On January 10 the Supreme Court of India agreed to urgently consider a petition on “hate speech” against the country’s Moslem communities, with reference to specific incidents, most notoriously an incident in December 2021 in Haridwar – a city venerated in the Himalayan foothills on the banks of the River Ganges. Both the city and river are regarded as holy by Hindus.

Back in December, during a private three-day event held in Haridwar, a Hindu religious leader Yati Narsinghan made a speech which (assuming the transcripts published in the Indian press are accurate) it would be hard to describe as anything less than a call for Indian Muslims to be violently expelled from their country. But he went even further – after an investigation was launched into his conduct he lashed out at all India’s main state institutions. Among others, he was outspoken in his tirades against the Supreme Court, General Prosecutor, Army, Police and even the Constitution. The outspoken orator was promptly arrested.

Although one might think that his first speech alone – in which he praised India’s neighbor Myanmar for its policy towards Muslims – would have been enough to justify arresting him. Readers will remember that back in autumn 2017 the Myanmar military led a “counter-terrorist operation” in the border state of Rakhine, forcing most of the Muslim Rohingya people in the region to flee to Bangladesh. The refugees are still living across border from their former homes in Myanmar, stuck in a country which, to but it mildly, is far from prosperous.

Since then the Rohingya people’s plight had been the subject of considerable international attention, especially after the coup led by generals in the Myanmar army on February 1, 2021. The international attention has taken various forms, ranging from entirely well-meaning support to thinly-disguised propaganda attacks from the US and its close allies against a country that has been under the influence of the US’s main geopolitical rival, China, since long before the recent coup that returned the generals to power.

As for the anti-Muslim hate speech from a high-profile Hindu leader, it is worth looking in a little more detail at just what was said. Firstly, this is far from the first time that Yati Narsinghan has spoken out in this way. And while in the past he has been able to get away with his attacks, this time even the radical Hinduist Bharatiya Janata Party, which has been in government since 2014 and tends to share his views, has had enough.

But this clear provocation of the Muslim community, both in India and in neighboring countries, was too much for the BJP and its leader, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Although the problem of inter-faith relations is a universal one, in India the sheer size of the population gives these issues a special importance. If in Myanmar the Rohingya number just over a million (about 2% of the country’s population), India’s Muslim population numbers some 200 million, or 15% of all Muslims in the world.

It is clear that if only a small proportion of India’s Muslims are provoked by the excesses of certain adherents of the majority religion, then turbulent times lie ahead for the country. And, as the author has noted before any serious conflicts between India’s Muslims and Hindus could cause the opening of a dangerous rift in India – although it is by far from the only such fault line. And that could result in the fragmentation both of Indian society and of the country itself.

It is important not to forget the mass protests by farmers against (long overdue) laws passed in 2020 to reform the agricultural sector, which lasted more than a year, and the ongoing situation in Kashmir, which is still challenging, and which the fiery rhetoric of Yati Narsinghan risks further inflaming.

But the problem is by no means limited to Kashmir – in the second half of last year other states in India saw an increase in the number and seriousness of outbreaks of violence between Hindus and Muslims (for example the many ways in which Hindus sought to obstruct Muslims from performing namaz – ritual prayer- in the open air). The triumphant seizure of power in Afghanistan by the Taliban (a group prohibited in the Russian Federation) has clearly had an impact, albeit indirect, on the activities of radical Muslim groups.

It is important to note that in India the tensions between Hindus and Muslims are superimposed onto other domestic conflicts. There is for example the religiously-motivated Sikh separatist movement, as well as the more secular Tamil separatist movement. It was Sikh separatists who assassinated the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 – earlier in that year she had ordered the security forces to storm the Golden Temple in Amritsar, which is sacred to Sikhs. And, seven years later, her son Rajiv, also serving as Prime Minister, was killed by members of the Tamil movement.

However, as stated above, the population figures are a major factor: India has far more Muslim citizens that Sikhs or Tamils, and therefore the potential for a major conflict between Muslims and Hindus represents a far more serious risk for the country. To give an idea of the scale of the problem, it is enough to cite two examples – the consequences of the demolition of the Babri Masjid mosque in Ayodhya at the end of 1992, and the Gujarat riots of 2002. Each of these incidents resulted in the deaths of some 2000 people. Significantly, the Haridwar hate speech incident took place on the 29th anniversary of the demolition of the Babri Masjid mosque – a fact which attracted a great deal of comment in India.

And relatively recently, in February 2020, major riots in which a number of people were killed took place in several districts of the Indian capital. The immediate trigger for these riots was the passing by the Indian Parliament of amendments to the law on citizenship which Muslims saw as discriminatory. Some 50 people were killed in the riots.

However, as often happens in such cases, the investigation identified a number of different and seemingly unrelated causes for the riots. And a year ago, on January 26, 2021, this trend was confirmed by another serious incident of rioting – this time fortunately without any victims – during the Republic Day celebrations. The disorder was largely provoked by Sikh separatists among the protesting farmers who had been permitted to organize a tractor procession through the streets of the city.

In fact, in as complex a country as modern India, with its many different domestic problems, any internal disorder is inevitably the result of many different factors. Any excuse is enough.

It is important to remember that Muslims form an integral part of Indian society. They have always served in government at all levels, including at the very top, and it is hard to overestimate their contribution to the nation’s scientific and cultural achievements. It is enough to cite the Taj Mahal (an achievement that tends to be ignored by Hindu zealots).

But the difficult relations between India’s two main religious groups also has serious foreign policy implications, especially in view of the fact that India’s neighbors include the important Muslim nations of Bangladesh and Pakistan. And while the anti-Muslim hate speech incident risks inflaming relations with the friendly nation of Bangladesh, it also risks derailing the regular bilateral attempts to improve the generally poor relations between India and Pakistan, both of which are de facto nuclear powers.

Imran Khan, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, who is under pressure from radical Muslim movements in his own country, was naturally unable to ignore an inflammatory speech made by a senior Hindu priest. Yati Narsinghan’s speech was also noted in China, which expressed doubt as to whether the West, with its high-profile campaign against different manifestations of extremism, would take any notice of such a blatant example in pro-Western India.

In general, this latest outspoken anti-Muslim tirade by a senior representative of what is practically India’s state religion has been extremely inconvenient for the country’s government.

And many centuries of human experience have proved what the ancient texts tell us: that there are almost no circumstances in which hate speech is appropriate.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

There has been global confrontation between the US and China for many years. Against this background, the regional confrontation between China and India continues. The two mighty neighboring Asian powers have long been competitors, having territorial issues and vying for influence in neighboring states. Fortunately, the struggle is mainly in the economic sphere, but to be sure that it will remain there, the countries are building up their defense.

Pakistan is another long-standing and strong adversary of India, which shares a common  border with it. Pakistan has worked closely with China in recent years. Considering Chinese activity in other neighboring countries of India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka, it could be said that India is gradually finding itself in a “hostile ring”. It should also be borne in mind that, in addition to those countries that are unfriendly to India or pro-Chinese regimes, there’s agents of international terrorism operate in neighboring countries that are not averse to using those conflicts between Muslims and representatives of other religions that reignite in India for their own purpose. Tterrorists are particularly strong in Pakistan, which, as you know, shares a border with Afghanistan. Their activity has been observed in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Bangladesh for some time now. In recent years, the terrorist threat in the region has multiplied in connection with the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. In such conditions, India needs outside support.

