On November 28, the 15th Summit of the Leaders of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Member-States was held in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, with the participation of the heads of state and governments of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, the countries that are members of the organization.

The ECO summit agenda included further expansion of multifaceted cooperation within the organization in such priority areas as trade, investment, “green” economy and innovation, digital technologies, transport, logistics, tourism, etc.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation (ECO) is a regional interstate economic body established in 1985 by the Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries. It is the legal successor of the Organization for Regional Cooperation for Development operating on the basis of the Izmir Treaty signed by the three founding countries — Iran, Pakistan and Turkey on March 12, 1977. It was later joined by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

As President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov stressed out in his speech, the development of cooperation in the transport and energy areas is among the most important priorities of the ECO, since these spheres are effectively defining the trends of global economic growth. In keeping with the practical implementation of these initiatives, ECO has proceeded with the large infrastructural projects. The latter include, in particular, building of transmission lines Turkmenistan — Afghanistan — Pakistan, the railway from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, the gas pipeline Turkmenistan — Afghanistan — Pakistan — India. Strong emphasis has been also made on the activation of transport and transit communication along the East–West and North–South lines and, in particular, on the creation of transport corridors Uzbekistan —Turkmenistan — Iran — Oman, as well as Afghanistan — Turkmenistan — Azerbaijan — Georgia — Turkey. In this context, it is essential to establish a goal-oriented dialogue between the ECO and such interstate associations as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. “The implementation of major infrastructure projects with the participation of ECO member-states, without exaggeration, means a qualitative breakthrough in establishing a new geopolitical and economic space on the continent; it offers great opportunities for cooperation, attracting large external investments and tackling a number of important social challenges,” Turkmenistan’s president said.

Speaking during the Forum, the leaders of the ECO member-states, as well as the Secretary General of the Organization emphasized that the current summit, as well as the Organization itself in general, has become an effective platform for making decisions on topical and key aspects of regional economic cooperation in the ECO space.  The Organization has put in place all conditions for the further development of multilateral regional cooperation, for the socio-economic growth of the member countries, as well as the expansion of effective mutual cooperation in the field of trade, industry, transport and communications, agriculture, energy, health care, education, science and culture. Following the results of the ECO Summit, the Final Document was adopted.

The Iranian President was very active during the 15th ECO Summit, announcing Tehran’s position and proposals regarding strengthening regional and international relations, as well as removing obstacles and increasing the level of cooperation between ECO member-states. He also held meetings with his foreign counterparts in order to explore the possibilities of expanding bilateral ties. As the spokesman for the Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) said earlier, the country’s value of trade with ECO member-states from March 21 to October 22 (which corresponds to the first seven months of the Iranian year) increased by 48.5% amounting to 20.3 million tons of goods worth $9.2 billion. The share of Iran’s exports in this figure totaled 17.4 million tons of goods valued at $6.03 billion while the exports of ECO member-states amounted to 2.88 million tons, which corresponds to $3.3 billion in value terms.

As part of the deepening ECO cooperation, the 9th meeting of Iran-Pakistan Joint Trade Committee was held in Tehran on November 6 –7. During the talks both sides agreed to expand trade exchanges to $5 billion and create a barter trade mechanism. In the follow-up to this agreements, on November 24, Islamabad negotiated the purchase of Iranian liquefied gas through the barter system. At the same time, Iran agreed to meet the energy needs of Pakistan through the implementation of the gas pipeline project.

Meanwhile, Jeyhun Bayramov and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Iran, met on the sidelines of the summit. The sides discussed the current regional situation, as well as the Sochi declaration that had been adopted following the meeting of the leaders of Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia. The ministers also touched upon the implementation of trilateral statements, as well as the importance of cooperation in the “3+3” format.

A day earlier, on November 27, Ashgabat hosted a business forum of the ECO member-states. The business forum was attended by representatives of the ECO Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the Asian Development Bank, CCIs of ECO member-states, the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, the Turkish-Pakistani Chamber of Commerce and Industry as well as by relevant ministries, public organizations and various companies. About 300 foreign representatives participated online; bilateral meetings were set up in a range of sectors: oil and gas industry, chemistry, agriculture and food industry, textile industry, trade. The ECO business forum saw the signing of contracts worth more than $35.5 million. Within the framework of the ECO business forum, a Memorandum was signed with the purpose of increasing cargo shipping through the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway corridor, with Turkmenistan companies signing contracts for the export of confectionery products to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan. Deals were also struck on the supply of equipment from Turkey for the production of furniture in Turkmenistan, grain supplies from Kazakhstan, etc.

Vladimir Platov, expert on the Middle East, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Recent weeks have seen a significant military escalation on the border between Azerbaijan and Iran. With belligerent statements made by both sides, Iranian troops are being transferred to the border with their northern neighbor. Explaining the move, Brigadier-General Mohammad Pakpour, commander of the Ground Forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), said: “We will not tolerate the presence of Israel in our back yard.”

Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel are indeed a constant irritation and tension to Iran, which is, in effect, in a state of undeclared war with Israel. Iran is frankly afraid that Israel will establish an outpost on its northern border, which will serve as a base for intelligence and special operations such as the drone attack in which Iranian General Qasem Soleimani was assassinated on January 3, 2020. With that attack in mind, Tehran has been particularly closely monitoring Azerbaijani troops’ use of Israeli-made drones, missiles, anti-tank missile systems and other weapons during last year’s war in Nagorno-Karabakh.

“The relations between Azerbaijan and Israel are much deeper that they appear, like an iceberg, most of which is hidden from prying eyes.” These words of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev were contained in a telegram sent from the US Embassy in Baku to Washington, and became widely known following their publication by Wikileaks. The high level links between Azerbaijan and Israel – the two countries have exchanged visits by senior officials – are based on geopolitical and economic factors.

At the geopolitical level, Iran is the most important factor bringing the two states closer together. Azerbaijan’s relations with neighboring Iran are far from friendly. Azerbaijan accuses Iran of persecuting its ethnic Azeri minority, which numbers 20 million, while Tehran accuses Baku of using this population as a lever to interfere in its internal politics. As for the relations between Israel and Iran, since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, they have been not merely cold, but openly hostile. This situation has long provided both Israel and Azerbaijan with a reason for adopt shared strategies against Iran. Thus, the two countries cooperate closely on intelligence sphere, and Israeli special forces train their Azerbaijani counterparts, including those serving on the border with Iran, while Israeli defense companies provide Azerbaijan with both military hardware and intelligence support which enables it to monitor Iran.

During the events in Nagorno-Karabakh last year, Azerbaijan used both Turkish Bayraktar drones, and also several hundred Israeli-made kamikaze drones, including Aerostar, Orbiter 2M, Orbiter 3, Orbiter 1K, Hermes 450, and Heron 1 models. In fact, a significant proportion of the military equipment and drones that led Azerbaijan to victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 were purchased from Israel.

It should also be borne in mind that Azerbaijan is a very important supplier of oil to Israel. According to a report by the US Energy Information Administration, 40% of Israel’s oil requirements are provided by Azerbaijan. According to the Israeli newspaper Hareetz, the Aliyev family has invested almost USD 600 million in Israel’s economy, in sectors ranging from healthcare to the stock exchange.

Azerbaijan’s Jewish population, numbering about 7 thousand and based largely in Baku, is particularly involved in promoting good relations between Azerbaijan and Israel. Nevertheless, despite the shared geopolitical and economic interests, Azerbaijan tries to avoid openly taking a pro-Israel stance – Baku is clearly afraid of an anti-Israeli reaction from the Muslim world as a whole. With this in mind, Baku has also supported pro-Palestinian projects and proposals in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and Israel has greeted these initiatives with understanding.

However, the “Israeli factor” is not the only cause of the deepening rift between Iran and Azerbaijan. The increase of Turkey’s influence in the region is also clearly contributing to the tensions. Unfortunately, it appears that may influential political figures in Iran are may be dissatisfied with the results of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. In the past this area played a strategic role in international power play, and Tehran was one of the countries with influence over the region. Until fairly recently Turkey’s influence in the region was limited – a situation that suited Tehran. But the balance has changed: following last year’s conflict most of Nagorno-Karabakh is now controlled by Azerbaijan, and Turkey has gained in importance as a major regional power. It was Ankara that was Baku’s main ally in that war, providing it with military hardware, including Bayraktar TB2 drones, as well as consultancy services and, according to some reports, foreign militants, who serving as mercenaries.  As a result, despite all Tehran’s efforts, Ankara has in effect deprived Iran from playing any role in the post-war reconstruction of Nagorno-Karabakh, and, under the Shusha Declaration about Alliance, signed in June between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Turkey is permitted to expand its network of military bases in the disputed region.

Tensions in border areas have been further inflamed by the recent Unbreakable Brotherhood 2021 exercises held jointly by Baku and Ankara in Nakhichevan, and the Three Brothers-2021 in the Caspian Sea, in which the two countries were joined by Pakistan. The latter exercises were of particular concern to Tehran, which claimed that the use of this sea for military activities was a violation of the Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea, as countries other than the Caspian Littoral States, as named in the Convention, cannot have a military presence there.

In response, Iran deployed additional forces – two missile divisions and reinforcements from the 16th Tank Division based in Qazvin – to its border regions, stepped up drone surveillance of its north-western borders and put its air defense systems on high alert.

However, there are grounds for hopes that the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan will not escalate any further. Significantly, while troops were gathering on the borders, Kazem Sajjapour, Iran’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Baku. He expressed interest in the development of partnership and took part in negotiations with Azerbaijani and Turkish diplomats on future cooperation between the three nations. According to media reports, while in Baku he also participated in a number of meetings with representatives of local authorities, focusing on the reduction of tension between the two countries.

