Although Japan used to be associated with the poetic name “Land of the Rising Sun,” it has recently been increasingly turning, through the fault of its current political authorities, into a “Land of the Rising Sanctions.”

Until recently, under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, relations between Russia and Japan were consistently good and even warm. Regular working and personal contacts between Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin fostered trade and business cooperation between the two countries and were somewhat of a “failsafe” against Japan sliding into Russophobia under pressure from Washington and its own right-wing radicals calling for “war over the Kuril Islands.” It is precisely this skillful dialogue that distinguishes an outstanding politician, which Shinzo Abe no doubt was, from a run-of-the-mill Washington stooge willing to “please the big brother” even for a small handout from the big table.

Sure, Japan lost its identity after World War II and became an outright US dependent state, suffering a host of challenges from more than 75 years of US occupation, forced as a geisha to serve a contingent of thousands of US troops, who rampage and commit multiple crimes against Japanese citizens on a regular basis. The US military has notoriously been stationed in Japan since the end of World War II. More than 70% of US military facilities are located on the island of Okinawa – some 30,000 US troops serve here and several tens of thousands of their family members live there. According to statistics, Americans have committed more than five thousand crimes in Japan since 1972. And the US military often went unpunished. The Japanese regularly take to the streets to demand the dismantling of the military bases, but Japanese politicians have not been sufficiently assertive and consistent in supporting such demands of their people, servilely preferring “not to anger Washington” in the UN and other international institutions.

Nevertheless, even this stance towards the US has not prevented the now legendary Shinzo Abe from pursuing a policy of his own, which has led, among other things, to maintaining a “special relationship” with Russia. Abe’s main foreign policy tenets have been, in addition to alliance with the US and containment of a fast-growing China, friendship with Russia. A friendship, or rather amity between the two parties that enables cooperation to solve common problems. Abe took the approach literally – building a good personal relationship with Vladimir Putin, whom he called his friend, and with whom he met almost 30 times for talks. Because of this relationship, in 2014, despite pressure from Washington, Tokyo imposed a very mild, minimalist package of sanctions against Russia, described in the press as “polite,” letting everyone know that it does so with great reluctance too.

Abe’s tremendous domestic support made it possible to hope that Japan, through him, would agree to a convenient compromise (for example, joint economic activities on the disputed islands) that would open a truly new era in bilateral relations.

Abe valued mutual understanding with Putin because he believed it could ensure the balance of power in the South China Sea region, where Japan’s main adversary and – potentially – mortal enemy, i.e. China, has been creeping expansion for years.

But the new leadership of Japan, a country with centuries-old traditions of morality and noble behavior, Bushido, which has always stood apart from the rest of the world, has decided to fundamentally change its policy and bow even more to Washington. As early as January 21, a meeting between US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida led to the conclusion that Japan’s new leadership, together with Washington, would open a second front against Russia in the Pacific Ocean if Russia carried out an “invasion” of Ukraine.

And now, according to the Japanese Mainichi Shimbun, some 70 volunteers, including about 50 former members of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, are to go to Ukraine to fight for the Nazi authorities in Kiev. The Japanese government has announced the freezing of assets of four Russian banks, including VTB, as part of sanctions against Russia over the situation in Ukraine, Kyodo news agency reported, citing the country’s finance ministry chief, Shunichi Suzuki. Then the Japanese government imposed export sanctions on 49 Russian companies and organizations, as well as sanctions on 20 Russians, including businessmen, officials and prominent Russian figures in connection with the Russian military special operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine.

Given the clearly Washington-inspired support by official Tokyo for the Nazi authorities in Kiev, it is not surprising that the Russian embassy in Tokyo said in its Telegram channel that Japan “has supported a Nazi regime twice in less than a hundred years.” Meaning that the first of these regimes was Hitler’s Germany and the second the current Ukraine.

At the same time, Tokyo’s territorial claims to Russia have intensified, as expressed, in particular, in Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s declaration during a March 7 parliamentary debate that the southern part of the Kuril Islands are “ancestral territories” of Japan. “Unfortunately, Japan has been very active in this Western mainstream, and is obeying all instructions without complaint. Japan does not seem to realize how destructive it is acting against its own national interests,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on March 9 on Sputnik radio, commenting on Japanese officials’ statements about territorial claims against Moscow.