Therefore, New Delhi is developing cooperation with its long-standing strategic partner, the US. And the US is now trying to unite its main allies, such as Great Britain, Australia and Japan, and regional competitors of China, such as India and South Korea, to build a joint anti-Chinese front. To this end, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) was created in 2007, formed with the USA, Australia, India and Japan. In 2021, the AUKUS defense alliance was established, included with the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom.

India actively purchases American weapons and regularly participates in the Malabar joint naval exercise with the United States and Japan, and Australia has also participated in them since 2020.

However, excessive rapprochement with America and full participation in American military blocs is hardly a factor in the Indian plans, which is a long-term and consistent participant in the Non-Aligned Movement. Participation in military alliances implies an obligation to other members to act on their side in the event of an armed conflict. It is unlikely that such a powerful and, at the same time, peace-loving player like India would like to participate in any war not related to the defense of Indian territory, which is not in line with Indian interests and initiated by third countries.

Even though New Delhi and Washington are pursuing a common goal to weaken China’s influence, or at least prevent its further growth, the Indian leadership cannot but understand that the United States and India are in different conditions: India lies next to China and has a common border about 4,000 km long, and America is located across the ocean. In addition, the United States is known to have a propensity to fight “by someone’s hands.” Considering the worst-case scenario, a military conflict between China and its anti-Chinese forces, in the event of India being forced to participate, India will take on the most difficult blows of the Chinese Armed Forces. Therefore, in its cooperation with Washington, New Delhi prefers not to go too far and maintain a reasonable distance.

One may say that India is in a bit of a pickle: it is too vulnerable to China without collaborating with Washington. India can be drawn into a destructive conflict with China even when it does not correspond to Indian interests.

To maintain a balance in relations with the United States, India needs to cooperate with a third force comparable in power to the United States or China and, at the same time, not take an active part in their confrontation. Russia is such a force.

India and the Russian Federation are long-standing and reliable partners who have cooperated for many decades in various fields, including military and technical. Back in Soviet times, during the Cold War, the Indian strategy took shape: following the Non-Aligned Movement rules, maintaining good relations with both the USSR and the United States, and, if possible, using their support in its confrontation with China and Pakistan. This strategy is as relevant for India today as it used to be.

In 2018, an agreement was signed on the supply of five sets of S-400 air defense systems by Russia to India, which caused great discontent and threats of sanctions from Washington. The American threats were ignored.  In the same year, during a visit to India, Russian President Vladimir Putin recalled that Russian-Indian relations have a “particularly privileged strategic partnership” nature.

2021 was not an easy year for all states, especially for India: it was among the countries most affected by the COVID-19 virus at the beginning of the year. The deaths of many people and the closure of production due to quarantine measures have dealt severe blows to Indian society and the economy. However, India’s military-technical cooperation with Russia continued to develop.

At the beginning of 2021, the amount of Indian military and technical orders from the Russian Federation exceeded $ 14 billion.

In February 2021, in the Indian city of Bengaluru, Aero India 2021 took place, which is an international event dedicated to the achievements of the aviation, space and defense industries. As usual, one of the largest expositions was presented by Russia. India has decided to buy 12 Russian Su-30MKI aircraft worth more than $ 1.4 billion and 21 Russian MiG-29 fighters.

In August 2021, India-Russia joint training exercise INDRA 2021 took place. The event, held in the Volgograd region of the Russian Federation, was attended by 250 Indian and Russian military personnel, armored vehicles, multiple launch rocket systems and aviation were involved.

At the end of August 2021, the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan was complete, and now this country is officially under the rule of the Taliban terrorist group (banned in the Russian Federation). This is a common challenge for India, which may now face a manifold increase in the terrorist threat from Pakistan and Russia, whose security sphere includes the Central Asian states bordering Afghanistan. Let’s recall that even if the Taliban have not yet demonstrated hostile intentions towards neighboring states, there are many other terrorist groups in Afghanistan whose interests go far beyond the borders of this country.

In connection with this situation, on August 24, 2021, a telephone conversation took place between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin. After that, a Russian delegation headed by Nikolai Patrushev, Director of Russia’s Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, was sent to New Delhi to discuss cooperation issues in security and combatting terrorism. On September 9, 2021, Patrushev met with Narendra Modi. They discussed further development of Russian-Indian relations and interaction on regional security issues, including Afghanistan. In the opinion of both sides, Russia and India must coordinate their actions to prevent an escalation of violence.

On December 6, 2021, Vladimir Putin arrived in New Deli. During his discussions with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, all aspects of Russian-Indian cooperation were touched upon, including security issues and the situation in Afghanistan. It was decided to provide humanitarian assistance in the near future. On the same day, a Russian-Indian intergovernmental agreement was signed on a program of military-technical cooperation until 2030. The signing of the document was attended by the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and  Defense Minister of India, Rajnath Singh. All details of the agreement have not yet been disclosed. Still, it is already known that, among other things, licensed production of 600,000 new Russian AK-203 assault rifles is planned in Indian territory.

According to Sergei Shoigu, India is one of the key partners of Russia in the defense sphere.

Military and technical, and defense cooperation between Russia and India is still developing firmly and steadily. Continuing to maintain contacts with Washington for the sake of their national interests, New Delhi understands that the Russian Federation is a country with which India has neither ideological contradictions nor territorial issues. At the same time, it is on the same continent and, accordingly, is much more interested in common Eurasian security than the United States. In addition, considering Moscow’s friendly relations with Beijing, Russia can assume the role of mediator in some disagreements between India and China and contribute to their mutually beneficial outcome to a greater extent than Washington, which prefers the language of threats and sanctions. In conclusion, relations with Russia are of particular value to India and will be strengthened in future.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

With its sanctions intrigues and the desire to demonstrate a servile adherence only to the United States, Europe is increasingly becoming a global strategic periphery. Asia, on the contrary, is moving forward in terms of the global significance of the events taking place there.

Against this background, the strategies of Russia and India complement each other, striving to balance Eurasian affairs in the emerging multipolar world order. They seek to achieve this by coordinating their efforts through multilateral institutions and enhancing bilateral cooperation, especially in the economic, technological, military, and regional spheres of integration. Clear evidence of this was the working visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 6 at the invitation of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the participation of the leaders of the two countries in the 21st Russian-Indian Annual Summit, “Russia – India: Partnership for Peace, Progress and Prosperity,”

As emphasized in the joint statement following this summit, the past five decades of the 1971 Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Cooperation and two decades of the Strategic Partnership Declaration symbolize the long-standing, time-tested Russian-Indian relations. This relationship is carried with mutual trust, respect for national interests, and similar positions on various international and regional issues. As significant powers with shared responsibility, the privileged strategic partnership between Russia and India remains the pillar of global peace and stability.

Despite restrictions associated with the pandemic, in the first half of 2021, bilateral trade showed an increase of about 38% compared to the same period in 2020. At the same time, both leaders acknowledged that the significant volume of bilateral trade does not match the potential of the strategic partnership between Russia and India. The intensified efforts to increase mutual trade must reach the $ 30 billion target by 2025. At the same time, it was emphasized the need to begin negotiations for an agreement on free trade in goods between the Eurasian Economic Union and the Republic of India.

During the summit, it was confirmed that cooperation in energy was one of the critical elements of bilateral ties and an “energy bridge” between the two countries. The parties resumed joint efforts to implement the Roadmap for the Development of Cooperation in the Hydrocarbon Industry for 2019-2024 to enhance bilateral cooperation in the energy sector. They welcomed the opening in Moscow of the Indian Energy Center, which represents five oil and gas state-owned companies of India, to strengthen ties with interested Russian energy companies.

