African leaders are expected to head to Addis Ababa to attend the two-day African Union (AU) summit, scheduled to convene on February 5 and 6. The meeting will address a long list of conflicts — including militant and terrorist activities, management of natural resources, and internal disputes — that are stirring instability across the continent. Much attention is likely to be paid to developments in Mali and Burkina Faso, where internal and regional power plays are undermining the already frail stability of the Sahel and Sahara zone, and to developments in East Africa where Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia all face threats to their security. The dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt and Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is also expected to take up attention, especially on the fringes of the summit.

In addition, the AU summit will see the AU presidency handed over from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Senegal. The latter will thus become the third AU president, following South Africa and DRC, to take on responsibility for mediating a final, comprehensive, and legally binding agreement on the filling and operation of GERD.

Days ahead of the summit, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed issued a seemingly conciliatory message to Egypt and Sudan, stressing that GERD will have “multiple benefits for the two downstream countries of Sudan and Egypt, as well as for East Africa at large.” Ahmed added that “as a hydropower dam” GERD will “not consume water,” and thus cannot harm the water needs of downstream countries. Instead, he said, it will help regulate the flow of water in the best interest of Sudan and protect it against devastating floods. Egypt, Ahmed argued, will also benefit from GERD’s water conservation which will prevent “the wastage of billions of cubic metres of water to evaporation in downstream flood plains.”

A government official in Cairo, cited by Al-Аhram, argued that this Ahmed’s final point gives “the lie to Ethiopia’s plans.” The prime minister of Ethiopia, like his predecessors, has indicated once again that GERD is not just about hydropower. “The real objective, the hidden intention, is to create a water bank.” He added that this is not something to which Egypt can ever agree.

Ethiopia is going to chop down 17,000 hectares of woods around Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as a part of engineering works aimed at the third filling of dam reservoir. The country said that it would have the works finished within two months. If the work is complete, Addis Ababa would be able to save 10.5 billion cubic meters of water by the end of this year’s rain period. The stated goal is to add 10 billion cubic meters of water annually until the target of 74 billion cubic meter is reached. Although electricity output would entail more water flow to Egypt and Sudan, it would also mean that Addis Ababa has unilaterally decided to fill the dam for the third time without striking any deals. The announcement about forest clearance was made during the meeting of Ethiopian Minister of Irrigation Aisha Mohammed Mussa and El-Shazly Hassan, the governor of the Benishangul-Gumuz region, where the dam is situated. The statement that came out after the meeting said that deforestation would be completed within 60 days of starting work. Before the second filling in last July, the Ethiopian authorities had cleared 4,854 hectares of land.

Cairo has repeatedly stated that it does not object to Ethiopia using the dam to generate the electricity needed to fulfil its development plans. Egypt, however, is opposed to any steps that could compromise the already insufficient Nile water reserves or make those supplies unpredictable. Like Sudan, Egypt seeks assurances that any GERD failure would not cause sudden and uncontained floods in the downstream countries. “We have seen great reluctance on the part of Ethiopian delegations to address the need for a timely and transparent mechanism to exchange information, or for dispute settlement,” the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said. Cairo’s experience of negotiations over the past seven years had made it clear that the statement by Ahmed was no more than an attempt to pay “lip service” to Egyptian and Sudanese concerns and “improve his regional and international image.”

Ahmed’s image, political analysts think, has been undermined not only by his repeated blocking of an agreement over GERD, but “because of the human rights atrocities he has committed against his own people in the war against the Tigray.” A lot of diplomats note that the prime minister of Ethiopia is aware that he will face considerable pressure during the AU summit if he opts to act aggressively on a number of fronts. Placed under international pressure, Ahmed had recently ordered the release of high-profile political prisoners, issued his statement on GERD, and met with Mohamed Dagalo, the vice president of Sudan’s Transitional Council, to discuss the border dispute between Addis Ababa and Khartoum over Fashqa.

Two days after Ahmed issued his statement, Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukri stressed that as far as Cairo is concerned, what counts is genuine political will to reach a final agreement to end the dispute over GERD. While Shoukri’s remarks did not directly comment on Ahmed’s statement, Water Resources Minister Mohamed Abdel-Ati directly addressed Addis Ababa’s failure to respond to Egypt’s and Sudan’s repeated requests for reassurances on an information exchange and dispute mechanism, as well as on details of GERD’s security specifications. Despite the international pressure Ahmed has come under to end the war in Tigray, there is little expectation in Cairo that such pressure will lead to him significantly changing his position both on Tigray and GERD issues.

Egypt and Ethiopia are both trying to lobby the AU’s incoming Senegalese presidency to their side, and have been actively wooing other African states to support their positions. The two countries are also tussling to secure Sudanese support. “What we are working on is to lobby for as much support as possible for our demand Ethiopia honor its commitment to sign a comprehensive and legally binding agreement on the filling and operation of the GERD,” said the Egyptian government official, adding that Cairo is talking to the Senegalese, other members of the AU, the Europeans, and the Americans.

Egypt’s message set forth in Al-Ahram is clear: the resumption of talks must include the parameters and a tentative deadline for a comprehensive and a legally binding agreement. The idea of a tentative agreement that seemed to be in the works last year is no longer on the table. GERD negotiations last ground to a deadlock in April 2021, two months ahead of Ethiopia’s execution of a second filling of the dam reservoir.

Construction of the dam began in April 2011, and Ethiopian officials now say the long-delayed operation of GERD’s first two turbines will begin shortly. For Cairo, however, whether or not the turbines do enter an operational phase is far less important than what happens come the rainy season in July. Will Addis Ababa then go ahead with its threatened third unilateral filling? While officials in Cairo say Egypt has been successful in managing its water resources in the last two years this is partly due to heavy rainy seasons, and there is no guarantee that such heavy rainfall will continue.

In a post on Facebook, Prime Minister Mustafa Madbouli said that Cairo is interested in resuming talks to resolve technical and legal points of contention and reach a balanced deal. “The deal should take into consideration Egypt’s water scarcity and reliance on the Blue Nile’s water,” he said. Madbouli added that developments in Nile Basin countries were a priority for Egypt and that his country has provided aid and expertise to help secure stability in its neighbors.

Viktor Mikhin, corresponding member of RANS, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

At the end of December, the Turkish authorities were forced to suspend maritime traffic through the Bosporus Strait for a day after the BARLAS, a 70-meter-long (230-foot-long) dry cargo vessel under the Panama flag ran aground after engine failure. The maritime traffic in this vital sea route was restored on December 29. This is the second incident in December: a similar situation occurred on December 15, when a chemical tanker, due to a failure of its engine plant, was run aground by a strong current in the Beykoz area to the eastern side of the Bosporus Strait.

About 70 tankers were stuck in queues at the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits in both directions in mid-November. Due to fogs, short daylight hours and the construction of a suspension bridge over the Dardanelles, the passage time has increased almost fivefold. Oil tankers spent four days passing the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits in October, then in November for 19 days. Downtime has increased the cost of oil in the Mediterranean region.

Traffic across the Bosporus also came to a halt in May, when the Croatian-flag tanker named RAVA, 249 meters long laden with crude oil, lost speed and got adrift towards land. The rescue ship was able to stop it 300 meters from the coast.

Traffic disruptions occur here quite often, mainly due to vessels malfunctions. In addition to technical reasons, delays also occur due to weather conditions, causing the ferry service between Istanbul and Bursa is suspended.

