At the end of December last year, the National Security Council of Pakistan, chaired by the Prime Minister, adopted the National Security Policy of Pakistan 2022-2026 (or NSP), apparently the first such document in the country’s history.

However, its originality was immediately questioned by representatives of highly influential army circles in Pakistan who say that a similar report is issued by experts from the National Defense University on an annual basis. But the civilian leadership of any country tends to interpret the concept of national security much more broadly than the military, and commentators on the document under discussion have already drawn attention to the fact that it focuses primarily on Pakistan’s economic development.

The “published” version of the NSP, which is most likely redacted, with parts of the text remaining classified, is an extensive (62-page) document with eight chapters. The text is preceded by a brief introduction by Prime Minister Imran Khan and his National Security Adviser Moeed Yusuf.

Perhaps the content of both the document as a whole and the introductory articles can best be understood in the context of the upcoming general elections, scheduled for October 2023. Imran Khan and his Movement for Justice Party will then be faced with the challenge of repeating the success which they achieved in the summer of 2018, when they brought about what experts described as the “second democratic transfer of power” in the country’s history. Naturally, this description of the event is an exaggeration (to put it mildly), especially in view of the way that the military (which remains the main manager of “democratic processes” in the country) treated Nawaz Sharif, a member of one of Pakistan’s most powerful political clans. But still, it did not involve any shooting, attempted assassinations of political rivals or resounding court hearings.

And although Pakistan’s domestic politics are never free from a certain amount of turbulence, hopes remain high that the next electoral campaign will stay within the bounds of acceptable democratic procedure.

The Prime Minister’s comments in the preface to the NSP are clearly aimed at voters in next year’s elections: “… the security of Pakistan rests in the security of its citizens. Such a citizen-centric approach to national security prioritizes national cohesion and the prosperity of people… Realizing the symbiotic relationship between economic, human, and traditional security is now imperative for Pakistan’s long-term development.”

These introductory statements from the Prime Minister were further developed by his national security adviser in the latter’s comments on the “archaic guns versus butter debate.” “Our national security thinking seeks to identify means ….such that Pakistan can simultaneously strengthen its traditional and non-traditional security.”

It should be noted that experts have always been aware that the concept of national security is highly complex and cannot be reduced to a “basic” formula (such as the “traditional” security element). In recent decades, the catastrophic collapse of the USSR provided an impetus for rethinking the concept of national security: the collapse was the kind of event that could not have been prevented by the “main” component in a traditional security system, such as a nuclear missile shield. The shield remained untouched and in full effect, but the nation it was designed to protect just disappeared. That, of course, does not in any way detract from the importance to a state of having (or not having) nuclear weapons in its arsenal. This factor is reflected in the document under discussion.

However, the realization that national security depends, to put it broadly, on “everything”, that is, on all aspects of the functioning of a country, dramatically complicates the task of developing a national security policy that can be used by the government when drawing up plans for any given time period. The available resources are always limited, and thus the inevitable question arises – if “everything” is important, then what should be prioritized? It is not even easy to imagine (and express in a concise form) what this “everything” might consist of. In the words of the NSP, “Pakistan faces innumerable internal and external factors that impact its security.”

It is therefore no surprise that, according to the document itself, it has been under development since 2014, with input from all major state institutions and hundreds of specialists. Moreover, it appears that its authors do not consider it to be a final version, and it may therefore be updated to take into account new circumstances, both internal and external, that may arise.

And yet the authors still needed to define their own vision of the problematic concept of national security, which lies at the very hear of the document. Otherwise, all their hard work over many years would be effectively pointless. So, in the National Security Framework section, they define their terms of reference as follows: “Pakistan’s vital national security interests are best served by placing economic security as the core element of national security.” It is this element that can ensure “national cohesion, territorial integrity, internal security, and citizen welfare.”

However, the document has a whole section dedicated to the problem of “National Unity”. Among the various security challenges related to this issue, that of “socio-economic inequalities” is particularly significant. Based on the principle of “unity through diversity”, the Policy emphasizes the importance of strengthening the federal structure of the nation.

Challenges to national security from abroad are also considered in detail. These include threats both from Pakistan’s neighbors and from further afield. Important aspects of Pakistan’s relations with such leading world powers as China, the USA, Russia, and India are considered.

In the words of the Policy, “Pakistan’s deep-rooted historic ties with China are driven by shared interests … mutual understanding … and strategic convergence”. It also describes the continuation of the long-term China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” project as being of exceptional importance for Pakistan’s development. That statement seems particularly significant in view of the increasing propaganda attacks from Western countries against China’s vast Belt and Road Initiative generally, and specifically in the a–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which forms an important link in that project.

The Policy also describes relations with the United States fairly cautiously. Readiness is expressed to develop these relations in the areas of “trade, investment, connectivity, energy, counter-terrorism, security, and intelligence cooperation.”

Relations with Russia are described in positive terms. Russia’s role in the Central Asian region in general and especially in Afghanistan is emphasized. Recent developments in this region have been of particular concern to Islamabad.

Naturally, however, the views of Pakistan’s leadership on the general state of the country’s relations with India are of particular interest. Their ongoing tensions between these two neighbors remains the main challenge to maintaining strategic stability in the entire South Asian region. Without ignoring the existing problems in bilateral relations, especially the situation in Kashmir, which has its roots in the partition of that former Principality back in the 1940s, the authors of the Policy express the hope that they will be resolved peacefully.

In India, of course, Pakistan’s publication of the NSP has been the subject of considerable comment, and its content has been closely studied. There, assessments of the Policy’s implications for the future of bilateral relations range from cautious optimism to “nothing fundamentally new.”

But this brief commentary is unable to do full justice to such a wide-ranging document as Pakistan’s National Security Policy, which deals in depth with a wide range of ideas and is the fruit of many years of work by a large number of specialists. There is insufficient space here to focus on all the important points made in the Policy, and readers are recommended to seek out the original. Anyone with an interest in modern international politics today will find that the time they spend reading this document is amply rewarded.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

On November 28, the 15th Summit of the Leaders of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Member-States was held in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, with the participation of the heads of state and governments of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, the countries that are members of the organization.

The ECO summit agenda included further expansion of multifaceted cooperation within the organization in such priority areas as trade, investment, “green” economy and innovation, digital technologies, transport, logistics, tourism, etc.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation (ECO) is a regional interstate economic body established in 1985 by the Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries. It is the legal successor of the Organization for Regional Cooperation for Development operating on the basis of the Izmir Treaty signed by the three founding countries — Iran, Pakistan and Turkey on March 12, 1977. It was later joined by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

As President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov stressed out in his speech, the development of cooperation in the transport and energy areas is among the most important priorities of the ECO, since these spheres are effectively defining the trends of global economic growth. In keeping with the practical implementation of these initiatives, ECO has proceeded with the large infrastructural projects. The latter include, in particular, building of transmission lines Turkmenistan — Afghanistan — Pakistan, the railway from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, the gas pipeline Turkmenistan — Afghanistan — Pakistan — India. Strong emphasis has been also made on the activation of transport and transit communication along the East–West and North–South lines and, in particular, on the creation of transport corridors Uzbekistan —Turkmenistan — Iran — Oman, as well as Afghanistan — Turkmenistan — Azerbaijan — Georgia — Turkey. In this context, it is essential to establish a goal-oriented dialogue between the ECO and such interstate associations as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. “The implementation of major infrastructure projects with the participation of ECO member-states, without exaggeration, means a qualitative breakthrough in establishing a new geopolitical and economic space on the continent; it offers great opportunities for cooperation, attracting large external investments and tackling a number of important social challenges,” Turkmenistan’s president said.