The Indian side welcomed the growing participation of Russian companies in the modernization of the railway sector in India. Russia’s interest was implementing projects using Russian technology, equipment, and capital in India. Especially in alert and telematic systems, high-speed rail projects, railway electrification. Taking into account the principles of Indian programs “Make in India” and “Self-Sufficient India.” Emphasis was placed on more active and efficient use of the North-South international transport corridor to reduce cargo transportation, time and cost, and promotional communications in the Eurasian space. In this context, the conclusion last year of a service agreement between Russian Railways Logistics and the Container Corporation of India (Concor) on the joint development of multimodal cargo transportation services along the North-South International Transport Corridor was welcomed. The Russian side supported India’s proposal to include the Chabahar Port in the North-South ITC. The leaders emphasized that communication initiatives should be based on the principles of transparency, inclusiveness, respect for local priorities, financial sustainability, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states. The Indian side informed that the study of the profitability of the Chennai Vladivostok Maritime Corridor is almost complete, and the studies carried out to date indicate several opportunities to increase the volume of traffic per the recommendations formulated following the study of this issue. The sides noted with optimism that implementing the recommendations would give an additional impetus to developing bilateral trade.

In addition, cooperation in nuclear energy is developing. There is, for example, the construction of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant, Bangladesh, with the participation of India. In 2014, we agreed on constructing the second stage of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant in the south of the country, constructing about twenty nuclear power units, and the disposal of nuclear waste. It can be assumed that the Indian side is currently interested in constructing another nuclear power plant in the north of the country.

The summit confirmed the importance of holding meetings, including exchanging views on political and security issues at the global and regional level, of the Russian-Indian Intergovernmental Commission on Military and Military-Technical Cooperation. The first dialogue of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Ministers of the Russian Federation and the Republic of India in the 2 + 2 format was held in New Delhi on December 6, 2021, was reaffirmed. Usually, India, negotiates in the 2 + 2 format with the QUAD partners – Australia, USA, Japan. But, as we can see, the same format was chosen with Russia, and even more expanded, taking into account the meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Igor Sechin, also present in the Russian delegation. He represents the Russian energy complex on this occasion. It can be said that this format is the most functional since it allows you to solve many different issues at once.

It was emphasized that military and military-technical cooperation has traditionally been the cornerstone of the Russian-Indian incredibly privileged strategic partnership. Given India’s desire for self-sufficiency, the partnership is currently being reoriented towards joint research and development and advanced defense technologies and systems production. About 80% of the military equipment of the Indian armed forces is of Russian origin to this day. India is one of the main buyers of Russian weapons: over three decades, it has purchased about $70 billion in arsenal from Russia, and the volume of military orders exceeds $ 14 billion. Moscow, in particular, has a contract with New Delhi to supply five regimental sets of the latest S-400 anti-aircraft missile system by the end of 2024, and an agreement has been signed to produce AK-203 assault rifles in India.  The Indian tender announced a new Russian fighter, MiG-35, which surpasses competitors in many ways. Experts note that the advantages of the S-400 over American complexes are too significant for India and other countries to refuse to buy them, even under the threat of US sanctions. Analysts emphasize that Russian equipment enjoys well-deserved popularity in the Indian arms market. India may become the first foreign buyer of the S-500 after saturating the Russian army with these complexes, said Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov. “In some cases, we sell to India what we don’t sell to other countries,” Borisov recalled.

The two countries’ leaders noted with satisfaction the significant coincidence of approaches to foreign policy priorities. They reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthening the Russian-Indian incredibly privileged strategic partnership, both in the context of existing bilateral relations and in addressing regional and international issues. They expressed a mutual intention to strengthen and develop bilateral relations for the benefit of the peoples of Russia and India.

Vladimir Platov, expert on the Middle East, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The visit of the Russian President Vladimir Putin to India scheduled for December 6, is poised to become a significant event which will undoubtedly have a serious impact not only on the development of the bilateral relations, but also on the ongoing “radical transformation of the world order.”

Such an assessment of the upcoming trip of the Russian leader is underpinned by quite obvious reasons. The author would like also to highlight that India has been gradually moving to join a narrow pool of leading world powers since, as it seems, the end of the Cold War.

It was then, in the early 1990s, that India found itself in a totally different environment. The Soviet Union, India’s former go-to partner, collapsed almost instantly while its successor Russia engaged in “returning to the civilized path of development” and started to “integrate into Europe.” This chain of events put the nation on the verge on self-destruction.

Watching (ostensibly, with great dismay) its former key ally as well as neighboring burgeoning China (that has become the main partner of hostile Pakistan), India, after some hesitation, found no other way but to pivot to the US, its strategic Cold War rival. All this led to quite a positive response starting in the early 2000s, which resulted, in particular, in the visit of the US president Bill Clinton to India in March 2000.

In the next twenty years, the US-Indian rapprochement, with some fluctuations, (due to the partisan reshuffles in the Indian government) generally developed in an upward direction. The current high-level relations are confirmed by the fact that India and the US are parts of two “quadruple” interstate structures. The first one (QUAD-1) also includes Japan and Australia, while the second one comprises Israel and United Arab Emirates. Both of them, but especially the first one, are quite obviously anti-Chinese in nature.

It is worth noting, however, that India has not refused to mend ties with Russia that had previously collapsed. It is to India that the Russian military-industrial complex pretty much owns its survival since the Indian government placed several orders in the late 1990s.  But compared to the Cold War era, the framework of bilateral ties basically narrowed down to the arms deals. It is a sphere of a great significance, of course, but it cannot be a substitute for all the others in the architecture of relations between countries of such level of importance as India and Russia.

However, the “rebuilding” of bilateral relations will be now developing in a fundamentally different foreign policy environment that stands in a stark contrast with the Cold War era. This will require both Russia and India to embrace at least the same, or even a better level of innovation in their approach to this process.

The main difference of the emerging geopolitical landscape is the “multipolar world”, or the presence of several centers of traction pulling in most “other” actors. Meanwhile, in the relations between these “center-poles” some rather sustainable trends have been outlined.

One of them, namely the US-Indian rapprochement, has already been mentioned. Another one, no less important, is the Sino-Russian rapprochement forming a strategic configuration, back-to-back style. The third one, which has become the focal point of the “Grand World Politics”, is linked to the aggravation of the competitive positioning of the two leading world actors — the US and China.

Delhi and Moscow ought to take into account all these trends while “rebuilding” bilateral relations, including the interest of both parties in reducing tensions in the China-US relations.

In other words, it is impossible to embark on the strategy of developing Russian-Indian relations outside the context of the “radical transformation of the world order.” In the current conditions the direction of this strategy would be ideal if it were to eventually result in the formation of a balanced system of relations between all significant actors that would take into account their vital interests.

This “common system” does not have anything to do, of course, with the bogus concept of Yalta-2, by default implying the partition of the world’s political stage into spheres of influence between the above-mentioned “pool” of leading world powers. Due to the same considerations, the concept of “the community of democratic states” should also be off the table.

Meanwhile, given the factor of the multipolar modern world, the concept of a “common system” envisages cooperation between all the powers in the entirety of the geopolitical arena. During this work the roadblocks in the participants’ relations, that would inevitably emerge in the process, will be resolved.

