While January 2022 saw a record number of missile launches by the DPRK in a calendar month, late February and early March 2022 marked the beginning of a new series.

On February 27, the DPRK launched an unspecified ballistic missile from Sunan Airport near Pyongyang towards the Sea of Japan. According to a statement by the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DPRK-launched missile flew about 300 kilometers, with its highest flight altitude of about 620 kilometers. In January, two short-range ballistic missiles were launched from this area.

According to KCNA, the DPRK’s National Aerospace Development Administration and the Academy of National Defense Science have conducted important tests to develop an intelligence satellite. The tests included “vertical and oblique photography of a certain ground area with cameras that will be installed in the reconnaissance satellite. And they have confirmed the specificity and accuracy of the high-resolution photographic system, the data transmission system and the positioning control apparatus.”

A second launch of a similar type of missile took place on March 5, 2022. From the same launch site, the missile flew 270 km and reached a maximum flight altitude of 560 km. According to analysts, if the missile had been launched at a standard angle, it would have travelled between 1,000 and 1,200 km – a flight distance for a medium-range ballistic missile.

KCNA also reported that once again important tests on the satellite development plan had been conducted, and they “confirmed the reliability of data transmission and reception system of the satellite, its control command system and various ground-based control systems.”

The launch and telemetry were monitored by the US Air Force RC-135S (61-2663) reconnaissance aircraft from the waters off the Sea of Japan.

The reaction to the launches is described by the word “expected”, and although each side has said the “buzzwords” that are customary on the political agenda, there has been no excessive excitement. Hence only “big news” was noted, not another expression of regret or a call to stop.

On February 28, the UN Security Council held a closed meeting, at the end of which representatives of 11 countries, including the ROK, the US, the UK and Japan, issued a joint statement condemning the missile launches. They called on all UN member states to condemn Pyongyang’s dangerous actions, stressing the importance of complying with anti-North Korean sanctions. The statement also said the DPRK should choose to strengthen international security and peace by working to ease tensions in the region.  But what matters to the author is that the meeting itself did not end with a condemnatory official document.

A similar situation occurred on March 7 when discussing the next launch. 11 countries – the US, Albania, Australia, Brazil, the UK, France, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and the ROK – condemned it in a statement noting that by launching 11 ballistic missiles since the beginning of this year, Pyongyang violated Security Council resolutions. “We condemn the ballistic missile launch while remaining committed to achieving the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” US Permanent Representative to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield said, and recalled that the US and other countries have repeatedly offered Pyongyang dialogue without preconditions.

Yoon Seok-yeol, the Republic of Korea’s opposition presidential candidate, said that North Korea’s lifting of the moratorium on nuclear tests and long-range missile tests appears to be a matter of time: “Along with the nation, I strongly condemn North Korea’s provocation, which was a blatant violation of UN resolutions” that prohibit the North from using ballistic missile technology. Yoon reiterated his pledge to achieve peace by force, and criticized the government and ruling party presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung for failing to condemn the North’s provocations.

South Korean Defense Minister Suh Wook considered that with the launch Pyongyang had unveiled its policy principle of “power for power and good-will for good-will” in response to the South’s launch of a long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM) under development and to the global attention being focused on the armed conflict in Ukraine.

But back to the launch. As can be seen, the trajectory of North Korean missiles is becoming more and more elongated in altitude, leading the author to believe that the de facto moratorium has been broken. And if you recalculate these trajectories into typical combat missile trajectories, we are talking about a medium-range, instead of a short-range missile launch. The high trajectory in this context has a double meaning.

First, Pyongyang thus tries not to escalate the situation too much, so that missiles fall at a reasonable distance around the Korean peninsula without disturbing allies and neighbors. Second, this launch can honestly be called a space launch and this is the second time that North has published photos of the Earth taken from a satellite.

As early as the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in January 2021, if not earlier, the DPRK unveiled an ambitious weapons program that included not only hypersonic missiles, but also the launch of a reconnaissance satellite. This is not surprising, since satellite surveillance is important not only for military purposes but also for tracking and dealing with typhoons, which periodically affect the North Korean coastline.

Not only the author, but other experts also believe that the next step by Pyongyang may be not so much an open ICBM launch or a nuclear test, but the launch of a satellite for formally peaceful purposes.

Military analyst Ankit Panda notes that the apparent preparations for a new reconnaissance satellite space launch should come as little surprise. What is surprising, however, is the nature of the launch itself. North Korea used an apparent ballistic missile to launch a suborbital payload specifically to test technology for a possible Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite.

Russian military expert Vladimir Khrustalev also points out that engineers are quietly tackling the task of developing and testing the hardware for their advanced reconnaissance satellite. The DPRK cannot easily buy a complete set of equipment on the world market for full-scale testing of the equipment in space conditions. But outer space begins above 100 km – the perfect laboratory overhead! This is why the equipment kits are launched by combat missiles for short periods of time to the same altitudes where the satellite is scheduled to operate, especially as it is not difficult or expensive – the DPRK has many medium-range liquid-fueled and obsolete missiles in storage. Their energy capacity is more than enough to take a small load above 100 km.

In the past, Pyongyang has repeatedly claimed to have conducted satellite launches as part of “peaceful space exploration”, which have been perceived in other countries as long-range missile tests. The point here is that we are faced with self-contradiction: on the one hand every country has a right to the peaceful exploration of space, while on the other hand a UN resolution banning the launch of ballistic missiles deprives it of this right. This leaves the global community to choose a priority and the DPRK to check which trend prevails.

In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, the DPRK is discussed mainly on two fronts. There is speculation about how, while everyone else is busy, Pyongyang will decide not to miss out and launch something surreptitiously, whether making another step in the development of its missile program or conducting field training exercises. For example, the conservative JoongAng Ilbo notes that North Korea wants international recognition as a nuclear power under the power vacuum created by the China-US conflict: “North Korea will be tempted to build more pressure on America under such circumstances”.

Other authors add that the North may carry out a provocative act to mark Kim Il-sung’s 110th birthday on April 15, while the Japanese pro-North Korean newspaper Chosun Shinbo reported on March 7 that the DPRK would launch a satellite “at a time and place to be determined by the highest leadership.”

The second direction concerns the extent to which, amid the growing confrontation between the West on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, Moscow and Beijing will go for more systematic support for their ally. In this context, some predict a split in the UNSC (up to and including vetoing anti-North Korea resolutions), as well as overt and covert loosening of the sanctions regime. The extent to which this may be true will become clear within a year at least.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

]]> https://journal-neo.org/2022/03/11/waiting-for-dprk-s-new-satellite/feed/ 0 https://journal-neo.org/2022/02/21/self-exposure-of-the-myth-of-north-korean-hackers/ https://journal-neo.org/2022/02/21/self-exposure-of-the-myth-of-north-korean-hackers/#comments Mon, 21 Feb 2022 13:59:56 +0000 https://journal-neo.org/?p=176272

More recently NEO wrote that the termination of the DPRK moratorium and a potentially new round of tension could have been caused by a series of hacker attacks on the North Korean Internet in the second half of January 2022, since fortunately back in 2018, the United States stated that the first shot of this war would be fired in cyberspace.

Yes, it was not possible to collapse the entire Internet for a long time. The maximum that a hacker or hackers managed was to temporarily “crash” most of the sites for about six hours, but for the North Koreans it was a series of attempts to disable the Internet of the whole country or at least key sites, of which there are not so many, that was important. At least one of the central routers providing access to the country’s networks turned out to be paralyzed at some point, which disrupted the North’s digital connections with the outside world.

After that, the North Koreans began to act accordingly, but it is worth talking more about how, in this delicate situation, the DPRK enemies are trying to turn it around and how in the meanwhile they inadvertently exposed the myth they invented about Pyongyang hackers.

Firstly, out of nowhere (NEO did not find any links about the activities of this person earlier and out of connection with this incident), a hacker nicknamed P4x appeared, while claiming in an interview with WIRED that it was he who collapsed the North Korean Internet allegedly as revenge for trying to hack it.

According to an anonymous but talkative hacker, a little over a year ago he was hacked by North Korean spies as one of the victims of a campaign that targeted Western security researchers with the obvious goal of stealing their hacking tools and detailed information about software vulnerabilities.  However, when trying to clarify the details, it turned out that the hack looked like this. At the end of January 2021, he opened a file sent to him by a fellow hacker. 24 hours later, he discovered a blog post from Google’s Threat Analysis Group warning that North Korean hackers had targeted security researchers. Indeed, when P4x carefully examined the hacking tool he received from a stranger, he saw that it contained a backdoor designed to provide remote access to his computer.  As can be noted, there is no evidence that he was hacked from the DPRK, even at the level of “the attack came from a North Korean address” or “it was a signature line of.” P4x read that malicious North Koreans are hacking hackers, and since he is a hacked hacker, the threat is surely from Pyongyang. Truly, a genius of logic!

Later, the FBI contacted the hacker, “but he was never offered any real help to assess the damage from hacking North Korea or to protect himself in the future.” After a year of waiting, he never saw “the government’s reaction to North Korea’s attacks on American citizens” and did not hear “about any consequences for the hackers who targeted him, about an open investigation of their activities, or even about an official recognition that North Korea is responsible.” It is interesting here that a professional hacker contacts the FBI, and that the fact that the FBI confirmed the Pyongyang hacking trail is not reported.