At the same time, Japan’s business world refuses to go along with Tokyo and Washington’s politicians in dealing with Russia. Despite announcements of large-scale withdrawal of Western companies from Russia and the fact that Dutch-British Shell is leaving the Sakhalin-2 project, Japan’s Mitsui & Co. and Mitsubishi Corp. consider it advisable to stay. According to Nikkei, a top corporate executive in Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has submitted a document saying that a hasty withdrawal is dangerous and will play into China’s hands. Sakhalin-2 is the first LNG project in Russia, in which Gazprom owns 50%, Shell another 27.5% and Mitsui & Co. and Mitsubishi Corp. 12.5 and 10%, respectively. The Japanese companies believe, Nikkei reports, that no matter what happens, Sakhalin-2 will continue to operate, and Japanese consumers will have to pay an extra $20 billion for LNG on the spot market if corporations leave Sakhalin-2.

Vladimir Danilov, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

On February 7, 2022, US Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel, in a video message posted on Twitter, expressed support for Japan on the issue of ownership of the Southern Kuril Islands, stating that “the United States supports Japan on the issue of the Northern Territories and has recognized Japanese sovereignty over the four disputed Islands since the 1950s”. It certainly does nothing to help normalize relations on the Kuril Islands between Russia and Japan, but only fuels anti-Russian sentiment in Japanese society.

But it cannot be said that the Japanese society fully supports Washington’s line: one commentator under the video appeal ironically suggested the placement of American bases in Hokkaido to better protect national interests, another asked whether the Americans are to blame for the story of the return of the two islands in Khrushchev times, a third asked a reasonable question: “What did the Yalta Conference participants say? Wasn’t the US behind the Soviet invasion?”, while another commentator pointed out that Okinawa was returned to Japan 50 years ago [in 1972], but there is a basic Japanese-American security problem, there is the issue of a status agreement. There is also a perception in Japan that it was the US that created the “Northern Territories” problem with the Soviet Union. There were reminders of the US nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as US military operations in the Middle East.

Despite Washington’s long-standing call on Tokyo to impose sanctions against Russia, which Rahm Emanuel touched on in his video message, the Japanese leadership is in no hurry to draft domestic laws that would allow international economic sanctions on the basis of human rights violations. On that occasion, Russian Ambassador to Japan Mikhail Galuzin said in an interview on February 10, 2022:

“As for the possible participation of this or that country in the anti-Russian sanctions once again being conceived by Washington and the Anglo-Saxons, of course this will not help our country’s relations with the state that has joined these sanctions. I am fully compelled to explain this to my Japanese colleagues and reiterate that joining the sanctions will not help to create a favorable atmosphere for the Russian-Japanese dialogue”.

The lack of a legal framework for international economic sanctions allows Japan to maintain even relations not only with Russia, but also with another nuclear neighbor and major trading partner in the region, China, where Washington says human rights are allegedly being violated in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

As for trade ties with Russia, Japan, for example, is the main buyer of liquefied natural gas from the Sakhalin-2 project, owning a 22.5 per cent stake in its operator, Sakhalin Energy. Negotiations are also under way to create opportunities for “mutually beneficial business cooperation in the Kuril Islands, including the southern part, in the context of a major initiative by Russia’s leadership to launch a preferential customs and tax regime in the region,” Russian Ambassador to Japan Mikhail Galuzin said, adding that “Japan does not and cannot have any exclusive rights to those territories. Any economic activity in the Kuril Islands, including its southern part, must be carried out strictly on general terms and solely within the framework of Russian law.” It is the latter statement that does not suit the Japanese side, causing the issue of establishing a special economic zone in the southern Kurils to stall.

As long as Tokyo listens to Washington’s rhetoric, no positive developments are likely in the Japanese-Russian diplomatic dialogue, which is aimed, among other things, at finding a way to sign a peace agreement between the two countries. Unfortunately, the information posted in Russian on the official website of Japan’s Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty leave little room for optimism in quick resolution: “The ‘Northern Territories’, consisting of Iturup, Kunashir Island, Shikotan Island and the Habomai Islands, were handed down from one generation of Japanese to another, they are the ancestral territory of Japan and have never been the territory of other states.”