But not only on this “Turkish section” which is the most crucial sea route for European economies, significant delays in the delivery of goods have been noted recently. For most of December 2021, there was a traffic jam of several hundred trucks on the Russian-Chinese border due to the closure of four of the five border checkpoints. As a result, all the trucks headed to Suifenhe, the only road and rail border crossing. Trucks with food were the first to cross the border, and trucks with other goods, including holiday ones, were held up for weeks.

These transport problems and Egypt’s increase in tariffs for the passage of merchant ships through the Suez Canal are causing an increasing interest in finding an alternative to this transport route. As stated in Cairo, the decision to revise the pricing policy caused an increase in demand for the delivery of goods by sea. In particular, in November of this year, 1,847 vessels passed through the Suez Canal, which is 14% higher than in the same period of 2020.

Egypt raised tariffs, and sea prices for goods from southern countries to Europe have increased tenfold. The reason was the initial decline in supplies during the pandemic. In addition, during this period, the production rate of freight containers and ships also decreased, which became scarce after the resumption of demand.

In these conditions, the UAE, Turkey and Iran decided to create an alternative to the sea trade route through the Suez Canal by launching a transit corridor from the Emirates to Turkey through the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This corridor was previously used to deliver goods to Qatar when its neighboring countries blockaded it. Then cargo from Turkey arrived at the ports of Bushehr Province and then was sent by ships to Doha. Pakistan has also been using a similar route for a long time. The Islamic Republic of Iran authorities are currently considering expanding the corridor and developing transit cooperation with other neighboring countries. Such a partnership between the UAE, Turkey and Iran underlines some thaw in relations between the three countries. However, political tensions between Tehran and Abu Dhabi are due to several reasons, including territorial claims to several islands in the Persian Gulf, UAE concerns about the development of the Iranian nuclear program and differences in views on the Yemeni conflict. This common commercial interest has provided the three countries with an opportunity for dialogue.

Against this background, the transit traffic along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) has become more and more interesting for international transport and trade associations. Ending November, 86 vessels passed through the NSR, 11 vessels under the Russian flag and 75 vessels under other nations. The transit cargo traffic amounted to more than 2 million tons, which is 59% higher than the same indicator in 2020, according to the certificate on monitoring traffic using the NSR and world markets for shipping and logistics services. International transit traffic along the NSR in 2021 was characterized by a predominance of raw materials (iron ore concentrate, timber and coal) in an easterly direction. General cargoes, including containerized ones, are mainly transported in a westerly direction. In 2021, most of the routes were operated by ships of German companies. 22 ships in easterly and westerly directions for general cargo transportation, including containers and coal and iron ore concentrate from west to east. Norwegian and Swiss companies performed 18 voyages with vessels of up to 80,000 tons deadweight, ten ships are from Murmansk, and one is from Canada to the ports of China with iron ore concentrate. Chinese companies performed 14 voyages in easterly and westerly directions to transport general cargo, including containers. Dutch vessels made six voyages in easterly and westerly directions to transport general cargo.

Even though ice began to form two weeks earlier this year, the icebreakers of Atomflot were actively involved in escorting convoys of ships along the Northern Sea Route that got stuck in the ice.  On December 7, Taymyr, the nuclear-powered icebreaker operated by FSUE Atomflot, escorted seven ships. The ships independently continued to move from the water area of the Northern Sea Route from the water area to the western ice edge of the Kara Sea.

Along with the NSR, the transportation of goods through Russia using Russian railways is actively developing. On December 13, the millionth transit container was transported through Russia, which became a record figure in the entire history of Russian railways. The container proceeded from Chongqing, China to Helsinki. From January to November 2021, the volume of traffic on the China-Europe route increased by 43%. The competition between the Russian Trans-Siberian Railway and the international logistic route through the Suez Canal on Southeast Asia – Europe has been going on for more than a decade since the road through Russia using railway transport is shorter and faster. In the recent period, Russia created transshipping container terminals on railway connections with China, which sharply reduced the cost of delivering goods from Southeast Asia and reduced travel time. A similar modernization took place on the western borders of Russia, as well as in Belarus.

Russia also took unprecedented measures to simplify customs and related controls for transit cargo, which immediately positively affected the cost of delivery and travel time.

As a result of the fruitful work of many Russian ministries, departments, state and private companies, which created an alternative to the Suez Canal, a natural result has been achieved. In particular, the overland route through the Russian Federation became more profitable than shipping by sea. It began to gain momentum rapidly, and in general, the transit corridor through Russia became more reliable and cheaper than the Suez Canal.

Valery Kulikov, political expert, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Despite modern agro-industrial technologies, the trend towards food shortages continues. This, in particular, is evidenced by the information published by the UN that up to 820 million people are starving in the world, which is about 10% of the world population.  There are more malnourished and hungry people around the world today than ever before, despite the fact that the world produces more food per capita than at any time in human history.  However, the global problem of malnutrition and hunger is not limited to food shortages; it is permeated through politics and is closely related to the economy and various spheres of public life.

In percentage terms, the most hungry live in Africa, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The situation is complicated because the bulk of the inhabitants of this region live below the poverty line. This circumstance, deepening environmental and energy difficulties, high rates of demographic growth, determine the protracted, chronic nature of the food crisis. This is evidenced by the more frequent outbreaks of mass hunger in individual countries and the constant expansion of its distribution areas up to the formation of stable “hunger zones,” particularly within the Sahel in northeast and southern Africa. At the same time, it looks like a paradox that 2/3 of the continent’s population is employed in agriculture.

The commitments made by international institutions to reduce the number of hungry in the world have not yet yielded effective results. Thus, the most important initiative at the global level was the Millennium Summit, held at the United Nations headquarters in New York City in 2000, which formulated the Millennium Development Goals. One of humanity’s priorities by 2015 was halving the number of poor and hungry people in the world compared to 1990.

The goal set by the international community to end hunger by 2030, according to analysts at FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), is also unlikely to be achieved. A report on global hunger published jointly by Concern Worldwide and Welthungerhilfe noted: “Five years after the world committed to end hunger, food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition, we are still off-track to achieve this objective by 2030.” With reference to current expert projections, this report shows that the world as a whole and 47 countries, in particular, will not even achieve low levels of hunger by 2030.

In 2020, African Union member states also made a commitment to end hunger by 2025 through the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP).

However, progress so far has been modest despite these and other commitments: Currently, only 9 of 55 African countries are on track to reduce malnutrition to 5% or less by 2025. This highlights the need to redouble efforts. Therefore, in the future, the most promising is the solution of strategic tasks focused on using the achievements of science and digital technologies and solving the problems associated with instability, strengthening assistance to poor countries from developed countries.

In this regard, the recent joint efforts by Russia and Egypt to create a free logistics zone for grain storage in Cairo with an initial capacity of 1 million tons per year deserve attention and approval, which should ensure the food security of Egypt and neighboring countries. So, on December 14 Egyptian Minister of Supply and Internal Trade Ali al-Moselhi met in Cairo with the Russian Deputy Minister of Agriculture Sergey Levin and discussed the establishment of an Egyptian-Russian partnership for the production of grain in Egypt, as well as the creation of logistic free wheat storage areas in Cairo.  The idea of creating tanks for storing vegetable oil was also discussed, it was decided to form a committee that will study and monitor the implementation of the proposals.  According to Al-Moselhi, Russia is Egypt’s main trading partner. The possibility of partnership in the grain trade in the country is being discussed; cooperation should become the core to achieve stability in trade in strategic goods and strengthen food security in Arab and African countries.