Speaking during the Forum, the leaders of the ECO member-states, as well as the Secretary General of the Organization emphasized that the current summit, as well as the Organization itself in general, has become an effective platform for making decisions on topical and key aspects of regional economic cooperation in the ECO space.  The Organization has put in place all conditions for the further development of multilateral regional cooperation, for the socio-economic growth of the member countries, as well as the expansion of effective mutual cooperation in the field of trade, industry, transport and communications, agriculture, energy, health care, education, science and culture. Following the results of the ECO Summit, the Final Document was adopted.

The Iranian President was very active during the 15th ECO Summit, announcing Tehran’s position and proposals regarding strengthening regional and international relations, as well as removing obstacles and increasing the level of cooperation between ECO member-states. He also held meetings with his foreign counterparts in order to explore the possibilities of expanding bilateral ties. As the spokesman for the Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) said earlier, the country’s value of trade with ECO member-states from March 21 to October 22 (which corresponds to the first seven months of the Iranian year) increased by 48.5% amounting to 20.3 million tons of goods worth $9.2 billion. The share of Iran’s exports in this figure totaled 17.4 million tons of goods valued at $6.03 billion while the exports of ECO member-states amounted to 2.88 million tons, which corresponds to $3.3 billion in value terms.

As part of the deepening ECO cooperation, the 9th meeting of Iran-Pakistan Joint Trade Committee was held in Tehran on November 6 –7. During the talks both sides agreed to expand trade exchanges to $5 billion and create a barter trade mechanism. In the follow-up to this agreements, on November 24, Islamabad negotiated the purchase of Iranian liquefied gas through the barter system. At the same time, Iran agreed to meet the energy needs of Pakistan through the implementation of the gas pipeline project.

Meanwhile, Jeyhun Bayramov and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Iran, met on the sidelines of the summit. The sides discussed the current regional situation, as well as the Sochi declaration that had been adopted following the meeting of the leaders of Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia. The ministers also touched upon the implementation of trilateral statements, as well as the importance of cooperation in the “3+3” format.

A day earlier, on November 27, Ashgabat hosted a business forum of the ECO member-states. The business forum was attended by representatives of the ECO Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the Asian Development Bank, CCIs of ECO member-states, the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, the Turkish-Pakistani Chamber of Commerce and Industry as well as by relevant ministries, public organizations and various companies. About 300 foreign representatives participated online; bilateral meetings were set up in a range of sectors: oil and gas industry, chemistry, agriculture and food industry, textile industry, trade. The ECO business forum saw the signing of contracts worth more than $35.5 million. Within the framework of the ECO business forum, a Memorandum was signed with the purpose of increasing cargo shipping through the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway corridor, with Turkmenistan companies signing contracts for the export of confectionery products to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan. Deals were also struck on the supply of equipment from Turkey for the production of furniture in Turkmenistan, grain supplies from Kazakhstan, etc.

Vladimir Platov, expert on the Middle East, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

In recent months in the wake of the events in Afghanistan, Pakistan has conspicuously increased its regional influence, a fact noticed not only by the most active international actors, but also by Pakistan itself.

Thus, on September, 22 at a business conference in Islamabad Pakistani Minister for Information and Broadcasting Fawad Ahmed Chaudhry highlighted the increased regional importance of his country pointing out that under Prime Minister Imran Khan, Pakistan has now become a global decision-maker. To support his claim the Minister stressed out that Pakistan is taking an active part in Taliban’s efforts to form an inclusive Afghan government (banned in Russia) and is engaged in connecting Gwadar and Karachi with Central Asian countries by rail via Mazar-i-Sharif as part of the implementation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project. In addition, the government has initiated 1,100 various projects involving other countries as well.

After a chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan the US has found another reliable communications channel with Taliban via Pakistan. It became another venue in addition to Doha where under the auspices of CIA office in Central Asia talks with Taliban on the US military withdrawal were held. In an effort to establish a line of communication with Taliban CIA decided to turn to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) which has close ties with the militant organization and had previously helped the US to facilitate contacts with it.

Beijing also decided to turn Pakistan into its foothold in the region so that it could, among other things, check US regional influence thus becoming a leading investor in the country’s economy. For that reason Chinese investors have funneled more than $70 billion into Pakistani economy.

Meanwhile, Pakistan can capitalize on its close ties with Taliban helping the US and CIA not only to escape the Afghan trap with dignity, but also to punish the culprits who had killed the US military personnel in Kabul airport during the evacuation. To achieve this goal without Pakistani intelligence’s aid will be a difficult task. China also takes interest in Pakistan’s mediation services regarding not only ensuring stability in Afghanistan but also expeditious recognition of Taliban regime in the West. In early September, to address these matters General Faiz Hamid, the head of Pakistani intelligence, visited Kabul to discuss with Taliban leaders security issues as well as economic and trade engagement thus becoming the first top foreign official to set foot on Afghan soil after Taliban seized power in this country.

At the same time on September, 13 US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was quick to announce that the US administration intends to assess Pakistan’s role in supporting the radical movement of Taliban as well in the events in Afghanistan. The US authorities are set to look at “what role Pakistan has played over the last 20 years” amid the events in Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover, he said. Washington will also take up the issue of what role, from the US perspective, Pakistan “has to play in the coming years and what it will take for it to do that”. During his speech the Secretary of State said that actions of Pakistan in many cases “are in conflict with” US interests although at some points the interests of the two powers converge. Blinken stressed out that the US cooperates with Pakistan on a range of issues regarding counterterrorism.

With Taliban’s grip on power now secure, the political significance of Pakistan has clearly swelled. Let’s recall that Pakistan was one of the three countries (the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) that had recognized Taliban government in 1990. It also was the last to sever official ties in 2001. For more than two decades Pakistan provided injured Taliban leaders with shelter and medical care. Many Afghans who joined the movement were educated in Pakistani religious schools. For the first time in its history, Pakistan has gained global influence since such important countries as Russia, China and the US rely on its active participation in helping the interested parties in Afghanistan to engage in mutual cooperation as a new political landscape in Central and South Asian region emerges, which is a matter of interest for them.

Pakistan’s significantly increased importance was also visible during the last SCO summit as Islamabad, along with Iran, China and Russia, took an active part in debating Afghanistan’s political future. And this is understandable since Islamabad remains the only regional actor that has a direct sway on Taliban.

It should also not be forgotten that control over Taliban in Afghanistan is vital for Pakistan itself since it wants to stave off Taliban’s merging with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (banned in Russia) or with other Taliban militants present in the country who are in control of mountainous federal territories. Such coalition would entail the creation of a gigantic Pashtunistan, a threat to Pakistan’s very existence.

Proving this point in Islamabad on September, 12 General Faiz Hameed, the head of Inter-Service Intelligence, hosted a meeting of chiefs of intelligence services of Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Iran and China. The participants discussed the situation in Afghanistan, exchanged views on what was going on in the country and also discussed measures needed to ensure “lasting peace and stability” in the region. According to Mohammad Sadiq, Pakistan’s special envoy to Afghanistan, participants “were unanimous that peace in Afghanistan is vital for security, stability and prosperity of the entire region”. He said that the region-wide approach and the active role of Pakistan in this process will help to both realize the potential of the republic, and resolve problems of mutual interest.