But there is a bright side to Japan-Russia relations: under the rule of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a new impetus has been given to bilateral humanitarian exchanges in the field of education and the recruitment of graduates, including through the implementation of the Eight-Point Plan for Economic Cooperation between Russia and Japan, which Abe proposed to Russian President Vladimir Putin during a summit meeting. Putin during a summit meeting in 2016. As part of this Plan, the HaRP platform (Human Resource Development Platform for Japan-Russia Economic Cooperation and Personnel Exchange) was established in 2017, and inter-university relations were intensified: Hokkaido University and Niigata University are initiating educational projects on the Japanese side; Tokai University is actively working, concluding partnership agreements with five major Russian universities. At the same time, the project “Russian-Japanese youth exchanges”, which the Russian Ministry of Education and Science has been running since 1999, is gaining momentum. In 2018, the “Association of Russian and Japanese HEIs”, initiated in 2016, began its work with a total of 63 Japanese and Russian HEIs as of 2021.

In recent years, Japanese companies have been interested in hiring Russian graduates, especially in the field of IT: thanks to the digitalization of the global economy, they can work from home without having to leave the Russian Federation. Graduates from Russian HEIs are in high demand by Japanese employers after taking Japanese language courses provided by the Japanese side through agreements with Russian higher education institutions; Kazan Federal University and Astrakhan State University have been the most involved in this process.

The remote work offered by Japanese companies to Russian specialists is mutually beneficial to both Russia and Japan from an economic point of view. If Russian specialists are employed directly in Japan, they are expected to return home at the end of their employment contract, so there is no question of a “brain drain” from Russia.

By recruiting Russian employees to Japanese firms, Russia’s image is changing for the better in the eyes of the Japanese. The stereotype of the Russian man as “unfriendly and lazy” due to “old Western films” is gradually giving way to the fair view that the Russians “bear a great resemblance to the Japanese” in their serious attitude to work, humility and high capacity for learning, according to an extensive study conducted in 2021 by the government’s Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO).

Such high professional, intellectual and moral qualities, as restraint and modesty, especially important to Japanese culture, in fact, traditionally inherent in the Russian national character, are highly valued in the Japanese labor market, bringing the two cultures closer together.

It is hoped that in the future the difficult issue of Russian-Japanese relations will find a positive solution for the benefit of the two countries.

Petr Konovalov, a political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

NEO has already had reasons to complain about the rapidly changing agenda on both the local and global levels as the “Great Game” unfolds. Which, by the way, is a sure sign that at the current stage of its development it is mired in crisis. In this context, it is necessary to make some remarks.

Thus, recall that at a press conference after the meeting in Hawaii of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea, the head of the State Department, Antony Blinken, devoted almost half of the time allotted to him to the topic of the Ukrainian crisis. Although this meeting itself was held on an immeasurably more important occasion, due to Washington’s long-standing headache caused by unsuccessful (twenty-year) attempts to form a trilateral military and political union in the region. The reasons for the failures of which have been discussed more than once by NEO.

The reason for the recent trilateral meeting was provided (as always) by the DPRK, which made a series of new missile launches into the Sea of Japan the day before. What would regional political tricksters do without the North Korean “Kims”? They should have a monument raised in their honor instead of being publicly cursed.

Naturally, both the ROK and Japan could not care less about the problems of the “Space of Wild Ukies” located somewhere with their children’s fairy tales about “the thousand-year history of Ukraine, during which it has continuously repelled Russian aggression protecting the civilized world.”

During the aforementioned press conference, the Head of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs limited himself to a couple of meaningless phrases regarding the “Ukrainian” topic, while his Japanese colleague Yoshimasa Hayashi completely passed it over in silence. The latter probably caught not only NEO’s eye. And here some explanations will be needed regarding the “price of the issue” for Japan when its “big brother” has been trying (for a long time) to show it the “importance of the Ukrainian issues.”