As you know, Egypt is the world’s largest importer of wheat. Egypt imported approximately 12.5 million tons of wheat worth $ 3 billion in 2019 and 12.9 million tons worth $ 3.2 billion in 2020, according to Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. In 2021, Egyptian farmers harvested 3.5 million tons of wheat. Russia is one of the largest wheat exporters in the world.

President of the Egyptian Forum for Political and Strategic Studies Rashad Abdo believes that the partnership between Egypt and Russia in grain trade and storage is essential in achieving food security in Egypt and the African continent. He highly appreciated the negotiations between Egypt and Russia but stressed the need to accelerate the implementation of the agreed steps. According to him, both countries and neighboring states will benefit from such a partnership. The necessary stability in trade in goods which are strategically vital for ensuring food security, will be achieved. The Russian economy, in turn, will benefit from such a partnership through guaranteed sales of its products.

Adel Amer, Director of the Egyptian Centre for Political, Economic, and Social Studies, is also confident that cooperation between Egypt and Russia in trade and grain storage is of enormous importance for the African continent and a serious step towards achieving regional food security and stability. According to him, Egypt has always worried about the fate of the African continent. “The partnership between Egypt and Russia is one of Cairo’s priorities in terms of ensuring food security throughout Africa through stable supplies of strategically important goods, especially against the backdrop of a pandemic and climate change.” He believes that in 2022, the partnership between the two countries will be intensified, especially given the common views and mutual understanding on many issues. “The Egyptian market is attractive in terms of investment as well as an access point to the African market,” Amer added. “It is in the interests of the two sides to continue to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation.”

Yomn El Hamaki, a professor of economics at Ain Shams University, and former head of the Department of Economics believes the partnership will be successful. Egypt is the largest importer of wheat and Russia is the largest exporter. “Both countries, and the entire continent, should be interested in such a partnership.” The Egyptian expert highly appreciates the role of Egypt in ensuring food security on the African continent and maintaining stability in terms of strategically essential goods, including through a partnership with Russia to create a logistics free zone for storing grain in Cairo. According to Yomn al-Hamaki, “Such cooperation will not only ensure stable supplies of strategically important goods for Egypt and other African states, strengthening their food security but will also strengthen the Egyptian and Russian influence in Africa.”

Vladimir Odintsov, political observer, writing for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Against the background of consistent strengthening by Egypt of its role in the Arab world and and in the international arena, further coordination of policy between Egypt and Russia continues with the development of bilateral cooperation in various fields.

Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, held a meeting with colleagues from Egypt on December 22 in Moscow where, taking into account similar approaches of the Russian Federation and the Arab Republic of Egypt on crucial issues on the international agenda, he emphasized that Cairo is an essential partner in the Middle East and North Africa, and Moscow intends to strengthen bilateral cooperation in regional affairs. The parties have made significant progress in several vital areas this year. In particular, the Treaty on Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation entered into force, which opened up new opportunities for intensifying work across the entire spectrum of bilateral relations. Regular consultations are being held in countering terrorism and on information security issues, close interaction is being carried out between the military departments and special services, and some joint trade and economic projects are successfully developing. In addition to the special adviser to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on national security affairs, Faiza Abou el-Naga, and the Egyptian counterterrorism adviser Magdi Abdel Ghaffar, representatives of several ministries and departments of the two countries took part in the talks in Moscow.

The fact that relations between Moscow and Cairo at the moment “have reached a level the likes of which have not been seen before” in the history of bilateral relations, was pointed out the other day by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in an interview with the Egyptian TV channel TeN TV. He highlighted the vital role of large economic projects in Russia and Egypt in stimulating bilateral dialogue, particularly the Russian industrial zone in the republic. “It has huge potential,” the minister stressed. “It is just being launched, and there is already a queue of Russian companies wishing to participate in it, to create their own production.” According to Lavrov, this project is of fundamental importance not only for the Egyptian market but also has a regional dimension. An intergovernmental agreement between the Russian Federation and Egypt on developing the east of Port Said as a special zone with a simplified tax regime for Russian resident enterprises was concluded in 2018. The full implementation of this project is designed for 13 years. It is planned that resident companies will be able to start producing products as early as 2022 and will receive rent holidays, preferential tariffs for energy resources, a special preferential tax regime, as well as a ready-made site.

The pace of construction with the Russian Federation of El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant, the first nuclear power plant planned for Egypt, is increasing. An agreement on constructing El Dabaa with terms of a Russian loan of $25 billion was concluded between the parties in 2015. The NPP will consist of four power units. Construction is expected to be completed by 2028-2029.

Military-technical cooperation between the two countries is also actively developing. During December 3-10, in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, in the Gulf of Alexandria, the Bridge of Friendship 2021 joint exercise was held. Crews of ships of the Russian Navy and the Egyptian Navy operated under the leadership of the joint exercise headquarters. They performed the tasks of repelling attacks from naval targets, inspecting suspicious ships, organizing air defense and replenishing supplies at sea from a helicopter. Earlier, on October 19, the fifth joint tactical exercise of Russian and Egyptian paratroopers Defenders of Friendship 2021 was held at the military base of the paratroopers of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Cairo suburb of Inshas.

There is a further strengthening of the Egyptian army with advanced Russian weapons. So, the country’s Air Force has already received half of the 24 Su-35 aircraft ordered in Russia.  As noted by Defenseworld.net, initially Cairo relied on American F-16 fighters, but they turned out to be some of the “least dangerous” in service with America’s allies since they did not receive modern weapons such as AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missile, the absence of which reduced the target destruction range to less than 70 km (using the older AIM-7P Sparrow). At the same time, Egypt’s neighbors, such as Sudan, Libya and Ethiopia, have much more powerful Soviet-developed R-77 missiles installed on aircraft such as the Su-27. It is believed that the US refusal to supply Egypt with advanced missiles was intended to preserve Israel’s high-quality military superiority. In this connection, the Egyptian Air Force decided to strengthen its fleet of fighters with Russian Su-35s equipped with new avionics, including the Irbis radar with a phased antenna array with a range of 400 km and powerful AL-41F1 engines (14,500 kgf thrust) with thrust vector control. As regards its weapons, it can carry, in particular, R-27 air-to-air missiles and R-77-1 active radar-guided medium-range missiles, According to military experts, the Russian fighter is designed primarily to “guarantee the superiority of the Egyptian army in the regional sky.” The Su-35 can simultaneously track up to 4 ground or 30 air targets and hit up to 8 air targets simultaneously. It can identify the class and type of air targets and take aerial photography of the area.

During the Defence Expo – EDEX 2021 held in Egypt at the end of November, Russia demonstrated modern weapons. It held talks with representatives of various branches of the armed forces and the Egyptian Ministry of Defense.  “Egypt is the most important strategic partner of Russia … Rosoboronexport is ready for further cooperation with the Egyptian side in any modern format and across the entire range of promoted military, dual and civilian products,” said Alexander Mikheev, head of Rosoboronexport.