Vladimir Platov, expert on the Middle East, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The Republic of Azerbaijan, a former Soviet state that is now a member of the CIS, is a long-term partner of Russia. Although it is not a member of such important (from Russia’s perspective) international organizations as the EAEC (Eurasian Economic Union) and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), Russia and Azerbaijan nevertheless work together closely, and this cooperation means a great deal to both nations and the whole wider region.

Among the important sectors in which Russia and Azerbaijan cooperate is the automobile industry. Naturally, given the nation’s status as a former Soviet republic, Soviet and Russian-made cars have been in common use in Azerbaijan for decades and continue to play an important role in the national economy. And, with their low cost and high quality, Azerbaijan sees no reason to stop using them.

Russian trucks made by the KAMAZ factory are particularly popular in Azerbaijan. For several decades, they have been the main goods vehicles used in Russia and the other former Soviet republics. KAMAZ trucks are also sold in many other regions, and are currently in use in more than 80 countries, with some states, such as South Africa, manufacturing them under license. Azerbaijan has also expressed an interest in manufacturing KAMAZ trucks in its territory.

In December 2014 KAMAZ and the Ganja Auto Plant (the largest car manufacturer in Azerbaijan) signed an agreement on the supply of complete sets of KAMAZ components to Azerbaijan, as well as a license agreement granting the Azerbaijani company the right to assemble the vehicles in its facilities. The assembly of KAMAZ trucks in Azerbaijan began in April 2015. It was announced that these vehicles would be supplied to state construction organizations, as well as municipal and transport bodies – a clear indication of how highly the country’s government rates these Russian trucks.

If KAMAZ is the leading Russian manufacturer of heavy goods vehicles, then GAZ occupies a similar position in the light and medium goods vehicle sector. Like KAMAZ trucks, GAZ goods vehicles are very popular outside Russia, due to their high quality, reliability and reasonable cost. They are exported to more than 30 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe. GAZ vehicles have long been manufactured under license in Kazakhstan and Turkey. And as a long-term importer of large numbers of these vehicles, Azerbaijan also decided to start manufacturing them under license.

In April 2018, GAZ and the Azerbaijani company Azermash agreed to start the assembly of GAZ vehicles in a new factory in the Azerbaijani town of Hajigabul. According to the announcement on the deal, once production of the standard models has been launched, the company will use these models as a basis for the manufacture of special purpose vehicles such as ambulances.

The plant in Hajigabul began production in April 2021. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was present at the opening ceremony. Ever since production commenced, the company has assembled nine different GAZ models: trucks, vans and minibuses. The company currently aims to assemble 1 500 vehicles a year, and its capacity will be gradually increased to what is, in terms of the national motor vehicle manufacturing industry as a whole, a significant level. Neither the Russian nor the Azerbaijani party to the agreement have any doubt that these production volumes will be attained: GAZ vehicles are popular in Azerbaijan, and when they are assembled in the country they will be cheaper than when they were imported from Russia, as no customs duties will be payable. It is certain that the plant in Hajigabul will account for a significant share of the national market. And when demand on the national market is fully satisfied Azerbaijan plans to export vehicles assembled in the Hajigabul plant to Iran and Turkey.

At the end of July 2021 a Russian trade delegation from the Russian Export-Import Bank, a state bank established to support Russian trading ventures, visited Azerbaijan. On July 23, in Baku, the Azerbaijani capital, there was a meeting in which many representatives of major Russian firms held talks with their Azerbaijani counterparts on issues relating to cooperation in a range of different areas, including the development of transport infrastructure, the construction of residential property and the overall increase of trade between the two countries. According to participants in the talks, Russia and Azerbaijan are in a good position to develop bilateral trade and other types of economic cooperation.

The motor vehicle manufacturing industry was among the sectors discussed: according to Rashad Nabiyev, Azerbaijan’s Minister of Transport, Communications and High Technologies, who took part in the talks, the government is seeking support from Russia in upgrading its fleet of vehicles. Getting straight down to business, while the meeting was still under way KAMAZ and the Ganja plant signed a memorandum of understanding on expanding the manufacture of KAMAZ trucks in Azerbaijan.

Russian vehicle manufacturers feel comfortable doing business in Azerbaijan, and it is anticipated that that country’s demand for goods vehicles will soon significantly increase. During the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, which took place in autumn 2020, Azerbaijan occupied much of the unrecognized republic. Now Azerbaijan has to develop its new territory, which will involve a great deal of work. The government plans to construct a railway, several airports and approximately 1 000 kilometers of roads in the region. This work will certainly require a large number of trucks.

In December 2020 Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, announced that under international law Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan. Naturally, Azerbaijan appreciates these words of support. With this new factor in mind, and given the fact that, as mentioned above, Russian vehicles are popular in Azerbaijan, it seems clear that Azerbaijan will be using a large number of Russian vehicles in its upcoming building project, and that this will boost the growth of vehicle manufacturing companies and strengthen relations between Russia and Azerbaijan.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

It is still difficult to find out what is actually going on in the NK conflict zone. News outlets are highly selective in their reporting, which is based more often than not on carefully controlled information drips from Azerbaijan and Armenia. The reports being shared back and forth on various sites are little more than versions of whose ox is getting gored the most.

However, there is no doubt that this shooting war would not have got to the level it has without prodding from the Turkish president. What is his game – just self-preservation, or does he really believe in some greater Ottoman shadow?

Erdogan has been especially full of himself and his rhetoric of late, and neither seems to be abating. Many have even taken to calling the sitting president Sultan Erdogan, as his detractors have for years.

But why now? This conflict has been waiting to explode for two decades, with all the powers around wanting to keep it that way. What is Erdogan seeing as an opportunity here, and for whom – his “Turkic Council” or the other side?

Fox and Geese

It is true that the Armenian position is weak, at best, in terms of international law. But it is also true that extreme nationalist Armenians in various countries are willing to rally behind the homeland despite not knowing the facts.

The same goes for the Azeri side, but it has a much smaller international profile. More people have heard of the Armenian Genocide than can name the current President of Azerbaijan, despite one Aliyev or the other having run the place since Soviet times.

Azerbaijan will always be at a disadvantage in terms of international opinion. The fact that Armenia doesn’t just occupy Karabakh, but areas surrounding it where few Armenians live, and is allowed to continue doing so tells you all you need to know.

Erdogan may interpret this as an opening for him to assert himself as Azerbaijan’s “Great Power” protector. He may likewise see it as an existential threat to Turkey itself, which is already struggling as a Muslim country in the Western world.

It would be very typical of Erdogan to think this conflict was all about him. But if he is going to be the strongman at the head of a stronger country, he has to be seen to be doing something about Karabakh sooner or later.

It would be natural for Erdogan to feel that a diplomatic solution is beyond reach, as international law has been ignored in this conflict, but he is actually sating that such a solution is beyond reach for him, because Turkey isn’t as important as he thinks it is, and neither is he.

Things They Don’t Talk About

It is not true that Azerbaijan had no choice but to resort to the use of force. There are a number of territorial conflicts and disputes in the world where the players involved do not resort to force in their resolution, as it’s only the side which fears it will lose out in a diplomatic resolution is the one which resorts to violence.

By deciding to target and kill individuals it considers its own citizens, the Azerbaijani government is violating both its domestic laws and international humanitarian law. The latest violence has simply proven the Armenian contention that the Armenians of Karabakh cannot be assured of secure lives if they live under an Azerbaijani government.

However, Armenians know that they are partly to blame for this, hence their reliance on diplomacy and lobbying amongst people who don’t want a war. The Sumgait pogroms and Khojaly massacre at the end of the Soviet period are black spots on both nations, and such blood spilling has not been forgotten by either side.

Legal and territorial details must be high on the agenda of any negotiations, which is why Armenia is more interested in undertaking this necessarily complicated and time-consuming process to maintain the status quo. If someone finds a simple solution, which can never be maintaining what has existed on the ground since the Armenians occupied the area, Yerevan has very limited agency.

Foreign policy has not really changed since Pashinyan came to power. Pashinyan is just as stuck to Moscow as the earlier leaders, but he cannot turn easily to Russia for help under a security shield in light of his own connections with those in the opposite camp. Indeed, there is speculation in Azerbaijan that the Russians are on board with Kocharyan and his teammates, although fighting a war to drive Pashinyan out would only result in even more Russian influence over Armenia.

All About Russia?

Armenia and Azerbaijan have their own interests, like the pundits who get rich off their conflict. But at the end of the day, it is the interests of larger political powers which will decide what happens in Karabakh, and keeping these balanced is the task all sides have been forced to undertake since day one.

One of the attractions for the Turkish government is that further conflict in Karabakh opens up another front of engagement with Russia. With the West so anti-Russian, this keeps Erdogan sweet with Washington and also gives him the opportunity to avenge the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, like any good Turkish nationalist.

Turkey is already unofficially conducting a proxy war in Libya and Syria. Will Karabakh be used as a bargaining chip? Russia remembers what happened when the aura of Soviet invincibility was shattered in Afghanistan. It will have to tread very carefully to avoid getting involved in more foreign wars, engagements, than it can handle, and achieving outcomes it can defend long term.

This attack has clearly been planned for weeks, if not months, with the July clashes meant as a test or provocation. This suggests a specific military objective is being sought – probably the lower territories by the Arax river, or other points on the northern portion of the Line of Contact within easier reach.

If Turkey is conducting a limited military operation to redraw the line of contact more favourably, it might get away with this. However, there is a great deal of evidence now of the presence of radical militants from Syria, and possibly Libya, in the conflict zone. Erdogan is unlikely to get away with that, unless he then rides in to save the region from the people he inserted to begin with.

Someone Else’s Terrorists?