The abovementioned “price of the issue” is determined by the word “Russia”, more precisely, the possibility and level of influence on it in competition not only with Japan’s geopolitical opponent in the person of the PRC, but also with the “big brother.” It should be stressed that this is not so much about the notorious “problem of the Northern Territories”, but, again, about the possibility of influencing the Russian Federation as a whole.

NEO at one time had to listen to the same question from Japanese experts more than once: “When will this damned Ukrainian nonsense finally end so that we could focus on important things?”. It seems, it should never be the case since Japan’s “big brother” once acquired an overly effective foreign policy tool. It is namely suitable for “bossing around” Tokyo, so that the increase of Japan’s role in the world proceeds in the “right direction.”

For almost two years since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, the government of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been “dragging its feet” with joining the anti-Russian sanctions that Washington has begun to impose. During this time, articles appeared in some serious American media outlets (also written) by (a sort of) experts who reflected whether Article V of the Japan-US “Security Treaty of 1960” applies to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. But as soon as by the spring of 2016 Shinzo Abe declared solidarity with Japan’s main ally in the Ukrainian issue, the then US President Barack Obama, who had been silent on this topic for two years “like a partisan under interrogation,” personally said approximately the following words about the applicability of the mentioned article to the situation around the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands: “Well, of course, yes. Were there any doubts? It can’t be.”

And today, when “America returns,” the Ukrainian master key in the capable hands of Washington turns out to be very useful, since the discipline in the Euro-Atlantic ranks during the administration of Donald Trump has become by no means harsh.  The thing is the Japanese and Europeans seem not to care that the heroic Ukrainian people has been shedding blood by the bucketful “for our and your democracy” in the fight against one of the main autocratic regimes.

The effectiveness of this master key was tested, again, on Japan. That is why the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs remained silent on the Ukrainian issue in Hawaii but his rebellion did not go any further. It is necessary to know when enough is enough, and Hayashi, of course, knows it well. He demonstrated it during his visit to Germany at the end of the second decade of February on the occasion of a number of events held there.

However, he expressed his solidarity with his allies on this issue in fairly cautious terms (“if there is an invasion, then, generally speaking, economic sanctions will be considered together with other G7 participants”). Using equally interpret-as-you-wish wording, Japanese news agencies have been transmitting the content of Hayashi’s conversation on this topic with the current NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and a number of European colleagues. Thus, the Romanian interlocutor of the Japanese minister promised to help evacuate Japanese citizens from the territory of Ukraine (“just in case”).

But, of course, all these “adjustments” regarding the Japanese stance on Ukrainian issues were not initiated by Japan’s foreign minister. At the same time, there was a half an hour long conversation between Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, during which the parties expressed their intention to “persistently continue diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the conflict.” Fumio Kishida also promised to allocate an emergency loan to Ukraine for USD 100 million. The same problem of Japanese citizens staying on the territory of Ukraine was not forgotten.

The Japanese parliament, which adopted a special resolution demanding that the government promote “the rapid introduction of peace to the region,” did not remain idle either. However, even without parliamentary urging, the government has been working in this direction, as they say, “by the sweat of its brow.”

In particular, it decided to share parts from imported liquid gas with the Europeans in order for them not be frozen too much in the process of self-restrictions aimed at deterring “Russian aggression” in Ukraine.  Although the head of the German Foreign Ministry bravely states: “We will be patient.” As a matter of curiosity, who these “we” are and what relation does a trampoline-jumping champion have with the formation of one of the world’s leading economies?

Finally, it should be noted that the “Ukrainian project” was part of a more global endeavor aimed at the collapse of the USSR as a result of which all the peoples of the once great country suffered, and the Ukrainians practically most of all.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The run-up to the discharging of chemically treated, but still radioactive water from the wrecked Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant is once again taking center stage in the eyes of many of Japan’s neighbors.

The Japanese authorities opted to release Fukushima water last April to advance the decommissioning process that has lasted for more than a decade. As the reader may recall, in 2011, a massive magnitude 9.0 earthquake triggered a huge tsunami that killed more than 18,000 people along Japan’s north-east coast. Tsunami waves crashed into Fukushima nuclear power plant, knocking out its backup electricity supply, which caused meltdowns in three of its reactors and sending large quantities of radiation into the atmosphere. More than 150,000 people were forced to flee their homes. At the same time, evacuation orders in communities closest to the plant were only recently partially lifted.