Meanwhile it is not coincidence that Pakistan, fearing that Afghan destabilization will have a “ricochet” effect on it, is simultaneously maneuvering within the coalition Pakistan — Qatar — Turkey. So now the Pakistani intelligence is trying to determine how deep is the rift between the parties and what it could mean both for Islamabad and the region as a whole.

Vladimir Platov, expert on the Middle East, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 led to the country falling under the control of the Islamist movement Taliban (banned in Russia). The fall of the previous Afghan government caused deep concern for all the countries that share a border with Afghanistan. Pakistan is worried about the recent events in Afghanistan, because in Pakistani society radical Islamists enjoy great support among the population, and a large number of terrorist organizations are active in the country. The strengthening of the Taliban’s position could have a negative impact on Pakistan’s well-being.

On August 23, 2021, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi ​said that the world community should start a dialogue with the Taliban According to the Pakistani foreign minister, other countries must maintain contact with the Taliban. Shah Mahmood Qureshi said Pakistan is doing all it can to help stabilize Afghanistan. The Pakistani foreign minister called on the states neighboring Afghanistan to take action that would lead to a de-escalation of the conflict in that state.

The Afghan-Pakistani border is 2,670 km long. It is a challenge for Pakistan to maintain control of its borders with Afghanistan, as the border runs along the desert and there are settlements along the border areas whose residents have a negative attitude toward the government forces.

The Pakistani leadership is interested in order in Afghanistan, because if there is none, Pakistan may face an acute problem in the form of Afghan refugee flows in a very foreseeable future. Islamabad does not need such an unpleasant turn of events, because the standard of living in Pakistan is relatively low, and an influx of refugees would painfully affect Pakistan’s economy, which has already been hit hard by the financial crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

Pakistani authorities are also concerned about the fact that the Afghan regions adjacent to Pakistan are populated by ethnic Pashtuns. Today, the Pashtuns in Pakistan are the dominant ethnic group which plays the most important role in the political life of the state. It should be noted that the Pashtuns are the core of the Taliban. If Pakistani Pashtuns, inspired by the example of their tribesmen from Afghanistan, were to radicalize en masse, this could lead to a significant deterioration of the situation in Pakistan.

It is important to mention that among Pashtuns there are supporters of creating a sovereign state, Pashtunistan, in the territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Pashtuns are the majority of the population. This idea does exist, but its implementation is still out of the question. As noted earlier, Pashtuns occupy almost all the top positions in Pakistan, so they rarely share separatist ideas.

However, there is an Islamist group, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP; banned in Russia), which regularly commits terrorist acts in Pakistan. The TTP, as a separate organization, is actively cooperating with the Afghan Taliban to jointly establish an Islamic state on the territory of both countries. The Pakistani government is actively fighting the TTP on the grounds that it poses a serious threat to Pakistan’s territorial integrity and national security. If the Afghan Taliban becomes stronger, it will provide significant support to the TTP. The strengthened TTP would be a great challenge for Pakistan’s economy, as the state would have to significantly increase spending to deal with the domestic threat.

Afghanistan is not a mono-ethnic state: the country is home to a wide variety of nationalities. The Taliban who seized power are Pashtuns. The Taliban’s plan was to have a government composed entirely of Pashtuns, but neighboring countries insisted that power should be distributed proportionally among all nationalities. And according to many experts, an inclusive government is one of the pillars of a united Afghanistan. If other nationalities are deprived of the opportunity to gain power, separatist sentiments will be popular among them for the foreseeable future.

On September 17, 2021, Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan and President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon met in the capital of Tajikistan, Dushanbe. The press service of the leader of Tajikistan stated that the sides agreed to organize negotiations between the Taliban and the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, which is based on Tajiks living on Afghan territory, in Dushanbe. Rahmon reported that the Pakistan-Tajikistan talks resulted in an agreement to promote peace in Afghanistan. Imran Khan, for his part, said he had discussed at length with his Tajik counterpart how to ensure order and stability in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. The Prime Minister of Pakistan noted that Tajikistan and Pakistan are concerned about the conflict between the Taliban and the Tajiks in Panjsher.

Imran Khan called on the president of Tajikistan to influence the Tajiks of Panjsher, and he himself promised to reach agreements with the Taliban and the Pashtuns. The Pakistani prime minister stressed that Afghanistan is home to many peoples, so harmony can only be achieved after an inclusive government is formed, and his country will urge the Taliban to do so.

On September 19, 2021, Pakistan entered into negotiations with the Taliban to establish an inclusive government. The Pakistani prime minister said the multinational composition of the cabinet will help Afghanistan move to a new level of development. Imran Khan is confident that ending the Afghan conflict will benefit the entire region.

Despite the fact that Pakistan is a rather conservative state with, for example, functioning sharia courts, the state strives to keep up with the most developed countries. Many of today’s Pakistani politicians studied at the best universities in Europe and are familiar with the Western way of life. In particular, in September 2021, Pakistan became the home of the Afghan women’s soccer team, which the Taliban had banned from participating in sports.

Pakistan’s leadership understands that their troubled neighbor needs help. The world community is reluctant to recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s new government, and the Taliban will not be able to constantly quell citizen discontent. Without the support of neighboring countries, Afghanistan might not be able to establish itself as a state, which would have a negative impact on the development of the entire region. Pakistan understands this, and therefore contributes to the resolution of the conflict.

Petr Konovalov, a political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

In recent years, there has been an undisguised deterioration in relations between Washington and Islamabad. However, this breakdown with a country once considered a critical military and political ally of the United States in South Asia and the Middle East has long been evident.

The US-Pakistan alliance has already been severely damaged since the killing of Osama bin Laden by US commandos inside Pakistan in 2011 behind the backs of Pakistani intelligence agencies. This and many other incidents have badly strained relations between the Pakistani and US authorities. The result is that the number of US-positive people in Pakistan has plummeted in recent years and now stands at no more than 10-12% of the population.

During Barack Obama’s presidency, the deterioration in relations continued, with US authorities increasing pressure on Pakistan by refusing in 2016 to provide $300 million in military aid to a key ally in South Asia. The Pentagon’s decision attributed to “insufficient activity by Pakistani security forces in combating the Haqqani network (a terrorist group banned in Russia) operating in the border areas with Afghanistan.” Much of this escalation coincided with the growing crisis in Islamabad’s relations with India accusing Pakistan of supporting terrorists in Kashmir. Washington has clearly decided to side with New Delhi.

US cooperation with Pakistan was also severely tested in the “Trump era”. During his speech at Fort Myer base in Arlington, Virginia, on August 22, 2017, he actually accused Islamabad of supporting terrorists. Moreover, despite the Afghan grouping of US troops being supplied through the Pakistani border, the United States deliberately went to this cooling of relations with Islamabad.

However, there is reasonable ground to believe that the real reason for the US falling-out with Pakistan is not related to terrorism but China’s growing influence on the Islamic Republic’s policies. In this context, Washington’s sharp reorientation towards developing and deepening relations with India is a future counterweight to Chinese expansion in White House policy. India itself hastened to take advantage of the situation to pull the United States to its side in the dispute with Pakistan.