Anyway, it was decided to take the matter into their own hands. P4x discovered many known, but not fixed vulnerabilities in North Korean systems that allowed him to launch DDOS attacks alone, but refused to publicly disclose these vulnerabilities, since telling about them would help the DPRK authorities to protect themselves from the next attacks. He only mentioned a vulnerability in the NginX web server software that incorrectly handles certain HTTP headers, thereby allowing the servers running the software to overload and disconnect.

Of course, P4x “shared screen recordings to verify his responsibility for the attacks, but declined to use his real name for fear of prosecution or retaliation.”

According to the hacker, he now intends to try to hack into North Korean systems in order to steal information and share it with experts. At the same time, he hopes to attract more hacktivists to his cause with the help of a website that he launched under the obscene name “FUNK Project”, the purpose of which is “to carry out proportional attacks and collect information to prevent the DPRK from hacking the Western world completely and uncontrollably.” Although he admits that his attacks most likely violate US computer fraud and hacking laws, he claims that he has done nothing ethically wrong, and his conscience is clear.

On the one hand, American and Western public opinion was successfully fed the classic legend “about the hacker hero,” who, without getting out of his pajamas and with a break for TV series about aliens, can damage the Internet of an entire country. The audience accustomed to hackers from movies and films about superheroes perceived this as another story about the victory of democracy over authoritarianism, not to mention the fact that no one is responsible for the actions of one anonymous person, who was provoked on top of that. And what is meant here is individual attack, not the beginning of a cyber war.

But what was the reaction of cybersecurity specialists to the trick of P4x? Martin Williams, a 38 North project researcher, notes that it is unclear what the real consequences of these attacks were.  Only a small part of North Koreans have access to the Internet, and the sites that have become victims of P4x are mainly used for propaganda to an international audience.

Dave Aitel, a former NSA hacker and founder of the Immunity security firm, who also became a target in the alleged Pyongyang hackers, believes that P4x can rather interfere with more serious intelligence efforts aimed at the same goals.

Dan Pinkston, an expert on North Korean cyber threats at Troy University, also believes that DDoS attacks from P4x will force North Koreans to take more extensive cybersecurity measures that neutralize or reduce the harm from other cyber attacks against North Korea, so the end result may be negative.

A group of hackers from securityboulevard.com suspect that everything is somewhat wrong. Firstly, the vagueness of U.S. hacking laws makes what he did a crime, and in fact P4x denounced himself.  Secondly, the fact that the revenge coincided with the DPRK missile tests and Biden’s change of policy looks like a dubious coincidence. It is more like an attempt to set the wrong direction and distract attention from something else.

On the other hand, let’s ask ourselves how much one, even a talented hacker, can achieve such results. Oddly enough, there is a similar probability, because there is data on the security of the North Korean Internet, and they shatter the myth of impregnable digital trenches guarded by thousands of hackers. Some websites, according to experts, are extremely poorly written and even worse protected. In some cases, the situation becomes completely anecdotal when the site does not work because of a child’s mistake or an admin/admin combination is used to protect it.

Moreover, the story of “couch hackers” is not new. For example, in 2016, a British teenager Andrew McKean “hacked” the Starcon social network being tested in the DPRK, because the resource developers did not change the standard settings for administrator access. McKean entered “admin” in the name field, and the word “password” in the password field, thereby “founding himself inside” with the appropriate rights.   However, he did not break anything and only left a message “Uh, I did not create this site, but I just found a login,” after which the site became unavailable.

However, Doug Madori, director of the Dyn Internet Analysis Department, believes that starcon.net.kp was not a government project.  He suspects that someone in the DPRK did this as a test, but people outside of North Korea for some reason could access the site made with phpDolphin, a template-based software system that allows anyone to create a clone of Facebook.

Secondly, simultaneously with the hacker story, a whole series of reports and materials appeared about how malicious hackers from the DPRK steal millions that are spent on the nuclear program.

Initially, Reuters, citing a confidential report by a UN panel of experts monitoring the implementation of sanctions against Pyongyang, reported that from the beginning of 2020 to the middle of 2021, cybercriminals from the DPRK stole more than USD 50 million from at least three cryptocurrency exchanges in North America, Europe and Asia. According to experts, North Korea carried out at least seven attacks on cryptocurrency platforms, and the proceeds from them were directed to nuclear and missile programs.

Then Nihon Keizai Shimbun said with reference to the same secret report that a Kimsuky hacker group, part of the DPRK intelligence agency, attacked the IAEA by creating a phishing site and obtaining users’ personal data. The Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) was also attacked by hackers. It is assumed that the target of the attack could be devices in the virtual network of the corporation.

The official report will be presented in March this year after its discussion, so it is not yet possible to find out what evidence has been given.

But 50 million is not enough for someone. Here is a report by the American analytical firm Chainalysis, which says that in 2021, North Korean hackers stole about USD 400 million worth of cryptocurrency, and the number of hacks related to North Korea increased from four to seven.

The attacks mainly targeted investment firms and centralized exchanges. Hackers used a number of methods, including phishing baits, code exploits, social engineering and malware, to siphon funds from organizations’ hot wallets and then transfer them to addresses controlled by North Korea. And of course, “many of last year’s attacks were carried out by the so-called Lazarus group.”

Chainalysis did not identify all the targets of the hacks, but said they were mainly investment firms and cryptocurrency exchanges, including Liquid.com, which announced in August 2021 that an unauthorized user had gained access to certain cryptocurrency wallets that it managed.

In addition, North Korea has allegedly stepped up efforts to launder stolen cryptocurrencies by increasing the use of software tools that combine and encrypt cryptocurrencies from thousands of addresses.

Finally, the South Korean cybersecurity firm AhnLabs published the results in a new report, which states that hackers associated with the Pyongyang-backed Kimsuky group have begun distributing a remote administration tool (RAT) using a new version of the Gold Dragon malware, one of the group’s proprietary backdoors.

The North Korea reacted as expected:  “The United States has been making a fuss since the beginning of the year by accusing us of ‘stealing cryptocurrencies’ and ‘cyber attacks’ on other countries,” says an article posted on February 7 on the website of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Calling the United States “the state of the most serious cybercrimes in the world,” the North Korea criticized Washington for “abusing cyberspace.”

As can be seen, the notorious Kimsuki and Lazarus groups, in the North Korean origin of which NEO has long had doubts, are to blame for everything. In addition, another interesting question is worth mentioning. Let’s say that the North Koreans extracted USD 50 million at the expense of hackers. How much can this help the development of the nuclear program? Suddenly it turns out that for serious projects in defense construction it is a penny. One Iskander brigade costs around USD 200-300 million. And if earlier, when the missile program was at the stage of fundraising, making missile out of mud and straw, launching it, and saving money for the next one, such conversations still made some sense, then with the release of the DPRK’s missile program to a qualitatively different level, such reasoning can be perceived only from the point of view of propaganda.

Summing up, one can say that the attempt of turning it around failed. Moreover, the stories about insidious DPRK hackers contradict the proven story about a successful attack on the North Korean Internet. It is obvious that organizing a DDOS attack is not the most significant harm that this hacker or those who were hiding behind him could cause to Internet resources, and it is not a matter of great skill. But let’s think about something else. If a certain country is preparing hackers, then the level of its attack on someone else’s Internet and the ability to protect its own digital borders should be approximately equal.  Moreover, the NEO respondents note that the creation of a serious Internet security infrastructure should precede the training of hackers, and without it, both the creation of an army of such specialists and the fact that none of these hackers deals with security issues is unlikely.  Thus, arguments about either thousands of hackers in uniform, or the Internet of the country capable of being collapsed by one person in slippers are far from truth.

And we have to wait to see whether such attacks by representatives of “civil society” on the “tyrannical regime” will continue, and what will be Pyongyang’s response.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

January 2022 has been rather busy in terms of missile launches by the DPRK, and following the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea held on January 20, the month became even more eventful after they had hinted at the possible discontinuation of the unilateral moratorium.

On January 25, the DPRK National Defense Academy “conducted a test launch of long-range cruise missiles in order to update their system.” Note that cruise missile launches do not violate UN Security Council resolutions. It is claimed that the missile flew for more than 2 hours (9,137 seconds) and covered about 1,800 km along complex trajectories, that it has a slightly different control and guidance system (including on the final flight section), and this type of missile was shown at the Self-Defense 2021 exhibition.

On January 27, a “test launch of tactical guided surface-to-ground missiles took place to confirm the power of their warhead explosion. Two launched tactical guided missiles hit their island target with high accuracy, as a result of which it was confirmed that the power of a conventional warhead meets the design requirements.”

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea, the missiles flew about 190 km, thereby reaching a maximum height of 20 km. Standard KN-23s were fired, but an unusual launcher with the number “332” was used for this missile. This five-axle vehicle had already been exhibited at the January 2021 parade, and then at the March 2021 tests of a larger and heavier missile.