Almost immediately after the disaster at the nuclear power plant, radioactive water became a serious headache for the government and the company operating the power plant, Tokyo Electric Power. The government plan envisages that millions of tons of chemically treated, but still radioactive water will be dumped into the sea in the course of 30 years in several stages, starting in 2023.

This accident at Fukishima Daiichi has been the world’s worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl, although the environmental fallout turned out to be less damaging than experts feared. Immediately after the disaster Japan’s government banned the sale of 44 fish species, but by 2020 it lifted all these restrictions. Excess radiation in the agricultural products is also becoming increasingly rare. For that reason, in early February, Taiwan announced that it would lift the ban on food and agricultural imports from Northern Japan since it is now deemed safe.

Nonetheless, the issue of getting rid of radioactive water still looms large on the agenda of the government and Tokyo Electric Power. As of last year, 150 tons of radioactive water flowed to the NPP every day, with rain and ground water mixing up with the water used to cool the reactors.

For now, this radioactive water is being treated, but to remove tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, and some other elements from it is just not possible. All radioactive water is stored in 1,061 tanks, and according to Tokyo Electric Power, those will be filled to the brim by spring 2023. Japan’s authorities fear that adding up to the battery of tanks may pose new difficulties, so the issue of discharging water has taken on particular urgency.

However, to ensure that tritium level is low enough when diluted with seawater, storage sites are being constructed which will be used as temporary tanks before the discharge itself. Besides, the Japanese authorities’ project sets out for building of an underwater tunnel through which water will be dumped into the sea at a 1 km distance from the plant. The tunnel construction was expected to get under way earlier this year. The works, however, were put off until June as many officials doubt that the tunnel will be ready in time due to recent delays induced by the coronavirus pandemic as well as the lack of consent for such efforts both in Japan and abroad.

Some environmental experts and nuclear physicists believe that discharging water is the lesser evil as the Pacific ocean will help make radiation harmless to humans. At the same time, local fisherman abandoned by their customers in the wake of the disaster, lambasted the move as “absolutely unacceptable.”

The South Korean government whose waters border the Japanese ones, has fiercely opposed the plan. On February 4, Russian and Chinese leaderships issued a joint statement where they voiced concerns over Japan’s plan to release into the ocean contaminated water from Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant saying that the water should be disposed of in a responsible and adequate manner based on Japan’s agreements with neighboring countries and international organizations.

Tokyo Electric Power argues that its purification technology allows for removing almost all radioactive elements from the water except for tritium which is harmless in small quantities. It said the gradual release of the water, diluted with seawater, would not pose a threat to human health or the marine environment. In 2020, however, Greenpeace said the water still contained contaminants beside tritium and would have to be treated again.

In these conditions, the Japanese government asked the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to visit Fukushima and to examine the safety of the treated radioactive water with the idea that a seal of approval from a credible international body could be used as a powerful argument in debates with critics at home and abroad. At first, a team of researchers from 11 countries, including China, South Korea, and Russia, which are the fiercest opponents of the water release, was expected to visit Japan in December but the trip was cancelled due to a new coronavirus wave.

The Japanese government has also struggled to gain support from fishermen and the public regarding the plan of releasing chemically treated water from the NPP. Fishermen are particularly adamant in the opposition against dumping radioactive water in the area.

Their fears are justified by the events of the last month, when the Japaneses government suspended sales of black rockfish that had been caught not far off from Fukushima. This comes after experts found that the fish was 14 times more radioactive than the legally permitted level: according to Japan’s ministry of health, the fish contained 1,400 becquerels of radiation per kilogram, compared with a safe level of 100 becquerels per kilogram. This news, as The Times reports, added to anxiety of the local population which opposes the authorities’ plans to release contaminated water into the ocean from the crippled power plant.

On February 14, a group of IAEA experts arrived to Japan to review the “controversial” planned release of more than 1.25 million tons of contaminated water from Fukushima Daiichi into the ocean. The IAEA group promised to report its findings in late April.