On New Year’s Eve – December 25, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation with President of the Arab Republic of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The leaders praised the achieved level of bilateral cooperation in various fields, including the construction of Egypt’s first nuclear power plant, El Dabaa NPP, and the creation of a Russian industrial zone in the Suez Canal region, the Kremlin press office reported following the talks. In addition, Putin and el-Sisi touched upon some international issues. In particular, they noted the similarity of approaches to a political settlement of the situation in Libya.

Valery Kulikov, political expert, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Egypt, which has been steadily strengthening its role in the Arab world since the second half of the twentieth century, has uninterruptedly enhanced its authority on the international stage, and is now firmly in a noteworthy position on it.

Recently, very important talks were held in Cairo between Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. One of their topics was the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. President Al-Sisi reaffirmed Cairo’s support for peace within the framework of the “two states for two peoples” solution and relevant international resolutions and stressed the importance of international support for Egypt’s efforts to rebuild the Palestinian territories devastated during the last Israeli war against Gaza, as well as the need to maintain the truce between Israel and Palestine.

According to many analysts, it was Cairo’s efforts that brought the Palestinian dossier to the forefront after a decade in which it had been relegated to the background. And in this, the trilateral summit meeting held in the first week of September in Sharm el-Sheikh between President Al-Sisi, King Abdullah II of Jordan and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was very important. The aim was to jointly develop a vision for the resumption of efforts on the Palestinian dossier, negotiating steps to revive the peace process based on a two-state solution. The region, while appreciating Cairo’s efforts to revive the Palestinian dossier, is at the same time aware that while the “deal of the century” had little chance of breathing new life into a process that stalled 14 years ago, prospects now depend on US and Israeli positions as well as on Egyptian initiatives. Palestinian National Initiative Secretary-General Mustafa Al Barghouti told the Egyptian broadsheet Al-Ahram Weekly, speaking from Ramallah that “a recent flurry of activity, including a meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, could help resolve some issues, such as a ceasefire and improved treatment of Palestinian prisoners.”

In addition to the Palestinian dossier, Egypt has taken many steps to build stability elsewhere in the Middle East, including the third round of meetings and consultations with Qatar aimed at restoring relations. The two sides reached agreements on a multitude of issues, including the signing of several memoranda of understanding to resume cooperation. That said, it should be recalled that Egypt re-established diplomatic, economic and tourism ties with Qatar in January 2021, although Qatar is a sponsor of the Muslim Brotherhood (an organization banned in the Russian Federation), which lost power in Egypt in 2013.

Turkey and Egypt also recently held the second round of political dialogue four months after the first talks. A day earlier, ARE Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry said in an interview with Bloomberg that there were important issues between the two countries, and if they were resolved, relations could be restored by the end of the year. Among the demands insisted upon by Egypt, which are also supported by the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Libya, as well as the extradition to Cairo of 15 members of the Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (aka Muslim Brotherhood, banned in Russia) movement living in Turkey. However, Ankara perceives these demands as difficult to fulfil, contrary to national interests, while noting that “common ground can be found as a result of negotiations.” Cairo, using Ankara’s desire to improve its economy through rapprochement, together with the UAE and Saudi Arabia is trying to persuade the Turkish authorities to change its position regarding the Ikhwan movement, banned in Russia and many Arab countries.

The focus of both rounds of talks with Ankara was of course also on Libya, as Cairo insisted that Ankara stop its military presence in Libya and withdraw its mercenaries before normalizing bilateral relations. Egypt’s position enjoys significant international support, which is consistent with the conclusions of the Berlin Conference on Libya.

Overall, stabilization of the situation in Libya ahead of the country’s parliamentary and presidential elections, scheduled for December 24, has received increased attention from Egypt over the past period. On September 14, President Al-Sisi met with the Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, to discuss in detail recent political and security developments in Libya. In mid-September, the entire Libyan government visited Cairo for the second round of meetings of the Egyptian-Libyan Joint Higher Committee. During the first meeting in April, several bilateral agreements and memorandums of understanding were signed, which included implementing agreements for major infrastructure projects, such as Libya’s third ring road, to be built by a group of Egyptian contractors. At the current meeting, Libyan Economy Minister of State Salama Al-Ghawil stressed that Egypt will make a major contribution to Libya’s reconstruction. Al-Ghawil roughly estimated that Egypt is likely to have a share of $70bn in Libya’s reconstruction program. According to Egyptian sources, Egyptian companies have already started work on some projects after receiving permission from the Egyptian government. They state that Egyptian and Libyan authorities agree that major infrastructure projects should be completed as soon as possible.

In addition to the diligent work on the aforementioned files, Egypt has recently taken active steps towards a comprehensive solution to the Yemeni crisis. Yemeni Defense Minister Mohamed Ali Al-Maqdashi, during his recent meeting with Egyptian President Al-Sisi, praised the cooperation between Egypt and Yemen, especially in the military and security fields. For his part, the Egyptian president noted that the solution to the crisis should lead not only to stability and unity among Yemenis but also to an end to foreign interference in Yemen’s internal affairs, clearly referring to the armed confrontation between the Iranian-backed Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement and the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia.

Since coming to power, current Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi has placed considerable emphasis on developing relations with Russia. As many Egyptian analysts have noted, el-Sisi considers Putin a key ally and sees the relationship between Moscow and Cairo as highly important to the Arab republic’s foreign policy and Egypt’s development. However, Egypt’s growing relations with Russia have provoked very jealous reactions in the West, which have at times taken the form of a targeted information attack to compromise or derail their further progress. And one of the most recent examples of this is a publication on the website of the Arab Centre in Washington, where “advisers” suggest that Cairo should abandon its independent policy, remaining as it did a few years ago “in the shadow of Washington”. However, Cairo had already travelled the “indicated path” earlier and had therefore decided to pursue an independent policy both in the world and in the region, which was already bearing significant fruit and increasing its credibility.

Valery Kulikov, political expert, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

After more than a month of consultations, the UNSC adopted a chairman’s statement calling for the resumption of the African Union (AU) mediation to reach “a binding agreement on the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).”

The adoption of the resolution coincided with the arrival of Christophe Lutundula Apala, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo. He handed over to his Sudanese counterpart Mariam al-Sadiq al-Mahdi a document prepared by AU experts in anticipation of the resumption of negotiations under the leadership of this apex African organization. In this regard, the Sudanese minister said her country’s position on the dam is based on international law and the Declaration of Principles on GERD, which was signed in 2015 in Khartoum between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Al Mahdi stressed Sudan’s support for the rights of the Nile River Basin countries and the need to implement projects on the river through cooperation and integration. “We recognize Ethiopia’s right to benefit from development sources, but this should not harm other Blue Nile basin countries,” she said.

Immediately after adopting the document at the UN, Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement rejecting the UN position, believing that the dispute between the three states was beyond its mandate. Ethiopia believes the dam holds excellent promise for lifting millions of Ethiopians out of poverty and giving them access to cheap electricity, estimated to generate more than a billion dollars in annual revenue and a significant increase in its GDP. As conceived by Addis Ababa and of necessity, the new dam is a people’s project built with money collected from the Ethiopians’ pockets.  However, despite its importance, GERD is only the first of many hydro powers, and other costly projects on the Nile and its tributaries, which is why limiting sovereignty over the Nile as defined by Egypt and Sudan is unacceptable to Ethiopia, the country’s Foreign Ministry says.

