First, on March 18, 2021, NK News reported that there were no foreign UN or international NGO workers left in North Korea. About two dozen citizens of the Czech Republic, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Vietnam, as well as two employees of the World Food Program (WFP), left the country. They left Pyongyang for China.

And on April 1, 2021 the Russian embassy in Pyongyang congratulated its colleagues on the end of the two-week quarantine in China and summed up some results – at the moment there are fewer than 290 foreigners in the DPRK. Due to strict quarantine measures and lack of essential goods, the embassies of 12 countries, including Great Britain, Venezuela, Brazil, Germany, Italy, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the Czech Republic and France, were closed. Only nine ambassadors and four chargé d’affaires now represent their states, with embassy staff reduced to a minimum. Representatives of international humanitarian organizations have also almost completely left the country.

According to the embassy, those who left can be understood — “not everyone can withstand the unprecedentedly strict total restriction, the sharpest shortage of essential goods, including medicine, the lack of possibility to solve health problems”.

Russian diplomats also “have a hard enough time. There are many problems, and several families had to interrupt their business trips for various reasons. But the personnel’s ability to work is fully preserved.” Of course, the Western and South Korean press quoted only the passage about restrictions and scarcity, juxtaposing it with the notorious story about a group of Russian embassy staff crossing the border over a railroad bridge. Footage of Russian embassy employees walking on rails and pushing a cart with their luggage and children sitting on it went viral all over the Internet as an illustration of the terrible living conditions of foreign diplomats in North Korea amid the coronavirus pandemic. Western propaganda hinted that the plight of foreigners in North Korea is nothing compared to the terrible situation of the people, and that foreigners are being expelled on purpose so that no one will know about the famine in the country, which is comparable in scale to the disasters of the 1990s.

In addition to blatantly anti-Pyongyang propaganda coming from sources that the author does not even want to name again, this flight of “fakes” was partly built on the use of omissions: if one does not know the specifics of the situation, they will make them up based on some general notions. One of them, for example, concerns the word “embassy”. The reader will immediately picture an image of a large fenced area, which may have several residential buildings for employees, its own boiler room, a warehouse or a school for children. All this is in the Russian and Chinese embassies in Pyongyang, but these are countries that have longstanding ties and real interests with the DPRK. Most other diplomatic missions are located within the diplomatic quarter, which of course has its own store with foreign goods and its own hospital, but the embassy staff may be very small and in some cases actually consist of an ambassador, an accountant, a secretary and an interpreter.

Of course, when North Korea imposed an almost total import ban in August 2020, it was a very challenging time for diplomats. Contacts with North Korean officials have drastically decreased, there is limited access to the city, and the usual food has run out. And while Russian diplomats, most of whom are professional Korean experts, have no problem consuming local food, some Western diplomats may have a hard time eating it. In addition, the ban on imports also applies to drugs, which means that people with chronic diseases could simply run out of pills that they need to take for vital requirements. Consequently, it is necessary to return to the homeland.

North Korean authorities periodically organize extraction flights for foreign diplomats, but after air service was also cut off, the only option is to evacuate by bus to the Chinese border town of Dandong. There, the diplomats are quarantined for two or three weeks, after which they are free to go home. It should be noted, however, that Beijing-Moscow or Shanghai-Moscow flights are still irregular, and for emergency evacuations this option is poorly suited.

The second omission is due to the fact that, when talking about the border, it is assumed that it can be crossed or passed over relatively unhindered. Historically, however, the Russian Federation and the DPRK still have no automobile connection, but they do have railroad connections, even though there are no trains (as there are no planes either). That is why, after a certain period of coordination, an option was found that seemed ideal in terms of rapid evacuation. The Russians were brought to the border area, where they loaded their luggage and children onto a specially prepared cart, then walked about a mile and a half, and transport was waiting for them on the Russian side, after which they flew from Vladivostok to Moscow the next day. So there was really no special arrogance or desire to mock or humiliate the diplomats by making them walk.

It is difficult to assess the extent to which such border closures have affected the economic situation. The pictures from Pyongyang do not show this; the state is holding the prices of rice and gasoline, but according to Western observers from the NK News portal, prices of other products have gone up. According to claims, fresh fish has almost disappeared from the market, because the fishermen are not allowed to go to the sea for anti-epidemic reasons.

Of course, the author has already encountered the opinion that such tightening of the screws and voluntary blockade in the form of “the country’s transition to self-isolation” is actually a cunning plan of the insidious Kim Jong-un: they say, assessing the future policy of the Biden administration, the North Koreans realized that after a while the level of sanctions pressure will quite reach the blockade point, and in this situation a controlled lockdown is better than uncontrolled. The anti-epidemic measures are a good explanation for the masses, and with it, in foreign policy, North Korea has its hands untied. If the regime goes for a nuclear missile escalation in the face of worsening relations with the US and the ROK, “the tyrant will stick his tongue out to the entire international community, who cannot adequately punish him, because any level of sanctions pressure is still easier in its consequences than the situation in which the North Korean people are already in now.”

In the author’s opinion, there is some noble madness in this idea, but the harsh quarantine measures can be explained in another way. First, Kim Jong-un is well aware that with the weakness of North Korea’s health care system the epidemic will be hard to cope with, so it is important not to let the virus into the country at any cost. Second, because the virus has not yet been fully investigated, North Koreans assume that it could potentially be transmitted by all possible means, including water, migrating birds, and unsanitized objects. In such a situation, quarantine turns out to be a method with an obvious degree of reliability: let nothing in, isolate any suspicious people, don’t touch anything suspicious. Third, the protective reflex inherent in authoritarian regimes also suggests such solutions to problems, especially since, unfortunately, the North Korean authorities have theoretical reasons to fear sabotage.

The author would like to once again recall that in an interview with the leftist South Korean newspaper Hangyore Sinmun in the summer of 2020, defector Hong Gang Chul openly said that anti-Pyongyang NGOs were seriously discussing the possibility of a biological diversion by sending not only leaflets but also items contaminated with the virus to North Korea. Although one can argue about the technical capabilities of those who contemplated such sabotage, the DPRK authorities cannot leave this point unattended.

So is there any light at the end? — At the beginning of April 2021, there was a round of rumors that air travel between Beijing and Pyongyang would soon be launched. Other unofficial sources say that North Korea has received some amount of vaccine, and that it will not be used primarily to vaccinate the elite, but rather those who travel abroad on duty, or those who deal with border trade. So, there is hope that in the near future the trade turnover between China and North Korea, which is almost nonexistent at the moment, will return to acceptable levels.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“.

We have already made preliminary predictions about what the new US president’s course on the Korean Peninsula will look like. Now that Joe Biden has introduced some of his team and partially spoken out himself, some things are further clarified.

Let’s start with Biden himself. We recall that he was critical of the meetings between Trump and Kim, insisting that they only gave the North Korean dictator what he had long desired: global recognition as the leader of a nuclear state. He called Kim Jong-un a cutthroat, but at the October 22 presidential televised debate, Biden acknowledged the possibility of his summit with Kim – but only if the North first agrees to reduce or give up its nuclear arsenal.

Back in October 2020. Biden wrote an article titled “Hope for Our Better Future” exclusively for the Yonhap News Agency.  In it, he pointed out that the ROK-US alliance was designed to protect peace in East Asia and praised the ROK as a “shining example of a flourishing democracy and economic powerhouse.” The article concerned the North as well:  “As President, I’ll stand with South Korea, strengthening our alliance to safeguard peace in East Asia and beyond, rather than extorting Seoul with reckless threats to remove our troops. I’ll engage in principled diplomacy and keep pressing toward a denuclearized North Korea and a unified Korean Peninsula, while working to reunite Korean Americans separated from loved ones in North Korea for decades”.

However, the Build Back Better website he launched lists mainly internal problems as top priorities: COVID-19, economic recovery, racial equality, and climate change. The DPRK was not mentioned there or in the inaugural speech (unlike Obama’s and Trump’s speeches, which touched on the subject).

On Nov. 23, 2020, Joe Biden named Anthony Blinken, who has held foreign policy positions for more than 25 years, serving in Barack Obama’s administration as Deputy National Security Adviser from 2013 to 2015 and Undersecretary of State from 2015 to 2017, as US Secretary of State. As Hudson Institute Asia-Pacific Security Committee Chairman Patrick Cronin notes, Blinken was Joe Biden’s chief foreign policy adviser and was part of the inner circle of national security decision-making under Barack Obama and Bill Clinton.

Shortly before the presidential election, Blinken was a member of Biden’s three-person foreign policy advisory panel, which included former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Brian McKeown.

Antony Blinken is a vocal critic of Trump’s DPRK policy. He once called Kim Jong-un one of the worst tyrants and North Korea the worst concentration camp.  He believes that if North Korea does not accomplish its denuclearization, the United States should continue sanctions, although they could be relaxed in exchange for a partial dismantlement of the North’s nuclear weapons.

But the ROK media notes that he once said that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), aimed at limiting Tehran’s nuclear activities, would be the best deal President Donald Trump could reach with North Korea, even though Trump rebuked it as the worst deal ever negotiated.

In his June 11, 2018 New York Times article, the day before the Singapore summit between Trump and Kim Jong-un, Blinken promoted the Iranian agreement, especially emphasizing “a sweeping inspections regime.”  In addition, Blinken hinted at an “interim deal” option.   “The administration may find merit in an interim agreement that requires North Korea to disclose all of its programs, freeze its enrichment and reprocessing infrastructure under international monitoring and destroy some warheads and missiles in return for limited economic relief … That would buy time to negotiate a more comprehensive deal, including a minutely sequenced road map.”

