapons over a certain, very short-lived stage, can economically help Benjamin Netanyahu’s current government, but over the long term this Azerbaijani area of focus will only cloud the ability to correctly explain Israeli policy for various politicians. And it is unlikely that this will help advance Israeli policy on the world stage, including with regard to various facets involving how to resolve its long-standing Palestinian problem.

Viktor Mikhin, a corresponding member of RANS, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

As it’s been revealed by a number of media sources, Earle Litzenberger is a career member of the US State department that used to occupy the position of the senior advisor in the Bureau of political-military affairs within this government body. He has also been known for occupying the position of senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Prior to that, he used to serve as the deputy chief of the US mission to NATO, deputy senior civilian representative to Afghanistan within NATO, deputy chief of the US embassy in Belgrade and deputy chief of the US embassy in Bishkek.

If one is to take into consideration the fact that Litzenberger has a strong military background, he would be puzzled over the fact that such a figure was to be appointed US ambassador to Azerbaijan. Yet, things would become much more transparent when the fact that Washington has made a number of fruitless attempts to launch a color revolution in Azerbaijan is taken into consideration. Indeed, every election season in this country is associated with the Western media trying to persuade the local population that it’s the time to launch a mass protest movement that would ultimately result in every aspect of the political life in Azerbaijan getting subjected to Washington’s will. Moreover, there’s a matter of Caspian oil that Western monopolies have been dreaming to get their hands on for a long while. So it’s no coincidence that a new election season in Azerbaijan is approaching, as the voting is due to take place sometime in 2020.

The bilateral relations between the United States and Azerbaijan saw a major uptick during the terms of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. In the 1990s, the former US presidential adviser on national security, Zbigniew Brzezinski would travel to Azerbaijan to personally deliver private messages to the local political elites from the US president. The ultimate goal behind this trip was drive a wedge between Baku and Moscow, that enjoyed good friendship within the framework of the allied states in the post-Cold War period. Yet, Brzezinski would also try to drive Azerbaijan away from its another former ally – Armenia and it must be added that to a certain extent he was successful in this quest.

In a bid to test the waters, Brzezinski would propose developing energy cooperation between the United States and Azerbaijan, the scenario that would hurt both Moscow and Baku itself economically but would make Western oligarchs really happy. Even though back then there was no official rhetorics about the “harmful energy dependence of Europe on Russia,” Brzezinski would be ahead of its time in advertising Western energy independence from Moscow.

Gradually, Azerbaijan would become a principal player on the European hydrocarbon market by agreeing to export its oil via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Today it is also engaged in negotiations on the construction of South Stream pipeline, which would transport Caspian gas to Europe.

In addition to cooperating with the West in hydrocarbon production, Baku has recently begun providing extensive support to the US coalition forces in Afghanistan, while publicly manifesting its own intention of strengthen its economic ties with a number of Western countries.

However, in 2010 the bilateral relations between Washington and Baku took a noticeable dive once the Obama administration made an attempt to “normalize” relations between Turkey and Armenia, to the detriment of Azerbaijan’s interests. To a large extent, this shift in Washington’s policies became possible due to a strong pressure applied by the Armenian lobby in Washington on American political elites.

Almost three decades after the vote of independence, Azerbaijan represents a fairly successful state that is capable of pursuing its own international and domestic goals, consistent with its own national interests. In spite of the tensions in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Azerbaijan managed to develop its national identity and transform itself into a powerful international player.

However, in recent years, the United States and its European satellites have grown vocally critical of Azerbaijan and its policies. Just like in any other region of the world, Washington is unable to stomach the fact that the political leadership of Azerbaijan pursues its own independent policies and will be able to pocket the profits from its booming oil and gas trade with Europe, instead of turning them over to Western monopolies under the supervision of the United States. Therefore, the expectations that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines would land Azerbaijan in the Western camp, transforming it into a Caucasian equivalent of the present-day Baltic republics, Moldova, or the fascist-riddled Ukraine have all but failed. The West cannot find joy in its heart while observing the rapidly improving ties between Azerbaijan and Russia, especially in a situation when these ties transform into a mutually beneficial military cooperation.

In addition, Washington has started to rap its head around the fact that Azerbaijan has voluntarily assumed the role of Turkey’s younger brother, and as tensions continue flaring between Washington and Ankara, there’s no doubt that Baku would be more happy to support Tayyip Erdogan than Donald Trump. However, it seems that Washington has had enough of Turkey and Azerbaijan and is now going to make them pay an incredibly high price for their disobedience, especially in the light of Ankara acquiring Russia’s state-of-the-art S-400 air defense systems in spite of the massive outcry voiced in this West over this fact.