The Nile is also of great importance to Egypt.  According to some Egyptian experts, the economic consequences of GERD alone for the country of Pharaohs would be unbearable. It is believed that almost 95% of the country’s freshwater needs are dependent on the Nile, meaning that all other sectors of the economy are linked in one way or another to the river. The socio-political and psychological factors are just as significant, if not more important. The Egyptians have always been concerned that another riparian state might control the Nile, especially one as determined and large and now hostile as Ethiopia. For many Egyptians, the new reality on the Nile, which is in the making, proclaims the decline of Egypt.

Prolonged negotiations in their current form or the step-by-step approach proposed by the current African Union Chair, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are considered by many experts to be no more than attempts to revive negotiations and are stillborn. This is because, firstly, for Egypt, any transaction under the GERD phased-in or otherwise that does not secure its historic rights is invalid. Secondly, completing the second year of filling the dam will change the reality because the information on the filling and operating problem will become outdated. Thirdly, a phased approach would naturally lead to the complex issue of water sharing, which Egypt and Sudan are unwilling to allow. On the contrary, water sharing is an absolute necessity. In its absence, a binding agreement that confuses the GERD operation with water sharing will quite rightly be rejected by Ethiopia.

Therefore, if the AU-led process is to bear fruit, the tripartite negotiations must be redefined in scope, purpose and content. Such an approach should begin with the recognition that any GERD agreement is not final. Any deal on the Nile requires frequent adjustments and follow-ups that require a friendly atmosphere for cooperation between the parties. For such a relationship to be established and flourish, the three parties must, even if slowly, engage in confidence-building. In other words, the main goal of negotiations should be to find sustainable ways to build the necessary trust that helps to engage in negotiations and exchanges to remove obstacles continuously. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to broaden the scope of the current negotiations to encompass a wide range of issues of mutual interest.

The second year of filling the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has further provoked a polarization of views between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt. Basically, Egypt views this as proof of Ethiopia’s unilateralism and violates the tripartite talks’ agreements. In turn, for Ethiopia, the process is technically inevitable and proof of its integrity, which requires a complete change in the current regime on the Nile.  Both countries are struggling to grapple with the new reality facing these negotiations. At the same time, Egypt and Sudan see the process as a violation of international law and thus appear to be losing interest in a negotiated settlement. The possibility of agreeing to the kind that might even remotely recognize existing water use, known as historic rights, may already have been lost. Ethiopia may also have little or no incentive to enter into a binding agreement for a nearing completion project.

The three-sided talks have gone through several difficulties since they began just under a decade ago. Many issues have been resolved, but some critical issues remain undecided, jeopardizing the completion of the entire process. To overcome these concerns, several suggestions and adjustments have been made. However, numerous efforts have failed to reach a negotiated settlement. What is currently being proposed by the African Union as a step-by-step approach is likely to fail, as it will face the same set of problems that have constantly threatened to derail negotiations.  Egypt and Sudan continue to push for a change in the negotiating format, which includes a more substantial role for observers and a UN Security Council resolution urging a six-month deadline and an end to the current filling of the dam. There has also been pressure and, according to Ethiopians, several threats made to get the Ethiopian government to sign a deal that, as it openly claims, does not protect the country’s interests. It is not very difficult to predict that the repeated remedies already tried will fail to reach an agreement that considers all three parties’ interests. With the completion of the second year of filling the dam, trilateral negotiations face an unprecedented challenge that can only be addressed through a paradigm and format shift.

The relationship between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt goes back thousands of years and has had its ups and downs.  But lately, we can say that not much has been recorded in terms of strengthening friendships. What could have been a helpful contribution to alleviating differences in the tripartite negotiations has been abandoned, thereby exacerbating legal and technical differences in political, business, interpersonal, and even military tensions. This results from an increased and accumulated sense of suspicion, which leads countries to conclude that working on other aspects of the relationship will yield no results or give the wrong signal of complacency.  As hostile as the current state of affairs may seem, these countries have long-standing and well-established mechanisms to strengthen bilateral cooperation. Several bilateral agreements were signed in many different sectors. These include agreements that provide cooperation on trade, investment promotion, tariff exemptions, agriculture, livestock, health, education, etc. The countries also regularly convene a Joint Ministerial Commission. The “business-to-business” and “people-to-people” aspects of the increasingly stagnant relationship could lessen the animosity. The intertwining of cities and institutions could also help revive scarce trust. Revitalizing these mechanisms and enhancing other aspects of the relationship will help make the Nile negotiations more acceptable. The three countries should seriously consider developing their relations, both bilaterally and trilaterally.

It should be noted that the stepwise approach, which has been considered the most appropriate formula to address GERD so far, has been the most appropriate. And it begins, as defined, with an agreement on the rules for filling and operating the dam, followed by a water-sharing agreement. But filling GERD made the existing approach obsolete for the second year without agreement among all three countries. Tripartite negotiations led by the African Union should move beyond efforts at revitalization and through a paradigm shift that would move away from water sharing and focus on comprehensive cooperation in areas of common interest.  The starting point for revising the trilateral negotiations should be to recognize that the indissoluble ties between the three countries require a new long-term approach that includes multifaceted issues of common interest. The focus should be on the common destiny of the peoples of the three countries, not just a fading agreement on a single disputed project.

Viktor Mikhin, corresponding member of RANS, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook” .

July 26, 1956 is an important date in Egyptian history – it was the day President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. In his annual address to the nation from Manshia Square in Alexandria, he said that the famous canal would now become Egypt’s exclusive property and its people. Until then, the country had no control over it because a foreign firm ran it, and Cairo received only five percent of the canal’s revenues. He touched on both financial and historical aspects in his speech. Nasser stressed that nationalization is necessary to ensure the construction of the vital Aswan Dam from an economic point of view. Still, from a historical significance, it is a restoration of justice, a release from the traces of British colonialism, and a tribute to those 120,000 Egyptians who died during the canal’s construction in the 19th century. Nasser’s speech caused quite a stir in the Arab world. For the first time, the leader of a developing country went directly against the interests of the Western powers, successfully challenging them.

Although 65 years have passed since that day, people still question the undeniable fact of whether the proclamation of nationalization of Egyptian property was worth it. It triggered the Trilateral Aggression of France, Britain, and Israel in November of that year, causing considerable human and material damage to Egypt. But ironically, the invasion of former colonial powers, who had lost their bearings in time and international politics, only strengthened Egypt’s political power and confirmed its role as a leader in the post-colonial world. Egypt has become a model for third-world countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America struggling for independence and control over their national resources. The famous Fidel Castro admitted that the nationalization of the Suez Canal inspired the Cuban revolution that took place a few years later. One of Fidel Castro’s first actions after the revolution succeeded was nationalizing all US oil refineries in the country such as Nasser did in Egypt.