At a confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 20, 2021, Blinken said, “we have to review and we intend to review the entire approach and policy toward North Korea because this is a hard problem that has plagued administration after administration, and it’s a problem that has not gotten better“. In this context, the new government “will begin by looking at what options it has to increase pressure on North Korea to come to the negotiating table, as well as what other diplomatic initiatives may be possible.” This review will “start with consulting closely with our allies and partners, particularly with South Korea and with Japan and others.” The US cannot solve all the world’s problems alone, so it needs cooperation and partnership with other countries, Blinken emphasized.

Noting the possible need for increased pressure on North Korea, Blinken agreed that international sanctions on the North should not inadvertently harm the North Korean people: “I think in North Korea and in other similarly situated places, we have to have an eye clearly on the people of the country in question, and do what we can to alleviate their suffering … we have an eye on the humanitarian side of the equation, not just on the security side of the equation.”

Former US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman may become the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations. During Bill Clinton’s presidency, she was an adviser to the US State Department and special adviser to the president and secretary of state, as well as coordinator of U.S. policy toward North Korea. In particular, Sherman was involved in negotiations with the DPRK on nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, and was the lead negotiator on the Iran nuclear deal.

Jake Sullivan, a senior political adviser to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, has been named the new national security adviser. Little is known about his stance on the DPRK, but in an April 2018 post in the Washington Post — shortly before the Singapore summit — he mentioned North Korea’s long standing strategy of first making a promise and then breaking it.

We know of another important appointment – on January 14, Joe Biden appointed former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell to a newly created position tentatively called “Asian Czar”. More precisely, the coordinator for the Indo-Pacific region in the White House National Security Council, who will coordinate the Asian policies pursued by US government agencies. According to the Financial Times, the creation of this position shows that the new US administration attaches particular importance to relations with Asia. Campbell was heavily involved in the so-called “pivot to Asia” of the Barack Obama administration. This policy was designed to contain China by strengthening regional alliances, military presence, and multilateral security and economic institutions. Prior to his appointment, he served as chairman and co-founder of Asia Group, a strategic consulting firm.

The ROK media in this context recall his article in Foreign Affairs magazine, where Campbell clearly outlined his approach to cooperation in containing China: “The United States should encourage new military and intelligence partnerships between regional states, while still deepening those relationships in which the United States plays a major role — placing a “tire” on the familiar regional alliance system with a US hub and allied spokes,” he added”.

There Campbell also called for the creation of ad hoc bodies on specific issues to “keep China in check and maintain the US-led regional order.” Campbell also touched on military deterrence, expanding on the so-called quartet, which currently includes the United States, Australia, India and Japan. “The purpose of these different coalitions — and this broader strategy — is to create balance in some cases, bolster consensus on important facets of the regional order in others, and send a message that there are risks to China’s present course.”

Campbell is known to have pondered how to promote reconciliation between Seoul and Tokyo, which are mired in quarrels over historical disputes, including the issue of “comfort women”.

On November 20, 2020. Campbell stated that the resumption of humanitarian aid to North Korea could send a good message of patience as well as strengthen the joint efforts of South Korea and the United States to denuclearize the North.

On December 2, even before his appointment, in a webinar organized by the Atlantic Council and sponsored by the Korea Foundation, Campbell noted that the new US administration will have to decide quickly how it will deal with North Korea to have a better chance of engagement and send an “early signal” to the North before Pyongyang commits itself to provocations instead of dialogue. “What we saw at the Obama administration was a rather prolonged period of study, during which North Korea took provocative steps that basically headed off the possibility of engagement with North Korea.” He believes the new administration should be bold, and he was not afraid to point out the rapprochement between Trump and Kim.  Campbell also emphasized the need for the US to work with its Asian allies-South Korea and Japan-in the face of various challenges, including North Korea, and for allies to work with each other.

All this allows us to draw some preliminary conclusions. There are several options with regard to the DPRK. On the one hand, there is the possibility that the people on Biden’s team who dealt with the DPRK under Obama, because of prior experience and for reasons of “just not like under Trump,” will not be able to go beyond established limits and return “strategic patience” in the expectation that the combination of sanctions pressure and economic consequences from DPRK borders closed due to the pandemic will result in a “regime change.”  Since Obama, however, the North has made a significant leap in its nuclear missile program, and strategic patience has largely been built on the thesis that Pyongyang will not give up the bomb, but that nuclear threat to the US is negligible. This is not the case now, and Kim Jong-un’s promise to increase his country’s nuclear arsenal during the January WPK convention leaves little room for compromise on Pyongyang’s complete denuclearization.

On the other hand, based on Blinken’s experience, he is expected to attempt to conclude some version of an interim deal with the DPRK on the Iranian model, although the nuclear capabilities of Iran and the DPRK are incomparable: Pyongyang has already developed nuclear warheads and an assortment of ballistic missiles and other delivery vehicles. It would be a relatively good option if the US and the DPRK, albeit in a somewhat different vein, continued Kim and Trump’s approach here: the problem cannot be solved amicably, but it can be paused, with both sides refraining from escalating the situation.

On the third hand, the DPRK is really not a problem of first priority, and if Pyongyang does not attract attention, political inertia will ensure the continuation of the freeze period for at least a year.

As for South Korea, the outlook is much more clear. Biden promises to intensify Washington’s contacts with allies in the Asia-Pacific region, declaring that “America is strongest when it works with its allies.”  This means that trade wars or extra spending on US troops will most likely be curtailed, but Seoul will be required to take an active part in US-initiated coalitions, including those against China.  In addition, Washington will try to befriend Seoul and Tokyo.

Nevertheless, much remains uncertain. We’ll see who ends up as Special Representatives for Peninsula Affairs (a position now held by Stephen Bigen) or Human Rights. Therefore, the next material in this series will be large and devoted to how American and South Korean experts assess the direction and prospects of Biden’s course.

 Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, a leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

From January 5 to January 13, the 8th congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) was held in North Korea, which marked a series of major inner-party and inner-state changes.

Background

The decision to hold the eighth party congress in January 2021 was made at the plenum of the WPK Central Committee held in Pyongyang on August 19, where the North Korean leader noted that the country “faced unexpected and inevitable challenges,” and that the current five-year plan, which was unveiled at the seventh party congress held in May 2016, was not implemented, and the lives of people “facing severe internal and external situations” had not improved. Therefore, it was proposed at the Eighth Congress of the WPK to analyze “in a comprehensive, three-dimensional and anatomical way the deviations and shortcomings”.

The ROK experts saw it only as “it is rare for the North’s leader to acknowledge a policy failure.” Few have noted that the reason also is that much effort and resources have been spent on “unplanned” problems such as fighting the coronavirus or rebuilding flood-stricken areas.

One gets the impression that in 2020 the party bureaucracy was not fulfilling its role as moral vanguard. Because of this, a serious audit of the ruling system was attempted in the run-up to the congress.

As Kim Jong-un said in his opening speech on January 5, “The Party Central Committee set up a non-permanent central control committee and sent its groups to the grassroots to get acquainted with the situation there and listen to the voice of the workers.” The inspection groups visited the branch departments and as a result the auditors found out “what were the mistakes in the implementation of the decisions of the 7th Party Congress, what were the reasons, what were the shortcomings in the party leadership.”

At the same time, complaints and suggestions were collected from departments of the Party Central Committee and all party organizations of the country, revision of the situation with party finances, and study of the Party Statute for outdated formulations that do not correspond to our real reality.

Member List

The eighth congress was held as an unusually massive event. While at the previous congress there were 3,667 delegates, at this one there were 5,000 delegates, only 250 of whom belonged to the leading party ranks. Plus 2,000 observers compared to 1,387 at the last forum.

The change in the percentage of delegates by category is also intriguing. The number of party activists classified as “exempt workers” fell from 42.13% to 39.18%, and the number of workers’ organization workers fell from 1.42% to 0.88%.

The number of non-partisan military delegates also dropped sharply, from 19.61% to 8.16%. While about 30 “honorary elders” participated as delegates at the last convention, several comrades were present only as guests of honor at this one.

But the number of representatives of administrative and economic activists increased from 11.54% to 16.02%; party activists not released from the main work – from 21.43% to 29.10%; workers in science, education, culture, art, etc. – from 3.05% to 6.66%. The proportion of women among the delegates rose from 8.59% to 10.02%.

This change is a consequence of several trends that were evident even before the congress. The first is a definite reduction in the influence of the military. Although Kim Jong-un constantly praises members of the military and the KPA performs not only military but also national economic tasks, the 2016-2020 constitutional amendments finally ended the period of military priority policy and the term “Songun” is hardly mentioned.

The second trend is a certain aversion of the leader of the country to the party bureaucracy and his reliance on the masses of the people in the form of primary organizations. A landmark moment here was Kim Jong-un’s speech during the celebration of the Labor Party’s 75th anniversary, at which not a single eulogy was uttered in honor of the party itself.

Sequence of Events

Compared with the previous congress, the eighth congress was clearly not a formal event held for the sake of appearances. Whereas the last forum took four days, this one has taken eight.

From the opening speech, Kim Jong-un immediately set a goal: we gathered not so much to describe achievements, but also to comprehensively analyze failures, so that something like this would not happen again. From the first to the third day, Kim Jong-un delivered his report to the Party Central Committee. The fourth and fifth days were spent on debates, and if one were to translate their description from North Korean officialdom into ordinary language, “The speakers mentioned successes and experiences in their industries and units … seriously analyzed and summarized the shortcomings, their causes and lessons learned from them.”  Many gave self-critical analyses of mistakes, describing “the failure to apply valid and popular methods in Party work.”

It is also important that those who “confessed their mistakes before the Party Congress” did not turn out to be repressed enemies of the people. Rather, they “once again thoughtfully took the criticized issues as their shortcomings and lessons,” and engaged in developing tactics for the future.

In addition to the report of the Central Committee, the Report of the Central Audit Commission of the WPK was read, which “meaningfully analyzed and summarized the successes, experiences, shortcomings and lessons in the work of the Party on financial management.” As a result, it was decided “to further strengthen party financial discipline and to make a new revolution in the work of financial management.”