Against this backdrop, an unprecedented decision was taken in January 2018 by Pakistan’s leadership. Islamabad has responded to the American accusations with dignity, showing that the nuclear weapons state with a population of many millions is no longer going to bow and scrape before “Uncle Sam” by making guilty excuses. As a result, Pakistani authorities decided to suspend cooperation with the United States through the Ministry of Defense and intelligence agencies. In fact, it was an indication that the country was abandoning further alliance with Washington. Moreover, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry explained American charges against the country because the US and NATO campaign in Afghanistan is failing, so Washington is looking for a scapegoat, and Pakistan appears to be a very convenient country for American politicians and generals in this case. Of course, Islamabad itself would never take such a demonstrative step if the US had not created the preconditions for a deterioration in bilateral relations.

However, it should be emphasized that the US alliance with Pakistan has always been purely situational, tactical in nature. Therefore, this partnership has had a very shaky foundation from the beginning. The long-standing “friendship” of the two states was based primarily on the confrontation with the Communist block during the Cold War. At that time, the Soviet Union was supporting India, Pakistan’s main adversary, and was also active in neighboring Afghanistan, which could not fail to alarm the elite of Pakistan. In these circumstances, it was Pakistan that Washington chose as the key link in helping the Afghan mujahideen, who were fighting against the Soviet troops and the army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Anti-US sentiment in Pakistan also has a long history. Back in 1979, an angry mob set fire to the American Embassy in Islamabad – the diplomats barely escaped. Even then, Pakistani society did not believe in friendly relations with the United States. It was the mistrust of Washington that led, among other things, to the South Asian nation’s authorities categorically refusing to reduce its tactical nuclear weapons capabilities at the suggestion of the White House in 2015.

The arrival at the beginning of the year of Joe Biden’s new administration in the White House initially seemed to offer an encouraging sign regarding a possible settlement of bilateral relations. And the occasion was the announcement of the inclusion in the Biden administration of two Americans of Pakistani origin. These are Ali Zaidi, as the first Deputy White House National Climate Advisor, and Salman Ahmed, he joined Biden’s foreign policy team as the Director of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff. Ahmed previously served as senior director of strategic planning for Barack Obama’s United States National Security Council. Salman Ahmed has also served as chief of staff of the US mission to the UN and as senior political advisor to the US permanent representative to the UN.

However, given that Joe Biden’s election campaign (as well as Donald Trump’s) was in serious competition for Indian Americans votes, the above appointments have not changed the White House’s attitude towards India’s already established influence in the US. And a striking example of this is Joe Biden’s nomination, less than 100 hours before his inauguration, of 20 Indian Americans, including 13 women, to key posts in his administration, a record in itself for this small ethnic community which makes up 1% of the country’s population.

For years, Islamabad’s significant contributions to the “war against terrorism” in Afghanistan have sustained the close ties between Washington and Islamabad. But the cooling of relations between Washington and Islamabad has to some extent devalued Pakistan’s contribution to the American war against terrorism. It has also indirectly weakened the country’s special status in international affairs. This also harmed the implementation of the US deal with the Taliban, as evidenced, among other things, by the course of events in Afghanistan as US troops withdrew from the country. There will always be a risk of terrorism, and Biden objectively cannot discount Pakistan’s importance in bringing stability to the Afghan situation. With respect to Pakistan, Washington’s choice, of course, will certainly have to determine the balance of US policy with both New Delhi and Islamabad, where the White House expects each of these countries to fulfill “its purpose” in carrying out relevant and essential functions for the US. That is, India to contain China through the Indo-Pacific strategy and Pakistan to fight terrorism in Afghanistan.

However, the United States, which has long since forgotten how to use diplomacy to seek the truth and resolve complex inter-state issues and has switched entirely to a policy of threats and sanctions, has decided to use a decidedly coercive method in determining the prospects for future bilateral relations with Pakistan. And this was confirmed by United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who said on September 13 that “the US administration intends to assess the role Pakistan has played in supporting the radical Taliban (banned in Russia) and the events in Afghanistan”. During a speech in Washington, the secretary of state noted that Pakistan’s actions “in many cases go against US interests.” In this regard, he said, US authorities intend to “review in the coming days or weeks” what “role Pakistan has played in the last 20 years” in the context of the situation in Afghanistan and the country’s takeover by the Taliban. According to Blinken, Washington will also discuss what role, from the US perspective, Pakistan should “play in Afghanistan in the coming years, and what it needs to do.”

To support the US position on Pakistan in the media space and with the explicit coordination with Washington, the German publication Die Welt even published an article “The main enemy has always sat in Islamabad” with explicit “recommendations” on how to punish Pakistan for the apparent defeat of the US in Afghanistan.

However, such moves by the White House and its “advisers” in Western Europe are unlikely to restore the former “cooperative business relationship” between the US and Pakistan.

Vladimir Platov, expert on the Middle East, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

It looks like it may become a bad tradition to use the opening phrase “No sooner had the New Eastern Outlook…” in an article on the situation in Pakistan, which is prompted by yet another terrorist attack on Pakistani territory.

These attacks have increased sharply recently, which fits in with the general pattern of increasing turbulence in the Central and South Asian region. It should be noted that in addition to Pakistan, the political picture that is emerging in the region also involves major regional and global powers such as China, Russia, India and the United States, whose interests often (and often strongly) do not coincide.

So, no sooner had the “New Eastern Outlook” discussed the 14 July terrorist attack in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in the context of the Afghan issue than a new one occurred just five weeks later. This time in the territorially opposite to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan province of Pakistan. Specifically in the Gwadar port area.

As in the previous case, the suicide attack was aimed at Chinese nationals. It is recalled that a bus carrying Chinese experts was blown up near Dasu town (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province). In the Gwadar area, a terrorist attacked a vehicle, also carrying Chinese nationals. The bus was on its way to the construction site of the hydropower plant, which has been under construction by a Chinese company since 2017. The vehicle was moving somewhere near the Gwadar port complex, which is also being “modernized” (actually being rebuilt) with the decisive involvement of the PRC.

In Dasu, 9 Chinese and 4 Pakistanis were killed; in Gwadar, mostly children playing nearby were injured (of whom two were killed and two injured) and one Chinese was also injured.

Again, the only thing that seems to be common between the two attacks that took place two thousand kilometers apart are their targets, namely the Chinese specialists working in various, much-needed facilities in Pakistan. The Dasu hydropower plant (whose first phase is due for completion in 2025) will substantially solve the country’s electricity deficit.

As for the Gwadar port complex on the Arabian Sea, it serves several purposes. Previously, the possibility of permanently stationing Chinese naval units here was mentioned among them. In recent years, however, it has been mentioned mainly in connection with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project, which in turn is one of the main elements of the global Chinese Belt and Road Initiative project.

But a substantial part of the CPEC runs through the Pakistani province of Balochistan, where separatist sentiments are strong. Representing the infrastructural skeleton that binds Pakistan, the CPEC is seen by Balochs as a major challenge in their quest for independence. The PRC specialists involved in its implementation, who are periodically attacked by armed personnel, are treated accordingly. The most recent was the aforementioned attack in Gwadar, although no one has yet claimed responsibility for it.

Less clear is the motivation for the Dasu attack, for which Foreign Minister Sh.M. Qureshi blamed the Tehreek-e-Taliban (banned in the Russian Federation), which is somewhat perplexing. For until recently, this group based in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (populated mostly by Pashtuns) has been fighting mainly against its own “secular, pro-Western government betraying the interests of its brethren.” This “betrayal” is mainly seen in relation to the Kashmir issue.