On January 30, a control and verification launch of a medium- and long-range ground-to-ground Hwasong-12 ballistic missile took place. The launch site is Chagando Province, where hypersonic missiles were launched on January 5 and 11 from. The flight range was only 800 km, but the altitude reached 2,000. Such a hinged trajectory is used “taking into account the safety of surrounding countries” so that the missile does not fall into foreign waters and if it is launched using not a hinged but a usual trajectory, then it covers 3,700-4,500 km, which means medium range. These characteristics are comparable to the parameters of the missile launched by the DPRK in May 2017 (range 787 km, altitude 2,000 km), which suggests to experts that the missile was equipped with a new solid-fuel power plant, and the launch is an intermediate stage on the way to creating a solid-fuel ICBM.

KCNA reported that the launch “was aimed at a selective assessment of the missile being produced and deployed and checking the overall accuracy of the weapon system”, and this point is very important. Again, they are not talking about an experimental sample but about a missile in service and “randomly taken from a warehouse.” This, we note, is the majority of the annual launches of ICBMs in Russia and the United States.

The reaction to the first launches was foreseeable, although the launch of a medium-range ballistic missile can be responded to in two ways. One can either quote (like the author of this article) what the DPRK itself said about the type of missile, or recalculate the distance based on the normal trajectory (and then use this as an excuse for a new round of pressure or compromise), or state that the medium range starts from 1,000 km, and since the missile only covered 800 km, then there has been no violation.

ROK President Moon Jae-in choose the second option and stated that North Korea has only “inched closer to scrapping its self-imposed moratorium on testing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).” Moon said the latest launch was “a challenge to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and diplomatic efforts by the international community, as well as an act that violates the UN Security Council resolution” and called on North Korea to stop creating tension and respond to international calls for dialogue.

The US Indo-Pacific Command condemned the launch and called on the North to refrain from “further destabilizing actions”. An anonymous representative of the US State Department declared that “like the DPRK’s recent series of ballistic missile tests, this launch is a clear violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions, and demonstrates the threat the DPRK’s unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs pose to the DPRK’s neighbors and the region as a whole.”

Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said that in light of North Korea’s recent missile launches, the United States is ready to sit down at the negotiating table with Pyongyang without preconditions, while simultaneously building up its military potential in the region to protect itself and its allies.

Thus, “Kim did what he had promised,” and the author believes that the moratorium period is over. Although Kim Jong-un announced in December 2019 that the DPRK no longer considers itself bound by its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and ICBM launches, the January decision of the Politburo brought this statement to the stage of practical implementation. But still, why now?

Military expert Vladimir Khrustalev wonders what is the purpose of a unilateral refusal to develop one’s combat potential if opponents do not refrain from developing their offensive and defensive systems. From this point of view, the moratorium would have ended sooner or later, especially after the failure to transform it into a legally binding document at the Hanoi summit. In addition, without raising the stakes and in the absence of the contact that Trump and Kim have developed, negotiations “anywhere and at any time” cannot go beyond the requirement “first disarm, and then we will think about it.” Until the US offers the North something really valuable, the pause will continue.

On the website asiarisk.org, they believe that the strategic pause suits the United States more than the DPRK, since sanctions and self-isolation due to the coronavirus are crippling the North Korean economy, and Washington has the opportunity to take care of matters that the United States considers more important. That is why Pyongyang first waited for Biden to define his policy towards the DPRK, and then drew conclusions that it was time to raise the stakes.

Russian Korean scholar Aleksandr Zhebin draws attention to another issue. If, until recently, the Biden administration only extended the sanctions imposed by its predecessors, at the end of 2021 it made for the first time public its own sanctions against a number of legal entities and individuals of the DPRK, and imposed secondary sanctions against companies and organizations of several countries that allegedly cooperated with Pyongyang, including entities from Russia. Moreover, at the end of 2021, the United States vetoed a Russian-Chinese UN Security Council resolution providing for the partial lifting or easing of sanctions that negatively affect the living conditions and standard of living of the DPRK population (a ban on Pyongyang’s export of statues, seafood and textiles, as well as restrictions on the import of petroleum products), and on January 9, 2022, Washington tried to push through a decision in the UN Security Council extending its own unilateral measures to the entire international community. China and Russia rejected the initiative.

The author would add that on January 26 and 27, access to North Korean Internet resources, such as the sites of KCNA, Nodong Sinmun, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other structures, was actually blocked. It is assumed that this resulted from a large-scale DDoS attack on the DPRK Internet segment and networks but it has not been officially confirmed. On January 30 and 31, the attack resumed but was less efficient.

Pyongyang has however always stated that it will respond toughly to tough measures and show kindness in exchange to kind deeds.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

When talking about the reasons for the end of the North Korean moratorium, global media and most pundits have disregarded one factor that could have played a key role in the DPRK leadership’s decision.

On January 14, 2022, NK News reported about North Korea’s disappearance from the Internet that lasted several hours as crucial servers inside the country were unavailable. The reasons for this failure were unclear. It could well be caused by a technical malfunction or an unexpected power outage. However, a more likely scenario, as experts think, is the North Korean servers becoming a target for an outside attack.

According to Junade Ali, a cybersecurity researcher, North Korean IT-infrastructure was possibly targeted by a DDOS-attack that caused a complete Internet shutdown. In particular, the servers of North Korean KCNA news agency and North Korean airline Air Koryo were unavailable.

According to log files collected by Ali and reviewed by NK News, North Korea’s servers and the websites hosted on them disappeared from the Internet and remained inaccessible for about four hours.

On January 26, another major DDOS-attack on North Korea’s servers led to the country going offline for more than six hours, as log files and network records reviewed by NK Pro show. All this came one day after North Korea conducted its fifth missile test.

Access to North Korean Internet resources, such as websites of KCNA, Rodong Sinmun, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other bodies was again effectively blocked. Websites hosted on DPRK-controlled domains are mostly unreachable because the North Korean Domain Name System (DNS) stopped reporting the routes which data packages addressed to .kp domain are supposed to go through. Those so-called Border Gateway Protocol routes (BGP) play the decisive role.

On January 27, 2022, the third attack occurred, but it seems it did not come as a surprise; for that reason it led only to network delays. North Korean Internet server response time decreased but it did not entail the collapse of the nation’s Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routes which direct global internet traffic.

The fourth DDoS-attack took place on January 31. Access to the websites of Rodong Sinmun and Foreign Ministry was disturbed but not completely blocked.

Of course, the author would refrain from embracing double standards claiming that those attacks against the DPRK were definitely unleashed by the US government.  Just like in the case with the North Korean hackers, there is no direct evidence. However, similar attacks have taken place before, while the US leadership from time to time comes out with statements that could be read into as indirect evidence.

For one, The New York Times, a US-based newspaper, reported that in 2010 the US National Security Agency (NSA), engaged in electronic intelligence, got inside the DPRK computer networks and allegedly planted there spyware which turned out to be handy in monitoring the work of computers that the US intelligence community took interest in.

In March 2013, the North faced a full-scale electronic warfare. As a result, the Internet connection was blocked on the nation’s territory. In May 2013, International hackers’ collective Anonymous broke into a North Korean propaganda website and pledged to launch another massive cyber attack on anniversary of the beginning of the Korean War (June 25).

According to The New York Times, since 2014, the US has been conducting cyberattacks against the DPRK to undermine its nuclear and missile programs. The newspaper says that Americans gained control over some parts of the DPRK computer networks and carried out remote sabotage attacks against the adversary’s defense facilities.

In January 2015, The New York Times, citing declassified documents, reported that NSA employees, with the help from Malaysia and South Korea, broke into North Korean computer networks via the Chinese segment of the Internet and planted spyware. It is understood that due to this spyware Washington was able to accuse Pyongyang of a cyberattack against Sony Pictures.

On June 3, 2016, Russian news agency TASS reported that the DPRK is experiencing disruptions in the Internet connection, as the nation’s Internet resources were “affected by a powerful cyberattack from abroad.”

In February 2018, Russian newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, citing the New York Times and Edward Snowden’s research, said that the US and South Korea tried cyber­spying against the DPRK and used software to knock out of service North Korean missiles.  It was alleged that the US was funneling billions of dollars in recruiting professionals and preparing an attack against North Korea while in May 2017 the CIA established a new division called Korea Mission Center, a move that some pundits saw as a solid proof pointing out that Washington was gearing up for military activities against the DPRK.

The same year, Foreign Policy, citing sources familiar with the matter, reported that the first strike against the DPRK would be digital rather than physical. The preparation included installation on the Japanese and South Korean territory of fiber cables as bridges, setting up remote bases and listening posts, where hackers may attempt to gain access to North Korean content that’s largely walled off from external connections. At the same time, Foreign Policy sources described the scope of resources aimed at cyber-counteraction of Pyongyang as unprecedented .

On August 16, 2018, The Wall Street Journal reported that US president Donald Trump signed an order reversing Obama-era policy regulating Washington’s right to deploy cyberweapons. The order was described as an “offensive step forward” by an administration official, one intended to help support US military operations.

Against such a backdrop it does not really matter who is behind the attacks — the US, allied NGOs or, let’s say, South Korean protestant sects. What matters here is the North’s response since the it has most likely clearly identified the culprit. “The first shot will be in cyberspace,” cited Foreign Policy the former head of a US intelligence agency, and this quote pretty much went viral online.

And the DPRK responded to this shot.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

After a year and a half of interruption, North Korea has reopened rail connections with China.

Since the end of January 2020, the DPRK has halted cross-boarder railway services. Even though on June 26, 2020 one freight train passed from Hunchun (a border city in China’s Jilin province) to Tumangang station on the North Korea-Russian border, amid the rising epidemic the borders have remained closed.