In addition, the congress solemnly adopted a resolution “On Consistent Implementation of the Tasks Outlined in the Report of the WPK Central Committee,” adopted amendments to the Party Statute, and elected Kim Jong-un as Secretary General. The composition of the Central Committee was significantly renewed, but the leader’s sister, contrary to expectations, was not in the Politburo, although during the event she made another scathing comment about the South.

The congress closed on January 12 with the singing of the “International” instead of the WPK anthem.

Some expected that Kim’s harsh language would lead to demonstrative repressions, especially after his passage that the news of the congress “dealt a tangible blow to reactionary forces of all hues and guises, hostile to our great cause.” This was taken as a hint that the said forces were also within the WPK, but there was no new Jang Song-thaek case. A good sign: at the congress they decided not to look for the switch-tenders, but to repair the tracks.

Then the festivities began. On January 13 a big concert took place at the Pyongyang Sports Palace and on the evening of January 14 a military parade with fireworks and new rockets was held in Pyongyang.

Meanwhile, Kim’s birthday on January 8 went unnoticed once again: against the background of a detailed report on the congress, the North Korean media made no mention of the leader’s 37th birthday.

Kim Jong-un’s Statements

The resolutions of the congress have not yet been leaked to the public, but Kim’s opening and closing remarks, as well as a summary of his report to the Central Committee, are available, and even from them it is possible to derive much that is unusual and interesting.

Kim Jong-un’s report took nine hours of reading, and is said to have been a very detailed “debriefing,” mentioning specific facts and names. For those who were not at the congress, the KCNA published an abridged version, but even that shows the main direction of the leader’s thought.

The report consisted of four parts: an outline of the successes achieved during the reporting period, indications for the future, and those devoted to economic and internal political issues, foreign policy and the development of party work.

The first part acknowledged “serious shortcomings that hinder further progress.” Moreover, these shortcomings were not referred to as “isolated manifestations,” but as serious problems, to combat which a total audit of both the party and the administrative system was carried out by the Extraordinary Revision Commission.

Of course, despite a succession of “hitherto unprecedented worst difficulties,” the Party “has won titanic victories,” but “it must be said that the tasks previously set have fallen far short in almost every sphere of life,” and “the challenges that hinder and impede efforts and advance in the struggle to win continuous new victories in socialist construction are still making themselves felt.” Nevertheless, “these problems may well be corrected and solved by one’s own mind and strength.”

The second part of the report was called “For Radical Advancement in the Construction of Socialism.” It was only noted here that Kim made a detailed analysis, “focusing on the shortcomings and the lesson, setting important tasks for further new progress and development.” To summarize the lengthy section, the task of economic development in the new environment is reduced to maintaining at least the level of economic development that was achieved over the past 8-10 years when modernizing certain areas (for example, the Pyongyang subway is being modernized); the quality of life is to be improved not so much through new goods as through infrastructure, housing, local government development, and so on.

In the field of military development (it is worth noting that in both the report and the closing speech, this section comes after the economic section), Kim noted that the nuclear missile shield must be improved, and set a number of ambitious but achievable goals, like building a nuclear submarine and hypersonic weapons: “There is no more foolish act” than resting on one’s laurels while the other side arms itself.

The third section was devoted to external relations. Noting the development of relations with the PRC, the Russian Federation and the former Soviet Bloc, Kim emphasized that the hostile policy of the United States does not change with changes in the presidents. Of course, the report notes that the diplomatic route is not completely rejected, but Northerners will not be the first to move toward consensus. Responding with force for force and good for good, they will adhere to the old principles of step-by-step action in response to action, and expect from the other side not ceremonial measures, but real proposals that can revive the dialogue and give ground for negotiations.

Regarding South Korea, it was stated that the level of inter-Korean relations had returned to the times before the Panmunjom Declaration was signed. The author can agree with this point of view, because if one were to analyze the implementation of the agreements, with the exception of border demilitarization, all the projects were drowned in delays due to Seoul’s fault. What is now being pathetically proposed by the South is either irrelevant or of purely ceremonial importance. Most likely, the North understands that the last year of Moon Jae-in’s rule is unlikely to be marked by breakthrough events. If anything, it will be as useful as the 2007 inter-Korean summit. But here, too, it is noted that everything depends on Seoul. “Results come at the cost of the effort invested.”

The fourth section was devoted to strengthening the role of the party, and the outcome of this part of the report was reflected in changes to the WPK Statute. In addition to renaming the post of party chairman to general secretary and designating the Korean People’s Army as the armed forces of the party, a meeting of party cell secretaries and a meeting of primary party organization secretaries will be called every five years between congresses. Thus, there is a direct channel of interaction between “sky” and “earth”.

Significant is the emergence of a new body, the Central Revision Commission, and the increased powers of local revision commissions indicate that internal control is being strengthened and a special new structure, similar to China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, will watch over discipline and morality among party members.

Kim Jong-un’s closing speech left many in mixed feelings. On the one hand, the leader clearly sees the problems. In particular, Kim openly said that “in provincial towns and counties, particularly in the countryside, life remains very hard and underdeveloped.”

The strategy, however, is not presented in the final speech, nor are there any new slogans. Kim himself suggested that “instead of some loud slogan, these three ideals — “worship the people as the sky,” “unity and cohesion,” and “self-reliance” — should once again be imprinted in the depths of one’s heart.”

Specific recommendations boil down to well-known general words like “strengthening discipline” and “taking action.”

In Conclusion

To summarize everything written above, it could be said that the last congress does reflect the new course of the leadership, aimed primarily at restoring order within the party system. On the one hand, this was due to the need to prepare for the coming period of “bad years” related to the consequences of the pandemic and the international situation; on the other hand, it was due to dissatisfaction among the top leadership that the party members were not performing the function of the moral vanguard. They see the solution in tightening the screws by expanding the fight for morality and increasing pressure on private business, as well as strengthening discipline, including the creation of a new structure that would serve as a “party counterintelligence.”

However, there was no revision of the leadership role of the party, and the WPK remains in its former place, without dragging some forces and resources from the party apparatus to the state apparatus. Under the Kim Il-sung’s and Kim Jong-il’s ideas, the party could only be in the ruling position. At the same time, the authorities are trying to ensure that the quality of life of citizens is not reduced, but it is going to be achieved not so much by increasing the number of goods, but by making the living conditions easier.

As for foreign policy, although the North is still willing to reciprocate with good, they do not intend to be the first to make any unrequited moves. Washington and Seoul are expected to make real proposals and counter concessions, but the North is also ready to demonstrate a tough approach.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

On October 10, 2020, the DPRK held a massive celebration for the 75th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea. It is one of the most important national holidays, and the milestone anniversary was marked by a whole array of mass gatherings, including concerts, gala functions, and a fireworks festival. The highlight of the program was a military parade, and international experts had been “sizing up” this event for a long time, believing that both the content of the parade and the leader’s speech at it would be something like “flagship documents” that determine North Korean policy over the short term.

The reader should recall how talk that in 2020 Kim Jong-un would arrange “something like that” began almost immediately after he mentioned a “new strategic weapon”. And, during the summer of 2020, speculation that new types of weapons would be shown at the military parade started to gush forth, especially since satellite images quite clearly indicated that kind of related activity.

In addition to the vehicles deployed in preparation for the parade, there were reports that in the summer of 2020 North Korea did work revamping a crucial factory that manufactures long-range missile launchers, the so-called “March 16 Factory”.

Generally speaking, Kim Jong-un managed to arrange a splendid, memorable show, where not just the military vehicles drew people’s attention but also with interesting twists in the scenarios, be it the fact that the parade was held during the nighttime, the illuminated airplanes that went along with that, or the filming and photography accomplished using drones or cavalry, which paid tribute to the legacy of the “anti-Japanese guerillas”.

Before the start of the parade, Kim Jong-un gave a speech that was very different from the assumptions made by American and South Korean authors about what the North Korean leader would say. Kim did not mention the United States at all, and then wished South Korea a speedy recovery from the coronavirus, expressing the hope that the day will soon come, after the current pandemic crisis ends, when both Koreas will join hands together.

North Korea presented two new types of ballistic missile during the parade. The first type was a large intercontinental ballistic missile on a 22-wheeled carrier, which apparently runs on liquid fuel (like the Hwasong-15), can theoretically strike the continental United States, and along with that is capable of carrying multiple warheads (either decoy targets or a single nuclear charge with one megaton of power). Harry Kazianis, the Senior Director of Korean Studies at the Center for the National Interest in Washington, stated this is probably the largest rocket on the planet (the transporter for the Hwasong-15 has 18 wheels), and could mean it either has an increased range or could carry a heavier payload.

One should take into account that the presumed flight range for the Hwasong-15 is 13,000 kilometers, which already would let it reach not only the western coast of the United States, but also its eastern coast. The Hwasong-12 flies up to 5,000 kilometers, meaning it could attack Hawaii or Alaska.

According to Koizumi Yu, an associate professor at the Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology at the University of Tokyo, North Korea’s new ICBM is one of the largest in the world, and may have multiple warheads. However, the rocket has not been tested yet, so the focus of attention is on when its first test launch will take place. South Korean experts also reported that the new missile is longer and heavier than the Hwasong-15, and suspect that it may be equipped with a new type of engine – one which the North tested twice in December 2019, stating that these tests would have an important impact on changing the country’s strategic position and strengthening its nuclear deterrence capabilities.  The large space under the missile’s payload fairing calls attention to itself: with this design, the ICBM will be able to carry not just one conventional warhead, but either several warheads (increasing the number of targets destroyed, and the chances of overcoming a missile defense system), or one that has a thermonuclear warhead with a capacity of several megatons (this is a completely different level of damage when attacking huge city, entailing up to one million victims), as well as some decoy targets that, once again, increase the chance of bypassing an enemy’s missile defense system.