Alas, for now, the chances for creating such a “common system” are quite slim. In this respect, the recent appearance of a global project is worth noting, dubbed Build Back Better World (B3W). It has been initiated during the latest G7 summit that was held on June 11-13, at the Carbis Bay resort in Cornwall, United Kingdom. It has been proposed to spend $40 trillion for the purpose of “building” the infrastructure, mainly in the developing countries.

Apart from the ambiguity of the answer to the question of where such a spectacular sum could be fundraised, this project should be only applauded. Unless it is blatantly anti-Chinese in its nature, since it had been mentioned in the text of the above-mentioned document (and also alluded in the remarks by the US president three months earlier as a counter project to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.

It should be noted that the latter has been in progress for quite some time, and its success accounts for the increase of China’s political influence in the so called third world countries. This is confirmed, in particular, by the results of the recent regular Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) that deserves, however, a separate comment.

Envy is generally a bad quality. In this case it is also counterproductive if the stated main purpose of the B3W project is taken into account, which is allegedly to aid the above-mentioned countries (in reality it is just repayment of historical debts, though). In such a noble cause, the efforts should be joined, not separated. Much less should they be antagonized.

The complexity of the global political situation has been reflected in an indicative remark by Indian Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar that he made during a recent event within the framework of the SCO as Moscow and Delhi are trying to build a new format of bilateral relations. In a reference to India’s possible joining the BRI, he said that such projects “must be transparent and conform to the most basic principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Commentators interpreted this phrase as an allusion to the problem of passing one of the main branches of the BRI through the territory that is now under Pakistani control, but disputed by India.

Along with difficulties of a more or less objective nature, which are brought into focus by the same process of “radical transformation of the world order”, long-standing values are upended as the acts of state madness occur.

The main international expansionists are fighting for “freedom” and universal observance of “norms of democracy and human rights.” Rational and pedantic Germany elects and appoints to government potential grave diggers for its own economy, its main source of prosperity and an increasingly strong position on the world stage. Those are the same grave diggers who had ruined fairly “green” nuclear power industry which never really vanished since the same “atomic electricity” is simply purchased in neighboring France.

India and Russia will have to build bilateral relations in a world that finds itself in a state which is far away from the desirable format of the “common system” and common sense.

No small feat, to say the least.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

On November 19, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a very remarkable statement referring to the government’s decision to repeal three laws on the subject of reforming the country’s agriculture. The cancellation procedure, the Indian Prime Minister continued, will be launched as early as the next session of Parliament. He also urged farmers “to return home to their families and start afresh.”

This decision raises the most general point, suggesting that the Indian government has decided not to tempt fate anymore. Not even so much their own, but the country’s as a whole. This decision took into account the worsening of various aspects of the internal situation and the complexity of the surrounding external environment.

There is no definite answer to the question as to whether or not this solution is the right one. It has already been the subject of intensive discussions among Indian experts.

While the NEO more or less regularly refers to the topic of protest movements by some Indian farmers against the agriculture reform laws passed in late September 2020 (), it nevertheless seems appropriate to recall what it is all about. And also explain the contents of the messages in the said statement of Narendra Modi.

Thus, by signing three laws, initiated by the Central Government and adopted by the Parliament earlier the same day on September 27, the President launched a process of radical reforms in agriculture, which employs over half of the working-age population of India and produces less than 20% of national GDP. These two figures explain the relevance of the very issue of agricultural reform in India, its focus, and the most likely inevitable social costs. Given the sheer number of people involved in agriculture in a country of 1.3 billion people, it is not hard to imagine the scale of the government’s problem if the entirely expected protests had taken hold of even half of the farmers.

Criticism of the laws, immediately voiced by political opponents of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party represented since 2014 by the Narendra Modi government, accepted the need for agricultural reforms in the country and focused mainly on procedural issues of their adoption. It was pointed out that there was insufficiency or absence of any broad preliminary discussion of the draft laws and the accelerated format of their passage through Parliament.

The government’s response to these and other rebukes was, firstly, to deny the secrecy of the preparation of the laws, which had dragged on for two preceding decades. The discussion on this subject dates back to the Bharatiya Janata Party’s political predecessors when the government was inter alia formed by the Indian National Congress, the primary opponent of the now ruling party. Second, as the current government argued, the laws included measures to mitigate the adverse effects of their enactment.

Pointing to this second circumstance, back in January of this year, the Ministry of Agriculture claimed that the started farmers’ protests were local in nature. Generally speaking, this statement was and still is accurate to date. Farmers’ protest activity has been confined mainly to the two states of Haryana and Punjab. But again, one must consider that Punjab alone is home to some 30 million people, and one can imagine what a TV picture of protests by local farmers does to a common person’s imagination.

Moreover, the multifactorial nature of the domestic politics of the highly complex country that is modern India has come to the forefront in this state. When one factor comes into play and is accompanied by another one, it is difficult to answer which one is first and second.

Punjab is one of those states where the problem of separatism is evident (or not so obvious), conditioned in this case by a long-standing aspiration of Sikhs (practicing a peculiar religion) for their statehood. During the famous tractor parade of farmers held on January 26 in the Indian capital Delhi on the occasion of Independence Day, it was the Sikhs who were the prominent participants in the assault of the Red Fort, over which the flag of Khalistan, the non-existent Sikh country, appeared.

And here we come to the question of the very turbulent background against which the brief history of adoption and repeal of the laws under discussion has passed. Once again, let us emphasize that the said background has internal and external components concerning India. From time to time, the Sikh community in Canada makes itself known, creating unnecessary problems in relations with one of the main participants of the current stage of the Great World Game, which India de facto is.

To the north, Punjab is adjoined by the now union territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the former state until August 2019. Periodical aggravation of the situation due to the separatist-interreligious factor also contains a considerable external component. Which until recently was entirely due to the complexities between India and Pakistan, dating back to the period of British India and catastrophically manifested at the time of both countries’ independence in 1947.

However, the recent dramatic developments in Afghanistan have undoubtedly, albeit indirectly, reflected on the current stage of aggravation in the Kashmir Valley. The coming to power of the Taliban (banned in Russia) in that country has provoked, again, probably against the wishes of the Taliban, increased turmoil in Muslim communities throughout South Asia.

In particular, in neighboring Bangladesh, always friendly to India, there have been acts of violence directed against local Hindu communities, instigated by Muslim extremists. In the Indian state of Tripura, adjacent to the Bangladeshi province of Chittagong, where these clashes took place, the reaction was quite foreseeable.

Note that Tripura is one of the so-called seven sisters. It belongs to a group of states located in the far north-east of the country, separated from the main territory by a narrow corridor, about 50 km wide, called a chicken neck. Any amount of turbulence would prove here to be a source of severe problems for the Central Government.

Meanwhile, such potential sources in the area of the Seven Sisters are observed in excessive numbers. To name China’s claims on the territory of Arunachal Pradesh and separatist movements in Assam and Mizoram, adjacent to Myanmar. With which the separatists are somehow connected and where one of the world’s most significant drug traffic routes begins.

This bunch of problems (whose list is far from being exhaustive) must have been lying on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s desk as he and his colleagues tackled the increasingly urgent task of reducing the pressure of the accumulating domestic political steam. It was assumed, based on some signals from the Central Government, the most appropriate action would be to restore Kashmir’s status as part of India at least partially. This status has undergone radical changes with the abolition of Article 370 of the National Constitution on August 5, 2019, provoking the same separatist-interreligious tensions here.