The presence of these radicals is easier to blame on Aliyev than Erdogan because the latter is theoretically is spectator, whilst the former is directly responsible for his country. Erdogan can present himself as a double Western saviour in return for a free hand at home – not only beating the Russians, but ridding Azerbaijan of terrorists too.

Aliyev cannot be seen to be backing down. Otherwise he and his family will outrage the population which has waited too long for this conflict to unfreeze, and the country to move forward.

Aliyevs father and son have always been able to blame lack of progress, and political and civil repression, on the frozen conflict. However Azeris know that they have both failed to conduct that conflict either well or credibly.

Armenia controls a number of Azeri areas around Karabakh because the all-controlling Azeri state was so desperate for troops during the initial conflict that it was kidnapping young men off the street and sending them to the front without any military training. Dictatorship is supposed to produce strong leadership, instead it produced a humiliation borne of chaos, which a system with greater accountability might have prevented.

The national self-worth of Azeris depends on restoring their territorial integrity, not supporting a regime or ideology, like in Soviet times. Aliyev can’t restore it, so he too has wanted the status quo to prevail. Now he has been stitched up, the question is who else wants to keep him there, regardless of the consequences for his own people.

Brinkmanship Before the Brink

Thomas de Waal, author of the book ‘Black Garden,” maintains that Turkey and Azerbaijan are trying to break the OSCE process and remake it in their favour. He has said in an interview with Yavuz Baydar, the editor of Ahval:

For Armenia, Turkey is the biggest existential threat. It’s been at peace with Turkey since 1920; for a hundred years there has been no shooting war. And now suddenly Turkey comes in on the side of Azeris. [Such engagement] is a source of fear in the Armenian DNA – a huge issue for Armenians.”

This may well have been the offer made by Erdogan to Aliyev, or perhaps the other way round. It is easy to see why Aliyev would be attracted by the idea of bringing in terrorists to help him do what he can’t do himself. Such a scenario is suggested by various media outlets, who quote Sergei Naryshkin, head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, as saying “We are talking about hundreds, even thousands, of radicals hoping to make money in the new Karabakh war.”

Russia has long been concerned by terrorists infiltrating it from neighbouring states. Erdogan is saying in effect, here they are then, I am bringing them here, what are you going to do about it?

Russia’s problem with terrorists is not that they are unpredictable, but that they are Western trained. It cites the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, which has become a safe haven and training base for terrorists recruited by Saudi and US intelligence.

But whichever way you look at this conflict, and why it has heated up again, fingers can only point in one direction. Aliyev doesn’t want more humiliation (or worse), Armenia doesn’t want the status quo upset, other countries don’t want another conflict getting in the way, and reducing their influence.

Only Recep Tayyip Erdogan has anything to gain from moving into Karabakh, and everyone else involved knows this. He has decided, in typical fashion, to push tolerance to the limit to show how important he is.

A frozen conflict is being turned into a “do or die war”, and all those people are dying, simply to protect the Turkish leader from his own population’s scepticism of his boasts about how great he and his country are. He has played his hand well, it must be admitted, but we will have to see how long it is before he oversteps everyone else’s mark.

Henry Kamens, columnist, expert on Central Asia and Caucasus, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

As the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh mushrooms, the Israeli-Azerbaijani arms trade is flourishing, and in this case Netanyahu’s government is being chiefly guided by economic benefits, with political calculations, or rather miscalculations, in second place after those.

It should be pointed out that at present the Israeli economy is experiencing great difficulties due to the pandemic, basically just like other countries. Restaurants, cafes, factories, and plants are temporarily shutting down, and the number of tourists has sharply dropped. Under these conditions, the Israeli government is trying to find some sources of assistance, even temporary ones, for both the economy and the population itself. For these purposes, it is keeping close track of the sales of weapons and high-technology systems.

Presently, in the 31-degree heat at Ben Gurion Airport, it is quiet and calm, without the previous hubbub – civilian flights have virtually ceased due to the rampant COVID-19 pandemic. But cargo flights along the route to Azerbaijan have still picked up recently, and are loaded to capacity. The large number of flights is a direct consequence of the resumption of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. At least four Il-76 aircraft operated by the Azerbaijani cargo airline Silk Way, which serves the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense, landed and then took off from Uvda Air Force Base in southern Israel: two before the start of hostilities, and two afterwards. According to the air traffic rules, this is the only airport from which aircraft loaded with explosives are allowed to take off.

Surveillance of the takeoffs and landings, as well as aircraft traffic throughout the Middle East and beyond the region, is something done by both professionals and amateurs, and therefore the flight paths of the four aircraft have been documented by professionals, and on various public websites that follow air traffic activity. Some of these planes have also flown from Baku to Ankara, and to Istanbul and back again, in recent times. All of this speaks of the redeployment of weapons and military equipment, and therefore that Israel is involved in the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh – and has taken the side of one of the warring parties.

On September 27 fighting resumed, with a surprise offensive conducted by the Azerbaijanis along the entire front. Many people, both those in military uniforms and civilians, have been killed so far. Both sides are using artillery and tanks, and carrying out airstrikes (using helicopters and drones) on cities and villages. People are now in shelters or basements; some have already moved to places that are safer, while others are still in the process of fleeing.

It is difficult to try to correctly – and objectively – describe the behavior exhibited by the various parties involved in this struggle, and their temporary and constant allies. The fact remains that:  Turkey and Israel, which currently harbor animosity toward each other (Recep Tayyip Erdogan just recently, and sharply, stated that Jerusalem belongs to Muslims), are both giving support to Azerbaijan, a Shiite Muslim country. On the other hand, Iran, one-third of whose population is of Azerbaijani descent (including its Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei), supports Christian Armenia and, according to some reports, is delivering armaments to it.  Greece, a strategic ally of Israel, and currently in conflict with Turkey over gas disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, is supporting Armenia.

This is, indeed, a very complex and confusing issue.

Another issue that should worry the Israeli government, and everyone else in this country, is that Israel – the state for a people that witnessed six million of its own perish during the Holocaust – refuses to recognize the Armenian genocide committed by the Ottoman Empire during World War I. For many years, it adopted this position so that Ankara would not become annoyed, which for 50 years was Israel’s strategic ally against Syria, and then versus Iran. The Mossad and Turkish intelligence services collaborated with each other, and Israel’s defense industry secretly sold billions of dollars worth of weapons to Turkey. In an ironic twist of fate, the systems that Israel sold to the Turks included drones and technology that helped Turkey build the same kind of industry. Turkish Bayraktar drones now operate on the battlefields in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Turkey, which in the past has declared a zero conflict policy vis-a-vis its neighbors, is currently in conflict with all of them, or at least is taking part in wars that involve them.

Dismantling the strategic alliance between Turkey and Israel is a systematic and purposeful process, and one which was started by Recep Tayyip Erdogan one-and-a-half decades ago. However, Tel Aviv did not use this as an opportunity to fulfill its historical duty, or follow its conscience and values, regarding the Armenian genocide. The reason for this is Azerbaijan itself. At the same time that Recep Tayyip Erdogan began to distance himself from Israel, Azerbaijan and Israel started becoming closer. It soon became clear that the two countries had formed a kind of strategic alliance – one centered on mutual hostility towards Iran. Four years ago, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu paid an urgent visit to Baku, during which Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced that he had signed a series of contracts for the purchase of Israeli weapons worth $5 billion. So that let the cat out of the bag, and told the whole world the truth about the relations between the two countries.

After that, according to foreign sources, the Mossad created a station in Azerbaijan that serves as “its eyes, ears, and a foothold” for monitoring Iran. According to these reports, Azerbaijan has prepared an airfield that would help Israel if it were to attack Iran. Other reports claimed that an Iranian nuclear industry archive, stolen by Mossad agents in Tehran two-and-a-half years ago, was smuggled into Israel via Azerbaijan. According to some reports, the Israeli aerospace industry in the form of Elbit, Rafael, and other, smaller companies sells almost anything to Baku. This includes artillery, missiles, naval vessels, reconnaissance equipment, and a large number of unmanned aerial vehicles. Almost all Israeli companies that manufacture drones, including assault or self-destructing (“kamikaze”) drones, have sold their goods to the Azerbaijani army. According to past statements by Armenian officials, some of these drones, including those made by Aeronautics Ltd., have been shot down during incidents along the border with Azerbaijan. The most recent data suggests that Armenian air defense systems, including the Russian S-300 system, were destroyed by Israeli Harop kamikaze drones, which target the signal when radar is switched on.

On several occasions, Armenian politicians, including the top leadership in Armenia, have expressed their concern over the continued sale of Israeli weapons to Azerbaijan. The previous President of Armenia, Armen Sarkissian, called Israeli President Reuven Rivlin about this, expressing his concern over the continued sale of Israeli weapons to Azerbaijan. Reuven Rivlin was demagogic in how he expressed his regret, and noted that Israel has long-standing relations with Azerbaijan, adding that their cooperation “is not directed against any other country”. It is true that he forgot the old truth that if there is a weapon, then sooner or later it will start shooting and killing people. In this case, the Israeli president was not interested in the fact that his country, while allegedly actively advocating for the cause of peace, is undermining that peace in another part of the world. It should be repeated that the principle of “I’m just straddling the fence” is unlikely to be painless for the Israelis.

It would be difficult to anticipate that Tel Aviv, which has always condemned the launch of missiles against civilians by Hezbollah and Hamas, will now change its methods. Another country could perhaps suspend its shipments, if only temporarily. Concerning anything related to arms sales, the hypocrisy of Israeli governments over the years is nothing new. The current silence kept by its government on this issue speaks volumes, yet it simply does not understand one simple fact: if, at some time in the future, the Israelis start talking about any allegedly illegal arms deliveries to the Palestinians, they will simply be reminded of the behavior exhibited by Tel Aviv, which actively supplied arms to Azerbaijan, and so added a generous portion of fuel to the fire of the military conflict. There is only one truth, if there even is one.