On the whole, however, experts had different opinions about whether it was a mock-up or not, and if it was not a mock-up then how long it would take to prepare the rocket for launching. Whether it carries one warhead or several of them. Whether it is a vulnerable target (during a combat situation, delivering it to the intended site, raising it to a vertical position, and filling it with fuel and oxidizer all requires time, and it would be very difficult to ensure secrecy during this method of transportation and use).

Something else is more important: it is a way of demonstrating force, since in the time leading up to a war putting this kind of missile on combat alert, after satellite surveillance detects it, would suggest that the DPRK is ready to cross that “red line” – and that perhaps its demands should be taken seriously.

And then it doesn’t even matter that much whether this kind of rocket exists in the form of a mock-up or it is the only one that exists. The system shown during the parade demonstrates the aspirations present, and at least shows in which area of focus development work is being done, and is designed on the principle of “guaranteed deterrence”. And, as Mike Pompeo said at the time when he was still director of the CIA, “we must proceed from the strategy that North Korea has this kind of missile. Sooner or later they will make it, because for them it is similar to the Manhattan Project for the United States back in the time of WWII”.

The United States is often guided by what former Vice President Dick Cheney called the “one-percent doctrine”. In other words, if there is even a one percent chance of some fact, then we have to take it as an absolute certainty in terms of our response. In this context, American strategists cannot neglect the small likelihood that a North Korean missile will reach the US mainland, even if it is one percent, or a fraction of one percent, because if this happens then the consequences of the attack will negate any political gains from the conflict. This means that it doesn’t matter how many missiles like that North Korea has. If there is not a 100% possibility of intercepting them all, Washington should think about how to solve the problem of DPRK using non-coercive methods.

The second type showcased at the parade were the Pukkykson solid-propellant missiles, which included the previously tested Pukkykson-2 along with new missile, the Pukkykson-4: according to South Korean experts, this missile is intended to be deployed at sea, and will be suitable for a new submarine that is being built at the North Korean naval base located at Sinpo, on its east coast. The new submarine is believed to be capable of carrying three or four SLBMs.

It should be noted that missiles of this type that currently exist adequately meet the standards for intermediate-range ballistic missiles: The Pukkykson-2 can theoretically (it is worth reiterating how tests were executed along high-angle trajectories, so recalculations need to be done) fly up to 1,250-1,300 km, and the Pukkykson-3 up to 1,900 km; however, alarmist estimates claim that even the Pukkykson-2 will reach 2,000-3,000 km, and could attack Guam. In addition, it is a two-stage missile, which will allow creating over the longer term a three-stage version capable of operating at a distance up to 5,500 km or more. However, South Korean alarmists believe that even what was shown at the parade has a maximum range of more than 3,000-4,000 km.

More important, however, is that the DPRK possesses a whole range of solid-propellant missiles, which, unlike liquid-propellant missiles, can remain in a fueled and ready-to-strike state – meaning that they can be brought into combat readiness much faster (up to 15 minutes). They could wind up being “second-strike weapons” in situations where a large liquid-fuel missile would be the primary target for an American attack.

And, although the capabilities that the Pukkykson missiles exhibit are still more modest than the Hwasong family, it is believed that this missile can also carry nuclear weapons, and be used to attack US allies (Japan and South Korea), as well as American military bases “on the approach routes in the vicinity”. If an attack were successful, this would “cut down” the enemy’s infrastructure, and deprive it of the unique bonus that the United States has in terms of its ability to quickly transfer large troop contingents from one end of the world to the other.

In addition to the “program’s highlights”, North Korea showed off a diverse family of short-range, quasi-ballistic missiles – ones that we have seen tested over the past few years. There were also new anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles (approximate equivalents to the Russian S-300 and Tor air defense systems), “super-large-caliber” multiple-launch rocket systems with calibers up to 600 mm (with the designation KN-25 in Western countries).

However, it is worth noting that there has been visible progress made not only with missile systems, but with conventional weapons as well.

This magnificent mass event had two objectives. First, under the current regime involving the emergency anti-epidemic measures, Kim still acted to give the public a holiday. Those who wanted to search for hidden meanings found something else in the holiday: the nighttime show was supposed to demonstrate that the situation with electricity in the country was improving, while the audience’s lack of masks was the proof that the country was successfully fighting COVID-19.

Second, on the eve of the November 3 presidential elections in the United States, and a likely change of course if Biden secures a victory, Pyongyang is once again showing Washington that the DPRK has a military potential that is higher than some hawks can conceive, who still allow for the possibility of a military solution to any potential problem. However, at the same time, Pyongyang is refraining from an aggressive show of force, and believes that the missiles will speak for themselves.

It is clear that the message sent by the parade was taken by many people in different ways, and depending on their political partisanship. In the author’s opinion, on one hand the North is inclined towards dialogue, if it is oriented towards consensus rather than unilateral concessions; on the other hand, the North is clearly demonstrating that forceful methods of influence will be tolerated less and less.

The lack of reaction on the part of the United States is quite telling. John Supple, a spokesman for the US Department of Defense, simply told Yonhap that they knew about the parade, and that “our analysis is ongoing, and we are consulting with our allies in the region”.

Another official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the United States government “finds it disappointing that North Korea continues to prioritize its weapons development”, but no official statements were issued, either on behalf of the White House or from Donald Trump himself, about the parade.

In any case, one can assume that an October surprise has taken place, although experts from the rightist camp still expect that the moratorium will be violated by the end of this year, and perhaps even before the US presidential elections on November 3, 2020 – but the author will speak about that next time.

Konstantin Asmolov, Ph.D. in History who is a leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The upcoming US presidential election is yielding a series of books designed to analyze how Donald Trump has performed and, more often than not, put forth a rationale why everything went wrong during his tenure. The book Rage occupies a notable place among those; the author is Robert “Bob” Woodward, who is an American cult journalist and an associate editor at The Washington Post.

The cornerstone for the book was comprised of both 18 interviews that Woodward had with Trump from December 2019 to July 2020 and other sources. In particular, Woodward managed to get his hands on 27 letters that Kim and Trump exchanged (25 of which were never released to the public), and which he quotes copiously.

Analyzing this correspondence, Woodward notes that the language used by both leaders does not seem like what is traditionally used in diplomacy, and more resembles “a declaration of personal loyalty that the Knights of the Round Table would utter.”

For example, on June 15, 2018, three days after they met in Singapore, Trump writes that “the media outlets did a fantastic job for you and North Korea”. In response, on July 6 Kim writes: “This significant first meeting with Your Excellency, and the joint statement we signed together in Singapore 24 days ago, really marked the start of a meaningful journey”.

On September 6, 2018, Kim starts talking about the specifics: “We are ready to take further significant steps, one at a time, in stages, such as completely shutting down the Nuclear Weapons Institute, or the satellite launch area, and irreversibly closing our nuclear material production facility.”.

On December 25, Kim writes that he cannot “forget that historical moment when I had the opportunity to firmly squeeze Your Excellency’s hand in that beautiful, sacred place, while the whole world was watching us with great interest”, as well as “I am very humbled by the opportunity to establish a wonderful relationship with an individual such as Your Excellency”. However, he does get down to business quickly: 2019 is approaching, we have to meet, and it will be “a historical meeting, like a scene from a science fiction film”; people are already working, and it is necessary to definitively determine the meeting place for working negotiations. Kim Jong-un hopes that “Your Excellency will once again demonstrate a high level of resolve, and excellent leadership qualities, for the sake of achieving results during the second summit” and “the objectives set by Your Excellency will result in enviable fruitfulness”.

And, even though the summit in Hanoi was not successful, both sides still bowed and scraped before each other. On March 22, 2019, Trump writes to Kim: “Thank you again for making such a long journey to Hanoi. As I told you when we parted ways, you are my friend, and always will be”.

On June 10, Kim writes “a letter of verbose flattery”: “Just as during the short time we spent together a year ago in Singapore, every minute we shared 103 days ago in Hanoi was a jubilation that left precious memories… I am convinced that our strong and special friendship will become that magical force which will unfetter progress in relations between the DPRK and the United States, and will clear all the obstacles for us on the way to achieving our joint goals”. “I assure Your Excellency that my respect for you will never wane”.

However, in this author’s opinion, flattery is not as important as the passage that states “without new approaches and the needed resolve, the prospects for solving problems will only diminish” and “sooner or later, one fine day, to give our mutual trust yet another chance, we will sit down together and turn our grand intentions into reality”.

In response, on June 12, 2019 Trump writes: “Only you and I, working together, can solve the problems between our two countries and end nearly 70 years of hostilities, bringing an era of prosperity to the Korean Peninsula that will exceed our highest expectations – and you will be the one in charge”.

After the June 2019 summit at the DMZ on June 30, 2019, the parties exchanged several more letters – and then, on August 5, Kim expresses outrage over the joint US-South Korean military exercises. “I thought that these provocative joint field training exercises would be either canceled or postponed until the start of working-level negotiation between our countries, where we will continue discussing important issues… I am clearly offended, and do not want to hide this feeling from you. I am truly deeply offended.”

Woodward believes that the US President fell for crude flattery and the fact that he was called Your Excellency, noting that Trump often called Kim’s letters beautiful, although in response to similar accusations made by John Bolton, Trump explained that he was just being sarcastic.

But we are more interested in what new things we can learn about the underlying reasons for some actions. First, it seems that this author’s assumption is correct that Trump understood that the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula cannot be solved, but can be handled by putting the process of exacerbation on hold.  For example, Woodward describes how US officials, including senior intelligence officials, have warned that North Korea is unlikely to ever give up its nuclear weapons, and that Trump’s approach may wind up being ineffective. Trump, however, told Woodward that he is filled to the brim with resolve to stay this course, and that the CIA has no clue how to communicate with Pyongyang.