State media have warned that the virus can be brought into the country by snow and dust, and nobody has been officially admitted into the country since March 2020. Vessels carrying imports have also had to undergo several weeks of quarantine outside ports for fear of contamination.

In July 2020, North Korean newspaper Rodong Sinmun called for the closer monitoring of imported goods to prevent the spread of coronavirus. This was prompted by an incident in which the virus was discovered on packing paper. Even then it was assumed that the border might only open again at some point between 2021 and 2022.

At around the same time, it was reported that North Korea had passed a law concerning the ‘decontamination of imports, ‘as a part of which the construction of decontamination centers began in regions close to the border. The largest of these even moved the Uiju airport not far from the Chinese border, where a special railway line was built. Judging from Planet Labs images, construction began around mid-February 2021 and was mostly completed by the end of March. However, on April 15 the facility did not appear to be completed or open. The complex consists of ten large warehouses, auxiliary buildings and five railway platforms. As is often the case with such facilities in the DPRK, it is not enough to construct a building; you also need to fill it with the appropriate equipment, which is not easy under the sanctions.

On October 15, 2021, North Korea opened a key shipping route from the Chinese port of Dalian to Nampo to allow for the shipment of humanitarian aid. On November 8, local media broadcast footage in which a train from the PRC crossed а bridge over the Yalu River. However, the RK authorities advised them to wait, ‘as consultations between North Korea and China should be concluded beforehand’.

As a result, the author of the latest material on this topic noted that, despite rumors about the imminent opening of the border, it remained closed for now. But it seems that this situation began to change at the start of the year.

On January 1, the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun reported on a supposed agreement to resume bilateral trade over land between Pyongyang and Beijing. The newspaper referred to sources from a number of North Korean trade representatives.  It was affirmed that deliveries of dairy products, medical supplies and other goods would begin within the scope of the bilateral agreement, and the goods would be transported via Dandong-Sinuiju railway links. This issue was agreed by both sides in November 2021; however, due to quarantine measures the trade launch was postponed.

On January 16, 2022 a North Korean freight train crossed the railway bridge into China, although it wasn’t confirmed whether the train was bearing cargo.   A second train arrived in Dandong on January 17, and at the same time a train, composed of at least 15 carriages with essential goods and medical supplies, set off from Dandong to Sinuiji.  The third train to Dandong arrived a day later, and the author hopes that this is the beginning of a regular occurrence, even if it is one train a day. By this point, the resumption of train traffic was confirmed by a statement from the spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhao Lijian.

It is also worth noting that, prior to the resumption of shipments from PRC, a full vaccination program was conducted for several hundred workers in customs and related services. Furthermore, the source previously told NK News that the first shipment had been sent to test decontamination equipment for rail transport.

So what now? The Ministry of Unification of the South Korean government has declared that it will continue to monitor similar rail haulage operations and whether they will lead to the resumption of trade and the movement of people between the neighboring countries. Meanwhile, RK intelligent services assert that the border was being crossed each day by a train with 20 carriages.

As expected, the goods are transported along a special railway line to a large warehouse, where they are held in quarantine. This is on the site of the converted Uiju airport, along a 14-kilometer track that passes residential areas in North Korea. This indicates the confidence of the authorities that the train will not spread COVID-19 amongst the surrounding population.

This also suggests that, after unloading, the carriages of incoming trains can return to China without being subject to a lengthy quarantine. This reduces the number of carriages required for the operation.

According to satellite images taken on January 24, 2022, upon arrival the carriages are divided into groups along five separate unloading platforms, which are adjoined to five warehouses. The unloaded goods are quickly processed in large warehouses, before they are taken from the entrance to the opposite end of the building. Then, they are stored outside on the airport’s former runway.  The time it takes for workers to process goods remains unclear, but the images indicate that it takes one or two days.

Theoretically, this means that the decontamination facility can continue to receive incoming goods on a daily basis without being overloaded until the first shipment, which arrived on January 17, has completed the decontamination process and is ready to be dispatched. Quarantined goods can be sent to other parts of the country daily or several times a week.

The duration of this process of decontamination and probable quarantine that imported goods undergo remains unknown, but it is most likely that it lasts from a fortnight to one month.  It is also not clear whether these exports to the DPRK were humanitarian aid from China or purchased goods.

Let’s now address the reaction to the event and the partiality of experts. The comments that the author came across in the English-language media were divided into several groups in terms of content:

• The opening of the border speaks to the alarming breakdown of the economic system, on account of which the regime has been forced to accept foreign aid. However, it is unlikely that this is about helping a starving people, but rather about luxury items, with whose distribution the regime is buying the loyalty of the elite.
• 20 carriages a day is negligible; such imports ‘won’t bring real relief to the inhabitants of North Korea, who are suffering from shortages of food and materials on the back of the administration’s strict policies in combatting COVID-19’.
• ‘It is unlikely that the long-awaited opening of the North Korean border will extend to Pyongyang’ and ‘it won’t pave the way for any possible progress in nuclear talks or the improvement of inter-Korean ties’.
• “This indicates a major shift in North Korea’s quarantine policy, which has so far focused on restrictive measures that strictly prohibit contact with the outside world. Now the international community must take more active steps by offering the North further humanitarian assistance. Offering vaccines against COVID-19 will help ease security concerns arising from the confrontation between the US and North Korea. Moon Jae-in’s administration should strengthen cooperation with the United States to create an atmosphere for dialogue and accelerate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to North Korea”.
• - China is feeding its ally, but this will not last long; soon Pyongyang will violate the moratorium on nuclear weapons tests or launches of ICBMs, and, owing to its ingratitude, will certainly do it during the Beijing Olympics.

It seems to the author that the first step is always the hardest, and the decontamination facilities scheme is unlikely to work in the short term. But we mustn’t forget that the DPRK never allowed the pandemic to enter its borders, largely due to exceptional measures. Of course, myths and propaganda abound in relation to this, which we will analyze when the opportunity arises.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The previous publication on the North Korean missile launches ended on the description of the events that took place on January 14, 2022. The missiles were fired after the North warned of a “stronger reaction” in response to newly imposed US sanctions on six North Korean citizens involved in weapons of mass destruction programs as well as one Russian national and a Russian firm involved in the development of North Korean WMDs and ballistic missiles.

As is often the case in the DPRK, however, the rapidly unfolding events are taking an interesting turn. On January 17, “a test-fire for evaluating tactical guided missiles was carried out according to the plan of the institutions concerned, including the Academy of Defense Science and the Second Economic Commission.” Photos published by the North Korean media allowed experts to determine that the DPRK fired KN-24 missiles, a North Korean version of the US army tactical missile system (ATACMS).

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the latest tests were intended to boost North Korean military’s capability to launch several missiles in a row with high precision.   The author, meanwhile, took note of a line in a KCNA report saying that the test-fire was aimed “to selectively evaluate tactical guided missiles being produced and deployed and to verify the accuracy of the weapon system.” This means that North Korea test-fired not one-of-a-kind experimental weapons, but assets that are being massively deployed and fielded.

At first, the response to this development was generic.  The US State Department condemned the launch saying that it violates multiple UN Security Council resolutions and poses a threat to neighboring countries and the international community. Nonetheless Washington is still committed to a diplomatic approach and calls on Pyongyang to engage in dialogue. National Security Council (NSC) under the President of South Korea expressed “deep concern” about the launch. NSC members pointed out the need to intensify efforts to resume dialogue with Pyongyang in order to prevent further escalation on the Korean peninsula. Main opposition presidential candidate Yoon Suk-yeol vowed to secure a preemptive strike capability, while conservative media lambasted Moon Jae-in for not calling the North’s actions a “provocation”.

Some Western experts believed that the DPRK “is doubling down on the country’s nuclear arms buildup, rather than seeking more concessions before re-engaging in nuclear negotiations,” while some think that it is just checking its missile capabilities as the DPRK will not take the first step towards dialogue and is waiting for the US to “abandon its hostile policies”. Moreover, the article said that “Biden is overwhelmed with domestic problems, the Ukraine and the Iran nuclear issue… There does not appear much interest at the moment for what is seen as high-risk, low-reward dealings with North Korea.”

On January 19, 2021, the United States, the UK, France, Ireland, Mexico and Albania called for a UN Security Council meeting to discuss North Korean missile launches, with the US Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, openly saying that the purpose here is to push through a new UN Security Council sanctions resolution.

This backlash was entirely different in nature, and it induced a swift response from Pyongyang. The same day saw a Politburo meeting of WPK Central Committee where an analytical report regarding the situation on the Korean peninsula was presented. During the meeting “further direction of response to the US” was discussed, which “had been wrongfully nibbling the lawful use by our state of our sovereign rights and making indiscreet moves.” It was also mentioned that as the DPRK adhered to the moratorium, the US was conducting hundreds of joint military exercises and strategic weapons tests, imported to South Korea state-of-the-art offensive weapons and “committed the rash act of adopting unilateral sanctions for over 20 times.”  As a result, the Politburo pointed out that it was time to act and make “more thorough preparation for a long-term confrontation with the US imperialists”.  “The Politburo meeting reconfirmed the tasks of defense policy to strengthen and develop without delay more powerful physical means to definitely overpower the daily intensifying hostile moves of the United States,” KCNA said.