It is interesting how people perceive this problem in Israel itself. The majority of the population is quite skeptical, and they believe that thanks to the sharp improvement in relations between Israel and a number of Gulf countries, they no longer need an “oil for arms” alliance with Baku. For moral and strategic reasons, Israel should now take a look at Armenia.  Israeli-Azerbaijani relations, Israeli media outlets state, have always been based on transactions – and not only in terms of the “oil for arms” deal. Azerbaijan views its deepening ties with Israel as a means of currying favor with Washington, as recently confirmed by Azerbaijan’s ambassador to the United States.  Baku seeks to involve Jewish community groups in the United States in this scheme, positioning itself as a champion of “interfaith dialogue”.

But closer ties with Israel, writes the Israeli Haaretz newspaper, did not prevent Baku from establishing excellent relations not only with Turkey, but also with Israel’s implacable enemy, Iran. The two countries have deepened their relationship in recent years, with Hassan Rouhani making a more substantial relationship with Azerbaijan one of his top priorities. In reality, Azerbaijan has been cooperating with Iran for many years, ranging from selling a 10-percent stake in one of the country’s largest oil pipelines to sending millions of dollars to state-run Iranian companies in a major money laundering scandal (which recently involved IAI, a major Israeli aerospace industry player).  In addition, despite its efforts to develop relations with Israel, Baku has consistently refused to establish full-fledged diplomatic relations with this country, and open up an embassy, due to pressure from Iran, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and Turkey.   Despite trying to constantly appease the regime in Iran, Azerbaijan still seeks to woo both Israel and the West away from Armenia.

When analyzing all these facts, an obvious conclusion offers itself.  Yes, flirting with Azerbaijan and supplying it with the cutting-edge weapons over a certain, very short-lived stage, can economically help Benjamin Netanyahu’s current government, but over the long term this Azerbaijani area of focus will only cloud the ability to correctly explain Israeli policy for various politicians. And it is unlikely that this will help advance Israeli policy on the world stage, including with regard to various facets involving how to resolve its long-standing Palestinian problem.

Viktor Mikhin, a corresponding member of RANS, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

As it’s been revealed by a number of media sources, Earle Litzenberger is a career member of the US State department that used to occupy the position of the senior advisor in the Bureau of political-military affairs within this government body. He has also been known for occupying the position of senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Prior to that, he used to serve as the deputy chief of the US mission to NATO, deputy senior civilian representative to Afghanistan within NATO, deputy chief of the US embassy in Belgrade and deputy chief of the US embassy in Bishkek.

If one is to take into consideration the fact that Litzenberger has a strong military background, he would be puzzled over the fact that such a figure was to be appointed US ambassador to Azerbaijan. Yet, things would become much more transparent when the fact that Washington has made a number of fruitless attempts to launch a color revolution in Azerbaijan is taken into consideration. Indeed, every election season in this country is associated with the Western media trying to persuade the local population that it’s the time to launch a mass protest movement that would ultimately result in every aspect of the political life in Azerbaijan getting subjected to Washington’s will. Moreover, there’s a matter of Caspian oil that Western monopolies have been dreaming to get their hands on for a long while. So it’s no coincidence that a new election season in Azerbaijan is approaching, as the voting is due to take place sometime in 2020.

The bilateral relations between the United States and Azerbaijan saw a major uptick during the terms of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. In the 1990s, the former US presidential adviser on national security, Zbigniew Brzezinski would travel to Azerbaijan to personally deliver private messages to the local political elites from the US president. The ultimate goal behind this trip was drive a wedge between Baku and Moscow, that enjoyed good friendship within the framework of the allied states in the post-Cold War period. Yet, Brzezinski would also try to drive Azerbaijan away from its another former ally – Armenia and it must be added that to a certain extent he was successful in this quest.

In a bid to test the waters, Brzezinski would propose developing energy cooperation between the United States and Azerbaijan, the scenario that would hurt both Moscow and Baku itself economically but would make Western oligarchs really happy. Even though back then there was no official rhetorics about the “harmful energy dependence of Europe on Russia,” Brzezinski would be ahead of its time in advertising Western energy independence from Moscow.

Gradually, Azerbaijan would become a principal player on the European hydrocarbon market by agreeing to export its oil via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Today it is also engaged in negotiations on the construction of South Stream pipeline, which would transport Caspian gas to Europe.

In addition to cooperating with the West in hydrocarbon production, Baku has recently begun providing extensive support to the US coalition forces in Afghanistan, while publicly manifesting its own intention of strengthen its economic ties with a number of Western countries.

However, in 2010 the bilateral relations between Washington and Baku took a noticeable dive once the Obama administration made an attempt to “normalize” relations between Turkey and Armenia, to the detriment of Azerbaijan’s interests. To a large extent, this shift in Washington’s policies became possible due to a strong pressure applied by the Armenian lobby in Washington on American political elites.

Almost three decades after the vote of independence, Azerbaijan represents a fairly successful state that is capable of pursuing its own international and domestic goals, consistent with its own national interests. In spite of the tensions in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Azerbaijan managed to develop its national identity and transform itself into a powerful international player.

However, in recent years, the United States and its European satellites have grown vocally critical of Azerbaijan and its policies. Just like in any other region of the world, Washington is unable to stomach the fact that the political leadership of Azerbaijan pursues its own independent policies and will be able to pocket the profits from its booming oil and gas trade with Europe, instead of turning them over to Western monopolies under the supervision of the United States. Therefore, the expectations that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines would land Azerbaijan in the Western camp, transforming it into a Caucasian equivalent of the present-day Baltic republics, Moldova, or the fascist-riddled Ukraine have all but failed. The West cannot find joy in its heart while observing the rapidly improving ties between Azerbaijan and Russia, especially in a situation when these ties transform into a mutually beneficial military cooperation.

In addition, Washington has started to rap its head around the fact that Azerbaijan has voluntarily assumed the role of Turkey’s younger brother, and as tensions continue flaring between Washington and Ankara, there’s no doubt that Baku would be more happy to support Tayyip Erdogan than Donald Trump. However, it seems that Washington has had enough of Turkey and Azerbaijan and is now going to make them pay an incredibly high price for their disobedience, especially in the light of Ankara acquiring Russia’s state-of-the-art S-400 air defense systems in spite of the massive outcry voiced in this West over this fact.

Therefore, through various official and secret channels, the so-called sole superpower is going to try make it clear to Baku that should it be continuing such policies in the future, it will be treated extremely harshly in the West. That is why Washington spares no time in staging a drastic activization of the opposition forces within Azerbaijan that it has been sponsoring all along. Predictably enough, the so-called National Council of Democratic Forces would launch rallies under a variety of pretexts, starting with the violation of human rights in Azerbaijan and ending with corruption claims. But if in the past, Ilham Aliyev had to take restrained criticism from the mainly non-governmental entities, now he must brace for a full-scale color revolution. It seems that Uncle Sam decided that it was about time to replace him with a more “democratic” government that would have a better understanding of the chain of command that exist in the Western world. It’s no coincidence that the Azerbaijani currency – manat has recently taken a major hit and keeps falling down rapidly.

Under these conditions, the figure of the new US ambassador to Azerbaijan is just a part of a larger picture, as his past employment in the well-known German Marshall Fund of the United States non-governmental organization deserves a separate mention. Over the years this American NGO would be accused repeatedly of staging color revolutions and coup d’etats all across the globe. As it has recently been made public by the government in Baku, the sitting president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, outlawed this organization, breaking all officials ties with it. The German Marshall Fund used to finance the activities of the Peace and Democracy Institute in Baku that was headed by Leyla Yunus – a highly controversial figure that would cooperate on numerous occasions with anti-Azerbaijan forces, including Armenian intelligence agencies, under the notion of promoting “human rights activities.”

It is impossible to make any definite predictions in modern geopolitics, but it’s safe to say that the Aliyev regime is heading into troubled waters, and Earle Litzenberger would make sure that it’s not going to enjoy this trip.

Martin Berger is a freelance journalist and geopolitical analyst, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”  

On September 28, 2018 Russia’s Pravda news outlet published a story titled; “Putin in Azerbaijan: Israel will have to leave Moscow’s Sphere of Influence.”

The story itself was sketchy on details of the exchange.

“Russian President Vladimir Putin came to Baku to participate in the Russian-Azerbaijani interregional forum. Putin will also attend the final stage of the World Judo Championship. However, behind closed doors, Putin and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev also discussed topics of military-technical cooperation, the CSTO, as well as issues of the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

The Kremlin watched closely the recent visit of Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman to Azerbaijan. Lieberman promised to supply state-of-the-art air defense systems to Azerbaijan to build an echeloned defense system on the border with Armenia. In addition, Azerbaijan will continue purchasing unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel, after they proved to be highly effective in the course of hostilities in the zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in April 2016.

Naturally, Moscow wants to seize the initiative from Israel, especially after the shootdown of the Ilyushin Il-20 aircraft over Syria. The Kremlin would not want Azerbaijan – a key country in Transcaucasia – to cooperate closely with Israel.” 

In the aftermath of the September 2018 downing of a Russian IL 20 aircraft and Israel’s continued belligerence and denials of responsibility, it was clear Vladimir Putin would have to act assertively.

The incident became even more serious when Israel’s Haaretz newspaper broke a story that claimed high level Israeli military officers had seen Russia’s fairness toward Israel and her position on Hezbollah and Iran inside Syria as a “sign of weakness” leading to aggressive action toward Moscow.

This may well have been the straw that broke the camel’s back.