But, at the same time, Trump states that for the North Korean leader nuclear weapons are the same thing as a house that he cherishes, and therefore will not sell.   And that during the summits he “did not give anything away”.  And that if North Korea resumes its long-range missile tests then it will face “big problems. Big, big problems. Bigger than anybody’s ever had before”.

Second, it confirms the speculation that in 2017 the United States came very close to a war with North Korea. “Much closer than anyone would know. Much closer”. Furthermore, to counter a possible attack by North Korea, the United States considered the possibility of “using up to 80 nuclear weapons against the North”.

That last retort even prompted a comment from the presidential administration that the United States cannot use military force on the Korean Peninsula without consent from Seoul, and the use of nuclear weapons is not stipulated in the operational plan (OPLAN 5027), which describes the actions allies would take in the event North Korea invaded the South.

Along with that, according to Trump Kim Jong-un told him that he believes that war with the US is unavoidable, and is completely ready for it. It goes without saying that Trump emphasizes how if President Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton were in power, war would have already started, and for the fact that it did not happen he highlights his “excellent” relationship with Kim.

The DPRK leader made a huge impression on him, and allegedly was so sincere with him that he spoke in detail about the execution of his uncle, Jang Song-thaek. It turns out that Jang was beheaded, and his body was on display on the steps of a building used by high-ranking North Korean officials.

Third, Woodward notes that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un never once, directly or indirectly, raised the issue of withdrawing American troops stationed in South Korea, even though he was very upset by the joint field training exercises:  “Even less do I like the fact that the US military is engaging in these paranoid and hypersensitive actions with the South Korean people”.

Based on this, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, according to Woodward, came to the conclusion that the North may actually want US troops to remain in South Korea to help keep China in check.

The description of why the summit in Hanoi failed is also interesting. Trump is not as much heaping blame on Bolton as he is claiming that he said that closing down the Yongbyon Nuclear Science and Weapons Research Center was insufficient, asking Kim Jong-un to go for closing the “big deal”. Kim was supposedly ready to eliminate one of his nuclear facilities, but he had five.  However, the North Korean side refused to make any further concessions, which was the reason for Trump’s statement that it was “unwilling to negotiate”.

Naturally, this book is not only about the DPRK. Woodward reproaches Trump for “not feeling responsible for the anger and pain” experienced by black Americans, and for not believing there is systemic racism in America. He is surprised at Trump’s train of thought about a new US nuclear weapons system that nobody in the world has ever heard of, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. He quotes the president’s son-in-law and senior adviser, Jared Kushner: “the most dangerous people around the president are arrogant idiots.”

He described how some senior administration officials contemplated resigning, and how US Defense Secretary James Mattis went to the Washington National Cathedral to pray for the country’s future under Trump as commander-in-chief, even going to bed in his uniform to prepare for a possible emergency. According to Woodward’s book, Mattis once told then-Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats that Trump was dangerous, and unfit to be the president, and there might be a time when “we have to take collective action”. Also, Mattis allegedly told Coats that the president “does not have a moral compass”, and Coats agreed: Trump does not know the difference between truth and lies.

But let us recap the “Korean section”. On one hand, Woodward does believe that Trump conceded too much to Kim, postponing and then wrapping up the joint US-South Korea field training exercises, which have long angered the North, and giving Kim the international status and legitimacy that the North Korean regime has long craved. And it is no coincidence that almost every article in the South Korean media devoted to the book has ended with the rejoinder that “North Korea has not yet returned to the negotiating table with the United States”, or that “the negotiations, as before, have come to a dead end”.

On the other hand, although in 2017 many were convinced that a person like Trump would immediately start to wage war, it was the  interaction between the US President and the North Korean leader that prevented the escalation of tension.

“We didn’t have a war, and you […] have to give him his due” – that assessment is clearly praise, given that it comes from an author who believes that Trump is not the right person to serve as the country’s president.

Konstantin Asmolov, Ph.D. in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

On May 2, 2020, North Korea’s leader appeared in public, putting an end to rumors about his death or complete incapacity. The frenzy around this subject demonstrated nicely the value of a few “informed sources,” which in the West are accepted as trustworthy and, while Kim Jong-un wasn’t in sight, were busy distributing blatant disinformation.  In this context we shall present to our audience a “black list of sources about North Korea,” whose information was not confirmed by other sources, and are 99% “fables” for sure.

First place in our list goes to so-called “career defectors” from North Korea, who profit off their status by peddling horror stories about their former homeland. In their midst, assorted versions were advanced to explain Kim’s absence, including “hiding from the epidemic that was devastating the country,” but the one who “outshone” all others is the “storyteller cripple,” and now lawmaker, Ji Seong-ho, who laid Kim to rest back on April 23, stating that he was seriously ill, and could not return to power. At the same time, the power struggle was in full swing between the leader’s wife, sister, and mistress.

Yet, even other defectors, treated this talk with skepticism, in particular Thae Yong-ho. Thae himself, however, soon announced publicly that, although Kim was alive, “one thing can be said for sure – Kim cannot stand up by himself or walk properly”. After Kim’s return, Thae admitted that his statement was untrue, but continued to suggest that Kim may have health problems.

In the newspaper Dong-A Ilbo, yet another defector, Lee Jong Ho, who had fled to the USA, advanced his version that Kim could have been killed or seriously injured during missile tests that were conducted on April 14.

As a result he was, in fact, reprimanded in the country As Won Gon Park, Professor of International Politics at Handong Global University stated, “Ji, Thae, and others have sources inside the North, but it’s doubtful that they have access to such important information as Kim’s whereabouts and his health problems.”

Second place goes to the well known “fable” producer, Daily NK, which, while relying typically on anonymous sources, from the start simply reported that on April 12 Kim underwent heart surgery due to “excessive smoking, obesity, and exhaustion.”   Then, Daily NK in particular continued to rock the boat, reporting on April 28 that a video in North Korea of Kim Jong-un’s passing began spreading around. It simulated a broadcast of North Korean TV (naturally, Daily NK wanted to be taken at their word, yet they didn’t get their hands on the video itself). It is worth noting that a similar video had already appeared on the Internet under the guise of news by the Associated Press. The funeral of his father was passed off as Kim Jong-un’s. Of course, according to Daily NK, the video already had widespread exposure. Discussion of it was risky, and State Security was “going berserk in search of the author.”

In addition, Daily NK actively spread the news that texts written by Kim during his illness were composed in a style that differed so greatly from his typical style, that everyone understood the texts to have been written for him, and so they did not really dampen the rumors about the leader’s death, which were spreading around the country. That means we await the obituary.

Third place goes to Japanese and foreign news media. Regardless of their level of respectability, their faces turn an unhealthy yellow when speaking about North Korea.  This time, the weekly Shūkan Gendai especially distinguished itself with the news that, “during his trip around the country, Kim suddenly grabbed his chest and fell. They drove him to a local surgeon for an urgent stent insertion in his cardiac vessels, but the doctor’s hands shook, and Kim was too fat. As a result, the operation lasted, not 1 minute, but 8, and Kim fell into a vegetative state.” In reality, the average time for such an operation, if medical sites are to be trusted, takes approximately 2 hours.

Citing an anonymous intelligence operative, CNN reported on April 20 that Kim was in critical condition after his heart operation. But at the same time, another anonymous source and two named experts held a different opinion. Journalistic standards were formally maintained.

Attention now turns to those who more likely deceived themselves, or were deceived.  For example, Anna Fifield of the Washington Post cited trusted sources, who informed her of panic in Pyongyang’s stores, and that helicopters were flying low over the city. This information reinforced quite strongly public opinion that Kim was dead. But there was a problem. Yevgeny Agoshkov, a correspondent for TASS, was in Pyongyang that same day. While walking around the city, he did not notice any helicopters or panic.

On April 25, Qing Feng, Vice Director of HKSTV, Hong Kong’s satellite television network, reported Kim Jong-un’s death According to information from the publication International Business Times, a “very solid source” confirmed this information to her. However, on Qing Feng’s page in China’s social media site, Weibo, that post is no longer there. In her most recent note on April 24, she stated that she herself did not delete her posts, but that may have occurred either from pressure or comments from above, or because her source may have lied.

At least the rest of the news media observed strict standards. CNN’s report that Kim was in critical condition after his heart surgery appeared on April 20, citing an anonymous intelligence operative and material from Daily NY. At the same time, another anonymous source and two named experts held a different opinion.

The Reuters article that described China’s dispatch of a group of doctors and officials to North Korea to advise on Kim, cited three unnamed persons, who were familiar with the situation. The news agency, however, had difficulty determining precisely the trip’s objective, although the departure of both the aircraft and delegation were confirmed.  The agency drew its conclusion about the objective of the visit, due to its lack of publicity, and that Chinese physicians had also treated Kim Jong-il, yet the visit might also have been intended to coordinate activities to fight the coronavirus epidemic.

Finally, it’s the turn of those who were not lazy about digging into details, and didn’t chase after a hot story. Multiple informed sources of NK News reported on the frenzy in stores, but they did not tie this together with rumors of Kim’s death. Nor did they conclude that reports from State news media about “more severe emergency, anti-epidemic measures,” taken within the country meant that people should expect disruptions in food shipments from abroad.

In general, followers of news should keep in mind several rules.  Analysis of any sensational news should begin with its source. And the absence of other facts or statements that confirm the version of this “well-informed, anonymous source,” points toward a “fable” with a high degree of probability.

A reference to a “source, wishing to remain anonymous” is used typically in three cases. The first case likely concerns a civil servant or expert, who does not want to make his name public.  And, typically, expert observers are well aware of who is being quoted.

In the second case, a directive comes from above regarding news about a specific topic, but since the item cannot just appear out of nowhere, an anonymous source reveals it.