However, the government decided to sacrifice three anti-farm laws. Of course, the Indian government knows best, but this decision has already sparked a heated debate in which direct contradictory assessments are being made. Leaders of the oppositional Indian National Congress generally responded positively to Narendra Modi’s decision, advising him to draw lessons for the future.

The camp of Bharatiya Janata Party supporters was divided into two unequal, in every sense, parts. The Bharatiya Janata Party leadership adheres to the strategy of presenting defeat as a victory. At the same time, pessimism and feelings of betrayal seem to be spreading in the party’s grassroots structures.

Finally, the urgency of the problem of reforming India’s agriculture, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in his statement on repealing the three anti-farm laws, won’t disappear. However, it will now be solved with the indispensable participation of the established farmer’s movement. Of course, taking into account the whole general political situation with its internal and external components, and that second one is looking challenging today, and, at times, just menacing. Not just for India, but in the world at large.

So let’s wish all of us to overcome our respective new difficulties. And achieve that without the exceptionally high costs.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The announcement of the October 18 video meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Israel, India, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States has not garnered much attention. Meanwhile, it may well be a landmark in the transformation of the world’s political map taking place before our very eyes. First of all, some clarification of what is going on and what can be expected in the near future is required.

Briefly about the event. In the second half of October, a video meeting took place with a four-day visit to Israel by India’s Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and his negotiations with his counterpart Yair Lapid. Yair Lapid was appointed in June of this year as Israeli Foreign Minister by its new Prime Minister, Naftali Bennett. Two of the participants, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Yair Lapid, were in Jerusalem, while the other two, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and Anthony Blinken, remained in their capitals.

It is alleged that the very idea of such a meeting was discussed a week earlier in Washington during the visit of the same Yair Lapid to the USA. At that time, in particular, there were trilateral talks between the Foreign Ministers of the US, Israel, and the UAE. In other words, the video-meeting of the New QUAD, already designated in the press by the familiar abbreviation QUAD, but with the addition of the number “2” probably had been discussed in advance and was not spontaneous.

It was hardly surprising for the Indian minister, who arrived in Israel to discuss bilateral relations, which have long been developing quite successfully, especially regarding military-technical cooperation.

A US State Department summary of the event states that participants “discussed expanding economic and political cooperation in the Middle East and Asia, including through trade, combating climate change, energy cooperation, and increasing maritime security.” Reference is also made to the problem of combating the COVID-19 pandemic.

Generally speaking, QUAD-1, whose two members (India and the United States) are now also part of the “second edition” of the QUAD, has previously identified approximately the same topics for joint work. The notable difference from the “first quad” is due to the other two parties, the UAE and Israel, which signed a landmark document called the Abraham Accords in September 2020. Therefore Israel has established normal relations with a third Arab country, expanding space for its involvement in the entire region of the Middle East, which until recently was entirely hostile to the Jewish state. The fact that Israel is now also participating in Quad-2 will undoubtedly contribute to a dramatic expansion of this space.

And yet, the main thing that draws attention in the formation of both quadrilateral configurations is the presence of two participants in a narrow pool of leading world players, i.e., the United States and India. Especially the second of these, referring to the transition into action of a long-standing trend to reduce both Washington’s presence abroad and its commitments to allies and partners, which is one of the main characteristics of the process of radical transformation of the world order, being talked about everywhere today. New centers of power and attraction are emerging in the “liberated” political spaces. The role of one of them is, quite reasonably, claimed by India. It is to it that the outgoing current hegemon would like to “hand over the position” in South Asia. And in particular, with this trend in mind, it is worth noting that the second QUAD with Indian participation has already been formed.

One could reasonably expect a similar “transfer of position” to Japan, mainly in East Asia. And here, it seems crucial to mention once again another no less significant trend in contemporary global politics associated with the process of comprehensive Japan-India rapprochement. This, in particular, was reflected in the fact that QUAD-1 was formed.

One of the main motives behind this process is that China is emerging as the second global power and is perceived by New Delhi and Tokyo as a source of threat to their national interests. Again, the anti-Chinese orientation of the Japan-India tandem could, if desired, be interpreted as a successful transfer of position for the US in the Indo-Pacific region, the key one at the current stage of the Great World Game.

But each of the participants in this tandem has diverse and deep-rooted problems in its relations with China. That is, the mentioned motive has a much more serious background than someone’s (American) intrigues. For India, for example, this motive was instrumental in finding new external partners after losing its mainstay of the Cold War period, which was then the USSR.

The gradual rapprochement first with the United States and then with Japan was expected. In the Indian expert community, intense discussions have been taking place on this topic in recent years. They focus on positioning the country in the international arena amidst problems with China and its regional ally Pakistan. An offshoot of the above-mentioned discussion is the prospect of a “war on two fronts,” periodically brought up to date by military analysts and the country’s top generals.

Earlier NEO has noted that the divergence of opinions among leading Indian experts on the topic of the country’s foreign policy positioning boils down to the issue of the extent and depth of India’s rapprochement with the US and Japan. It also discusses its participation in various interstate configurations (both existing and potentially possible) of obviously anti-Chinese orientation.

In connection with the latter, it’s appropriate once again to outline the author’s position regarding the just formed, as it seems, military-political configuration of AUKUS. It is unlikely to go beyond a business project with the target of two leading Anglo-Saxon countries taking out a very financially large-scale project from France, which for some reason got it from a third not so leading Anglo-Saxon country. Regarding the prospects of expanding the US military presence in Australia, it is also quite possible within the framework of the long-existing bilateral alliance relationship.

As for the prospect of relations between India and China, such a reputable expert as Brahma Chellaney once again came out with the most radical positions, having published an article titled “Save Taiwan” on October 11. Discussing the Taiwan problem, which is the most painful for Beijing, the author, in contrast to the official position of Washington, denies that the island belongs to historical China and calls on the US and Japan to take measures to prevent the island from being annexed to the mainland.

Raja Mohan, a leading Columnist associated with The Indian Express, takes a more restrained stance towards China, seeing it as one of the sources of problems emanating from India’s neighboring countries. He assesses the fact of QUAD-2 talks as “an important turning point in New Delhi’s relations with the Middle East.”

Career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service, M.K. Bhadrakumar, who served in the Indian Embassy in Moscow for a long time, while mentioning “confronting China and the rise of political Islam” as the main challenges for the country, leaves the question “Is the Indian foreign-policy ship changing course?” without a clear answer.

Incidentally, despite all the mutual political filibustering of recent years, there has been a sharp rise in trade between India and China this year, as assessed in cheerful tones by China’s Global Times. It fits well with the general, outwardly strange picture of the state of affairs in the Indo-Pacific. Politicians of the opposing parties nearly curse each other while businessmen develop mutually beneficial cooperation without excessive excitement.

Among other things, this circumstance allows the author to believe that India, one of the major players in modern global processes, in the course of changing its positioning in the international arena, has not yet crossed the invisible line beyond which no positive change in its relations with its great neighbor, China, could be expected.

And this is no minor issue in our world, which seems to have gone seriously insane in the aforementioned “transformation” process.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The so-called Quad nations, the United States, Australia, India and Japan have just had a meeting in the United States. A rather bland statement was issued by the four following the meeting. It contained no surprises. What is a surprise and remains a puzzle is the presence of India in the quartet, whose intentions of its formulator, the United States, remains the construction of an anti-China alliance. It has to be noted however, that this element of the quartet was rather overshadowed by the announcement of the new trio of nations, the United States, United Kingdom and Australia as a new grouping.