Almost all experts arrived at the conclusion that the North referred to a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests that Pyongyang upheld since late 2017.  During the 2019 Hanoi summit North Korea seemingly proposed to put this verbal commitment on paper and convert it into a legally binding document, but since the meeting at the last moment went downhill, such an agreement was never reached. Therefore, if the North is accused of violating the moratorium, one should bear in mind that it being in place was a goodwill gesture from Pyongyang, and lambasting it as a violator of international law does not make any sense.

For now, three points are being discussed: when the North will start making concrete steps, why Pyongyang needs all this, and what repercussions will it face.

As far as the first point is concerned, a military parade to celebrate Kim Jong-il anniversary on February 16, 2022 is expected, with the preparations already underway. Many believe that during the parade the North will showcase new intermediate-range missiles and ICBMs, both soon to be test-fired.

The probable menu does not really change: a test launch featuring another hypersonic missile that can reach Guam or Alaska, a solid-propellant ICBM, a military satellite. All this would be scheduled either on Kim Jong Il’s birthday (February 16), or Kim Il Sung’s birthday (April 15) or the date of US-South Korea joint military exercises that will take place in March or April.

As for the second point, some anti-North “experts” have repeated familiar mantras saying something about North Koreans “begging for rice.” They claim that North Korean agricultural sector lies in tatters, and the issue of reforming it was even brought up during the last plenum as the country arguably stands on the brink of famine, a fact that induces the North to solicit attention in order to get humanitarian aid. The author would like to solely note that such explanations are shopworn, and he does not recall if such policies have ever been rewarded.

Harry Kazianis, senior director of Korean Studies at the Center for the National Interest, said that the North Korean leader realized that Washington did not care about Pyongyang as long as it does not pose a threat to the US mainland by deploying nuclear missiles.  Unless North Korea begins testing them again, it will never rise to the status of something that Joe Biden will use political capital to tackle. However, if Kim does test an ICBM or nuclear weapon, that would violate Washington’s unofficial red line that such tests mean more pressure on the DPRK.

It is possible that the North got sick of waiting for Washington to finally drop its hostile policy and decided to either stir the US into action, hinting that the pause in the peninsula’s nuclear agenda would not last forever since “it takes two to tango,” after all.

Besides, Pyongyang now knows a thing or two about Washington’s and, especially, Seoul’s attitude, namely that they take notice of the North’s demands only when they hear it pounding the table for the second time. For instance, the problem with anti-North Korean leaflets was solved only after the DPRK had blown up the liaison office in Kaesŏng, and other moves that gave an impression that Pyongyang had enough of it.

It is quite possible that local engineers have come up with a lot of interesting and powerful devices that should be put to the test.

As for the third point, the question about China’s reaction to the termination of the moratorium now looms the largest. On the one hand, there are signs that railway communication between China and the DPRK has been reopened with a couple of freight trains making trips between the two countries.  Moreover, an attempt to slap new sanctions failed. When Linda Thomas-Greenfield proposed to extend the US unilateral sanctions to the entire world, China and Russia vetoed the motion.

On the other hand, from February 6 to 20 China will host Olympics, an event of paramount importance for the country. The North does not send its delegation, but has voiced support for China. At the same time, the author recalls that one of the reasons behind the cooling in relations between the two countries in 2017 – 2018 was the DPRK’s decision to launch one of its “fireworks” on the eve of a CPC congress, a show of disrespect, as some Chinese pundits contended.

Besides, the breach of moratorium and certainly nuclear and missile tests on the eve of the presidential election in South Korea may influence its outcome, and strengthen the conservatives’ positions. This would lead to a drastic cooling of inter-Korea relations and reduce to nothing all that had been achieved during the “Olympic thaw.” Especially considering that Yoon Seok-yeo has already embraced tough rhetoric, saying that the above-mentioned North Korean missiles could be countered not by a ballistic missile defense system, but by a pre-emptive strike, and in a critical situation the South may think about returning the US nuclear weapons to the peninsula. Responding to the statement of Politburo of the WPC Central Committee, Yoon Seok-yeo said that the peace process had utterly failed since Moon’s submissive policy allowed Pyongyang to enhance its nuclear and missile capability.

At the same time, Lee Jae-myung, a member of the ruling Democratic party, expressed a deep concern and urged “the government to be clear and firm so that North Korea does not miscalculate the situation and make the wrong move… At the same time, make continued efforts for dialogue for the easing of tensions and denuclearization.” Lee described the recent series of missile tests as provocations, calling on the United States, North Korea and other concerned parties to immediately restart denuclearization talks and come up with practical and mutually acceptable solutions. The stance has definitely somewhat toughened up.

Of course, if the moratorium is done for, this would be unfortunate for the regional security and Russian interests since Moscow is committed to maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula. The end of the moratorium, political uncertainty in the run-up to South Korean 2022 presidential election, rising tensions between China and the US — all those are alarming signs, but the author would not like to make pessimistic projections, since it is easier to just follow the developments.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

As the reader may recall, on January 5, 2022, the DPRK National Defense Academy conducted a test launch of a hypersonic missile, which “reconfirmed the flight control and stability of the missile in the active-flight stage and assessed the performance of the new lateral movement technique applied to the detached hypersonic gliding warhead.” The rocket flew at a maximum speed of Mach 6, made a “120 km lateral movement … from the initial launch azimuth to the target azimuth and precisely hit a set target 700 km away.”

The new missile creates a lot of problems for the DPRK’s opponents. Hypersonic missiles usually fly at a speed of at least Mach 5, which is five times the speed of sound and gives enemies little time to react. According to the South Korean experts, in the fall of 2021 the rocket flew less than 200 km at a speed of about Mach 3, and this time it reached the designed Mach 5 and twice the distance. Add to this the technology of lateral (horizontal) maneuvering complicating the work of the enemy missile defense and the fact that “during the test, the reliability of the fuel ampoule system was also confirmed in winter weather conditions.” Compared to conventional missiles that require hours of liquid fuel injection before launch, an ampoule (that is, a container with liquid fuel) can significantly reduce the fueling time and provides continuous and fast launches comparable to launches using solid fuel.

The reaction to the launch was generally expected, but the South Korean military actively talked down Pyongyang’s statements as exaggerated.

On January 10, the United States and five other countries, including Albania, Britain, France, Ireland, and Japan, called on North Korea to stop missile tests and begin negotiations on denuclearization, noting that “the DPRK makes these military investments at the expense of the well-being of the North Korean people. The people of North Korea continue to suffer under a strict authoritarian regime and through an increasingly serious humanitarian crisis.” In addition, the six countries argued that the missile test would not only expand the North’s capabilities, but also increase its illegal arms exports. “The DPRK’s record of weapons proliferation is clear. Each missile launch serves not only to advance the DPRK’s own capabilities, but to expand the suite of weapons available for export to its illicit arms clients and dealers around the world.” It is, however,  unclear and, frankly, irrelevant how Pyongyang sells weapons amidst a “self-isolation of the whole country”.

The joint call was made shortly before the UN Security Council was to hold a meeting behind closed doors on the launch. However, the Chinese Foreign Ministry urged to show calm and refrain from overreaction, and the condemnation of the North at the UN Security Council did not work out this time.

On the same day, January 10, Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby said that North Korea’s missile test was a violation of the UN Security Council resolutions.

On January 11, the DPRK again launched a hypersonic missile, which was attended by Kim Jong-un and a number of high-level officials of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). The place of the launch was in the Chagang Province, from where the previous missile was launched on January 5. The published photos of the missile launch show that it looks similar to the one launched on January 5, but the results were much better.  “The hypersonic gliding warhead detached from its booster at 600 kilometers, after which it hit an established target at sea at a distance of one thousand kilometers.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Republic of Korea also confirmed that the missile flew more than 700 kilometers at a maximum altitude of 60 km and with a maximum speed of Mach 10, that is 10 times the speed of sound.

What was the response? On January 11, the National Security Council under the President of the Republic of Korea held an emergency meeting. A few hours after the launch, President Moon Jae-in also expressed his concern, noting that the latest test launches took place before the presidential elections in the Republic of Korea.

The Ministry of Unification issued a statement saying that “North Korea should prefer cooperation for peace to actions that contradict efforts to establish peace on the Korean peninsula, such as missile launches.”

On January 13, representative of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Korea Pu Seung-chan stressed that “South Korea’s military possesses capabilities to not only detect this projectile but also intercept it”.

And again, the government avoided the term “provocation”, although the opposition conservative media and their politicians have used it to the fullest, since the “North Korean threat” is playing into their pocket. According to presidential candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, “the growing missile threat of North Korea is due to the negligence of the Moon Jae-in administration.” Moreover, Yoon said that since it was impossible to intercept a hypersonic missile with a nuclear warhead by the missile defense forces of the Republic of Korea, they may have to use a preemptive strike.

In the West, the reaction was much more cautious. Firstly, the use of a missile with an engine identical to the first stage of the Hwasong-14 ICBM as a rocket platform for launching a “hypersonic unit” created in the first dozens of seconds of the launch a picture (for both radars and missile flare detection systems) identical to an ICBM launch towards the United States. The missile further changed its trajectory, but apparently it was enough for a false alarm.