Finally, it also occurs that a journalist invents a certain theory, but to give it weight, he cannot write simply, “many believe,” but instead will write, “a number of experts consider that…” That sounds more authoritative, although current journalistic standards expect the disclosure of experts by name, and a news item should not rely only on an anonymous source or “rumors going around.”

There is one other possibility to expose a “fable” – when dramatic details from a “first-hand source” coincide with disbelief that the news item’s author could have had access to such information. For example, Shūkan Gendai’s news about Kim’s operation came from a certain source in China’s medical circles. But even if one imagined that this hypothetical doctor was a member of a group of physicians, who allegedly departed from China in a rush, who would have entrusted him with such details? It is far easier to imagine that, having received news, even if it was from China, that Kim underwent a stent insertion (theoretically, a mark left on his arm could indicate that), the Japanese journalists embellished the story with contrived details.

Finally, consideration must be given to a source’s political bias, which is a major problem with regard to North Korea. No one trusts North Korea’s official propaganda. There is widespread belief that it exists to put polish on reality. But besides Pyongyang’s propaganda, there is anti-Pyongyang propaganda, and organizations such as Daily NK, or career defectors from the North, who provide the “horrible truth” from the opposite side of the coin. It must be noted that news of this type is also supplied with references to a hidden network of informers, whose exposure risks their lives. Together with the country’s secretiveness this, to put it mildly, creates the temptation to invent further “horrors up North,” because there is almost no practical way to verify, what exactly is happening deep inside North Korea. As a result, with respect to the operations of Daily NK’s office, it is still possible to read evaluations such as:  “The organization’s reporting over the years has often proved highly accurate and it has an excellent reputation among professional North Korea watchers”.

And the author would like to conclude with a quote from an editorial from Korea Times:  “The media are required to go back to the principles of journalism. They should strengthen their fact-checking functions. They must not provide incorrect and unconfirmed information, especially about Kim’s health which is sensitive to national security. Do not forget that fake news is the enemy of democracy”.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

North Korea is considered to be one of the poorest countries and many believe that it is behind the rest of the world in the IT sphere. But is this true?

Mobile phone and computer penetration

As of November 2019, there were 6 million mobile phones (on average costing $100-200) in use in the DPRK. But they cannot be used to make international calls. There are two telecommunication providers: Koryolink and Kangsong Net. In July 2019, the Washington Post, citing documents it obtained from a former Huawei employee, reported that the Chinese company helped build and test North Korea’s commercial wireless network in 2008.

In order to make a phone call to an international number, one has to obtain the necessary permission from a relevant authority. Despite this, the number of international calls made from the DPRK has increased slightly.

Every fifth household has a personal computer. According to data published by Recorded Future, a cybersecurity company, “the network activity of the North Korean regime increased by 300 percent since 2017”.

In addition, “from 2017 to the present, the highest levels of internet usage among the North Korean elite who can access the internet shifted from weekend evenings to conventional work hours on weekdays”.

Locally made gadgets?

On 26 September 2019, a smartphone made in the DPRK, Phurun Hanul (“Blue Sky”), was presented at the 15th Pyongyang Autumn International Trade Fair. Its modern features include facial and electronic fingerprint recognition, and touchless gesture controls.

The device costs $290 (a substantial amount of money even for the relatively well-off inhabitants of Pyongyang) and can only be sold to DPRK residents. To ensure this, strict requirements are adhered to at the time a phone is sold. A vendor records the passport details of a customer and the device is then considered to be their property.

A detailed review of the Taeyang W713 (“Ocean”) tablet, released in 2017, can be found on the NKNews website. It is made by Chunggu Haeyang Unha Technology Exchange Company, which is under DPRK’s Central Information Agency for Science and Technology (CIAST, also referred to as the central bureau for science and technology development). The company has also designed the Mirae (“Future”) WiFi Network and the Taeyang 8321 tablet PC, which can connect to this network using a SIM card.

DPRK media outlets have also written about Jindallae smartphones. They have fingerprint, image and voice recognition features, and several hundreds of thousands of them are made per year.

There is an ongoing discussion among experts about the origins of these devices. Some believe that North Koreans are manufacturing all these gadgets themselves; others think that they simply assemble Chinese parts, and yet another group is convinced that these products originate in the PRC and are then made under DPRK brands. The third viewpoint finds indirect support in the fact that Pyongyang 2425 is identical to China’s Xiaolajiao E-Sports and Allview Soul X5 Pro smartphones.

Own software`

Even if it is hard to determine where these gadgets originated from, the same cannot be said about the associated software.

Some data is already available about DPRK’s efforts to digitize systems for managing and distributing available information on science and technology.  According to North Korea’s propaganda outlet Meari, CIAST has “recently developed and rolled out the ‘Field Worker’s Companion (1.0)’,” described as a project management app for mobile phone users.

In addition, CIAST uploaded hundreds of millions of articles on science and technology translated from various languages to North Korea’s Intranet. In April 2018, the Pyongyang Times reported that CIAST provided manufacturing plants with tens of millions of papers on technology, and developed and rolled out an approach for creating databases and search engines.

In June 2018, Rodong Sinmun (the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea) wrote that CIAST launched software that would allow North Koreans to view indexes listing economic, science and technology resources from all over the world dating back to the end of 1970s, and to search and read foreign academic journals.

In February 2020, KB Financial Group Research Institute reported that, since 2018, North Koreans have been using a mobile payment app named “Woolim”, “an imitation of China’s WeChat Pay and Alipay”.  “Users can buy products on North Korea’s e-commerce platforms using the app” and transfer money to each other.

In March 2020, Meari wrote about Taean 2.0, an integrated information management system that was implemented in a number of institutions and manufacturing facilities across the nation.

The updated version is a standardized corporate system for planning and managing the use of all the human, physical and information resources in an integrated manner. It can be used to process tasks ranging from production planning to managing products, manufacturing processes, workforce, key assets, electricity needs and financial reporting in real time.

The expertise of North Korean software developers is ascertained based not so much on stories about hackers, but on the fact that a team of three people from Kim Chaek University of Technology came in 8th place during the International Collegiate Programming Contest (ICPC), held in April 2019 in Portugal.

In September 2019, an article in Rodong Sinmun on advances in DPRK’s education system talked about new courses being offered on “information security, robotics, and engineering”. It also said that eleven “senior secondary schools with specialized IT courses” were to be established in each of North Korea’s provinces.

Crypto-DPRK

Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that the DPRK hosted its 1st Pyongyang Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Conference in April 2019. Approximately 100 experts from this “cutting-edge field from around the world” participated in the event. Attendees included Virgil Griffith, an American programmer who has worked on the Ethereum cryptocurrency platform. On 29 November 2019, he was arrested for providing highly technical information that “could be used to help North Korea launder money and evade sanctions” in his presentation at the Pyongyang conference.

Cryptocurrency use by the DPRK is a politicized topic. In fact, Recorded Future has often reported that the increased internet usage in North Korea has been linked to mining of cryptocurrencies, their theft or other financial crimes.  However, we will focus on hackers from the DPRK (or more specifically on the activities they supposedly engage in) another time.

Internet Censorship

While Kim Jong-il tried to prevent the flow of information, Kim Jong-un encourages it by adopting a “Mosquito-Net” model (which allows air to enter but not mosquitos) in controlling the Internet.  It is not difficult to find ideologically non-threatening information of common interest or about science and technology on North Korea’s Intranet. But to access it, users have to “fill out a lengthy application form” (in fact each subscription needs to be registered).  More interestingly, North Korea’s version of Linux (Red Star OS or “Pulgŭnbyŏl”), which needs to be installed on every device, has at least two important characteristics.

Firstly, screenshots of everything that one views are automatically saved and cannot be deleted. Hence, when a device undergoes a routine inspection, a staff member of an appropriate agency can see straight away what website a user has visited.

Secondly, the system checks the cryptographic signature of a file, which cannot be opened unless it is “authenticated” first. Only files generated on a user’s device or those sanctioned by the government can be viewed. Hence, it is problematic to save a file on a USB drive and then open it on a friend’s device so that he or she can access it. Of course, there are ways to bypass such restrictions, but they are not commonly available.

Radios in the DPRK are “fix-tuned to government frequencies” and it is also illegal to listen to foreign “enemy” stations. North Korea is also focusing on replacing traditional TV broadcasts with IPTV (a streaming service). It means that it will be impossible to tune into TV broadcasts from China, for instance, using homemade antennas. In fact, North Koreans can use these antennas not only to view Chinese broadcasts but also Korean ones, which include South Korean TV programs meant for residents of the Korean Autonomous Prefecture.

Still we need to remember Article 184 of the criminal code concerning the possession and dissemination of corrupt and decadent materials. Media content produced in the West and South Korea is deemed illegal and accessing it is punishable by law (imprisonment for up to 1 year, and up to 5 years for reoffending).  Such rules may seem draconian to proponents of freedom but, in accordance with South Korea’s National Security Act, “behaviors or speeches in favor of the North Korean regime” are also punishable by law.

All in all, North Korea’s hi tech sector (of the Fourth Industrial Revolution) is doing fairly well, which is in line with Kim Jong-un’s key economic policies.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“.

The deadline, established by the United Nations Security Council in December 2017, for ensuring all DPRK workers employed abroad return home was on December 22, 2019. As a result, all North Korean restaurants in Moscow closed down, and up until December 20, the Air Koryo airline had increased the number of flights between Pyongyang and Vladivostok from two to five per week. By November 19, 23,200 workers from the DPRK had come back home.