Therefore, through various official and secret channels, the so-called sole superpower is going to try make it clear to Baku that should it be continuing such policies in the future, it will be treated extremely harshly in the West. That is why Washington spares no time in staging a drastic activization of the opposition forces within Azerbaijan that it has been sponsoring all along. Predictably enough, the so-called National Council of Democratic Forces would launch rallies under a variety of pretexts, starting with the violation of human rights in Azerbaijan and ending with corruption claims. But if in the past, Ilham Aliyev had to take restrained criticism from the mainly non-governmental entities, now he must brace for a full-scale color revolution. It seems that Uncle Sam decided that it was about time to replace him with a more “democratic” government that would have a better understanding of the chain of command that exist in the Western world. It’s no coincidence that the Azerbaijani currency – manat has recently taken a major hit and keeps falling down rapidly.

Under these conditions, the figure of the new US ambassador to Azerbaijan is just a part of a larger picture, as his past employment in the well-known German Marshall Fund of the United States non-governmental organization deserves a separate mention. Over the years this American NGO would be accused repeatedly of staging color revolutions and coup d’etats all across the globe. As it has recently been made public by the government in Baku, the sitting president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, outlawed this organization, breaking all officials ties with it. The German Marshall Fund used to finance the activities of the Peace and Democracy Institute in Baku that was headed by Leyla Yunus – a highly controversial figure that would cooperate on numerous occasions with anti-Azerbaijan forces, including Armenian intelligence agencies, under the notion of promoting “human rights activities.”

It is impossible to make any definite predictions in modern geopolitics, but it’s safe to say that the Aliyev regime is heading into troubled waters, and Earle Litzenberger would make sure that it’s not going to enjoy this trip.

Martin Berger is a freelance journalist and geopolitical analyst, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”  

Armenian-Iranian relations have the potential to achieve new levels of ‘amicable’ collaboration—if the two nations are left alone to deal with one another. Although few laypersons can even locate one or the other on a map, many soon will be able to as American sanctions on Iran impact the region and complicate larger geopolitical events.

America’s goal is to isolate Iran from all outlets to the rest of the world, albeit it is not working as planned. Efforts to date may actually be making the US governments position more difficult with its friends and driving Iran closer to some of its neighbours out of economic and political expediency.

Describing the close relationship in 2018 between Armenia and Iran (the main two countries in this discussion), the [then] acting Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, said: “We don’t see the need to make any change in them, we need to only maintain the good level of these relations and to raise them to a new level.”

This statement is significant, from both a perspective of historic and context of current events. This should be hardly surprising, as both nations live under the shadow of US-imposed sanctions, which in Armenia’s case also include any business dealings with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

These continued good relations are maintained despite US might and they are not a welcomed development for the US while it continues finger pointing and trying to further tighten the noose around Iran.

New Realities

For Armenia, the current challenge is to keep its good relationship with Iran intact whilst also not distancing itself from the US and Russia. Pashinyan has repeatedly said that, “Armenia needs to intensively develop relations with Iran for mutual benefit.”

This may be easier said than done in light of recent statements. For instance, “Iran considers Karabakh to be Azerbaijani territory and supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan,” said Lt. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri, Iran’s chief of General Staff a few days ago. “Changing borders by force is unacceptable, and Iran always stands by the [Azeri] side on this issue.”

But this sudden shift in policy by Iran is all about location, timing, and trying to maintain a delicate balance. At the end of the day, that is what Armenia is also trying to do. It understands (and accepts) the Iranian support of the Azeri position, provided it (does not go beyond) mere words.

Two of Iran’s near neighbours, Armenia and Georgia, serve as important conduits to the West. Azerbaijan and Turkey have Armenia blockaded on two sides, and Georgia has not always been a trusted trade and banking outlet for Armenia. All told, if it weren’t for the borders with Georgia and Iran, the economies of both Armenia and Iran would suffer far more.

Armenia remembers the early 90s well, a period when food and energy had to flow through neighbouring Georgia, and were subject to hijacking and extraction. On one occasion the main railroad bridge which carried wheat and energy supplies from Georgian ports was blown up.

The Western media blamed this act on the Azerbaijani Special Forces. However, from the information I have been able to gather from local sources, it was an open secret in regions close to the border that this was the handiwork of the Georgian fuel mafia.

Hence there are very pragmatic reasons why the small border between Armenia and Iran should remain open for traffic and trade, especially for energy. As then-president Sargsyan said in an interview in 2017 with the Shardh Daily newspaper, gas for electricity swaps was a win-win situation for both Iran and Armenia, and this is why both countries remain interested in future cooperation.