Military experts pay attention to the characteristics of the flight trajectories of the new missile systems. What matters is not so much the hypersonic speed but the ability to perform vertical and horizontal in flight maneuvering with large overloads instead of a simple ballistic curve. The missiles are very effective in overcoming missile defense systems originally designed to intercept conventional short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. In DPRK’s new complexes, the calculation windows and effective firing zones are greatly reduced compared to simple ballistic trajectories. In certain cases, a missile defense interception is simply impossible because of high speed (like a normal medium-range ballistic missile), the fact that most of the flight takes place at an inconvenient altitude (too high for some anti-missiles, and too low for the others), and the missile’s ability to reach its target from an undisguised direction or at an inconvenient angle (anti-missile guidance radars have limited sectors).

Another important detail is that a thousand kilometers is a conditional boundary between the distance of short- and medium-range missiles. This is NOT yet a violation of the moratorium, because Kim promised not to launch ICBMs, the distance of which begins with five thousand km, but a kind of signal confirming the thesis put forward at the December plenum of the WPK’s Central Committee that the international situation is becoming increasingly unstable.

Incidentally, the former chief of the US Armed Forces in Korea Curtis Scaparrotti said on January 14, 2022 that if data on North Korea’s recent self-proclaimed hypersonic missile launches isf true, it can be a reason for South Korea and the United States to be “very concerned,” citing the absence of “sure means” to counter them, given their “speed… and the maneuverability”.

That is why Washington condemned the launch. According to a representative of the US State Department, it violated a large number of UN Security Council resolutions. In addition, this action is regarded as a threat to the countries neighboring the DPRK and the world community as a whole. Nevertheless, he noted the US commitment to maintaining a diplomatic approach in relations with Pyongyang. According to him, Washington will continue to urge Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table. The US State Department also noted that the US remains committed to ensuring the protection of Seoul and Tokyo.

The United States Indo-Pacific Command stated that it closely monitors the missile launches by Pyongyang and conducts close negotiations with its allies and partners, and that the missile launch does not pose an immediate threat to the US or its allies, but indicates the destabilizing effect of the illegal actions of the North on the security situation.

On January 12, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control imposed sanctions on five North Korean citizens responsible for purchasing goods related to Pyongyang’s development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. They are employees of the DPRK Defense Research Institute and were previously included in the US sanctions list in 2010. At the same time, US representatives said they were still ready for a diplomatic solution to the issue. Sanctions were also imposed on one Russian citizen and one Russian company with links to North Korea’s development of WMDs. In addition, Washington called on the UN Security Council to adopt additional sanctions. However, their adoption requires the consent of China and Russia, which will require additional discussion.

On January 13, the US Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, tweeted that the United States insists on additional UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea. On the same day, the United States imposed sanctions on six North Koreans involved in programs to create weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

Afterwards, on January 14, a representative of the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a press statement in which he noted that “the US accusation of the DPRK’s legitimate exercise of the right to self-defense is an evident provocation and a gangster-like logic,” while “North Korea’s recent development of a new-type weapon was just part of its efforts to modernize its national defense capability.” “While Washington may talk of diplomacy and dialogue, its actions show it is still engrossed in its policy for isolating and stifling North Korea,” the statement said. Therefore, “if the United States stands on such a confrontational position until the end, there will be a stronger and certain reaction.”

On January 14, North Korea launched two unidentified ballistic missiles.  At the moment it seems most likely that these were either KN-23, also known as the “Iskander”, or KN-24 class (the North Korean equivalent of the American ATACMS), which are able to make abnormal maneuvers.  Missiles were launched from Ŭiju County in the North Pyongan Province in the North West of the country, bordering with China, and at a maximum speed of about Mach 6 flew about 430 kilometers at an altitude of 36 km (according to the Republic of Korea) or 400 km and 60 km respectively (according to Japan).

But more important is the fact that the missiles were fired by a railway-mobile missile regiment, which “after having unexpectedly received a firing task from the General Staff, made an emergency maneuver to the specified launch site and accurately hit the target in the Korean East Sea (Sea of Japan – editor’s note) with two tactical guided missiles.” Recall that last fall, the DPRK tested for the first time an “atomic train” equipped with short-range missiles, although, according to experts, this train can carry not only a pair of KN-23s but also a transport and launch container with one large missile of higher power.

The National Security Council of the Republic of Korea again expressed deep regret. Members of the National Security Council noted that North Korea’s weapons tests did not contribute to the stabilization of the situation on the Korean peninsula, and again called on Pyongyang to return to dialogue. The US, in turn, reiterated that “this launch is in violation of multiple UN Security Council Resolutions and poses a threat to the DPRK’s neighbors and the international community”. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said the US would use “every appropriate tool” to address the issue.

At the moment of writing this article, the missile news is over, and the question that remains is whether this series of launches will grow to become something bigger. Unfortunately, it may for a number of reasons.

Firstly, the DPRK closely monitors military development of its supposed opponents and will develop its nuclear missile complex proportionately.

Secondly, if the United States moves from ritual sanctions to something more, it could destroy the de facto “double freeze” regime established during the Trump administration.

Thirdly, it is highly likely that Conservatives will come to power in the South. Although their presidential candidate Yoon Suk-yeol is not a classic right-wing politician, he may well, following the logic of factional struggle and the need to strengthen party unity by negotiating with other groups in the conservative camp, nullify Moon Jae-in’s achievements, and relations between the two Koreas will worsen more.  The remark about a possible preemptive strike in this context is already a signal.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

In early January, several media outlets ran a clickbait headline, “North Korea Claims Kim Jong-il Invented Shawarma.” This fast-food dish is popular in post-Soviet countries. The statement about its North Korean roots immediately broke into negative comments about how North Korea is duping the people and making them believe that its top leaders have invented a commonly known dish.

Allegedly the source of this information was The Independent, a British online newspaper, with a text titled “North Koreans enjoy burritos after paper bizarrely claims Kim Jong-il “invented the dish in 2011.” It turns out that the dish in question recently appeared on television in a propaganda program where it was described as a wheat wrap. The major DPRK newspaper Nodong Sinmun reported that the dish was initially invented in 2011 by Kim Jong-il, the current leader’s father, and predecessor. In addition, the article claimed Kim Jong-un also takes a “meticulous interest” in the foodstuff, and its popularity is “booming.”

The author would like to give a complete translation of this short piece:

“At the stall for wheat tortillas stuffed with meat.

At the counter, you can see people having wheat tortillas stuffed with meat and saleswomen kindly explaining their nutritional value to customers.

Whenever we witness such scenes, we recall with deep excitement the image of Chairman Kim Jong-il, who was pleased during his field leadership with the newly built workshop at the Geumseong Food Factory.

When the Chairman looked into the mobile kiosk, he instructed the people to be served warmed wheat tortillas with toppings. We still recall his words that our people would be happier if they were served mineral water in summer and hot tea with wheat tortillas in winter.

Dear Secretary-General Kim Jong-un, who inherited the history of the Chairman’s noble love for people, has taken a keen interest in wheat tortillas, from production to service, and has taken steps to do so. Indeed, a small stall of stuffed wheat tortillas is associated with the motherly love of our party.”

As you can see, Kim Jong-il is not positioned in the text as the inventor of this dish: instead, he is the author of the idea to establish this type of fast food, which, again, is neither shawarma nor burrito in the classical sense. In Korean, this dish is called milssam (밀쌈) and is similar to shawarma in a wheat pita but wrapped. It is not rolled on the spot but heated in the microwave. In 2016, such “fast food” was sold in Pyongyang, including Kaesong International Park (the main recreational area for students and schoolchildren), where the author tried it himself.

The article was published in the context of the December Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, where Kim Jong-un talked a lot about the need to restructure the agricultural system, including paying more attention to wheat rather than rice. And since milssam is precisely wheat flatbread, it was, therefore, emphasized that the promotion of wheat products was not his personal initiative but a continuation of the great ancestors’ course.

This is quite an essential point because North Korea is actively trying to solve industrial safety problems by introducing new crops, which do not always take root. For example, North Koreans consume potatoes, which often save the day given the climate and topography, only in processed form – potato flour or noodles. Foreigners order fried potatoes in restaurants. Therefore, when promoting new products, it is worth recalling that their introduction was blessed as early as (in this case) the current leader’s father.

By the way, there is no such counterpart to fast food in traditional Korean cuisine, although the idea of wrapping meat in a flatbread is common throughout the world. Armenian brtuch, Mexican burrito, and Middle Eastern shawarma appeared independently of each other.  And if it was Kim’s idea to have this type of fast food in Korea, he could be called the inventor of the milssam if the North Korean media had written a signle line about it being his idea.

And then, The Independent published an article about this article. For simplicity, it renamed milssam burrito, apparently because the English version of the North Korean text translated the Korean word as “wheat cakes stuffed with meat.” In addition, an incorrect translation or a conscious desire to release a fake made Kim the “inventor of food.”   The media, which loves loud headlines, renamed burrito shawarma for even more simplicity, and Kim Jong-il was not credited with creating this type of food specifically for Korean realities but in general. After that, the “fake” took its final form: North Korea claims that Kim Jong-il invented shawarma.

However, thanks to the efforts of experts who quickly got to the sources, this fake was knocked down fairly quickly, so two more fakes should be mentioned that caught the author’s attention these days.