The situation in China is similar, on December 20, all the North Korean restaurants in the prefecture-level city of Dandong, in PRC’s Liaoning province, closed down. A source has reported that employees at the restaurants had received a notification from the DPRK instructing them to return home. Any eateries established jointly with Chinese partners remain open but employ staff from outside of the DPRK. At the same time, South Korean media outlets have reported there have been no signs that North Korean workers on tourist or other types of visas in the PRC are leaving the country. They have also affirmed that both China and Mongolia have refused to divulge the exact number of workers from the DPRK within their borders, which makes it impossible to ascertain how many of them have returned home.

In 2015, it was estimated that more than 50,000 North Korean workers (earning from $1.2 to 2.3 billion per year) were employed abroad, mainly in Russia and China. There were approximately 30,000 DPRK citizens working in Russia, according to official records from 2017. In 2019, ROK news outlets estimated that there were 100,000 North Koreans employed overseas earning more than $500 million a year.

In the current context, the author would like to remind the readers about the role played by these people in the economy of the DPRK. After spending two to three years in Russia, it is a fact that North Korean workers can return to the DPRK with $4,000-6,000 in savings. And as they are going back home on a Vladivostok-Pyongyang flight, the plane is full of goods that these workers had purchased on their salaries (which can be potentially “confiscated”) and that range from VCRs to car tires and industrial or agricultural equipment, clearly meant for use by small businesses.

In Russia, workers from the DPRK are highly valued since they are not involved in any criminal activities and are easy to manage. North Korean citizens also tend to isolate themselves from the rest of the world which reduces the chances of conflicts between them and locals. This is why local businesses were very keen on increasing their numbers and considered workers from the DPRK a sound alternative to those from Central Asia and China.

In view of all of this, it is tempting to ask the question “To what extent will the repatriation curb the chances of North Korean workers of earning money abroad?”. South Korean media outlets have pointed out that the measure will have a limited impact because existing loopholes in legislation will allow DPRK citizens to receive tourist visas instead of work permits.  According to professor Kim Dong-yub, China and Russia could change the visa status of these workers to another, such as travel or study, as both of these nations “need the North’s labor supply and vice versa”. Other reports state that next year, the DPRK is planning on sending approximately 10,000 of its workers to the PRC, including those who returned to North Korea from other UN members states.

It appears that blaming the Russian Federation and China for harboring North Korean workers or enabling them to travel abroad on tourist visas will be added to the list of accusations levelled against these two nations.

We would also like to highlight that sanctions have not yet been imposed against the DPRK’s tourist industry. Hence, it remains one of the few sources of revenue from abroad for the country. In light of this, ROK news outlets have highlighted the fact that a range of tourist facilities, possibly meant for Chinese visitors, is being built in North Korea. At the beginning of December, the DPRK opened a “tourist spot focusing on hot springs in Yangdok County” in its South Pyongan Province. Preparations are underway for the inauguration of the new tourist complex in the Wonsan-Kalma area, located in an isolated peninsula. It will offer its guests a range of hotels and facilities that meet international standards. Samjiyon County, situated near North Korea’s border with China, is also viewed as a tourist draw. However, in reality, the place is more of a pilot project rather than a tourism initiative, aimed at developing remote regions of the nation.

Such efforts are viewed as part of North Korea’s attempts to diversify its revenue sources in response to the sanctions imposed by the UN. Apparently, China is also aiding DPRK’s economy by providing help and spending its tourist dollars, on account of the fear that there could be an economic downturn. For instance, in 2018, the PRC gave North Korea $56 million in aid, and as of August 2019, it provided the DPRK with financial help amounting to more than $35 million.

In conclusion, it really does not seem reasonable to believe that the repatriation of North Korea workers would deal a “death blow” to this nation.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“.

On 1 October 2019, Choe Son Hui, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, released a statement saying that North Korea and the United States had agreed to hold a meeting between their respective working groups on 5 October. Later on, it was reported that the talks would take place in Stockholm. And then the North Korean delegation headed by Kim Myong Gil, the Roving Ambassador of the Foreign Ministry, arrived there via Beijing. The previous meeting (which lasted 3 days) between Choe Son Hui and her U.S. counterpart, Stephen Biegun, had also been held in Stockholm in January 2019.

South Korea’s presidential administration welcomed DPRK’s decision. While fielding questions from members of ROK’s National Assembly during a session of its Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, Foreign Minister of South Korea Kang Kyung-wha said that the outcomes of the negotiations on 5 October would depend on the extent of flexibility both sides would be prepared to show.

Naturally, there were questions about the agenda of this meeting as well as expert forecasts regarding its outcomes prior to the talks in Stockholm. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell even suggested that “President Donald Trump could eventually accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state” as long as Pyongyang agreed to “partially dismantle its nuclear weapons program” in exchange for relief from sanctions.

On 3 October, two sources “familiar with the issue”, who had asked not be identified, told the Korea Times that the United States had “unofficially” promised “North Korea “low-level” sanctions relief including a partial resumption of tourism at Mount Geumgang.

Other rumors of this nature came from Vox Media, an American digital media company based in Washington D.C., which reported that the United Nations was going to lift sanction on textile and coal exports from the DPRK for 36 months in exchange for the closure of the Yongbyon nuclear facility and the end of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program. Vox also claimed “US President Donald Trump promised North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during their meeting at Panmunjom in June that he would sign a declaration to end the Korean War which is technically ongoing — as only an armistice was signed — and cancel a joint military exercise with South Korea”.

We would like to remind our readers that in July 2019, Yonhap News Agency published an article “citing a source close to the White House” that said “Washington would support suspending the UN sanctions on Pyongyang’s coal and textile exports for 12 to 18 months” if Pyongyang agreed to dismantle its main nuclear facility at Yongbyon and halt its nuclear program. At the time, the US State Department denied the report saying it was “completely false”.

Time also made similar claims citing officials from the White House. According to the magazine, Donald Trump’s aides made a number of different proposals aimed at renewing negotiations with the DPRK during the meeting of the National Security Council on 1 October. The aforementioned suggestion was among them, and if the United Nations were to refuse to lift the sanctions, advisors to the US President recommended halting enforcement of these restrictions during the 12 to 18 month period. Donald Trump supposedly agreed to the proposal as, on account of Pyongyang’s submarine missile launch, he decided that it was important to restart and continue the negotiations with North Korea despite its efforts to develop dangerous weapons.

Donald Trump’s opponents were most probably behind these reports. And the latest developments remind the author of the times before the summit in Hanoi, when U.S. President’s enemies began to leak information about documents (to be signed) with concessions to North Korea, a step opposed by the U.S. society.

On 4 October, the deputy chiefs of countries’ delegations Mark Lambert of the USA and Kwon Jong-gun of North Korea were supposed to attend the pre-negotiation session in a conference hall of Villa Elfvik Strand on the island of Lidingo. And it is unclear whether the meeting between Kim Myong Gil and Stephen Biegun had taken place or not. Curiously, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not send any officials to Sweden. And, during a parliamentary review, ROK’s Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), in no uncertain terms, urged North Korea to alter its “course” and reject the notion that time could be on their side. He said that there were no guarantees that the position of Donald Trump’s administration would remain flexible and ensure its willingness to engage in dialogue.

On 5 October, the bulk of negotiations took place, and both sides described their outcomes in very different ways. According to the Dagens Nyheter newspaper, Kim Myong Gil spoke to journalists after the talks, saying he was disappointed that the United States had brought “nothing to the negotiation table”, and that the fate of any future North Korea-U.S. dialogue depended on the United States.

Kim Myong Gil told the journalists “The US raised expectations by offering suggestions like a flexible approach, new method and creative solutions, but they have disappointed us greatly, and dampened our enthusiasm for negotiation by bringing nothing to the negotiation table”. Having thus expressed his dismay, Kim Myong Gil then proposed a suspension of talks with the United States until the end of the year. He demanded the USA come up with mutually acceptable proposals to either keep the dialogue alive or “forever close the door to dialogue”. Kim Myong Gil also said that whether or not Pyongyang “would lift its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests” was completely up to the United States.

In turn, spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State Morgan Ortagus stated “The early comments from the DPRK [North Korean] delegation do not reflect the content or the spirit of today’s 8.5-hour discussion.” “The U.S. brought creative ideas and had good discussions with its DPRK [North Korea] counterparts,” she said, adding “The U.S. delegation previewed a number of new initiatives that would allow us to make progress in each of the four pillars” of the joint statement issued after the first North Korea–United States summit in Singapore in June 2018.

Morgan Ortagus noted “The United States and the DPRK [North Korea] will not overcome a legacy of 70 years of war and hostility on the Korean Peninsula through the course of a single Saturday.” In addition, she said the U.S. representatives had accepted an invitation from Sweden to return to the negotiating table in two weeks to continue the talks.

Sweden’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Ann Linde also said that the working-level negotiations between the DPRK and the United States, held in Stockholm, had been constructive. During an interview with the Sveriges Television (SVT) channel, the head of the ministry noted that the two sides had not reached any specific agreements, but also stated that if the DPRK and the United Stated decided to have another meeting, Sweden would be happy to provide both sides with comprehensive support.

On 6 October, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement saying that although, in fact, no progress had been made during the negotiations, Seoul hoped that the dialogue would resume. Later on, a spokesperson for ROK’s Foreign Ministry pointed out that South Korea would continue to play the role of a mediator and collaborate with the United States in order to keep the dialogue with North Korea going. A spokesperson for ROK’s Ministry of Unification also stated that it was too early to say that there was no longer any impetus for negotiations, after all the fact that the meeting had taken place was significant in itself as both sides were able to understand each other’s positions better following a 7-month break after the talks in Hanoi had failed.