Rock and Hard Place

In these days of never-ending US sanctions, it can be awkward, given its relations with the West, for Armenia to fully justify its close and expedient relations with Iran. But there is a general understanding in Brussels and Washington that Yerevan is between a rock and a hard place.

The fallout from the recent Iranian statement over NK remains to be seen. But the Iranian Ambassador in Yerevan will be obliged to issue a clarifying statement of some sort.

On January 18 the Iranian military attaché to that embassy discounted the “information which is circulating in the Azeri media on his visit, especially in terms of the controversial statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue”.

The attaché reaffirmed Iran’s balanced position on the NK issue, and that Iran has recently stated that it has not undergone any changes in [its policy] and that the information presented in the media and with various comments, has been distorted. Moreover, emphasising the importance of political relations between the two countries, “the sides are confident that there will be many opportunities to express their official position on high level mutual visits and to address various issues.”

Diplomats from both sides, Levon Ayvazyan and Mehdri Vecdani, also highlighted the development of defence relations for regional stability, peace and security.

Meanwhile – never ending story

America and many of its close allies often turn a blind eye to sanctions-busting due to the realities faced by Armenia, as a landlocked country. Despite the rhetoric, Iran and Armenia will likely continue business as usual, as it would not be politically expedient, especially for the US, to drive Armenia even closer to Iran and Russia by trying to use it as a stick to–beat –Iran with.

Cross-border and regional commerce is made easier by the presence of a sizable Armenian community in Iran (albeit one that’s been dwindling since the revolution of 1979). It gives ties between Armenia and Iran a particular relevance today. The current geopolitical turmoil has strengthened the Armenian community in Iran, and it is now in a better position, both politically and in terms of religious freedom.

That is why Armenia will not collaborate and impose strict sanctions on Iran. It also has to maintain a delicate balance with other, less friendly, neighbours like Azerbaijan and Turkey but also Russia, which is an unconditional military ally, supplier of weapons and other necessary goods. Russia also maintains a military presence in the country which ensures Armenian national security. The ties with Russia go back far and run deep.

Both Armenia and Iran have regional ambitions. Armenia already has a stronger military than fellow Caucasus countries Georgia and Azerbaijan. The collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991 afforded regional opportunities to both countries.

Regional Dynamics

Relations between Iran, Armenia, and Azerbaijan will also impact the future status of the Caspian Sea, and reflect the dynamics of regional power plays. With so many interactions, it should be obvious why Armenia clarified last year, as reported by Radio Free Europe, that it has a mind of its own.

Despite John Bolton telling Prime Minister Pashinyan last October that, “the administration of Donald Trump will impose sanctions very vigorously,” and despite America’s efforts to pressure Armenia to close ranks with the US over sanctions, Armenia has made it very clear that it will not bow to foreign pressure. All these political maneuverings make the Armenia-Iran border a significant issue.

America knows very well that Iran uses Armenia and Georgia as gateways to the West, and that Armenia priorities its own national and state interests. It also understands that such vested interests do not always correspond with the interests of other countries. The presence of an active and vocal Armenian Diaspora in the US and its allies also makes these interests a matter of domestic importance.

But Iran also has other routes, via the Middle East and India and points farther east, to connect with the Western World. Georgia and Armenia are important, but they are not the only paths Tehran can use. This factor is often underestimated, but that is because Iran and Armenia both want this, knowing that emphasising their common interest benefits both.

Iran also has to walk a fine line. It borders counties that are not on good terms with Armenia, such as Azerbaijan and Turkey. It must also respect cultural diversity and be politically expedient and open to compromise. It will also need to present a less radical face to Christian countries for the sake of trade.

This explains in part why Iran has maintained a more or less neutral position in terms of the Karabakh conflict, at least until recently.

Iran, as an Islamic nation with a large Azerbaijani or otherwise Turkic population, would normally side strongly with Azerbaijan out of common religious values. The recent statement by General Bagheri is what you would expect to come out of Tehran. But it is newsworthy because it is anomalous.

Given what the US is always saying about Iran, Washington will be hoist on its own petard if it tries to use it to cause trouble, when this is one of the few statements Iran has made which can be interpreted negatively by Yerevan.

Iran also realizes that it is not an expert in the conflict resolution process. Tehran tried to mediate back in the ’90s, but did not get too far. In fact, it was one of the first nations to realize that it would ultimately gain more influence by allowing the combatants to sort out their own mess, and then offer resolution models over NK.

Reluctance to get involved in resolving conflicts also puts them out of step with the US, which tries to enlist everyone into such efforts. But if Iran’s alternative methods are seen to work, this will antagonise the rest of the world and make formal Iran-Armenia alliance, a necessity.

Henry Kamens, columnist, expert on Central Asia and Caucasus, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.