However, as The Guardian reports, Shaun Burnie, a senior nuclear specialist for Greenpeace East Asia, said he did not believe the IAEA would fully investigate and address safety and environmental concerns in its report. He noted that “the IAEA is not an independent agency in nuclear affairs – under statute its mission is to promote nuclear power. It has sought to justify radioactive marine pollution as having no impact and safe. But the IAEA is incapable of protecting the environment, human health or human rights from radiation risks – that’s not its job.”

Vladimir Danilov, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The regular US-Japan meeting (2+2) (officially called the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee) in January this year, involving the foreign and defense ministers of both countries, is noteworthy for a number of reasons.

First of all, it should once again be emphasized that the very existence of the 2+2 format in a pair of states is almost a necessary sign (with a few exceptions, such as in the RF-Japan pair) of a high level of trust in the relations between them. Necessary, but certainly not sufficient.

In the case of the US-Japan nexus, this necessary attribute is complemented by others, among which the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the most important. The confirmation of the “cornerstone” importance of the bilateral military and political alliance in the whole system of US-Japanese relations is the central thesis of the outcome document of each successive 2+2 meeting.

The motivation for holding another 2+2 meeting does not, of course, end with the fixation of allegiance to this “creed” in this relationship. Each such event audits the full range of defense and security issues, both bilaterally and in the Indo-Pacific region as a whole.

The latter is subject to high dynamics, but still not to the extent that the Joint Statement, which is adopted by the parties at the end of the next 2+2 meeting, is completely different from the previous one. A major aspect of the US and Japanese concerns about the regional situation was identified long ago. It is driven by the factor of the PRC’s emergence as one of the world’s leading powers. Everything to do with it has been in the spotlight lately in Washington and Tokyo, encouraging them to meet more frequently in the 2+2 format.

Since 2020, they have been held annually, with a gap of just nine months between the last and penultimate one (held on March 16, 2021). The reasons for this seem to be the sudden change of the Japanese cabinet in November 2021 and the further straining of relations between Washington and Tokyo on the one hand, and Beijing on the other.

With regard to the PRC, the Joint Statement 2022 mainly uses already established negative connotations, such as: “Ongoing efforts by China to undermine the rules-based order present political, economic, military, and technological challenges to the region and the world.” The concern is expressed, first, about the situation in the entire maritime belt adjacent to the PRC (at least 4,000 km long) and, second, about the intention to jointly confront the challenges that both members of the US-Japanese alliance see here. In particular, the US confirms the extension of Article V of the alliance to the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu in China).

Both sides once again advocated a “peaceful settlement” of the situation in the Taiwan Strait and rejected China’s claims to the waters and island archipelagos in the South China Sea. The second case refers to a ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in the summer of 2016.

An opportunity has not been missed to meddle once again in the internal affairs of the PRC with regard to the situations in XUAR and Hong Kong.

At the same time, the text of the Joint Statement 2022 reflects the military and political innovations that have emerged in the region since the penultimate 2+2 meeting. In particular, the ministers endorsed the signing (discussed in the NEO) of the so-called Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), a detailed set of rules under which military units of both countries can be stationed on each other’s territories.

The formation of the trilateral AUKUS configuration (comprising Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States), as well as the increasing military and political activity in the region by leading European countries, have been equally welcomed.

Participants in the last US-Japan 2+2 meeting expressed their intention to promote cooperation in the development of advanced military-applied technologies, as well as to strengthen controls on the possibility of any information about the results being leaked and falling into the hands of the PRC.

In this regard, the Joint Statement first mentions “hypersonic systems” in the part that deals with this kind of development by regional opponents. Apparently, this does not only refer to PCR’s announced test of its hypersonic missile. The DPRK is suspected of something similar.

It was therefore noteworthy that a report that appeared the day before the 2+2 meeting was held that the Japanese Defense Ministry was funding the development of a railgun with an electromagnetic projectile acceleration system. It is supposed to be used in air defense systems to intercept hypersonic missiles. Apparently, these studies will be taken as a basis for joint work on such systems, which, among others, were mentioned by Secretary of State Antony Blinken during his speech at the event.