As a matter of fact, in its 200 plus air missions inside Syria during 2018, Israel has misused its agreement with Russia, time and time again, to attack Syrian Arab Army positions in order to support ISIS attacks or to allow ISIS leaders to escape from “pincer” moves by Syria’s military.

Israel’s interests in Azerbaijan date back to 2009 and before when Israel began establishing a covert military presence there to carry on attacks on Iran. This relationship was discovered after a 2010 expose’ by Veterans Today and the defection of two Azeri military officers in 2011 adding confirmation. From Reuters in 2011:

“Reuters confirmed through two Azeri officers that Israeli forces were in place in Azerbaijan and that the president was weighing options of supporting their attack.  Yet despite official denials by Azerbaijan and Israel, two Azeri former military officers with links to serving personnel and two Russian intelligence sources all told Reuters that Azerbaijan and Israel have been looking at how Azeri bases and intelligence could serve in a possible strike on Iran.

“Where planes would fly from – from here, from there to where? That’s what’s being planned now,” a security consultant with contacts at Azeri defense Headquarters in Baku said. “The Israelis…would like to gain access to bases in Azerbaijan.”

An earlier Reuters story provided more background to the alleged “combined project” between Azerbaijan and Israel. It is likely that Russia’s memory of these events are a factor in current moves by Putin to limit Israeli military action in the region. From Reuters (September 30, 2012):

“Baku (Reuters) – Israel’s “Go-it-alone” option to attack Iran’s nuclear sites has set the Middle East on edge and unsettled its main ally at the height of a US Presidential Election Campaign.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu exudes impatience, saying Tehran is barely a year from a “Red Line” for atomic capacity. Many fellow Israelis, however, fear a unilateral strike, lacking US forces, would fail against such a large and distant enemy. But what if, even without Washington, Israel was not alone?

Azerbaijan, the oil-rich ex-Soviet Republic on Iran’s far northern border, has, say local sources with knowledge of its military policy, explored with Israel how Azeri air bases and spy drones might help Israeli jets pull off a long-range attack.”

By 2012, Azerbaijan had sought to expel Israel’s military from their country. Their announcement to this effect, while not openly admitting Israel’s bases, was intended to assure both Tehran and Moscow that Israeli moves against Iran and Armenia from Azerbaijan would not be allowed. From Press TV, October 2, 2012:

“Azerbaijan has been following a policy of non-interference in the (internal) affairs of other countries,” Baku’s ambassador to Pakistan Dashgin Shikrov said in an exclusive interview with the Pakistani Daily, The Newson Monday.

The ambassador strongly rejected rumors in the Western media outlets about his country’s readiness for providing Israel ground facilities for attacking Iran’s nuclear sites. “Azerbaijan is a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and nobody should have any doubt that it will not permit the use of its territory for committing acts of aggression against another OIC member,” the ambassador added.

Israel has recently stepped up threats of carrying out a strike against Iran’s nuclear energy facilities. The threats are based on the unfounded claims that the peaceful nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic include a military component.

Iranian officials have refuted the allegation and have promised a crushing response to any military strike against the country, warning that any such measure could result in a war that would spread beyond the Middle East.”

Despite assurances, however, it seems Israel had chosen to establish air bases in the Nakhchivian Autonomous Republic, a region under only nominal control by Azerbaijan’s government in Baku. From Baku Daily, September 18, 2014:

“An Israeli spy drone which Iran recently downed on its way to one of the Iranian nuclear sites had taken off from an air base in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, Press TV reported, citing unnamed sources.

The sources said the Hermes drone, which was taken down by Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) forces on August 23 after 300 kilometers of flight, was bound for the Natanz enrichment facility in central Iran. 

The stealth spy drone was targeted by a surface-to-air missile before it reached the strategic location.

Iran’s nuclear facilities have been a regular target for espionage activities by US and Israeli secret services, which have at times used drones for this purpose. 

However, all efforts made to this end have been successfully thwarted by the Iranian military forces.

Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry last month denied allegations that the drone took off from Nakhchivan. Officials in Baku have repeatedly said no country will be allowed to use Azerbaijani territory or airspace against Iran.”

Further evidence of Israeli involvement, not just against Iran but Armenia as well comes from this report by Jared Keller of Task and Purpose, quoting an October 2017 article from the Times of Israel:

“An Israeli drone maker apparently attempted to bomb Armenian military personnel with “one of its unmanned kamikaze aerial vehicles” back in October 2017, the Times of Israel reported on Wednesday. According to the leaked complaint with the Israeli Defense Ministry, drone manufacturer Aeronautics Defense Systems’ Orbiter 1K suicide drone was dispatched to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region “at the request of Azerbaijani clients during a sales demonstration.”

Here are the technical details, per Joseph Trevithick at The War Zone:

Aeronautics employees reportedly refused to carry out the 2017 mission and company executives subsequently stepped in to fly the drone themselves. Though it’s not clear if this was deliberate or not, the drone reportedly missed the target, only injuring two ethnic Armenian fighters.

It could very well be that the executives made this decision consciously since Orbiter 1K has a so-called man-in-the-loop guidance system whereby the operator is either actively flying or otherwise monitoring the video feeds from the drone and they can see what it sees throughout the mission.

‘The Israeli government has permitted private defense companies to demonstrate their wares in actual combat,” he writes, “but this is rare and is unlikely to have occurred in this case, since Israel does not view Armenia as an enemy.”

However, in 2010, Israel began transiting munitions from the Black Sea port of Poti in the Republic of Georgia to Azerbaijan, brought in by the controversial visit of the USS Grapple accompanied by Israeli patrol craft.

Reports from sources on the ground in Georgia, confirmed by Jeffrey Silverman of Veterans Today in Tbilisi, tell of a convoy of heavy munitions transiting ground routes toward Azerbaijan, guarded by Israeli security and American private military contractors working for Bechtel Corporation and British Petroleum.

Conclusion

What has become clear is that Russia is beginning to recognize Israeli actions on her border as a deeper threat than previously noted. Exacerbating the issue is the Trump administration’s willingness to back any Israeli military moves, something President Obama totally refused.

Adding Trump to the mix has empowered extremists within the Israeli military, if the Israeli press is to be believed, taking a clear side against Russia believing that American military power can mitigate any potential downside for Israel. If Israel’s assessment of President Putin as “weak and indecisive” turns out wrong, as most analysts know quite well, events are likely to turn against Israel.

Gordon Duff is a Marine combat veteran of the Vietnam War that has worked on veterans and POW issues for decades and consulted with governments challenged by security issues. He’s a senior editor and chairman of the board of  Veterans Today, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

The breakdown of Turkey’s aggressive plans directed against Syria, Ankara’s fault in the strong aggravation of the Russian-Turkish relations, the complication of Turkey’s domestic security issues and its emerging isolation in the international arena, are forcing Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to seek new allies and partners in the region.

Thus, at the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016, Turkey significantly increased its political, military and military and technical cooperation with Riyadh, Doha, Kiev, Tbilisi and Baku.

Turkish President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu have both made urgent visits by way of ‘shuttle diplomacy’ and signed a number of new agreements with the aforesaid countries, including, in particular, on establishing mutual military bases in their own country and in their partners’ countries.

Simultaneously, special attention was paid to Turkish-Azerbaijani relations and contacts.

As it is well known, “The Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support” between Azerbaijan and Turkey, concluded back in 2010, serves as the legal basis for bilateral cooperation between Ankara and Baku.

In accordance with it, Azerbaijan has purchased various artillery rocket systems, armoured vehicles and other heavy weaponry in Turkey for its armed forces; and the joint production of a range of the aforementioned military equipment has been established.

These include:

107 and 122 mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), Kasirga large-caliber 300-mm MLRS T-300 (a licensed version of the Chinese WS-1B system with a maximum firing range of up to 100 km) and more than 100 armoured personnel carriers and Cobra armoured vehicles produced by the Turkish company Otokar.

It is planned to deliver the TASMUS tactical area communications system, produced by Aselsan, and 2 batalions (36 SP howitzers) of Firtina 155 mm self-propelled howitzers (a licensed version of the South Korean self-propelled howitzers) and some other modern types of weapons and military equipment made in Turkey.

With Turkey’s help, Azerbaijan hopes to acquire night vision systems, radio and electronic sensor systems, radars, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, etc. It may be noted that, in general, Turkish-Azerbaijani military and military and technical cooperation has been steadily growing and already covers the following areas:

- Delivery of Turkish and NATO weapons and the establishment of the joint production of them with Baku;

- Training of Azerbaijani military personnel with the participation of Turkish advisers and trainers on site, as well as training in military academies and training centres in Turkey;

- The advisory participation of Turkish high-ranking officers in activities of the General Staff and the Defence Ministry of Azerbaijan;

- Acquisition and joint analysis of intelligence data;

- Joint exercises and manoeuvres of all branches of the armed forces (Army, Navy and Air Forces);

- Promotion of structural change and upgrading of the Azerbaijani army according to NATO standards.

In the period of March 7-25, 2016, joint Turkish-Azerbaijani planned exercises were held at the airbase in the Turkish city of Konya, in which 3 combat aircraft MiG-29, 3 combat aircraft Su-25 and 3 military transport aircraft IL-76 of Azerbaijani Air Force took part.

These were the second joint exercises of this kind, held by the two countries.

In 2015, Turkish and Azerbaijani soldiers held both land and air military exercises.

Ankara has repeatedly stated that “Turkish-Azerbaijani brotherhood continues to develop in line with:

one nation – two states”.

In fact, this slogan means that Erdoğan is going to draw Azerbaijan, other Turkic-speaking, Muslim and other States once a part of the Ottoman Empire into the circle of his political and military influence.

His compulsive idea is to revive the Ottoman Empire on a new basis:

with the help of Pan-Turkism slogans, Salafi-Sunni Islam, and trade and economic, cultural and other ties.