The same day, in response to views expressed by the American side regarding the negotiations, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DPRK, issued a statement clarifying its stance. It said that North Korea had approached “the negotiations with expectations and optimism that the U.S. side would think and act in a proper way.” However, “The trite stance shown by the delegates of the U.S. side at the negotiations venue made us feel that our expectations were no better than an empty hope and rather increased a doubt as to whether the U.S. truly has a stand to solve the issue through dialogue.” Most importantly, the statement said “We have no intention to hold such sickening negotiations as what happened this time before the U.S. takes a substantial step to make complete and irreversible withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the DPRK, a policy that threatens the security of the country and hampers the rights to existence and development of its people.” Hence, North Korea’s stance has not changed since its leader gave a speech in April when he said that unless the United Stated changed its approach there would be no dialogue between the two sides. And the statement ended as follows “We have clearly identified the way for solving problem, the fate of the future DPRK-U.S. dialogue depends on the U.S. attitude, and the end of this year is its deadline.”

From the author’s point of view, the situation in Hanoi, in part, had repeated itself in Stockholm. Since Donald Trump’s opponents publicly claimed that he would make unacceptable concessions during the talks, the U.S. was forced to take a step back which caused dismay among the North Korean side.

Still, we would like to point out that although Pyongyang was clearly disappointed with the talks and chose to wait until the end of the year to see if any further changes occurred and then to prepare plan B, Americans were much more optimistic about the negotiation process. And possibly, they have adopted this stance not only with the view of creating a good impression within the United States. Since the talks actually lasted for 8.5 hours, they were not simply a part of a formal event that both sides had attended only to slam the door on any possible negotiations in the future.

After the summit in Hanoi, Donald Trump’s hands were “tied” for a certain period, but since Robert Mueller’s investigation ended and did not yield any ammunition for the President’s opponents, the internal political climate in the USA improved. Hence, the decision was made to continue the talks with North Korea. However, such processes need time, but, in the meantime, the scandal over Donald Trump’s conversation with Volodymyr Zelensky erupted and the Democrats used it as an opportunity to begin an impeachment inquiry. Therefore, once again the U.S. President had limited room to maneuver.

Other than that, the author would like to point out that Kim Jong-un’s strategy will in large part depend on who he thinks will become the U.S. President in 2020. After all, neither the Democrats nor conservative Republicans are likely to choose the direction the relationship between the United States and the DPRK is currently taking. This means that, despite a good personal relationship between the two leaders (if Donald Trump has been honest in his descriptions of it), from a political perspective, it is not to Kim Jong-un’s benefit to sign any agreements that, a year and change later, could be deemed as not in line with wishes of the American people. Naturally, until the end of Donald Trump’s presidential term, the two sides will try to maintain the current status quo. However, DPRK’s launch of the ballistic missile from a submarine could (if so desired) be used by hard liners to put an end to the dialogue.

Konstantin Asmolov, Ph.D, Chief Research Fellow of the Center for Korean Studies, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“.

Early in the morning of August 6, North Korea conducted a new series of missile launches, the fourth incident over the last two weeks. Short-range missiles (presumably the same type as those that were launched on July 25) crossed the Korean peninsula from the west to the east and, after flying for about 450 km, fell to the Sea of Japan.

According to South Korean military and the US expert V. van Diepen, short range ballistic missiles were used, though this term did not appear directly in the message of the Korean Central News Agency. However, in its opinion, the new multiple rocket launchers have a range of 60 km more. All this can give North Korea “more flexibility in the choice between multiple rocket launchers and short range ballistic missiles, as well as complicate even more the missile defense challenges for the US and South Korea.”

The missiles are now capable of maneuvering in order to reach the target covered with the missile defense under various azimuths. The trajectory projection to the Earth surface is not a straight line, but a curve, which means that the high-precision missile maneuvers both in the horizontal and in the vertical plane.

Now let us discuss the reaction of the officials of the US and South Korea to the launches.

After the first launches, Washington urged North Korea to abandon further missile tests: the US Department of State Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus said that Washington wanted the negotiations on the North Korean nuclear and missile programs to return to the proper course.

The South Korean Presidential Administration condemned the launches at once, making it clear that countermeasures may follow such actions. The representative of the South Korean Ministry of Defense Choi Hyun-soo also urged North Korea “to stop actions which do not promote efforts to decrease the military tension on the Korean peninsula.” The Ministry of Unification stated that the provocative actions of Pyongyang do not promote the decrease in the military tension in the region, which was practically repeated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Kyung-wha as well.

The opposition rigidly criticized the course of the present government of the South towards the reconciliation with the North. “After the conclusion of the inter-Korean military agreement on September 19, 2018 on the termination of threats against each other, North Korea carried out missile launches three times already. Taking into account this fact, we should abandon the agreement because of these actions of North Korea and take all measures for building forces for the response to the missile threat of the North,” the parliamentary floor leader of the Liberty Korea Party Na Kyung-won said.

Certainly, Donald Trump’s reaction was interesting to everybody, since experts remembered that, after the May launches, he took a more favorable position than his subordinates: “My people (including the Acting Minister of Defense Shanahan) think that it could be a violation… I see it differently”.

This time, the US President showed, according to the Chosun Ilbo newspaper, similar carelessness, saying that “short-range missiles and quite standard missiles.” The Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also considered them a common bargaining element.

The UN Secretary General António Guterres expressed concern about the launches and called for a prompt resumption of negotiations between the US and North Korea.

Germany, which is presiding in the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea, condemned the missile tests of Pyongyang as a violation of the UN resolutions. As Radio Free Asia reports, the representative of the German mission to the UN Catherine Deschauer said in her statement that the launches increased the doubts in the readiness of North Korea to carry out the dismantling of the nuclear programme and arsenal.

However, according to one of Moon Jae-in’s assistants, South Korea and the US will not try to impose additional sanctions on North Korea, as they did not violate the promise of North Korea to stop the nuclear weapon and long-range ballistic missile tests.

The majority of publications in the South Korea media, as well as experts, called the launches a response to the shipment of the cutting-edge weapons to South Korea and conducting the 19-2 Dong Maeng military exercise; they also paid attention to the use of the expression “power demonstration” by the North Korean party, considering the dialogue thus declines giving way to a new form of confrontation.

Many expressed the idea that North Korea is trying to hammer a wedge between the US and South Korea, criticizing Seoul, rather than Washington, and, as the professor Kim Dong-yop from the Institute for Far East Research of the Kangnam University pointed out, “instead of using the term missile, the North spoke of a tactical guided weapon.”

Some analysts, such as the former Assistant US Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Ocean Daniel Russell, considered Trump’s reaction to the provocations of the North as a risk for the relations of Washington with its allies in Asia.

After the second stage of the launches, members of the South Korean National Security Council expressed a serious concern that the launches could have a negative impact on the peace-making efforts on the Korean peninsula. The participants of the meeting emphasized the need for continuing the diplomatic efforts for overcoming the deadlock in the negotiations on the denuclearization of North Korea.

At the same time, the Minister of Defense Jeong Kyeong-doo, speaking at the forum organized by the State Korean Institute for Defense Research said that the military are ready to resist a possible threat from the North. Jeong confirmed the strong alliance between South Korea and the US, noting that joint exercise between the two countries will take place in the regular fashion, despite its smaller scale. Moreover, if North Korea shows serious provocations again, it will be regarded as an enemy state again. He added that the South Korean military “have all means necessary for responding to this threat.”

On August 1, the opposition Liberty Korea Party presented a draft resolution condemning the missile tests and launches carried out by Pyongyang to the National Assembly. 16 people, including the parliamentary floor leader of the Liberty Korea Party Na Kyung-won, the member of the Parliamentary Committee for Defense Issues Pek Syn Ju and others signed the document. The draft resolution emphasizes that North Korea violated the UNSC resolutions. Besides, by carrying out the missile tests, Pyongyang seeks to increase its ballistic missile potential, which aggravates the situation in the region.

On August 1, the UNSC, following the request of the UK, France and Germany, held a closed meeting criticized by North Korea even despite the absence of final accusatory statements. “The Security Council is trying to call into question the launches with the use of ballistic equipment per se, rather than the range of the launched shell, it is equal to our refusing the right to self-defense completely. The thoughtless words and behavior of the UK, France and Germany will not contain the tension on the Korean peninsula, but, on the contrary, will work as a catalyst to make things worse,” the Kangnam University publication read.

However, John R. Bolton, National Security Advisor of the US, said in his interview with Fox Business that missile launch of North Korea was not a violation of the promises to observe the moratorium on ICBM launches. Such position differs from Bolton’s reaction to the launches which took place in May when he said that the North violated the UNSC resolutions.

Donald Trump also explained that North Korea had launched short-range missiles, which are standard weapons in the arsenal of many countries. “I think that this situation is entirely under control,” the president added and specified that launches did not violate his arrangements with Kim Jong-un.

In the morning of August 2, the South Korean Presidential Administration hosted an emergency meeting of the power block ministers under the chairmanship of Eun-Young Jeong, however the National Security Council did not convene this time.

By the third launches, the position of the US President began to change. Donald Trump recognized that tests could constitute a violation of the UN resolutions. “There can be a violation of the UN resolutions, but the chairman Kim would not want to disappoint me.” On the other hand, Trump once again emphasized that “there was no discussion of short-range missiles when we shook hands.”

The expert Stephan Haggard told NK News that, obviously following the instructions of the US President, his whole team is showing a reserved stance on the recent tests. Besides, he noted that the launches had a purely technical aspect as well. “The Iskander type missile is a sophisticated weapon and, as any new system, it has to be tested.”

As for the development in the situation, it is evident that Pyongyang is not going to remain inconspicuous and silent, while joint exercises are conducted. Demonstrations of power will continue until the exercises are over, but it does not mean that North Koreans are not interested in negotiations with the US any more. On the contrary, the choice of a short-range missile is a sign that Pyongyang is still ready to maintain the status quo.

Therefore, it is necessary to treat the recent messages about a confidential meeting between the US and North Korean officials in DMZ seriously. During this meeting, the North Korean representative allegedly told his American counterparts that the negotiations will soon resume at the operating level.

Of course, it will not happen while the joint exercises are held, but it will happen soon enough.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.