It would seem to be one thing to deal with bombing of trucks with soldiers of the central government of Pakistan, who are periodically engaged in “counter-terrorism operations” in various parts of the said province. But what has this to do with the Chinese building a facility in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that is useful to all (including Pashtuns)?

One could, of course, refer to the motive of revenge against Beijing for its policies towards the indigenous population of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the PRC. But the Pakistani Taliban (who, by the way, should not be totally correlated with the Afghan Taliban, also banned in Russia) hardly know the true cost of propaganda hysteria about the “genocide of the Uyghurs,” initiated by the West.

Be that as it may, Beijing appears to be becoming concerned about the increasingly visible helplessness of its “iron ally” government to control its own territory. The cost of this issue is by no means limited to the economic component, although the total cost to the PRC of building the CPEC facilities alone is now estimated to be in excess of USD 60 billion.

Equally important is its political-strategic component. Again, the PRC’s main regional ally must ensure control of the situation at least in strategically important areas of its own territory, which are undoubtedly the port of Gwadar and facilities such as the hydropower plant in the Dasu area. The transport arteries leading to them must function just as reliably.

But perhaps most important is the security of Chinese citizens. Despite China’s tight control of the situation internally, its leadership cannot ignore its own public’s possible bewilderment (to put it mildly): what kind of ally is this, in whose territory our specialists are being killed while helping it to build vital facilities?

That was apparently why there was a certain irritation with the PRC Public Security Minister during his (video) conversation on the subject of recent terrorist attacks in Pakistan, which he held with the country’s Prime Minister’s adviser and head of its foreign intelligence, M. Yousuf, on 24 August. Notably, it came only a week after the Foreign Ministers of both countries, Wang Yi and Sh.M. Qureshi, had spoken about the same thing on the phone .

As for the conversation between Zhao Kezhi and M. Yusuf, the latter was quite clearly confronted with the need, first, to solve the problem of supplying Chinese citizens in Pakistan and, second, to get a comprehensive answer to the question of not only the direct perpetrators of both terrorist attacks, but also those who ordered them. Although the Chinese minister did note “significant progress” by the Pakistani side on the issue.

It seems remarkable that in both these conversations there was no mention of the hypothesis put forward earlier by Sh.M. Qureshi that the Indian foreign intelligence agency RAW (the Research and Analysis Wing) was behind the direct perpetrators of the Dasu attack. Earlier, this kind of “tie-up with India” was made in connection with the attacks in Balochistan.

Finally, it seems appropriate once again to refer briefly to the category of “terrorism” itself (in particular “international” one) and its place in contemporary global political processes. In the author’s view, around the end of the 1990s the victors of the Cold War tried to define a specific phenomenon with this odd newspeak (based on a word for a fighting method).

The term “international terrorists” has come to denote those bad people who have resorted to (equally bad) means in an attempt to change the world that was so glorious for the main beneficiaries of the Cold War victory.

With the resumption of the (almost “completed”) historical process, however, the issue of “international terrorism” began to turn into one of the instruments of struggle between the leading world players. Behind at least some of the “international terrorists” they can clearly be discerned.

It seems clear enough that both attacks discussed here are aimed at causing problems for one of the two global powers, which de facto already is China. Namely, in the realm of its relations with both Pakistan and India. In particular, if China and India establish trusting relations, the prospect of an anti-Chinese “Asian NATO”, with the latter playing a central role, would become quite slim.

So immediately after another noisy act of “international terrorism” (such as the ones that happened at Kabul airport on 26 August), we “watch the hands” of some of the participants in the global political game.

While keeping in mind to ask the eternal question: Qui prodest?

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

In April a terrorist bombing targeted a hotel in Pakistan’s southwest Baluchistan province hosting China’s ambassador to Pakistan, Nong Rong. Ambassador Nong Rong was not at the hotel at the time of the bombing, but the attack still ended up killing 4 and wounding several more.

In July an explosion targeted a bus carrying Chinese engineers working on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), part of China’s wider Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This attack killed 13 including 9 of the Chinese engineers.

Such attacks are not new. They are merely the most recent acts of violence amid a long-standing effort by the US and armed militants it has openly supported for years to thwart China’s partnership with Pakistan and to sabotage the BRI.

While US President Joe Biden had unveiled his “Build Back Better World” (B3W) initiative at the February 2021 G7 meeting as America’s answer to China’s BRI, it was clearly a smokescreen behind which the US would continue a campaign of global destabilization and militancy aimed at nations cooperating with Beijing and hosting various BRI projects.

Pakistan is among many nations now facing America’s true answer to the BRI – state-sponsored terrorism, militancy, and political subversion. Joining Pakistan is also Southeast Asian nations like Thailand and Myanmar which have both suffered from US-sponsored anti-government protests in recent years – the latter of the two having protests transform into now ongoing armed conflict.

The US has also targeted China internally, focusing its efforts on radicalizing Uyghur separatists in China’s western Xinjiang region, then undermining Beijing’s efforts to contain the resulting terrorism. Xinjiang serves, without coincidence, as a critical juncture for several BRI routes.

More than Mere Speculation: America’s “Free Baluchistan” Campaign

Much of Washington’s efforts to “free Baluchistan” have been copied and pasted from both US efforts to carve up the Middle East through granting the region’s Kurds defacto autonomous territory, or the US-backed push for a “free East Turkestan” in China’s Xinjiang region. This latter effort is reflected on the US National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) own official website which lists its programs for Xinjiang, China as “Xinjiang/East Turkestan (China),” deliberately including the name given to the region by separatists.

Beyond mere speculation, the US has openly supported armed separatists in Pakistan’s southwest Baluchistan province for years. This includes entire hearings within the US Congress discussing US support for a “free Baluchistan,” publicly published op-eds written by US-based corporate-funded policy think tanks, and Congressional bills specifically calling for an independent Baluchistan.

As early as 2011, The National Interest would publish a piece by Selig Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, titled, “Free Baluchistan.”

In it, Harrison would argue (emphasis added):

While doing less elsewhere in Pakistan, the United States should do more to support anti-Islamist forces along the southern Arabian Sea coast. First, it should support anti-Islamist Sindhi leaders of the Sufi variant of Islam with their network of 124,000 shrines. Most important, it should aid the 6 million Baluch insurgents fighting for independence from Pakistan in the face of growing ISI repression. Pakistan has given China a base at Gwadar in the heart of Baluch territory. So an independent Baluchistan would serve U.S. strategic interests in addition to the immediate goal of countering Islamist forces.

In reality, “supporting anti-Islamist forces” was (and still is) the pretext the US uses to maintain involvement not only in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, but also across North Africa and the Middle East. Often times the US is actually both sponsoring these extremist forces, while also posing as in support of those fighting them.

The real reason the US was and is interested in Baluchistan was stated in Harrison’s very last sentence, alluding to the fact that an independent Baluchistan would complicate or even entirely expel Chinese interests from the region.

Baluchistan’s Gwadar Port is a crucial checkpoint along China’s BRI. It serves as the terminal destination of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and allows China to ship energy and goods from China to the Arabian Sea, bypassing all of Southeast Asia for shipping to and from the Middle East, Africa, and beyond.

In 2012, the US House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs would focus specifically on supporting an “independent Baluchistan.”

It would include a prepared statement from retired US Army Lt. Colonel Ralph Peters who would claim:

Baluchistan is occupied territory. It never willingly acceded to Pakistan, does not now wish to be part of Pakistan. If a plebiscite or referendum were held tomorrow, it would vote to leave Pakistan, as would every province and territory west of the Indus River.