One of the most important areas of cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan is the design and construction of newer and newer strategic communications (oil and gas pipelines, roads and railways), i.e., revival of the so-called ‘Silk Road’ Beijing – London, bypassing Russia.

In contacts with representatives of Baku the Turkish leadership strongly emphasizes the need to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict based on the principle of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, even including the use of military force.

At the same time Ankara ignores the absolutely equivalent principle of international law of ‘the right of nations (peoples) to self-determination’.

The Turkish authorities have repeatedly expressed their willingness to support the side of Azerbaijan in this regional conflict.

Erdoğan, with his provocative statements, in fact, pushes and provokes Ilham Heydar oghlu Aliyev to new acts of aggression against the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Armenia.

It was no coincidence that, overnight on April 2, 2016 the Azerbaijani armed forces again undertook a massive bombardment and launched an offensive on the position of Nagorno Karabakh rebels and Armenia’s military forces.

According to reports from Baku, Azerbaijani troops allegedly managed to capture several strategic passes and ‘liberate’ a number of settlements.

There were reports of dozens of dead and wounded on both sides.

Members of the OSCE Minsk Group, the CSTO secretariat, Russia and other concerned countries have launched an appeal to all parties to the conflict to immediately cease fire and reinstate compliance with the ceasefire in accordance with the Bishkek Protocol of 1994.

On the matter Erdoğan announced the following:

“We pray our Azerbaijani brothers will prevail in these clashes with a minimum of casualties.

We will support Azerbaijan to the very end”.

Thus, adventurism, aggression, provocation, blackmail, close ties with radical Islamist groups, international terrorists and criminals are increasingly the main components of Turkey’s current domestic and foreign policy.

Erdoğan’s imperial ambitions do not only create the preconditions for Turkey’s further isolation in the international arena, but also for the aggravation of the situation in the Turkish Republic itself and the region as a whole.

Unfortunately, Erdoğan’s clearly populist and provocative policy is finding support in the Trans-Caucasus region and in Baku.

Stanislav Ivanov, leading research fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies RAS, PhD in History, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

Part 1 of this article examined the nature of Azerbaijan’s political and economic development since the end of the Soviet Union nearly twenty five years ago, with specific attention paid to the country’s relations with the West.

There is a perception among political observers who monitor the Caspian region that Azerbaijan is a staunch ally of the West, that its military and intelligence cooperation with the West, coupled with its reliance on Western oil investment for the continued exploitation of its Caspian reserves, has transformed Azerbaijan into an unshakeable ally of Washington and Brussels. In some ways, this has certainly been true in recent years. The deals with European and American energy corporations have infused the Baku-Washington relationship with billions of dollars in investment. The military and intelligence cooperation with Israel has certainly fostered the perception that Azerbaijan is closer to Israel and the West than to Russia, Iran, or any of its regional neighbors. And yet, from the perspective of the West, there is undoubtedly something rotten in Baku.

The once rock-solid alliance has become far more unstable in recent years as Azerbaijan’s importance and image in the eyes of the West has, in many ways, declined. While western leaders have been quick to point to Baku’s crackdown on western-sponsored NGOs and so called “democracy activists,” the reality is that material concerns dominate the changing nature of the relationship. Where once the West, in particular the United States, saw in Azerbaijan and the Caspian region a potential bonanza for energy revenue and decreasing Europe’s reliance on Russian gas, today serious doubts exist about the sustainability, let alone total capacity, of the Azerbaijani reserves. While it was quite fashionable to see Baku as a staunch ally against Moscow, today doubts about this too have emerged as Russia looks to promote cooperation and business relations with the country as a counterweight to US machinations in the region.

In order to fully appreciate the changing nature of Azerbaijan’s geopolitical and strategic alignment, one must first examine how and why Azerbaijan has begun to move out of the West’s orbit. In so doing, the aggressive attitude and seemingly belligerent approach from western leaders toward Azerbaijan begins to become clearer. In particular, the levers of power that the West is using against Azerbaijan are well known both in Baku, and in Moscow. This is critical because, as was the case during the Soviet era, Russia is in many ways still an alternative to US domination. And so, the question becomes: Is Azerbaijan charting a truly new, independent path for itself? Or, is the country merely continuing its multi-vector strategy of playing Russia and the West off each other?

Azerbaijan and the West: From Cooperation to Coercion?

As outlined in Part 1 of this article, Azerbaijan has promoted close relations with the West since the 1990s, seeing in Europe and the US not only sources of much needed investment revenue, but also political and diplomatic backers in a region still reorganizing itself in the post-Soviet period. This made Azerbaijan a fashionable poster-child for post-Soviet US foreign policy, one which made a central priority of encroaching ever further into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Seen in this way, it is understandable that Baku would seek powerful patrons, hoping to guarantee its own security while furthering its regional and economic interests.

In the wake of the disastrous Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia, Azerbaijan sought out partners that could act as a counter to Russia’s longtime alliance and close cooperation with Armenia. As such, Washington was only too willing to answer the call, using Azerbaijan as leverage against Russian interests. Conversely, Baku understood that if it ever wanted to gain concessions from Armenia and its Russian ally, it would equally need powerful allies. But, as has often been the case with US friendship, yesterday’s ally is today’s adversary. Indeed, Washington and Brussels have seemingly abandoned their friendly attitude toward Azerbaijan in recent months, instead choosing to rebrand the country from “post-Soviet success story” to “anti-democratic, authoritarian regime.” The question is, why?

One obvious explanation for the dramatic shift in attitude toward Azerbaijan is the growing realization that the so called “Contract of the Century” was as much hype as it was substance. Recent studies have suggested that Azerbaijan grossly overestimated (whether unintentional or deliberate exaggeration is a matter of opinion) their true oil reserves. Energy analyst and researcher Patrick Eytchinson wrote back in 2003:

These Caspian ‘oil riches’ are essentially a myth manufactured by the United States Geological Service (USGS), the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), governments of some of the newly independent Soviet states of the Caspian Region, as well as the early hopes of some Western oil companies at the time of the breakup of the USSR. Deconstructing the myth of Caspian oil is important both for understanding how misinformation is created and manipulated in the present world, and for understanding the United States elites’ true geopolitical goals in relation to energy. 

Eytchinson here notes the critical fact that US policy toward Azerbaijan has always been a strategic calculation, one that has aimed at controlling and stifling Russia’s post-Soviet development, rather than being purely interested in profits. While there was plenty of money to be made in Azerbaijan for energy corporations, it was never the “rival to the Middle East” that many had pretended it would be. In fact, the gross miscalculation may have been less of an error than an intended consequence of the Big Lie of Azerbaijani oil wealth – a lie propagated both by Baku and westerners keen to do business in Azerbaijan. Undoubtedly, the growing consensus that Caspian oil in Azerbaijan is far less lucrative than once imagined plays a big role in the growing animus towards Baku. Seen as far less important than it once was, the Azerbaijani government has come under much more scrutiny in recent years, souring relations with the West in ways unimaginable even five years ago.

As a corollary to the exaggerated oil reserve estimates is the fact that the much touted Nabucco, Trans-Caspian, and other pipelines of the Southern Corridor project have been either scrapped or dramatically scaled back. Originally envisioned to supply Europe with Caspian gas from Azerbaijan, in addition to a number of other countries, this basket of pipelines has never come to fruition to a number of issues including cost, political barriers, Caspian Sea rights, and the successful development of Russia’s South Stream, the primary rival of the Southern Corridor. Because of the failure of these West-sponsored projects, Azerbaijan has decreased in importance to western political and corporate elites.

And so, the US and its allies have retreated to their usual demagogic talking points about “human rights,” “civil society freedoms,” and “democracy” in a transparent attempt to demonize and ultimately, if need be, destabilize the Aliyev government. Leading the charge is US envoy to Azerbaijan Richard Morningstar who, despite being America’s top diplomatic official in the country, has made repeated disparaging remarks about the country and its commitment, or lack thereof, to human rights. In an interview with the US Government-sponsored Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Morningstar opined that:

There are trials that are going on now…We’ve certainly been troubled by some of those trials…I think fair results with respect to some of those trials and appeals would show progress. I think that fewer attacks on journalists during the period would show progress. I think the reopening of the civil society dialogue would show progress…A couple years ago, after one of [U. S. Secretary of State Hillary] Clinton’s visits, the government agreed to hold a civil society dialogue. I think there was one session and there has not been one since then. I think that would help. There seems to be a huge amount of pressure right now on international NGOs that are working with respect to civil society – investigations by the Tax Ministry, by the Justice Ministry…Again, I don’t understand why these investigations are taking place other than to harass these organizations and the people who work for them. Lightening up on that, I think, would show progress…Who else is going to speak up for Azerbaijan sovereignty and independence vis-a-vis Russia — particularly after Ukraine?  Who else is going to be a buffer to make sure that the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations are fair or don’t go in an unfairly bad direction. Who else is going to work with Azerbaijan on…counterterrorism problems?…I know that people think we care too much about energy. Yeah, we care about energy, but we are not going to see any Azerbaijani oil or gas — but we do think it’s important as a counter to Russian monopolization in some places. 

While Morningstar strikes a conciliatory tone, his measured comments belie the venom with which he speaks. Though he discusses US “hopes” regarding Baku’s actions, what he’s actually articulating are thinly veiled threats regarding how the Aliyev government should conduct its internal affairs. Morningstar intimates that, unless the outcomes of the trials of key western-sponsored NGO officials and political opponents are favorable, Washington would regard them as politically motivated and damaging to the overall relationship between the countries. Naturally, Morningstar speaks to an audience that is willfully ignorant of the key role that NGOs and so called “civil society” organizations play in the projection of what US planners call “soft power.”