Their intention is manifestly anti-China, which is no surprise to anyone. Its timing, and focus on replacing Australia’s $90 billion submarine deal for 12 French submarines with eight United States built submarines caused uproar and outrage from the French. They recalled their ambassadors from both the United States and Australia, with the latter being unlikely to be replaced any time soon.

The Indian participation in this quartet is a puzzle. India has long enjoyed friendly relations with Russia, and indeed have just completed a new deal to purchase more Russian fighter jets to add to its existing supply from that source.

India (along with Pakistan) is also a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. They have just held a major conference in Dushanbe, Tajikistan to mark the 20th anniversary of the founding of that group. That same group has recently welcomed as a full member the Islamic Republic of Iran which remains in a bitter stand-off with the Americans. The United States president Joe Biden notwithstanding criticism of Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal has done nothing about re-joining the group, and has maintained Trump’s policy of imposing sanctions on Iran. Again, this is a point of difference for the Indians who have maintained diplomatic links with Iran. The two countries are also coordinating a rail link with Europe. The Indian Prime Minister Modi has refused to be drawn into the American sanctions against Iran.

It is true that the Indians have a long-standing border dispute with China, but that did not prevent the Indians from joining the SCO. It would be incorrect to describe China-Indian relations as warm, but the two sides have managed to reach a stability in their border dispute and the exchange of shots a few years ago that left casualties on both sides are in the past.

India has also shown a positive attitude towards the further extension of SCO membership. The SCO currently has eight members, including four “stans” of central Asia, three observer states, Afghanistan Belarus and Mongolia, and six “dialogue partners” of whom the most populous is Turkey. The total population of the permanent members accounts for nearly 40% of the world’s population.

There is talk about extending the membership even further, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. India enjoys good relationships with all the observer states, dialogue partners and prospective other members. It is all the more puzzling therefore that it has affiliated itself with the Quad which apart from a manifestly anti-China orientation does not enjoy particular good relationships with any of the other actual and prospective members.

The latest meeting of the SCO was held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The leaders present at the conference adopted an extensive statement, part of which dealt with Afghanistan. They reaffirmed their support for the emergence of Afghanistan as an “independent, neutral, united, democratic and peaceful state, free of terrorism, war and drugs.”

The SCO meeting, representing as it does, the world’s two most populous nations and an increasingly important international body, received scant coverage in the western media. Pakistan, China, Iran and Russia sought accountability from the United States for leaving Afghanistan in a chaotic state. Although a total of more than $2 billion was spent by the Americans during their occupation there is precious little to show for the expenditure. The economy, post the United States retreat, remains a shambles, facing a profound humanitarian crisis.

All of the parties at the conference expressed a commitment to combating the “three forces” of terrorism, separatism and extremism. The SCO has since the conference carried out joint military exercises to increase the interoperability of the member states. On the question of security, India heightened its concerns about militance on its north western border. In that and shares a common concern among all SCO members that Afghanistan does not become a haven for terrorists.

Afghanistan was naturally a topic of major interest at the Dushanbe conference. Following the United States withdrawal there is a grave danger of utter chaos descending on the region. It will be interesting to see the extent to which China is prepared to come to the rescue.

India has made its concerns clear about the possible future development of Afghanistan. It has openly questioned the “exclusive” nature of the new government, publicly urging all its partner countries in the SCO to “think carefully and collectively while deciding on the legitimacy of the new political system in Afghanistan.”

India is also very conscious of the strong Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. The precise future role of Pakistan in Afghanistan remains to be seen. Pakistan’s role in promoting regional economic understanding will be very important, along with other interested parties including China, India, Russia and Iran.

When one looks at these developments by India’s neighbours and in organisations like the SCO in which it plays an important role, it is all the more difficult to understand the reasoning behind its membership of the Quad.

China’s only territorial disputes lie within the South China Sea which is physically remote from India. The country has been reluctant to get involved in that particular dispute. As far as Taiwan is concerned, India regards it as part of China and has little or no interest in United States posturing on the Taiwan issue.

India is unthreatened by China in its own international waterways and joining any American lead naval exercises to assert “control” over the Indian Ocean would be a pointless exercise from its point of view. India’s best interests clearly lie in being part of the world’s largest economic arrangement, the SCO, and joining the Quad seems to me to be a pointless and ultimately self-defeating exercise.

James O’Neill, an Australian-based former Barrister at Law, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Popular unrest arising from religious differences has become increasingly commonplace in India over the last few decades. The proportion of Muslims in the country, which was recorded as 14.25% in the 2011 census, is increasing year by year, and the government, dominated by Hindus, is unwilling to face up to this reality. How long has this conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India been unfolding? And why is the Indian government reluctant to carry out a new census? What do the Muslims in the neighboring states of Pakistan and Bangladesh think about the attacks on their fellow believers? And how is this conflict being affected by the COVID-19 pandemic? What does the future hold in store for India’s Muslims?

The Mountbatten plan to divide British India into a Muslim state, Pakistan, and a Hindu one, India, which was set out and implemented in 1947, failed to take into account a large number of ethnic and political factors, and this failure led to a great deal of bloodshed and an endless stream of refugees. As a result of the Partition, as the division is known, more than 19 million people have been forced out of their homes with more than 4 million killed.

While Hindus living in the new state of Pakistan were regarded with hatred and large numbers of them were forced to migrate to India, in India Muslims were treated with a greater degree of tolerance. However, despite the fact that they are allowed to practice their faith openly and worship in mosques without restriction, their access to education was limited, and those working in government service were deprived of promotion opportunities. As a result of these policies, almost all India’s Muslims migrated to Pakistan. The Muslims remaining in India tended to be from the poorest parts of society – those who did not have enough money to relocate to the Muslim state.

Their communities thus became, as it were, Muslim “enclaves” in India. Few Muslims seek to obtain a higher education, in many cases they do not send their children to school, and they tend to work mainly in Muslim districts. Naturally among India’s Muslims there are some people who are fully integrated into modern society, but they represent a fairly small population of their community, not least because Hindus are reluctant to work alongside Muslims, seeing them as having a lower social status. Inevitably, the above factors have had an impact on the standard of living enjoyed by the Muslim community, which is significantly lower than that of Hindus.

And as often happens, it is among the poorest sections of society that birth rates are the highest. India’s Muslim families tend to have more children than Hindu or Christian families. This situation is naturally of concern to India’s government, which is aware that some parts of the country may, in the future, become entirely Muslim, which would have a wide range of consequences.

To avoid drawing public attention to this issue, India’s government has decided not to carry out a new census, and, according to some sources, has failed to publish all the results of the last one, conducted in 2011. No doubt this decision is related to the fact that over the last fifty years the proportion of Muslims in India has increased by almost 50%, from 9% to 14% of the total population (which is currently 1.39 billion).

In order to increase the numbers of people who follow religions other than Islam, in December 2019 the Indian government issued a law simplifying the procedure for non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan and Bangladesh to obtain Indian citizenship. This decision was criticized by India’s Muslim community. In February 2020 the capital, New Delhi, was the scene of major anti-Muslim riots, in which radical Hindu nationalists attacked Muslim districts, killing more than 30 people and looting dozens of mosques. The riots clearly showed that the antipathy between India’s Muslims and Hindus is getting even stronger.