Meanwhile, the Tripartite aggression against Egypt, as is well known, failed on the eve of the collapse of the old British and French colonial empires and their departure from the ranks of the Great Powers to the dustbin of history. The fighting in Egypt caused an immediate increase in international tensions. The Soviet Union was particularly active in this situation, warning Great Britain, France, and Israel of their possible military intervention, including nuclear strikes on their military facilities. The United States of America also demanded an end to the aggression and was highly irritated by the Anglo-French amateurism. The UN General Assembly decided to deploy a peacekeeping force in the conflict zone with the quick consent of the Egyptian leadership. As early as November 6, the opponents of the conflict succeeded in forcing Britain, France, and Israel to conclude a truce with Egypt. The conflict was extinguished, and by December 1956, Britain and France had withdrawn their troops from the seized beachheads in Egyptian territory. But the “Quick War” caused significant losses to Egypt; when about 3 thousand Egyptian soldiers and about 3 thousand Egyptian civilians were killed, half the Egyptian army’s armored vehicles were destroyed. At the same time, Egypt’s main issues in terms of troop management, troop training, and weaponry were identified, forcing Nasser to embark on large-scale modernization of their armed forces with the help of the Soviet Union, which became for a long time the main supplier of military equipment with instructors to the Egyptian army.

Critics of the canal’s nationalization still argue that the concession of the greedy foreign company expired anyway in 1968, after which ownership automatically reverted to Egypt. Hence, there was no need for nationalization or the ensuing war. This argument is a misleading oversimplification that demonstrates a poor understanding of realities, which indicates that the foreign powers associated with the company planned to maintain control of the canal even after the concession expired. The very fact that Britain and France went to war to seize control of the canal militarily already confirms that they never intended to let it out of their greedy hands. If they intended to hand over the canal after the concession expired, they would not have bothered to hold secretly planned meetings for the war against Egypt in the city of Sèvres, France, or incur such exorbitant economic, military, and political costs.

The so-called Protocol of Sèvres is a secret agreement reached between the governments of Israel, France, and Great Britain during discussions held between October 22 and 24, 1956. The protocol concerns their joint political and military conspiracy to overthrow the Egyptian leader Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser by invading and occupying the Suez Canal area in response to its nationalization. The planning and agreements contained in the protocol initiated the so-called Suez Crisis of October 29, 1956. Both this secret protocol and the subsequent nefarious conspiracy of the three powers are now well known and give a clear and distinct picture of the corrupt policies of the colonial powers of the period, which tried unsuccessfully to stop time.

It is well known that since 1909 the Universal Company of the Maritime Canal of Suez has been persistently trying to extend the concession for another 30 years. Shortly before nationalization, Jacques Georges-Picot, who served as the company’s French general-director in France before it was nationalized, said the company had sent a memorandum to France, Britain, the US, and Italy, warning them of problems that would arise when the concession expired and urging those governments to intervene to internationalize the canal. London and Washington rejected the request, fearing that it would open the way for the USSR to participate in the negotiations since Tsarist Russia was a party to the Convention of Constantinople of 1888 governing the use of the Suez Canal. As for the countries that were parties to the concession, they opted for expansion rather than internationalization.

The company assembled prominent British figures to launch an international campaign to keep the canal administration under foreign control. Their role was to raise “alarm” about the impending transfer of the canal to Egypt, which they said would lead to the departure of foreign supervisors and the resulting disruption of the waterway. In 1954, the Universal Company of the Maritime Canal of Suez also organized a massive media campaign in the United States to increase pressure on officials in Washington to support the idea of an international body based in Egypt to oversee the canal from abroad. It is only natural that this so-called international body should have acted only in the interests of the West.

Critics of the decision to nationalize the canal also argue that Egypt was forced to pay vast sums of money to compensate the company’s foreign shareholders. But what matters here is the opinion of a competent person, Jean-Paul Callon, honorary president of the Association du Souvenir de Ferdinand de Lesseps et du Canal de Suez, who represented France in the negotiations with Egypt on the amount of compensation. The Egyptian government voluntarily decided to pay this money to shareholders after nationalization. He repeatedly said that the French shareholders had received all the sums due to them on time and that the sum they received was used to establish the association of which he was honorary president. In addition to activities aimed at preserving the memory of de Lesseps, the association also organizes several cultural events related to the canal and its history.

Many critics and others in the West do not realize that the natural term of the concession and the transfer of the canal to the Egyptian administration would also have cost Egypt quite a bit. One of the terms of the concession contract stipulated that at the end of its term, Cairo would have to compensate the company for all the equipment, various machinery, and materials belonging to the company, regardless of whether the Egyptians needed them or not. It was stipulated explicitly that the price of these goods would be determined by mutual agreement, and if this was not possible, then by experts, quite naturally British and French. Without any doubt, this would leave the door open to controversy, interfering with the timely transmission of the channel. In addition, there would be a vicious campaign in the Western media to smear Egypt, its leadership, and the Egyptian people as a whole. Ultimately, his corrupt journalists know how to insult the people of former colonies, from which the West has sucked up all their wealth, delaying their development for many decades.

Gamal Abdel Nasser, a most remarkable Arab figure, took on the very sensible decision to nationalize the Suez Canal back in the day. He saved Egypt from all its problems and ensured the return of a highly profitable canal to its rightful owners, the descendants of those who built it and who now fully benefit from its revenues for all Egyptians.

Viktor Mikhin, corresponding member of RANS, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

For economic success, as we know, it is not enough to produce goods. It also needs to be delivered to the buyer. That’s why transportation routes are becoming more and more critical every day. And why, along with the use of already well-known transport routes, China, for example, is creating its own New Silk Road, building an alternative to the Panama Canal in Nicaragua, while Turkey is building the Istanbul Canal in parallel with its traditional Bosphorus. These efforts were spurred on by the May 28 accident at the Suez Canal, which led many countries  to search for alternatives to this Egyptian transport artery. Danish shipping giant A.P. Moller-Maersk CEO Soren Skou told the Financial Times about the unconditional acceleration of changes in the global supply chain of goods after the blocking of the Suez Canal .

Given the particular importance in these conditions of creating a sustainable and profitable transport route for participants in international trade between Europe and Southeast Asia, Russia has been actively involved in the search for alternatives.

As indicated earlier, one of the largest logistics companies on the planet, Danish A.P. Moller-Maersk Group, which specializes in container transportation, has already taken the path of increasing its cargo traffic through Russia by sending containers from Asia by sea to the Vostochny Port (Primorsky Krai), and then by rail in Russia. The containers will be delivered via Russian transport routes to the Port of Novorossiysk  (Krasnodar Krai), from where they will be transported by ship to the Eastern Mediterranean. This new transcontinental business, the Danes admit, will cut transportation time in half. In 2019, the Danish company launched another similar route between the Russian ports of Vostochny and St. Petersburg, carrying about 2,000 containers since the beginning of 2021.

Russian Railways said that they see a constant influx of new customers with orders for transit traffic in containers, not only against the background of the situation in the Suez Canal. Since April 2020, the beginning of the pandemic, Russian Railways has recorded a considerable increase in the volume of transit containers along the China-Europe-China route. The average shipping speed of containers on the main routes is on average 1100-1200 kilometers per day, taking into account customs borders. According to Russian Railways, this is much higher than for sea transport, higher than for road transport, and comparable with aviation – taking into account the first and last miles, all container handling operations at terminals. In addition, Russian Railways notes the provision of a stable tariff policy: the rates for container transit through the Russian Railways network have not risen since 2011. The company said it was ready for volume growth and would develop the necessary services for this.

As Russian entrepreneur Oleg Deripaska has repeatedly stated, his earlier idea of reconstructing leading railroad tracks, the so-called Siberian Cedar Route, could become a competitive alternative to China’s New Silk Road, providing  Russia the opportunity to develop into a key hub, a full-fledged link between Europe and Asia. In his opinion, it is necessary to make this initiative a national project.