If Morningstar were serious about being truthful, honest, and providing full disclosure, he’d explain that a number of the organizations in question are directly funded by the US and its allies and proxies. For instance, one of the so called “political prisoners” in Azerbaijan is Anar Mammadli, Chairman of the Training Center for Monitoring Elections and Democracy (TCMED). The organization has been, from its very foundation in 2002, an appendage of US soft power. TCMED was formed in 2002 with funding from the infamous National Democratic Institute (NDI), an arm of the National Endowment for Democracy, a US Government-funded project designed to project power throughout the world using NGOs and civil society organizations.

Although it is no secret in Azerbaijan, Morningstar and his ilk would prefer that westerners remain in the dark about the fact that Mammadli, like his fellow “political prisoners” is in fact an agent of the US and its allies, one whose political and public life is owed entirely to western organizations. Of course, it is self-evident why the US would want well-placed agents whose responsibility is to cast doubt upon elections, thereby forcing governments that have fallen out of favor into a submissive position. Should one require examples of this, look no further than the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia in 2003 which brought to power the neocon darling Saakashvili, the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine in 2004, and a number of other instances.

Indeed, if one looks closely at the list of alleged “political prisoners” held up by Washington and Brussels as crusaders for democracy, the reality is that many are, like Mammadli, merely acting on behalf of foreign interests whose goal is to coerce Azerbaijan into acting in accordance with US diktats. This is of course nothing new as the US has used civil society organizations and NGOs around the world to effect regime change, color revolutions, etc. where it has so desired.

If there were any lingering doubts as to the attitude of the Obama administration toward Azerbaijan, they have been put to rest by Obama himself when he singled out Azerbaijan (among other countries) as a violator of human and civil rights. In a speech at the Clinton Global Initiative, Obama stated with a straight face:

It is precisely because citizens and civil society can be so powerful – their ability to harness technology and connect and mobilize at this moment so unprecedented – that more and more governments are doing everything in their power to silence them. From Russia to China to Venezuela, you are seeing relentless crackdowns, vilifying legitimate dissent as subversive.  In places like Azerbaijan, laws make it incredibly difficult for NGOs even to operate.

Keen political observers would do well to note that, aside from Azerbaijan, the singling out of Russia, China, and Venezuela is telling as to how Washington interprets freedom and “civil society” – it is the countries which pose a political, geopolitical, and economic challenge to US hegemony that are the “worst violators.” It is Russia, where such organizations and their support are dwarfed by the exponentially more powerful base of support for President Putin and the Russian government, that is called out for its anti-democratic character. It is China, with its now number 1 economy in the world which is challenging US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region that is attacked for its “repression” of civil society. It is Venezuela, with its socialist Bolivarian government and refusal to be cowed by Washington and its proxies in the ruling class in that country that is demonized as a serial violator of human rights. It is of course hypocritical of Obama to make such accusations, considering his unlawful actions abroad and domestic repression at home are far more egregious, far more widespread than anything seen elsewhere in the world.

But Obama’s words are quite revealing insofar as they lay bare the fact that US interest in NGOs, civil society organizations, and human rights are directly proportional to the geopolitical advantage to be gained from a given country. Put another way, civil society is coded language for US soft power. And so, any crackdown on such organizations (including the reasonable demands made by Russia, Azerbaijan and others that such organizations register as agents of foreign governments, which they are) is seen as a means of undercutting US power, an action deemed unacceptable by the strategic planners in Washington. And this is precisely what Baku has done. The Aliyev government has moved to freeze the assets of the National Democratic Institute, Transparency International, and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), all of which are funded directly by the United States and powerful individuals and organizations within the western ruling class.

The crackdown on these organizations working to advance the US agenda has been presented in the West as an anti-democratic move by an authoritarian regime. However, perhaps the individuals most vocal in their criticism of Aliyev’s government should face more scrutiny. The most prominent voice in this regard is Carl Bildt, former Swedish foreign minister and aspiring European Commission chief. Bildt, who was perhaps the most belligerent European voice on the issue of Ukraine, described Azerbaijan as an “authoritarian regime” and expressed doubts about the sincerity of Azerbaijan’s commitment to the Eastern Partnership (an initiative that would de facto expand NATO to the borders of Russia). In response to Bildt’s attacks, the Deputy Head of the Azerbaijani Presidential Administration Novruz Mammadov stated:

Unfortunately, there are many such politicians in the international community. They think that everybody should accept and obey what they say. However they don’t understand yet that their irresponsible and narrow-minded thoughts have led the world to such a situation. Today, the ongoing negative processes, conflicts, political instability and tensions in different countries are the result of their thoughts and activities. They are unable to understand the essence of processes in the world. They just memorize some expressions and words, like parrots, and think that they fulfill their duties by using them as a means of pressure

Indeed, Mammadov is absolutely correct in his assessment. Not only is Bildt speaking more out of a vainglorious attempt to position himself in Brussels than out of genuine concern, he is once again meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign state in an attempt to destabilize the government, just as he did countless times in the Ukraine crisis. In fact, Ukraine is instructive for the Azerbaijani government, as some officials correctly view it as a template for the sort of destabilization that could be carried out in their own country.

Russia and Strategic Realignment?

Although the legacy of the Soviet Union has engendered mistrust on both sides of the Azerbaijan-Russia relationship, the reality of global politics is bringing the two closer together than they have been at any point since the collapse of the USSR. Undoubtedly, the increasingly bellicose rhetoric coming from the West in regards to Azerbaijan is a driving factor in the burgeoning relationship between Baku and Moscow. Additionally, the continued sanctions war waged by the West against Russia has opened a window of opportunity that Baku is quickly seizing. Such expanded cooperation bodes well for Russia’s ultimate goal of Eurasian economic integration, while obviously worrying many in the western foreign policy establishment.

In August, a Russian delegation headed by President Putin himself visited Azerbaijan to engage in high-level discussions about a variety of issues. The visit, unprecedented in recent decades, represented a decided change from the previously rocky relations between the two countries. Although there remain obstacles, the two leaders and their delegations agreed to a number of significant deals, including for increased energy cooperation. While Russia is certainly not wanting for energy, it does view Azerbaijan as a crucial partner both in terms of Caspian cooperation, and as a bulwark against encroaching western interests.

As RIA Novosti reported:

A cooperation agreement was signed by Rosneft and SOCAR respective chiefs…The two oil giants also said they would cooperate in marketing and sales of gas and oil products. Rosneft has shown interest in joining the development of the Apsheron gas field in the Caspian Sea, whereas Russia’s largest privately held oil company, LUKoil, is participating in the development of the Shah Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea and owns a network of gasoline-filling stations in Azerbaijan.

While the deals seem comparatively small, the larger ramifications are clear. Moscow and Baku also agreed to closer military and security cooperation, a signal that Azerbaijan has no interest in pursuing the path of NATO cooperation and integration that Georgia and the Baltic states have. Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev noted that military and defense cooperation with Russia amounts to $4 billion annually, with that number expected to rise in coming years. Although Azerbaijan has long since been wooed by powerful military contractors from Israel and the West, it seems that the tide has turned, and Baku is now content to look to Russia for its military hardware.

Although Azerbaijan and Russia’s ally Armenia remain adversarial in regards to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there are increasing signs that Russia could be seen by Baku as more of a good faith mediator than it once was. Although the Russia-Armenia alliance remains strong, Moscow is clearly interested in finding a lasting solution that could benefit all involved. Indeed, that would be a tremendous diplomatic breakthrough, and one that could usher in the accession of Azerbaijan to the expanding Eurasian Economic Union, which recently accepted Armenia as a new member.

Finally, the sanctions imposed on Russia by the West, and Russia’s counter-sanctions, have created new spaces in Russia’s domestic market, particularly in the area of agriculture. Russia, which had largely relied on European countries for its fruits, vegetables, and many other products, is now increasingly looking to countries like Turkey and Azerbaijan to fill the void. As Chairperson of the Russian Council of the Federation (upper house of parliament) Valentina Matviyenko noted during a recent trip to Azerbaijan, “A project on increasing agricultural supplies and its efficient delivery to the consumers is being thoroughly discussed…I am sure that these volumes will increase. Moreover, Azerbaijan itself has shown interest in increasing agricultural supplies to Russia.” In response to the sanctions, Russia has sought new agricultural producers, with Azerbaijan topping the list.

The opportunity for increased Russia-Azerbaijan economic relations bodes well for both countries and the region as a whole. Naturally, the West, along with Israel, view any warming of relations as a direct threat to their own interests. And so, the proxy war expands into a new theater, with the West heating up its rhetoric. Baku would do well to examine the precedent set in Ukraine to understand what might lie in store for it. Rather than pursuing a true multi-vector strategy within which President Aliyev and his government perceive Russia and the West as equally dangerous, it is time that political realism caught up with outmoded ways of thinking about the world. Baku might finally be realizing that the western wolves in sheep’s clothing really do bite. Perhaps it is time that Aliyev & Co. recognize that the notion of a multi-polar world is not mere rhetoric, but a strategic necessity.

Eric Draitser is an independent geopolitical analyst based in New York City, he is the founder of StopImperialism.org and OP-ed columnist for RT, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

By the mid 1990s, newly discovered oil reserves in the Caspian Sea vaulted Azerbaijan to the top of the list of potential allies for the US and Europe. Western energy companies saw in Baku a new and exciting opportunity for profit, while Western capitals saw a potential partner in a volatile region, one that could become central to strategic planning both in the context of Russia and Iran. With its complex mix of Shia and Turkic peoples, combined with secularists from the Soviet era, Azerbaijan seemed a prime candidate for incorporation into the US-NATO-Israel sphere of influence. Indeed, that is precisely what happened.