The first concern is the stylish leather trench coat that Kim Jong-un started wearing. Since journalists associate such leather coats exclusively with SS uniforms, it was concluded that Kim Jong-un sympathized with Nazi Germany. Moreover, according to Radio Free Asia, included in the registry of foreign media (citing anonymous informants as usual), such leather coat is now only allowed to be worn personally by Kim Jong-un, General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea.

However, almost a month passed, and Prime Minister Kim Tok-hun appeared several times in a similar coat during his leadership on the ground.

The second fake was the speculation that Kim Jong-un’s birthday on January 8, 2022, would be a starting point for a new round of the personality cult. Apparently, since according to the official version the leader turns 40, the round date will be the moment of appearance of new titles and mass portraits. But the date passed, and this didn’t happen.  The day remained a non-holiday, after which the most rapid experts were not embarrassed and postponed the forecast to the next round date.

Stay tuned for more fake news busting, and remember that it often may not even be due to ill will. Rather, due to poor translation and the desire to come up with a fancy headline, as in modern journalism, the quality of an article is often determined by the number of views. All you need to do is open it, not necessarily read to the end. Therefore, even though the essence of the text may correct a clickbait headline, it is called clickbait for a reason.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

It’s known that the former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il died suddenly at his workplace on December 17, 2011. The man who had the difficult task of taking the country out of a difficult situation caused by a set of natural disasters and radical changes in the international environment, which the DPRK calls “the hard march.”

Kim Jong il “took North Korea with a plow and left it with a plow and a nuclear bomb.” His youngest son Kim Jong-un inherited a reign, ten years of which deserve a special analysis because the author remembers the degree of skepticism the world and Western experts discussed the rule of the young general. Not everyone was sure that the status quo would last. They lashed out at his youth and unpreparedness, dreaming of the advent of democracy and a speedy unification. Reality proved different, refuting predictions of an inevitable regency, collective leadership, or military coup.

The anniversary was celebrated with a series of commemorative events honoring the late leader and emphasizing loyalty to the current leader.

Anti-Pyongyang propaganda also marked the anniversary with a parade of “fakes” in fairy colors, where a heartbreaking story took the first place by Radio Free Asia. It was reported by an “anonymous resident” of the border town of Sinuiju, clearly copied from stories about how “the evil duchess banned Christmas.”

The South Korean media wrote a lot about the anniversary, mainly around three topics, “purges, nuclear weapons, and Trump’s diplomacy.” By the first, it was meant strengthening his own power, eliminating and removing relatives and other influential figures who could threaten him (People’s Army Chief of Staff Ri Yong-ho, Jang Song-thaek, Kim Jong-nam, etc.). “Through the past ten years, Kim has effectively established his own leadership style using an extensive range of strategies, from building an image of a figure who cares about the lives of the people to the brutal killings of his own uncle and brother outside watchers say.”

The second is that having consolidated power, Kim focused on building and improving the DPRK’s nuclear missile capability, which he had succeeded in doing by the end of 2017, a series of nuclear tests and the launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile. Then in 2018-2019, there were three face-to-face meetings between Chairman Kim Jong-un and then US President Donald Trump, although the sides could not achieve the desired results in the negotiation process.

But to talk about the DPRK’s successes would fall under the article of South Korea’s National Security Law, which prohibits “praising the regime.” All such materials ended with the assurance that now Kim may be facing his toughest moment yet, as crushing sanctions, the pandemic and growing economic trouble converge.

As the Korea Times wrote, “Kim should bear in mind that he may face unpredictable consequences if he does not abandon his nuclear ambitions. North Korea’s economy shrank 4.5% last year due to crippling sanctions and the pandemic. An isolated country could face economic collapse if it spends money on a nuclear program. The Kim regime must return to dialogue and take the path of denuclearization before it is too late.“

Such assessments seem one-sided to the author, and the rule of “the third Kim” results look like this.

Domestic Politics

It is clear that American and South Korean authors see it only as a purge. There was quite a serious fight against corruption and those representatives of the partocracy, who had turned their departments into feudal principalities. Speaking of Jang Song-thaek, it is worth noting that a whole series of highly unpleasant incidents against Chinese and other foreign campaigns, which became objects of state racketeering, ceased as soon as Jang was repressed. As for Kim Jong-nam, it’s worth noting that an attempt to accuse North Korea officially fell apart in a Malaysian court.

In addition, speaking of purges against high-ranking party cadres, even human rights organizations note that pressure on ordinary citizens has decreased, and the number of camps has decreased. The heartbreaking stories that the Daily NK, Choson Ilbo, or Japanese media are telling us are not really about tightening the screws in the ideological sphere but rather about the violation of emergency anti-epidemic measures. In other words, smuggler “A” was shot for illegally crossing the border, fraught with the risk of bringing a pandemic into the country, not for bringing in a batch of South Korean soap operas and selling them to minors in the process. Then, Kim Jong-un did a lot to make the state system something more than a chief’s service apparatus. Many institutions, including party congresses, which used to meet on an ad hoc basis, and not by statute, began to meet regularly, and the system of government became more institutionalized. And speaking of Weber’s three types of power, Kim Jong-un moves from a charismatic ruler to a legitimate ruler. This includes the gradual abandonment of the “army priority” policy, a more informal photo style, and the appearance of both “First Lady” Ri Sol-ju and “First Sister” Kim Yo-jong.

It is also worth noting that until now, the personality cult of the third Kim was inferior not only to the first and second but also to a number of his contemporaries, who for some reason did not cause such excitement. Although South Korean Intelligence periodically prophesies that “the portraits of father and grandfather are being taken down,” the country’s leader is called a great leader. Everyone will soon hear about “Kimchenism,” the celebrations where it was time to announce a new era was over, and nothing of the sort was ever seen of them. It is not clear how much the situation will change by the new year, but as far as the DPRK is concerned, a sane expert acts according to the formula “I will not talk about the leader’s death until I see the hearse.” The ten years of Kim’s reign may be a kind of boundary, after which he will equal the merits of his ancestors, but so far, we know this reasoning not from open sources but reports of South Korean intelligence.

Nuclear Missile Program

Kim Jong-un has a military background. Thanks to his efforts, North Korea’s nuclear missile program was developed so rapidly that the previously discussed question of “does North Korea have a nuclear core or are they bluffing” has been finally resolved. Four of the country’s six nuclear tests, including the hydrogen bomb, happened under Kim Jong-un. North Korea has reached the level of nuclear deterrence, albeit minimal.

Cruise missiles, hypersonic gliders, large-caliber MLRSs, short-range fire missiles, the “atomic train,” SLBMs. All this makes war very hard and risky, not to mention that not every power in the nuclear club has an atomic bomb and a hydrogen bomb. As a result, if at the beginning of the reign of young Kim among the “young colonels” of the army of North Korea, the author personally heard statements, “if politicians didn’t interfere with us, we would flatten out the North in 90 hours.” By now, such cocksure sentiments have practically disappeared.

One more vital point to note. A nuclear missile program of this magnitude cannot be “stolen” or “made on the spot.” And this means that North Korea has a serious heavy industry, without which the defense industry cannot exist on its own, and a serious engineering school, because it takes a lot of people with a bright head and straight hands to develop a program in such a time frame.

The Economy

During Kim Jong-un’s reign, attention to building the economy was noted from the early years. First, the policy of prioritizing the military was replaced by a parallel development of the economy and nuclear-armed forces, and since spring 2018, the country has focused on economic growth. Although it is unlikely to build a fully autarkic economy (hampered by geographic determinism), the modern DPRK has made significant progress in this direction.

The growth of North Korea’s economy and rising living standards are quite obvious even when one looks at the panorama of the new Pyongyang. The city has become more colorful, with many modern high-rise buildings and other buildings that are not ceremonial in purpose. The so-called “temple of science and technology” is particularly noteworthy, which combines the virtues of a polytechnic museum aimed at stimulating interest in the research sciences, a major digital library, and a congress center capable of hosting scientific conferences on a global scale.

The improvement in the quality of life of ordinary citizens is particularly noticeable, showing that talk of the “people first” policy is not empty words. The improved quality of life can be traced in many small details, from the appearance of street food kiosks to the bright and modern homemade children’s backpacks. Or the spread of “native pop music” of the level of at least Vanessa Mae.

This modernization is not limited to Pyongyang but is also being actively promoted throughout the country. More recently, the North Korean media wrote about the development of the city of Samchiyon, when a provincial county center was transformed into a modern city.

After the sanctions burdened by the pandemic, it is clear that this level has decreased somewhat but has not dived. That is why another interesting fact should be noted. Before the 2018 Olympic warming, the United States and South Korea sought a complete blockade of the DPRK. The current sanctions regime can be defined as a “five-minute embargo.” Still, when the North Koreans went “self-isolating” at the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, the country shut down even more tightly than Washington would have liked. However, for almost two years, the DPRK, on the one hand, was the only state that did not let the coronavirus in, and on the other hand, the size of the regime’s “safety cushion” was large enough to last two years with a minimum of assistance.

Foreign Policy

At the end of 2017, the author was seriously concerned about the high probability of confrontation between the DPRK and the USA. The initiative of the Olympic warming belonged to Kim Jong-un. Although Moon went along for populism and political expediency from the author’s perspective, his efforts first led to a series of inter-Korean summits and an unbelievable event for past eras: a series of meetings between the DPRK leader and the US president.