Another project is the Western Europe-Western China (WE-WC) Highway. Its key points: St. Petersburg, Moscow with sections of the M11 and the Central Ring Road, Samara and Orenburg, access to Kazakhstan and on to China. The significant advantage of the project is the customs unions of the EAEU and the European Union – carriers only had to pass two customs clearance on the entire route — at the border with China and with the European Union. A memorandum on the project was signed in 2008, and construction began at the same time. As of 2021, China and Kazakhstan have already launched their sections, while Russia has only coped with the M11 highway.

In addition to these options, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) has recently been increasingly named one of Russia’s transport alternatives. At the end of May the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation offered to transport oil and gas along the Northern Sea Route by Russian-built ships that would be able to carry coal and hydrocarbons, as well as to engage in coasting, icebreaking and pilotage. Russian authorities have proposed that the NSR be considered an alternative to the route through the Red Sea on the way from Asia to Europe, seeking to make traffic along the Northern Sea Route year-round thanks to the icebreaker fleet, which Russia is actively building.

The other day, the plans to open a new Russian transport alternative, the river International North–South Transport Corridor, became known. Alexei Rakhmanov, chief executive officer of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) of Russia, reported this to Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 22 and the design of a container ship capable of delivering cargo from the Caspian to the Baltic Sea.

In particular, it was proposed to take the cargo in the north of Iran or the west of China and, accordingly, through Olya port in the Astrakhan region to deliver it to Helsinki within seven to eight days. According to the USC’s chief executive officer, container ships can deliver cargoes along the Volga River, then the Volga-Baltic Waterway, and further north to St. Petersburg. If necessary, it is also possible to deliver cargo to the White Sea. The International North–South Transport Corridor is aimed primarily at Iran, India, and other countries which border the Indian Ocean. It is assumed that the main flow of goods will pass through the Mumbai Harbour, then by sea to the Chabahar Port in Iran, after which it will be delivered by car or by rail through Iran to the Caspian Sea, then by water to Olya. How the shipment will be followed through the territory of Russia is a question of economic feasibility.  Recall that test launches on this route were held  from 2014 to 2017.

For goods from the Celestial Empire, Russia is building East-West Transport Corridor and the Western Europe–Western China Transport Corridor. The latter, in particular, is planned to be in the form of a network of highways, an essential part of which will be the M-12. In this case, cargo will accumulate in the Kazakh port of Aktau on the Caspian Sea.

Thus, the Astrakhan-Helsinki route will take some of the transit cargo from the Suez Canal. For northern Europe, such a route is faster than going through Egypt. Of course, it is still too early to say the cost of the route and how much money it will bring Russia. However, it is already clear that this project is essential for Russia, to the extent that it will ensure Russian shipbuilding capacities.

Valery Kulikov, political expert, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

In recent years, relations between Egypt and Turkey have been complicated on several fronts. There has been no relationship between Cairo and Ankara since 2013 (i.e., when the Egyptian coup d’état took place).

Much of the foreign policy conflict between the countries is due to the fact that Turkey is actively seeking to take control of the Arab world, in which Egypt sees itself as one of its leaders. As for the internal political conflict related to the events of 2011, when Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was overthrown, and pro-Turkish Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia) came to power, still, in 2013, the military staged a coup, blocked the way for the Ikhwan to power in Egypt, and succeeded in appointing Saudi Arabia-oriented Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as president, while imprisoning/condemning pro-Turkish politicians. Ankara wasn’t too happy about it.

Turkey’s active efforts in recent years to take control of neighboring Libya and turn it into a breeding ground for Islamism, as well as Ankara’s support for extremist militias not only from the Gaza Strip but also on Egyptian territory in the Sinai Peninsula, also create serious grounds for mutual conflict.

In addition to the above, the territorial claims must not be overlooked: Cairo and Ankara are disputing a large water area in the eastern Mediterranean, which probably hides large gas deposits.

Finally, ideological conflict: Turkey is trying to promote the concept of “political Islam.” At the same time, the Egyptians and other authoritarian Arab states see this as a direct, existential threat to their regimes.

Nevertheless, Turkey, aiming for a new balance of power in the Mediterranean, has made efforts in recent months to normalize its relations with Egypt by resuming contact between the two countries at a diplomatic level. Political consultations between the two countries were held in Cairo on May 5-6, 2021, to discuss with the Egyptian leadership the restoration of full-fledged relations and the measures required to restore relations between the two countries.

At the same time, Turkey rejected Egypt’s request to extradite the leaders of the Ikhwan movement (banned in Russia). Cairo considers the Ikhwan as terrorists, while Turkey emphasizes that it will continue to oppose the classification of the Ikhwan as a terrorist organization. In addition, Turkey cannot hand over the wanted leaders of the movement, most of whom live in the country legally.

Commenting on the resumption of contacts between Ankara and Cairo, Arab media noted that during the talks, the Egyptians made demands for the complete withdrawal of Turks from Libya and for promises from Ankara not to interfere again in Libyan affairs in exchange for coordination of Egyptian-Turkish efforts to support political authority in Libya. In addition, there was a discussion of potential cooperation between the two countries in the field of gas: Egypt has no objection to Turkey joining the Eastern Mediterranean Forum, but for its part puts certain conditions for this, such as full coordination between the gas fields exploration and the mechanisms of liquefaction, gas utilization, and selling prices between all countries. So far, there has been no movement on any of these issues, including allowance for progress in bilateral relations.

It didn’t help that the third parties participated in the reconciliation between Turkey and Cairo. In particular, Libya’s new Prime Minister Abdel Hamid Dbeibeh, considered to be almost the Erdogan’s protege, visited Cairo and took an active part in discussing issues of concern to the Egyptians.

A severe slowdown of the process of rapprochement between the two countries, and even another wave of cooling in relations, occurred in mid-June after an Egyptian court upheld death sentences for 12 leaders of the Ikhwan movement (banned in Russia), including former ministers in the government elected before the military coup. Among them are former Minister of Youth and Sports Osama Yassin, Professor Abdul Rahman Al-Bar, Safwat Hegazi, and Mohamed Al-Beltagy, secretary-general of the Freedom and Justice Party. Yasin Aktay, an advisor to the Turkish president, strongly criticized Cairo in this regard and stated that “it is inconceivable to rule on mass executions against hundreds of people, no matter how convincing the allegations.” He also noted that “Egypt’s continued imposition of death sentences at a time when it desperately needs support because of the Ethiopian Ennahda dam problem indicates a lack of political reason and that Cairo’s short-sighted steps will lead to drought and famine among the population, which will eventually end in a social explosion. As a Muslim country, Egypt should not be one of those places where human life becomes so cheap.”

As a result, Egypt decided not to raise the level of its diplomatic representation in Turkey for the time being, despite continuing negotiations aimed at restoring relations.

According to Al-Arabiya TV, Cairo’s restrained stance toward Ankara certainly reflects several Egyptian grievances. In particular, the refusal to provide Cairo with information about the “Egyptian militants” who were in Syria has recently returned to Turkey. Also, the Turkish authorities refused to sign documents promising an unconditional withdrawal from Libya. Another stumbling block is Turkish support for the Ikhwans, whom Egypt calls “radical extremists,” accusing Ankara of smuggling them into Libya and neighboring countries. However, the most essential and pivotal issue in the negotiations with Turkey remains the Libyan issue. The Egyptian authorities insist on the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Libya. All of these issues certainly hinder the process of resuming bilateral relations.