Azerbaijan has become in recent years a geopolitical crossroads. While it has long-standing ties with Washington and Tel Aviv, and a somewhat tumultuous relationship with Russia (and Russian ally Armenia), Azerbaijan should not be seen as entirely in the orbit of the West. Despite having developed close working relationships with Western energy corporations and governments, Baku has attempted to maintain a somewhat independent foreign policy, one that seeks good relations with the West while keeping it at arm’s distance. Baku has showed a willingness to work with Europe and the US while remaining leery of the West’s intentions. Indeed, the growing mistrust between Azerbaijani officials and their Western counterparts marks a decided change from the previous decade when all Western officials were greeted with open arms in Baku.

And so, the questions today are numerous and multi-dimensional. While Azerbaijan is obviously interested in cultivating a multi-vector foreign policy similar to that of other former Soviet Republics, it does so with a skeptical eye trained on the West. Likewise, despite the historical animus toward Russia, Baku is increasingly becoming friendly with Moscow, seeing in it a counterweight to the West and potentially significant market for its own exports and economic development.

In order to truly assess the political and economic calculus of Azerbaijan, one must also be aware of the various organs of western “soft power” which have taken root in the country. Through a vast network of NGOs and other institutions, the West has attempted to assert influence and indirect control over the political course of the country. In so doing, the West has in many ways alienated the government of President Aliyev, and driven it closer to Russia, particularly in light of recent events in Ukraine which have been correctly interpreted as a possible preview of what might come to Azerbaijan should Washington deem it necessary. Such forms of indirect control and influence exerted by the West further complicate an already complex relationship with Azerbaijan today reassessing many of its assumptions about the West, Russia, and its place on the regional and global chessboard.

Azerbaijan and the West

In November of 1997, the future President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, then First Vice President of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), addressed a number of political, academic, and corporate dignitaries at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. His address, intended to convince leading figures in the West that Azerbaijan’s oil boom was in full swing and that the country was open and ready for western investment, revealed a great deal about how Aliyev and his father, then President Heydar Aliyev, viewed the future of Azerbaijan. It was made explicitly clear that oil wealth would be at the heart of Azerbaijan’s post-Soviet economic and foreign policy, and that it was Western investment that it sought.

Ilham Aliyev, addressing the Harvard crowd, stated:

We have succeeded in creating very comfortable conditions for our investors because it is clearly understood that investors will come and invest only if there is stability in the region and their investments are protected… I want to mention all the companies we will work with within the frame of the oil consortia, so that you will have, perhaps, a better impression about what’s going on now in Azerbaijan. Our partners are Amoco, Unocal, Pennzoil, Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, British Petroleum, Statoil, Lukoil, Turkish Petroleum, Itochu, Delta, Ramco, OIEC, Petrofina, Deminex, Total, Elf Aquitaine and Agip. You can see that many countries are represented in the consortia in Azerbaijan. That was also part of our policy, part of our strategy, to invite companies, the biggest companies in their own countries, that [sic] represent different parts of the world.

At the time, these statements were intended to put at ease the minds of many investors and political leaders who were still unsure of Azerbaijan’s post-Soviet policy, and who were, consequently, reticent to sink large sums of capital into the country. However, the above excerpt also illustrates the psychological, not to mention political and economic, weight that Baku ascribed to the thoughts, opinions, and attitudes of the West, particularly the corporate elite in the energy sector. Not only did Aliyev hope to proclaim that Azerbaijan was open for business, but that business would be booming and, above all, that the capital flooding into the country would be safe and secure.

It is indeed revealing that Aliyev would incant this litany of partner companies, demonstrating the commitment that he and his father had towards economic cooperation with the West. At the same time, this growing friendliness towards the West should also be understood as a logical outgrowth of the humiliating defeat Azerbaijan suffered to Russia’s close ally Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. The war, which cost Azerbaijan a small but significant amount of its territory, forced Baku to seek out Western partners that could provide political and diplomatic backing to the Azerbaijani position vis-à-vis Armenia and Russia. And this is precisely what happened.

By the early 2000s, thanks to a decade-long political charm offensive, Azerbaijan had become a cause célèbre for European elites who saw in Azerbaijan both tremendous business opportunities and, perhaps more importantly, a chance to stifle Russia’s regional cooperation and reemergence as a regional power. By 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) issued its Resolution 1416 which, among other things, asserted that “considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan are still occupied by Armenian forces,” and “independence and secession of a regional territory from a state may only be achieved through a lawful and peaceful process based on the democratic support of the inhabitants of such territory and not in the wake of an armed conflict leading to ethnic expulsion and the de facto annexation of such territory to another state.” More than a simple expression of opinion, Resolution 1416 established quite clearly the fact that Azerbaijan had been “mainstreamed” in the European community, and that Euope saw in Azerbaijan a long-term strategic partner, rather than simply another former Soviet Republic.

Essentially then, Azerbaijan’s strategy of using its oil discoveries to spur large-scale capital investment which could then be translated into political and diplomatic support, ultimately proved successful. In the span of ten years, Azerbaijan went from tiny former Soviet Republic, to an integral part of the European and American foreign policy agenda. This is perhaps best illustrated by the myriad examples of cooperation between Baku and the West.

George Friedman, founder and Chairman of Stratfor, a private global intelligence firm, is perhaps one of the prime examples of just such cooperation. Having made a number of trips to Azerbaijan to meet with high-level contacts, Friedman and his firm is considered one of the principal liaisons between the US intelligence community and Azerbaijan’s government. When WikiLeaks released their “Global Intelligence Files” exposing Stratfor’s global network of paid agents, informants, and intelligence officers, one of the most striking discoveries was the sheer volume of Azerbaijan-related material. This should have come as no surprise as Friedman and Co. have for years indicated the centrality of Azerbaijan for US power projection in the region.

Stratfor, like other organs of US intelligence, views Azerbaijan as a convenient pawn to use in advancing Washington’s agenda against both Iran and Russia. With regard to Iran, which shares a border with Azerbaijan and is home to a large ethnic Azeri minority, Azerbaijan is supposed to act as a hostile nation, playing host to Western intelligence and military; Baku has played up its role as a transit center for US forces in Afghanistan as well as its position as intermediary with Iran in the ongoing talks regarding Iran’s nuclear program. In this way, Azerbaijan has postured as an indispensible ally for Washington. Whether Washington entirely agrees with such a posture is still an open question.

Friedman and others have written that Azerbaijan represents an absolutely critical linchpin for US-NATO strategy in containing Russia and stifling its development and any regional ambitions it might have. In many ways, Friedman and his ilk see in Azerbaijan a Caspian-Caucasus variation of the Baltic model – formerly Soviet Republics that can be brought into the orbit of the West through coercion and promises of collective security. In addition, like the Baltic States, Azerbaijan presents a wealth of business opportunities for the ever-stagnant European economy. Essentially, such planners see an “eastern line” separating what they optimistically regard as “Europe” from “Russia.” In more concrete and realistic terms, what Friedman and his colleagues are actually describing is the continued eastward expansion of NATO and Europe, pushing not only to the doorstep of Russia in the Baltic, Georgia and Ukraine, but also on the Caspian Sea.

Of course, there is also the very conspicuous cooperation between Baku and Tel Aviv. Indeed, Israel has emerged in recent years as a principal partner for Azerbaijan, partnering with Aliyev’s government on a massive $1.6 billion weapons purchase, in addition to smaller contracts for drones and other high military technology. As the now infamous diplomatic cable leaked by WikiLeaks entitled “Azerbaijan’s Discreet Symbiosis with Israel” indicated, President Aliyev described the state of Azerbaijan’s relationship with Israel as “nine-tenths of it is below the surface.” A widely read 2012 article from Foreign Policy magazine entitled “Israel’s Secret Staging Ground” noted that:

Four senior diplomats and military intelligence officers say that the United States has concluded that Israel has recently been granted access to airbases on Iran’s northern border… ‘The Israelis have bought an airfield…and the airfield is called Azerbaijan.’ Senior U.S. intelligence officials are increasingly concerned that Israel’s military expansion into Azerbaijan complicates U.S. efforts to dampen Israeli-Iranian tensions.

The military and strategic imperatives for the West in Azerbaijan certainly do not end with bases, airstrips, military contracts, and intelligence cooperation. Rather, perhaps the primary driver of Western strategic planning in Azerbaijan has to do with energy and pipelines. Seen as the gateway to the Caspian’s vast energy riches, Azerbaijan is a critical link in the West-sponsored “Southern Corridor,” an energy development plan that envisions a basket of pipelines bringing Caspian energy from Azerbaijan through Georgia and the Caucasus region, across Turkey, and into Europe. The centerpiece of this development model is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC). While it has been hailed as a major achievement, the BTC has changed the dynamics of the region only slightly, and provides a negligible amount of energy to Europe.

Once seen as part of a comprehensive strategy to undermine Russian energy dominance in Europe, recent developments have cast doubt on the viability of the Southern Corridor entirely, making the fanciful notion of countering Russia’s primacy in the region all the more absurd. Additionally, as Russia brings online its South Stream pipeline, Azerbaijan’s once vaunted position vis-à-vis Europe is now in question. Perhaps it is this loss of strategic importance that has made the West more belligerent and condescending toward Azerbaijan’s government. Indeed, a close analysis of recent developments signals a marked shift in the political and business elites’ attitudes toward Azerbaijan.

Part 2 of this article will examine the changing and coercive nature of the West’s relationship with Azerbaijan, including the mechanisms of soft power being used to undermine the government. Additionally, it will focus on recent developments in relations with Russia, and how those might affect the political alignment of Azerbaijan in the years to come.

Eric Draitser is an independent geopolitical analyst based in New York City, he is the founder of StopImperialism.org and OP-ed columnist for RT, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.