He would then denounce US-Pakistan cooperation and compare Pakistan to “pirates,” claiming:

Two hundred years ago, one of our greatest Presidents faced a problem. The Barbary pirates refused to let our ships pass in peace, so we paid tribute money to let our goods pass. Thomas Jefferson put a stop to that. Today, we are paying tribute money again, this time to the Pakistani pirates to let our goods pass to Afghanistan. Mr. Chairman, I am looking for a Thomas Jefferson.

Peters’ statement would reveal a US desire to carve off most, if not all of Pakistan’s territory west of the Indus River – which without coincidence is also where the entirety of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through. A successful bid for independence by US-backed separatists would effectively end CPEC indefinitely.

The establishment of Baluchistan as a US client regime would also mean both US-occupied Afghanistan and this bordering rump state would combine into a single US-controlled region in the heart of Central Asia with access to the sea, vastly enhancing Washington’s ability to project military power – both conventional and asymmetric – throughout the region.

Also in 2012, a US House of Representatives resolution titled unambiguously, “Expressing the sense of Congress that the people of Baluchistan, currently divided between Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, have the right to self-determination and to their own sovereign country,” would be introduced. Even though it did not pass, it indicates the very open and ongoing support within certain circles of US power to promote an “independent Baluchistan.”

As the US has done with other ongoing separatist projects around the globe, it and its European allies cultivate a government in exile for the imagined nation of Baluchistan.

The favored leader of this imagined nation is the “Khan of Kalat,” Mir Suleman Dawood. In one event hosted by “Democracy Forum” at the UK House of Lords in 2017, Mir Suleman Dawood would claim China’s investments and development of Baluchistan would only heighten tensions.

One of the main complaints made by separatists in Baluchistan is perceived neglect by Islamabad. However, it is very clear that infrastructure development driven by CPEC would alleviate this, meaning opposition to CPEC is in actuality prolonging this neglect – even actively preventing it from being addressed.

During this talk in 2017 in London, it was even made clear that if CPEC projects continued toward completion, the prospect of an “independent Baluchistan” would only become more remote. While it was never stated directly why during the discussion, it is clear that a developed and more prosperous Baluchistan would undermine and overcome separatist extremism in precisely the same way development in China’s Tibet and Xinjiang regions did.

Realistic or Not, US Will Continue Supporting Militancy

While these circles of US and European power promote independence for Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, they also admit the separatist groups themselves are unlikely to achieve independence and would – if ever achieving it – likely devolve into a fractured failed state.

Ralph Peters himself was included in a 2012 Huffington Post article titled, “Serious Internal Issues Undermining Baloch Insurgency And Independence Movement,” where he depicted the independence movement in less than optimistic terms.

The article would note:

According to Peters, one of the most serious issues with the Baloch independence movement is “deeply troubling” infighting. In fact, he is emphatic in his condemnation of such bickering; going so far as to assert: “they are quickly becoming their own worst enemies.”

In his view, individual Baloch simply don’t understand that their personal feuding undermines the larger movement: “Certain Baloch fail to understand that their only hope in gaining independence is if they put their own egos and vanity aside and work together. This is the cold hard fact. They are already outgunned and outmanned. Pakistan will continue to to exploit their differences until they realize this.”

So long as the Baloch continue to engage in “petty infighting,” including “savaging each other in emails,” Peters is pessimistic they can garner widespread support in the West. In fact, he warns that such infighting could eventually put off even their staunchest supporters.

Ultimately, however, whether or not the US can achieve their primary objective of carving off Pakistani territory and outright stopping CPEC, the US will continue supporting militancy in Baluchistan and elsewhere west of the Indus River.

Just as we’ve seen this year with attacks targeting Chinese engineers working on CPEC or an assassination attempt on the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan himself – the militancy will still serve as a significant obstacle in both finishing CPEC and utilizing it to its maximum potential.

President Biden’s B3W proposal was, at face value, an empty proposition lacking even the most basic details – because just like a screen of smoke – it is not meant to do anything except obfuscate. In this case, B3W is obfuscating a campaign of state-sponsored terrorism used by the West as its actual answer to China’s BRI – using armed militants to block or destroy BRI projects rather than present to the world a compelling and constructive alternative to these projects.

What Does the Future Hold for CPEC?

China has demonstrated a significantly compelling solution to US-sponsored separatism in both Tibet and Xinjiang where Chinese security measures coupled with infrastructure projects, job programs, and other means of addressing the root causes of extremism effectively smothered the long-burning fires lit by Washington.

A similar plan for addressing security, poverty, and perceived neglect in Baluchistan would stand the best chance of succeeding there as well.

We can anticipate any security operation or economic program implemented by Pakistan with China’s help will be met by the West’s industrialized “human rights” complex and Western media campaigns to depict it in the same nefarious manner China’s efforts in Tibet and Xinjiang have been depicted – as “genocide.”

The foundations have already been laid, with US NED programs focused specifically on Baluchistan province for years to build up fronts posing as human rights monitoring groups apt at fabricating reports regarding Islamabad’s “abuses” in the region. This localized propaganda campaign could – just as it was in Xinjiang – be internationalized if and when the conditions are deemed right.

It will be a race between Beijing and Islamabad’s ability to develop Baluchistan faster than the US and its allies can undermine and destabilize it, but it is a race that has already clearly begun, and a race that is both dangerous and deadly.

The US “withdrawal” from Afghanistan means that covert operations can be run out of Afghanistan’s territory by US contractors or special operations forces with a better sense of plausible deniability. The UK has also recently vowed to use its special forces for “higher risk” tasks against “big state adversaries” – clearly meaning China (as well as Russia).

Whether or not US and British operators will be plucked by local security forces from covert activities in western Pakistan remains to be seen, but the long-standing support by the West of armed extremists in this region is well established – support that still benefits and fulfills Western foreign policy objectives – so support that will undoubtedly continue well into the foreseeable future.

Brian Berletic is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Right after NEO commented on the terrorist act that happened on April 21, 2021, in the capital of the Pakistani province of Balochistan, Quetta, amidst the transformation of Pakistan’s foreign policy, similar reasons “arrived just in time” in order to again turn to the same generalized question.

The author is referring to two terrorist attacks committed at weekly intervals (June 23 and 29), this time in Lahore, that is, the capital of the largest province of Punjab and the second (after Karachi) in terms of population (over 11 million people) in Pakistan.

Note that most often the media attention is attracted by similar events in neighboring India, which take place mainly in the part of the territory of the former principality of Kashmir, controlled by Delhi. So, the terrorist act that happened on February 14, 2019 near the city of Pulwama in the Indian state (and since the summer of the same year, a union territory) Jammu and Kashmir gained considerable attention. A suicide driver, driving an off-road vehicle with 300 kilograms of explosives, attacked an Indian military convoy moving along the highway. That led to the death of over 40 people and about the same number were also injured. Delhi officially accused Islamabad of direct support to the terrorist group that planned this attack. In turn, these accusations gave rise to “acts of retaliation” (with the involvement of the Indian Air Force) in the form of strikes on the bases of this group on Pakistani territory. Which almost led to a full-scale war between the two de facto nuclear powers.