Speaking of the steps Ankara and Cairo are taking toward reconciliation, it should be made clear that the author is not talking about Egypt and Turkey turning from enemies into partners. Instead, they will become rivals. This rivalry will unfold in a more or less civilized manner, with clear red lines and stoppers that will not allow relations to degenerate into indirect hostilities, such as in Libya. Of course, this transformation will not happen immediately because mutual ties were severed many years ago. Therefore it is impossible to establish relations in one day as if nothing had happened. This requires consistent meetings, a roadmap, and action based on that.

Valery Kulikov, political expert, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Despite many factors that have attempted to alter the balance of power in the Arab world, and the Middle East, in recent decades, including “color revolutions” imposed on the region from outside, Egypt remains an influential state, both in the Arab world and on the African continent.

Russian leadership aspires to reinforce the country’s diplomatic, economic, and military influence in the Arab world. Therefore, it is not surprising that Egypt remains one of Moscow’s footholds in the region. According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Egypt is a country with lots of potential that is making serious efforts on its own to expand the scope of its cooperation with Moscow in a wide range of areas: political, military technology, energy, trade, investment, and many others.

On June 18 at the Cairo Opera House, the Year of Humanitarian Cooperation between Egypt and Russia was launched with an official ceremony; the countries’ two presidents, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and Vladimir Putin, had agreed on this back during the Sochi summit in October 2018. About 200 events will be held in both countries; these are planned within the framework of the first themed year in the history of Russia and Egypt.

According to politicians in the two countries, this year has become a landmark one for bilateral relations: in January, the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Arab Republic of Egypt on Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation entered into force, and in April the presidents of the two countries, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and Vladimir Putin, agreed to resume flights from Russia to Egyptian resorts.

The El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant project is undisputedly one of the most far-reaching plans that the Egyptian leadership has, and is being implemented using cutting-edge Russian technologies, stands on a par with the renowned construction project for the Aswan High Dam, which has been functioning reliably for many decades generating electricity for the country. Successful cooperation within the framework of this project underscores the high level of these bilateral ties, and multilateral partnership and strategic cooperation. Putting this construction in place will make a significant contribution to ensuring energy security for the Egyptian state, guarantee satisfaction of the country’s growing demand for electricity, and ensure the diversification of energy sources while preserving the environment.

El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant is slated to become the first Egyptian nuclear power plant. Its construction is planned in the northern part of Egypt, 130 kilometers from the country’s capital, Cairo, on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea near Alexandria. The power plant construction project involves building four power generation units with VVER-1200 (water-cooled, water-moderated thermal) reactors with Russian assistance. The total power capacity of the El Dabaa NPP should amount to 4,800 MW.  The cost of the project is about $30 billion, and $25 billion of that will be allocated by the Russian side in the form of a loan for a period of 13 years at 3% per annum, with payments supposed to begin in October 2029. The Egyptian side is supposed to bear the remaining expenses by attracting private investors. The project is intended to be realized over 12 years.

This construction will ensure competitive electricity prices in Egypt for at least 60 years. Commissioning the 1st NPP power generation unit is slated for 2026. The main distinguishing feature of the El-Dabaa NPP is that power generation units with high capacities will be combined with seawater desalination machines. Along with that, the NPP will facilitate the reduction of greenhouse gases in Egypt, and help it achieve its goals under the Paris Agreement on climate change mitigation.

In accordance with the contracts that have been signed, Rosatom will deliver Russian nuclear fuel throughout the power plant’s entire operational lifetime. In addition, Rosatom will train the personnel and provide support for operations and maintenance work at the El Dabaa NPP during the first 10 years of plant operations. In the bounds of another agreement, the Russian side will build a special storage facility and supply containers to store spent nuclear fuel (SNF).

Rosatom will also assist its Egyptian partners in developing nuclear infrastructure, provide support for training local personnel, and increase the level of public acceptance for nuclear energy. Training future workers at the NPP will take place both in Russia and Egypt, by virtue of which hundreds of students will be sent to Russia over the next few years for training in specialties in the atomic energy industry.

According to Rosatom’s estimates, the value added to the Arab Republic of Egypt’s GDP from implementing the project will amount to about $4 billion a year while building the El Dabaa NPP alone.

Scores of Egyptian companies will be involved in building the El Dabaa NPP. During the construction of the station’s 1st power generation unit, the level of localization will be at least 20%, and when subsequent units are constructed this figure will increase. At the peak of construction work, the total number of construction and installation personnel will be about 25,000 people, including more than 11,000 skilled workers. On top of that, 70% of the workers during construction will be drawn from among Egypt’s local population.

Aleksandr Voronkov, director of Rosatom’s regional center in the Middle East and North Africa, underscored that the nuclear power plant in El Dabaa will mean more than just stably generating environmentally friendly electricity. “The NPP is a huge infrastructure project whose implementation is stimulating development in various sectors of the economy, and making a significant contribution to the country’s budget. The NPP is one of the most important sources of employment, and drivers for sustainable development, both in the region where it is built and operated and in the country as a whole,” he summed up.

In the nuclear power industry there is a certain integrated economic indicator called the cost of a million megawatts of installed capacity. Naturally, that is not something that can be called universal, since geological and climatic conditions are important for any nuclear power plant, and different amounts of money are spent on infrastructure, but it still gives a general idea of the cost of a project. For the Egyptians, with the construction of the El Dabaa NPP one megawatt will cost $6,200, while for the British it will cost $8,125, not counting the interest on the loan. In addition to that difference of 30%, Egypt also receives one more important advantage: Rosatom is taking over the training of personnel who will work at the plant, several thousand highly qualified specialists, and give them internships at operating nuclear power plants – and this costs a great deal, both literally and figuratively.

With the construction of the El Dabaa NPP, Egypt also receives one more benefit – and one which is very difficult to assess in terms of money. The area where the NPP is being built, Matruh, is perhaps the most sparsely populated part of the country in terms of its population density: There are 322,000 people on 166,000 square kilometers, with a total population of 100 million people concentrated along the riverbed of the great Nile. Housing construction has already begun in El Dabaa, the first 350 students sat down behind their desks at a newly built school, the local hospital is being expanded several times in area and upgraded, and roads are being laid down. Taking into account the fact that the coast of the Mediterranean Sea is only three kilometers from El Dabaa, the reaction of representatives from the tourism industry becomes understandable: as of today, 46 investment projects have already been submitted for consideration to be implemented. Matruh is being transformed into the safest, newest resort in Egypt, and even has its own airport – this is what Egypt can get in the near future as a result of actively developing its cooperation with Russia and building the nuclear power plant.

The construction of El Dabaa NPP by Rosatom is definitely a record-setting deal in the history of the global nuclear power industry. It is also the largest agreement to export something that is not natural resources in Russia’s entire history. Moscow offered its Egyptian partners a unique, comprehensive agreement that covers the entire life cycle of the nuclear power plant, meaning 70-80 years. Rosatom is the only company in the world today that is capable of providing its customers with a full range of services in the area of peaceful nuclear energy. Developing Egyptian nuclear power is also important for the Russian economy: dozens of Rosatom organizations will receive a significant quantity of orders, as well as the opportunity to validate the advantages held by Russian nuclear technologies before the world community.

Vladimir Odintsov, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.