Pakistan’s politicians frequently talk about the need to support Muslims in India. After all, it needs to sow chaos in India in order to win the ongoing conflict in Kashmir. The authorities in Pakistan are highly critical of the discrimination against their fellow Muslims in India. But they are in no position to offer all of them a new home – Pakistan is a poorer country than India and is therefore unable to accept new citizens in need of housing and work.

As for the Muslim country of Bangladesh, its government is unwilling to spoil its relations with India, and therefore avoids commenting on India’s treatment of its Muslim population, preferring to maintain a strict neutrality on this issue. And Bangladesh’s position is understandable – the country is even poorer than Pakistan, and India is its second largest foreign trade partner after China. Unlike Islamabad, Dhaka has no territorial disputes with India and it is does not want to jeopardize its relations with its neighbor because of ideological issues.

The COVID-19 epidemic, which began in 2020, has halted the escalation of the conflict between India’s Hindus and Muslims. Many public organizations closed down and citizens were only allowed to go out of their homes except where this was absolutely essential. As a result, the number of religious clashes dropped to almost zero.

But sooner or later the pandemic will ease up. In August 2021 the Indian pharmaceutical company Panacea Biotech announced in a press conference that it planned to produce about 25 million doses of Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine under license. India’s government has imposed strict quarantine measures and is trying to limit the number of infections.

But it is likely that after the pandemic-related restrictions are lifted, the religious clashes will begin again. The lockdown has just put these outbreaks on hold for a while.

The future for India’s Muslims appears hazy and uncertain. There are not enough of them, for example, to form a majority in parliament or demand secession for their regions. But there are too many of them to remain as a religious minority with limited legal rights. India’s government needs to take appropriate measures to ensure that all Muslims are fully integrated into society. Otherwise, the religious conflicts that afflict India will get worse year by year, causing deep divisions in society and preventing the state from developing.

Petr Konovalov, a political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

At the end of July US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin returned to Asia to resolve one of the key foreign policy challenges facing all the US administrations of the last 10 years – the continuous growth of China’s influence, both in the region and globally. It is possible that the joint presence in the region of the heads of foreign policy and defense may be a concrete sign of what President Biden (as well as his predecessors) has referred to as the principle of providing “military support” for US foreign policy.

In fact, their first joint trip to the region took place just four months previously, a month and a half into the new US president’s term of office. On that occasion, they both visited Japan and South Korea, after which their paths separated. Anthony Blinken went on to Anchorage for a meeting with his Chinese counterparts. Meanwhile Lloyd Austin visited India as part of the US’s latest attempt to involve the other of the two Asian giants in its maneuvers against China – something it has been trying to do for years.

India was also one of the destinations on their current Asian tour. This time it was Anthony Blinken’s turn to woo Delhi, while Lloyd Austin focused on South East Asia – a region which is playing an ever larger role in the major powers’ geopolitical intrigues – visiting Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines.

In Delhi Anthony Blinken was received by India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, and National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, but the main negotiations, on a wide range of issues, were conducted in meetings between Anthony Blinken and his Indian counterpart, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. One significant aspect of Anthony Blinken’s visit to India was the focus on human rights, which he discussed in a preliminary meeting with representatives of Indian civil society. This issue is a priority for the current US administration but a sore point for India, as the subject immediately raises the issue of what is happening in the Jammu and Kashmir union territory.

Confining the sensitive issue of human rights to a preliminary meeting meant that there was no need to raise it in the main talks. That had been Lloyd Austin’s mistake in his trip to India four months previously, and it had almost spoiled the impression made by the new US administration in a country which it sees as a very important partner.

As for the contents of the talks between Anthony Blinken and Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, commentators have focused on three main areas: the problems caused by COVID-19, the situation in Afghanistan, and the status and possible future development of the Quad project – a proposed partnership between the US, India, Japan and Australia.

The first of these issues is particularly important for India, and for the rest of the world (if only because of the new, highly dangerous variant that first appeared in India), and it was one of the key focuses of Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s trip to the US at the end of May. As we have pointed out before, according to Indian media the real COVID-19 situation in the country may be much worse – even several times worse – than the already very sobering official figures indicate, and these are sobering enough.

Certainly, the USA now sees providing India with help in mitigating the consequences of COVID-19 as perhaps the most important part of its “battle for India”.

Given the Washington’s general policy of withdrawing from “unnecessary” conflicts, Afghanistan will become less of a preoccupation, while India grows in importance – almost as if there were an inverse correlation between the two countries. After all, India has long been seen as the main claimant to the position once held by the US, as the main monitor of the political situation in Central and South Asia.

This region is a troublesome one, and India is still weighing up the pros and cons of taking on such a role. For example Subrahmanyam Jaishankar considered this issue during talks on relations between these two regions during his recent visit to Moscow and then, shortly afterwards, in the most recent ministerial-level meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in Tashkent.

The Afghan problem was one of the main issues addressed by the US Secretary of State and his Indian counterpart in a speech they made to staff and students at the Jawaharlal Nehru University following the end of the talks. Both of the guests also touched on the subject of the Quad project in their addresses to the university. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar referred to the recent video summit dedicated to the proposed grouping, which was conceived back in the 2000s as a kind of Asian NATO, and which now seems to be getting more and more nebulous and further and further from the original concept.

The key message of Anthony Blinken’s speech can be described as yet another reiteration of Washington’s commitment to “one of its main foreign policy priorities – the strengthening of its partnership with India”. He also mentioned the Quad project, and “other multilateral partnerships”. We will just highlight another reference to the USA’s positioning itself on the global stage as an Indo-Pacific nation.

Anthony Blinken also raised the issue of India’s most recent arms deal with Russia. But he didn’t stress the point too much, wishing not to annoy his hosts (who were, on the whole, remarkably patient).

In the speeches he made during his trip to the three S.E. Asian nations, the US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin focused on the issue of setting up a military and political alliance against an unspecified opponent (clearly understood to be China). His first stop was Singapore, where he gave the Fullerton Lecture (named after a hotel in the city-state), one of the two annual events held in Singapore by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The first Fullerton Lecture was given in 2012 by the then Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon.

On this occasion, the Fullerton Lecture was a more significant event than usual, as, for the first time in many years, the main annual event organized by the IISS, the Shangri-La Dialogue (named after another Singapore hotel) was cancelled this year. The Shangri-La Dialogue is a prestigious forum for the discussion of issues relating to regional and global security, at which a number of countries (including both Australia and the USA) are generally represented by senior politicians, both current and retired.

The official reason given for the cancellation was the COVID-19 pandemic. But the present author suspects that in reality the organizers of the Shangri-La Dialogue considered (quite rightly) that in view of the current high level of animosity between the two major global powers – the main initiators of the Dialogues – to hold it this year would risk further damaging international relations. After all, those relations are tense enough as it is.

Apparently, it was intended that Lloyd Austin would have made a speech on the USA’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific region in the Shangri-La Dialogue, which was to have been held at the beginning of July. In the event, he addressed the same subject in his Fullerton Lecture. The audience in the Fullerton Hotel consisted mainly of representatives of Singapore’s administration, who had no particular reasons for asking the speaker to clarify any of his points, whereas the participants in a higher-profile international forum, such as the Shangri-La Dialogue, would have had a much more pressing interest in the contents of the speech.