The terrorist attack in Pulwama took a prominent place in a series of events that accompanied the next stage of aggravation of relations between India, on the one hand, and the Pakistan-China tandem, on the other. And only at the beginning of this year, the parties took measures to reduce the tension levels. This is mainly about the ceasefire agreement concluded on February 24 by the military representatives of India and Pakistan on the so-called Line of Actual Control, which separates the Indian union territory of Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan.

A number of events that followed made it possible to (albeit cautiously) hope for further progress in establishing relations in the India-China-Pakistan triangle. In this regard, the aforementioned terrorist attacks in Lahore happened at precisely the worst time. Or, on the contrary, right on time – for certain players for whom any positive development of events in the designated triangle is rendered useless.

Of the two terrorist attacks in Lahore at the end of June, in terms of scale and some accompanying details, the first, which was, one might say, a “classic” terrorist act, deserves special attention. A car with an explosive device was left near a police checkpoint on the outskirts of Lahore, which was then (apparently remotely) detonated. As a result, 4 people were killed and over 20 (including several police officers) were injured of varying severity.

It should be noted that in terms of the ethno-religious and social structure, Pakistan is no less complicated than India and it has no fewer problems in relations with the outside world. This provides a wide scope for guessing as to who needed the next bloody demonstration. One motive could be the internal dissatisfaction with the policy of Islamabad to develop relations with the PRC, while “suppressing the freedom of fellow Uighurs” in Xinjiang. Or it could be the revenge on the part of certain groups (no less complicated) of the Taliban (banned in Russia), whose cross-border movement with neighboring Afghanistan has recently been sharply complicated.

The angry reaction of the Minister of The Interior Sheikh Rashid Ahmed was quite general. There were talks about some “elements trying to sow disorder.” The successes of both the Indian department for strengthening the borders and the political course of the country as a whole under the strict guidance of the current Prime Minister Imran Khan were not forgotten.

However, after a day or two, the image of the “villain” began to be defined more concretely. First, attention was drawn to the fact that the aforementioned police checkpoint was not located anywhere in Lahore, but next to the house of Hafiz Sayeed, who is considered the founder of the Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous) (banned in Russia). In India, the latter is accused of organizing a bloody terrorist attack in Mumbai in November 2008, which killed over 160 people.

At the end of June, there were reports about the arrest of two (out of three alleged) members of the group that directly carried out the terrorist attack in Lahore, who were said to be associated with the Indian special services.

Speaking at a July 4 briefing, Adviser to the Prime Minister for National Security Moeed Yusuf bluntly said that the organizer of the attack was an Indian citizen “directly associated” with RAW. This abbreviation stands for the Research and Analysis Wing.

On the same day, Prime Minister Imran Khan himself directly linked the fact of this terrorist act “with the funding from India” of the spread of terrorism in Pakistan. His appeal to the world community with a demand to support “countering Indian terrorist activities in Pakistan” reflects the intention of the country’s leadership to use the terrorist attack under discussion for pushing foreign policies.

This intention was especially clearly manifested in the special statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Mahmood Qureshi. Repeating his boss’s thesis “on the funding of terrorism by India,” Shah Mahmood Qureshi stressed that his country is doing everything it can to “cleanse the tribal areas of terrorists” and strengthen national borders.

The above remark contains an obvious reference to the problem of the (more or less permanent) Pakistani-Indian confrontation in various kinds of international organizations. Such as, for example, the UN Human Rights Committee, but mainly in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

In February 2021, during the regular FATF meeting, Pakistan remained on the “grey list” of countries that, in the opinion of this respected organization, have certain shortcomings in this area. This, of course, is not a “black list”, but being in a “grey” zone creates certain problems in solving the problem of access to international sources of financial resources.

Be that as it may, but the author, who at the beginning of this year barely received any reason for positive expectations regarding the nature of the development of Pakistani-Indian relations, which are extremely important in modern global politics, again plunges into a state of depression.

It is possible, however, that to a certain extent it will dissipate if the forthcoming visit to the Russian Federation of Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar ends with success. The main purpose of the visit to Moscow of the distinguished Indian guest reportedly boils down to agreeing positions on the situation in Afghanistan after the US leaves the country. This is a good reason to use the upcoming talks to help reduce tensions in Pakistani-Indian relations. Moreover, Pakistan is closely involved in the Afghan question.

In general, the main function of Russia in the modern troubled world is seen in every possible way to contribute to the mixing of various geopolitical intensity.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The recent attention to Pakistan in describing aspects of the current stage of the Global Game is understandable. As one of the two “de facto” nuclear powers (along with India, Israel’s status, in this case, being labeled “volatile,” Pakistan occupies quite a distinctive place at the world’s gaming table, specifically, in the format of the China-US-India triangle, where one of the critical parts of the global political action is being played out.

Once again, Pakistan is not just sitting next to the noted “magnificent three” but participates in the game with its own cards. And what are those cards? When and how will they throw them on the gaming table? They are being watched with interest from every “corner” of the said political configuration.

The evolution in time of the answer to this question throughout Pakistan’s state independence (that is, since 1947) is quite adequately traced, for example, in a recent study by Carnegie Endowment experts.

We should add that at the current stage of development of the situation in the aforementioned triangle, the most remarkable and relevant reducing the importance of the United States in Pakistan’s foreign policy. It gradually evolved with the end of the Cold War and was accompanied by a parallel trend of the increasing importance of China. The relationship with Pakistan has always been positive, but in recent years it has been defined by strong terms: “all-weather,” “ironclad.”

In Pakistan-India relations, on the other hand, there remains a fundamental basis for contradictions related primarily to a set of issues stemming from the Kashmir problem. The February agreement on a cease-fire on the stretch of quasi-border that has divided India and Pakistan in the former Principality of Kashmir since 1948 is a significant positive development in bilateral political relations. But judging by the recent statements of senior military officials of both countries, this seems to be all that can be expected for the near future on this fundamental problem.

As for Pakistan’s relations with the United States under the new administration in Washington, we agree with those American experts who rule out the success of the attempts (allegedly) made by Islamabad in recent months to downgrade the importance of the “geopolitics” factor by replacing it with that of “geoeconomics”. The two are hard to separate at all. But this is especially true for characterizing the behavior in the outer arena of the leading players.

Perhaps Islamabad is trying to derive some mercantile benefit from US interest in Pakistan in the process of solving the relatively local problem of a more or less unproblematic withdrawal from Afghanistan. But such attempts are indeed easy for Washington to see and not very highly regarded accordingly.

The US has long been faced with a different, global problem in the face of China, in the solution of which Pakistan can not be seen as an ally but at least a neutral country.

In this regard, the Wilson Center experts’ prediction that the Joe Biden administration will not show interest in a qualitative change like relations (particularly in the sphere of the economy) with the country, “which is a close ally of China.” The general conclusion of these experts is quite apparent: Of course, Washington will give India preference in the complexity of the latter’s relations with Pakistan. Again, based on the central problem of American foreign policy due to the global confrontation with China.

From the just-announced President Joe Biden’s draft budget for the next fiscal year allocates 324.5 million dollars to several South and Central Asian countries, of which something will “go” to Pakistan.  But its “share” is designed to solve the rather narrowly applied problems of the same general problem of maintaining at least some control over the situation in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

In this regard, the speech of Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi  on May 26 in the Upper House of Parliament was a landmark event, who stated that his government would not allow the US to deploy military bases for counterterrorist attacks. In particular, they mentioned American drones, the uncontrolled use of which in the noughties on the territory of Pakistan was already a source of not a minor headache for his government.