The PRC’s conflict with the US has significantly improved relations between Pyongyang and Beijing, with North Korea as its only regional ally. And although this relationship is not simple, we can safely talk about a new alliance.

As the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear weapons settlement is paused, Kim Jong-un continues to honor the commitments made to Trump. However, the moratorium on nuclear tests and ICBM launches has never become a legally binding document. This means that his personal will maintains the status quo on the peninsula.

Over the past decade, Kim Jong-un has proven himself not to be a classic dictator from American dictator movies but a competent ruler who has done much for the prosperity of his country. It is very much hoped that such trends will continue into the next ten or more of his reign.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

]]> https://journal-neo.org/2022/01/02/ten-years-of-kim-jong-uns-rule/feed/ 0 https://journal-neo.org/2021/12/10/a-pause-in-the-talks-between-the-us-and-north-korea-continues/ https://journal-neo.org/2021/12/10/a-pause-in-the-talks-between-the-us-and-north-korea-continues/#comments Fri, 10 Dec 2021 14:59:27 +0000 https://journal-neo.org/?p=171967

Since the failure of February 2019’s summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un, relations between the US and North Korea have been put on hold, with no active dialogue, but no nuclear crisis or military stand-off.  On the one hand, Pyongyang has avoided any talks on the question of denuclearization. On the other hand, it is still complying with the moratorium on the testing and launch of long-range rockets, even though some commentators had predicted that North Korea would resume its previous course when Joe Biden took office. The US has also stopped talking about the “big deal” scenario and the “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement” (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear program.

Washington is doing whatever it can to restart the talks with Pyongyang. Wendy Sherman, US Deputy Secretary of State, has confirmed that the US has contacted North Korea, but Pyongyang has not responded – although it is still taking every opportunity to make its presence felt.

Ned Price, Spokesperson for the US Department of State has reiterated on a number of occasions in the last six months (August 3, September 9, September 24, October 7, October 14, October 26, and November 8) that the US is ready to enter into talks with North Korea at any time and in any place, and that Washington has no hostile intentions and that its offer to enter into dialogue is still open.  And, no less frequently, White House representatives Jen Psaki and Jalina Porter have reiterated this message.

On August 6, during the regional ASEAN forum, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken repeated that Washington was still ready to meet authorized officials from North Korea for talks at any time, anywhere, without preconditions. However, An Kwang Il, North Korea’s ambassador to Indonesia, ignored these calls.

On September 21, in an address to the UN General Assembly in New York, Joe Biden stated that the US was seeking serious and sustained diplomacy to pursue the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. He added that Washington sought “concrete progress toward an available plan with tangible commitments that would increase stability on the Peninsula …. as well as improve the lives of the people in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

On September 23, Mark Lambert, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Japan and Korea at the US Department of State, also said that the US would “go anywhere” to talk with North Korea, but that “unfortunately, they have not responded to date.” He also added that “We will continue to support the provision of humanitarian aid, consistent with international standards for access and monitoring, to the most vulnerable North Koreans, regardless of progress on denuclearization.”

However, Donald Trump’s role in bringing about the current situation has been swept under the carpet. For example, on August 23 the US Department of State published a fact sheet on bilateral relations with North Korea.  The document states that the US works closely with allies and partners to achieve “greater peace and security in the region” and that in the past, it provided food and other aid to North Korea in response to famine and natural disasters, but that it does not currently provide any aid to Pyongyang. But, significantly, the document made no reference to the summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un.

Despite the US proposals for talks, the general trend is “one step forward, three steps back.” For example, on October 7, Ned Price stated that the US would continue to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea even if the denuclearization talks failed to make any progress. He described providing humanitarian aid to Pyongyang as “critical”, but blamed the North Korean regime for the suffering of its people as it “continues to exploit its own citizens, to violate their human rights, to divert resources from the country’s people to build up its unlawful WMD and ballistic missiles program.” Ned Price reiterated that the goal of the US remained the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and to that end, “we remain prepared to meet with the DPRK without preconditions, anytime, anywhere.”

North Korea has also continued to stick to its previous position. In an address to the UN General Assembly on September 27, Kim Song, North Korea’s ambassador to the United Nations, said that if the US wants to help bring about peace on the Korean Peninsula, it must stop the joint military exercises with South Korea, and its placement of strategic weapons in that country. “I am convinced that a good prospect will be opened for relations US – DPRK relations, and inter-Korean relations, if the US refrains from threatening the DPRK and gives up its hostility towards it. If the US shows its bold decision to give up its hostile policy, we are also prepared to respond willingly at any time,” he added.

Also on September 27, the North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) referred to the US as the “most heinous human rights abuser” for using human rights as a means to put pressure on other countries and assert its global dominance. It cited examples of human rights violations by the US, including its decades long blockade of Cuba and its use of the problems in Xinjiang and Hong Kong to threaten China’s political stability.

On October 31 the North Korean Foreign Ministry accused the United States of acquiescing in the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world, citing its decision to share nuclear submarine technology with Australia.   According to the KCNA’s statement, the North Korean Foreign Ministry saw the creation of an alliance between Washington, London and Canberra as a “dangerous act which will upset the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region and may trigger a nuclear arms race.” The statement added that if that decision caused any threat to North Korea’s security, then North Korea would immediately respond accordingly.

On November 3, Kim Song called for the dismantlement of the US-led United Nations Command (UNC) on the Korean Peninsula, claiming that it is only serving the political and military interests of Washington, which is using the command to occupy South Korea and exert influence in the region.

Experts from the US and South Korea have interpreted the situation in a number of different ways, and some have offered unexpected advice to resolve the crisis.  According to an article in the Korea Times by former diplomat Paul Tyson, there is little likelihood of a summit between Joe Biden and Kim Jong-un in the near future. He considers that the meetings between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un brought some benefits. The threat of war receded, but now it is unlikely that Kim Jong-un will negotiate with anyone less than the US President.  Paul Tyson therefore proposes the renewal of talks at a high level, perhaps with a meeting between US Vice President Kamala Harris and Kim Yo-jong (Kim Jong-un’s sister).

Harry Kazianis, a senior director at the Center for the National Interest think tank, considers that following the US’s withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, it has more pressing problems than North Korea. This conclusion is supported by a survey of US public opinions conducted by the Associated Press from August 12-16, in which only 47% of respondents said that they were concerned about North Korea’s nuclear program.  According to the survey, the greatest threats were seen as fake news (75%), cyberattacks (67%), domestic extremist groups (65%), the spread of infectious diseases (65%), the growth of China’s global influence (57%), climate change (53%), foreign extremist groups (50%) and the Iranian Nuclear program (48%).

Andrew Kim, formerly a Korea specialist at the CIA, believes that Pyongyang wants two things. Firstly, it wants an official declaration (rather than just spoken promises) confirming that Washington is ready to negotiate without any preconditions. Secondly, it is likely that North Korea wants the US to confirm that it is committed to an “action for action” approach.

Joseph DeTrani, former US envoy for the six-party talks with North Korea, has elaborated on the need for a “catalyst to reinstitute dialogue with North Korea”, such as an official declaration on the end of the Korean War, as repeatedly proposed by Moon Jae-in.  “This would be a confidence building gesture to the North.”

Donald Gregg, who served as a CIA officer and US ambassador to South Korea from 1989-1993, believes that the US should be more proactive in its attempts to resume talks with North Korea and break the impasse. In his view Joe Biden’s administration is in a more advantageous position than Kim Jong-un’s regime, and Washington should therefore reach out to Pyongyang. He also emphasized the need for efforts to build trust.

Jun Bong-geun, professor at South Korea’s National Diplomatic Academy, has commented that it is important to be aware that North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are “in full swing” and that the longer the denuclearization negotiations are further delayed, the more nuclear warheads and missiles North Korea will develop. Moreover, once North Korea becomes confident that it has an effective nuclear deterrent it will ask for exorbitant compensation for denuclearization, such as the suspension of all joint military exercises between South Korea and the US and the withdrawal of US forces. In an even worse case scenario, it could simply refuse to participate in nuclear negotiations at all, and become a de-facto nuclear-armed state like India or Pakistan.

Nevertheless, he believes that the current pause in the dialogue means that both parties are still in reality committed to the “action-for-action”, but that neither party is taking any action.

He sees the Iranian nuclear model as a possible way forward for the talks with North Korea, citing the views expressed by Antony Blinken, currently US Secretary of State, who proposed this approach in his columns for The New York Times back in 2018. He is aware that the dialogues between the US and North Korea, and between the two Koreas, can only begin again in earnest once COVID-19 has ceased to be an obstacle, but in the meantime, he suggests that Joe Biden send Kim Jon-un a personal letter proposing negotiations to fulfill the four goals set out in the Singapore Statement. “Once Kim receives Biden’s letter, he will be tempted to reply positively.”

How long will this situation continue? This author believes that nothing will change as long as both sides have little to gain from resuming talks – especially given that North Korea is far from the top of Joe Biden’s list of problems. To venture a prediction, it is possible that in the near or even medium term both sides will try to avoid inflaming tensions, but that two possible scenarios could make the situation worse: a renewed confrontation between the US and China, or a change of policy in South Korea, perhaps as a result of a Conservative election victory.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.