Nevertheless (again, this is the present author’s view) the contents of a lecture given by the Defense Secretary of the leading global power, and clearly prepared by high-level speechwriters, must be considered as fairly authoritative. That is to say, one would not expect it to contain any new initiatives having a negative impact on the key issue in international global politics today, such as the political, economic and military stand-off between the US and China which we have already referred to. The general message of the Lecture is consistent with the main statements made by Joe Biden in addresses to the Department of State and Defense Ministry two weeks after his inauguration as US President.

And everything Lloyd Austin said and did in Vietnam and the Philippines can be found in the address he gave in Singapore, which was clearly, as we have already stated, planned in advance.

As for the key issue in international global politics, referred to above, the two US Ministers’ trip to Asia may have the effect of keeping open the door for dialogue with China. Even though many figures in the US political establishment are doing their best to barricade the road to rapprochement with all kinds of political rubbish.

That is just one of the factors that makes it difficult, at present, to make any kind of reasoned forecast concerning the further development of relations between the two leading world powers. All we can do is to keep a watchful eye on events as they unfold.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

In Delhi, on June 24 this year, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met the heads of the main political parties in the Jammu and Kashmir territories – a meeting which might at first glance appear to be of purely domestic significance, and therefore a strange choice of subject for a journal specializing in international relations. But, in this case, appearances are deceptive. Both in terms of the big picture, and as far as specifics are concerned.

As for the big picture, the borders which many countries have lived with since they were established in the 17th century (in the Peace of Westphalia) and which have traditionally been divided into internal and external borders, are now looking increasingly porous.  Diplomats may call on other countries to “stop interfering” in domestic issues until they are blue in the face, but nevertheless such intervention has always been a fact of political life, and in recent years has become increasing common. And it is made much easier by new global communications technologies.

In terms of “specifics”, it should be emphasized that the author is talking about a very important aspect of internal politics in a country with a population of 1.3 billion, the fifth largest economy in the world and already numbered among the select group of major geopolitical powers.

The second “specific”, just as important, concerns, as always, the Kashmir Question – an issue which has very serious foreign policy implications, and which, in terms of its significance and the potential threat it poses in the current stage of the new Great Game, is as important as the Taiwan and Korean “Questions”.

In fact, it is hard to say with certainty whether the “Kashmir Question” was simply a (very clearly defined) background issue in the Delhi meeting, or whether it played a central role. To an onlooker the talks looked very much like a serious “family” dispute between the benevolent paterfamilias and a group of relatives.

The key members of that “group of relatives” were the (former) chief ministers of the (former) state of Jammu and Kashmir, Farook Abdullah and his son Omar, the last in a dynasty of statesmen who have played key roles in Kashmir’s destiny over the last century. In the 1950s Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah (Omar’s grandfather) was successful in reaching a compromise in negotiations with the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on the inclusion in the Indian state of those parts (approximately 60%) of the former principality of Kashmir which were under Indian army control at the end of the 1947-48 war with Pakistan.

In 1957 this compromise was enshrined in Article 370, a new clause in India’s constitution (enacted eight years previously), recognizing the de facto autonomy (except in matters of defense and foreign policy) of the new Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Significantly, this new administrative entity differed from the rest of the country in that it had a predominantly (about 70%) Moslem population. This last circumstance was the reason why the new state was given a special status when it acceded to the Republic of India.

The Kashmir Question has important implications for foreign policy, as the 40% of the former principality that is not controlled by India is split between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (two thirds) and the People’s Republic of China (one third). None of these three countries – especially not India and Pakistan – accept the others’ right to control part of Kashmiri territory.

That explains why, for a length of some 750 km, the dividing line between the latter two countries is referred to as a Line of Actual Control (LoAC), and does not constitute an internationally recognized boundary. Over the last ten years the regions on either side of the LoAC have regularly been the scene of armed confrontations, some small, and some much larger in scale. And it is important to bear in mind that both India and Pakistan are de facto nuclear powers. As are the USA and China, the “big brothers” standing behind the two countries.

In Autumn 2019 the relations between India and Pakistan, never good, deteriorated to what can only be described as a crisis. The reason was a new law cancelling the special status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, passed by India on August 5 that year. The law downgraded the two self-governing administrative entities to “union territories”.

The day before the (highly unpopular) law repealing Article 370 of the Constitution was passed, additional security forces were posted to the Vale of Kashmir and the local inhabitant’s civil liberties were dramatically curtailed. That same day, the 82-year old Farook Abdullah and his son were detained, and only released 8 months later.

Ever since then, the situation in the territories of Jammu and Kashmir has been a matter of international concern, not only for human rights campaigners, but also, to a lesser or greater extent (and frequently as a result of pressure) for India’s allies.

It should be noted that the increase in tensions in the region has coincided with (and may actually be one of the factors behind) a deterioration in India’s relations with Pakistan, and with the latter’s ally, China. And, since spring 2020, relations between India and China have been of particular concern. However, a year on there are signs of an improvement (largely, it seems, thanks to Moscow’s involvement). One important milestone in this positive trend was the signing of a ceasefire agreement along the LoAC on February 24 this year.

However it looks as if the same Article 370 of the Constitution may present an obstacle to further progress – at the beginning of April Pakistan insisted on the Article’s reinstatement as a key condition of any agreement between the two countries. A month after that, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, the Pakistani Foreign Minister not only reiterated that demand, he also repeated his country’s position on the issue: “Nothing about Jammu and Kashmir can be India’s internal matter.”

India’s government is therefore in a difficult position, which is made worse by significant internal political opposition to the step taken by the country’s Parliament’s decision two years ago. It should be noted that there has always been a lot of unrest in Jammu and Kashmir, but now the situation is being complicated by India’s internal political conflicts, among many other factors.

The central government has been accused of failing to take effective (or, indeed any) measures to prevent the catastrophic escalation of the coronavirus pandemic in the country. That situation has resulted in calls for a redistribution of powers from the central government to regional governments. The results of the recent elections to the West Bengal Legislative Assembly and the conduct of the local government, headed by the popular Mamata Banerjee, in its relations with Delhi, have posed a direct challenge to both the central government and to the country’s constitutionally enshrined federal system.

And India still has to find a solution to another of its most challenging problems – the protests by farmers against the reforms to the agricultural sector initiated by the central government. The first anniversary of the beginning of the protests was marked with a march organized by local farmers, which turned into a confrontation with police. Not everyone agrees on the importance of ceding power to local governments or on the “farmers’ rights and agricultural reform” issue.

That is a brief summary of the issues forming a background to the meeting between Narendra Modi and representatives of the main political parties in Jammu and Kashmir. The goal of the talks seems to have been to conduct a general review of the current situation in that key region and to decide on measures to prevent it from escalating.

It is unlikely that the meeting’s agenda was fixed in advance – instead it may be assumed that each participant set out their own position. These positions have long been a matter of public knowledge, and are, broadly speaking, mutually incompatible. For example, the day before the meeting Farook Abdullah stated that he was insisting on the reinstatement of Article 370.

As far as that demand is concerned, the present author’s personal opinion – as stated immediately after the decision on August 5, 2019 – is that the repeal of that article is counterproductive for India. The repeal did not bring any actual benefits other than creating an appearance of unity and simplifying administration in the country.

And, as you know, “simplicity” very often turns out to be quite different from what we expect. That certainly holds true for the present case. Both domestically and in foreign relations, things have been very different since the repeal of Article 370. According to the Indian Express the talks may have been motivated by foreign policy considerations.

This view suggests that, in relation to the future of relations between India, Pakistan and China, a certain cautious optimism may be justified.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.