Today, there could not be any other position on this issue. Islamabad faces the task of establishing relations with the future government of Afghanistan, which will almost certainly be dominated by the Taliban (banned in the Russian Federation). It is understandable how the latter would react to a neighboring country providing military bases to a bitter enemy that had just left their own territory.

The results of the regular trilateral (video) conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, held on June 4, proved that Islamabad intends to cooperate closely with Beijing in the Afghan direction.

That is to say; there is no tangible indication that in recent months “Pakistan has swung swiftly in the direction of Washington.” As such, it is unlikely that any of the outcomes of Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s trip to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in early May could be counted as such. If this fact is relevant to the state of US-Pakistani relations, it is very indirect.

And why would Pakistan turn away from Beijing toward Washington? You can’t take the nonsense seriously about China’s “technological recurrence.” The inventors of gunpowder, paper, the compass, porcelain, … “recurrent”? Activated adherents of the “Chinese threat” thesis should more often remember how China was treated by the current “technological leaders” in the 19th century.

The April 21 terrorist attack in Quetta, which nearly killed the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, is no indication of the deterioration in Sino-Pakistani relations. It is safe to say that Islamabad has nothing to do with it. The Baluchi (Quetta is the capital of the Province of Baluchistan in Pakistan) has long struggled in various ways with the central government of Pakistan for their own statehood. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor CPEC passing through Baluchistan is considered to be the main threat. Throughout this project (and earlier during the modernization of the Gwadar Port), Chinese engineers and workers were repeatedly targeted by the Baluchi militant organizations.

It should be noted that the CPEC, as a key element of the more general Chinese Belt and Road Initiative project, has long been the target of propaganda attacks by Western “well-wishers” of both China and Pakistan. The CPEC is exposed as an example of BRI member countries falling into a “debt trap” from China. “Well-wishers” also insist that state funding for the project (“the payoff from which may stretch for many years”) is at the expense of solving other, more urgent problems.

There is indeed much to talk about, but let us note that there has not been a single example of political “abuse” by Beijing of financial insolvency by some of its partners in implementing various branches of the BRI. Roads, bridges, industrial-energy facilities (not counting direct assistance in fighting epidemics, developing education) – here they are in front of our eyes. At the same time, some ledgers recorded numbers of money debts to the same Beijing, probably, preventing the leadership of the partner countries of China from sleeping peacefully.

But, again, they have not had any real trouble of a political and economic nature so far. In this case, the principal capital that Beijing “earns” is outside the sphere of the mercantile aspects of the “Global Game.” In this regard, see how the already mentioned Carnegie Endowment for International Peace experts observed that “China is not only exporting its model of development … but also assimilating local, traditional norms and practices.”

Thus, there is every reason to believe that since the new administration came to power in the United States, there has not (and could not) be any fundamental change in Pakistan’s foreign policy positioning.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

At the end of May, Russia and Pakistan signed a protocol on amending the tariffs of the intergovernmental agreement of October 16, 2015, to construct the Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline (formerly North-South Gas Pipeline), which should follow through with actual implementation in July. The project will cost $2-2.5 billion. The 1,100 km long pipeline will connect the liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals in Karachi in southern Pakistan to Lahore in the north, enabling Pakistan to strengthen its energy security and increase the use of natural gas as an environmentally friendly energy source.

The construction of the Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline remains the flagship project of cooperation between Russia and Pakistan in the energy sector. The pipeline will carry regasified LNG up to the north of Pakistan.

With a capacity of 12.4 billion cubic meters, the gas pipeline will receive gas from the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, which is also yet to be built.

Earlier, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Petroleum Nadeem Babar said that Pakistan would be represented by gas distribution companies Sui Southern Gas Co. and Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd, which have already started buying out land for the pipeline. The Russian side will carry out the construction work. As reported by The Express Tribune of Pakistan, Pakistan will make maximum use of Russian materials, equipment, and resources to develop the technical and operational capabilities of its own companies and human resources through joint work and team-building events.

According to experts, in the context of the construction of the Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline, Islamabad will draw off several gas supplies of the other markets, including the European market, where Russia’s position will begin to strengthen. This project differs significantly from other gas transmission projects in Russia, primarily because it does not involve direct supplies of Russian gas.  Russia acts as a contractor in this project.  For Russia, Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline is beneficial in several aspects. In particular, the more Pakistan will consume gas, the more this pipeline with the construction of the receiving LNG terminal will draw other suppliers here, primarily Qatar, which dominates in this region.  In this way, it will reduce the competition of Russian companies with Qatari companies in the European and Asian LNG markets and  with The Power of Siberia Gas Pipeline on the Chinese market.

As for the supply of Russian gas to Pakistan, it will be possible through exchange transactions with other countries, i.e. spot supplies, when companies exchange gas. In particular, Qatar will give gas to Novatek in Pakistan, and Novatek will give its gas to Qatar in Europe or Asia. In this way, the companies do not spend money on delivery, but fulfill their contractual obligations to their advantage.

Pakistan’s choice of Russian contractors was due to the fact that Russia has been building high-quality gas pipelines not only in the country, but also abroad, producing its own entire range of pipes and laying them itself for decades.  In the last 10 years alone, Gazprom has built Nord Stream, Nord Stream-2, TurkStream, and The Power of Siberia. Therefore, the good price offered by Russia to implement this project, along with the high quality of already confirmed work, inclined Islamabad to choose Moscow.

It is noteworthy that China, which invests billions of dollars in the Pakistani economy, is not participating in the new gas project. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1951, China and Pakistan have been linked by comprehensive cooperation, the basis of which in recent years has been the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The Chinese media points that since its official launch in April 2015, the CPEC has become one of the most popular projects of The Belt and Road Initiative, and Pakistan immediately received an investment of $25 billion from China. As for China’s non-participation in the construction of Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline, this can be explained quite simply by its lack of experience and technology required to implement such a project.

Islamabad is particularly interested in the construction of the gas pipeline due to the fact that Pakistan’s gas consumption in 2020 has already passed the mark of 47 billion cubic meters, although in 2001 the country consumed a modest 19 billion cubic meters.

It is expected that by the early 2030s, Pakistan’s gas market deficit will reach an astronomical figure of 40 billion cubic meters of gas per year. This rapid growth in natural gas consumption is due not only to the country’s growing population, but also to the accelerated growth of urbanization and the rapid development of national industry. However, Pakistan has extremely limited reserves of oil, gas, and coal, so the only way out of this situation is the ever-increasing import of energy.

In addition, it should not be overlooked that Pakistan has consistently developed automobile transport with a focus on the use of natural gas, and the share of such vehicles in the country is now nearly 70%, which is the second highest in the world.

However, the creation of a traditional pipeline infrastructure for natural gas imports is complicated for Pakistan by issues of interaction with its closest neighbors – primarily with India and Afghanistan. In this situation, LNG imports via offshore terminals have become almost the only way for Pakistan to rapidly increase its energy consumption, and the Russian proposal to build a modern pipeline was expected to be in line with the development of Pakistan’s gas industry.

Against the background of anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the US against the Nord Stream-2 pipeline, the signing of the contract to build and operate Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline is a visible recognition of Russia’s success in high technology fields of the gas industry and a vivid response to the sanctions policy of the U.S. and some of its Western European allies. Therefore, Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline, associated with the LNG import terminal, is not just another foreign project of Russia, but a promising model of future export sales of Russian gas, despite Washington’s intensified attempts to prevent it.

Vladimir Danilov, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“.