The NEO has repeatedly noted a long-standing trend towards a levelling of the roles of the participants in the US-Japan alliance. Japan is gradually shifting from being a “consumer” of defense and security services provided by its overseas “big brother” to being a significant “supplier” of them. This has been fully understood by all recent US administrations, especially the penultimate president. In this regard, it is notable that the Joint Statement says that “Japan reiterated its resolve to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities… The United States welcomed Japan’s resolve…”

At the same time, the US restated its “unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan” (in particular, as noted above regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands) in accordance with the provisions of the bilateral military and political alliance.

Of course, the Covid-19 pandemic factor could not but affect the agenda of the event under discussion, which, however, continues to be present in all global processes while the political and medical nature of this factor remains unclear.

It is understandable the interest with which the passing of another US-Japanese 2+2 meeting was watched in the main “object” of its targeting, the PRC. Here, on the one hand, they called everything that the sides have been saying lately about the situation in the sea lanes adjacent to the Chinese coast as well as in China itself well-established “anti-China clichés”. But at the same time they took the event quite seriously. This is especially true of the Taiwan issue.

Overall, however, the very fact, as well as the outcome of another US-Japanese 2+2 meeting shows a thickening of the shadows in the overall picture of the Indo-Pacific region.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

On January 5, Reuters, citing Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, reported the signing of the so-called Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with his Japanese counterpart Kishida. This event is certainly one of the most significant ones in the process of development of the political and strategic situation in the Indo-Pacific region.

The November 2020 visit to Japan by the same Morrison was a milestone in the successful conclusion of years of bilateral negotiations to conclude the RAA. Then, during a meeting with Yoshihide Suga, the predecessor of Japan’s current Prime Minister Suga, the two sides came to an “agreement in principle” that it was time to finally agree on all the contentious points in the document that would establish the RAA.

The latter should be an important addition to the format of bilateral relations in the field of defense and security, which since 2007 have been referred to as “semi-allied.” Note, however, that even after the RAA enters into force (discussed below), these relations will not necessarily become a full-fledged military-political alliance where its participants are bound by obligations (spelled out in a corresponding document) in the event of threats to any of them in the area of defense and security. Such commitments are present, for example, in the documents establishing NATO and the US-Japanese political and military alliance.

At the same time, the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s brief announcement about the signing of this document draws attention to the passage, indicating that with its entry into force the sides intend to “further promote bilateral security and defense cooperation,” increasing their contribution to “the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region.”

In other words, the RAA may actually be an important, albeit still intermediate, step on the road to establishing a full-fledged alliance between Japan and Australia. In this connection, recall the words Morrison said a year ago, stating that the very fact of the forthcoming signing of this document would be “a pivotal moment in the history of Japan-Australia ties.” He also drew a certain parallel with the US-Japanese “Security Treaty of 1960.”

This, however, so far sounds rather like an exaggeration, because, as follows from the extensive (29 pages) document of the RAA, it solves the rather intermediate task of “creating a legal framework” for the presence of units (as well as accompanying civilians) of the armed forces of one of the parties “visiting” the territory of the other. And, as follows from Article 6 of this document, the format of the mentioned “framework” is rather strict for the “visiting forces,” designed to exclude the possibility of them stepping outside said framework during their stay in the territory of a partner. Provisions are made in particular for the hos partner to fully identify each of the members of the visiting group.

Note the absence of the word “China” both in the text of the document under discussion and in the comments of the two prime ministers made immediately after the act of signing it. However, “independent experts” hardly hesitate to link the motivation for the emergence of the RAA with the fact of China’s transformation into a regional and global power.

To comment on this event, it is appropriate once again to express bewilderment as to why this fact is viewed with apprehension by the current Australian government, whose anti-Chinese motives result in quite tangible economic losses.

At the same time, for Japan’s leadership, the signing of the RAA fits into the overall process of the country’s return to the table of the Great Game as one of its leading participants. In particular, it corresponds to the trend towards the expansion of its comprehensive (including military) presence in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. It seems quite obvious that it is Japan who will get the most use out of this document. The fact of its signing also fits in with the creeping process of diluting the significance of the anti-war Article 9 of the Japanese constitution as it stands.

It is remarkable that commentators link the RAA Agreement with the beginning of the so-called Quad, which, in addition to Japan and Australia, also includes the United States and India. Note, however, that the Quad is not a formalized military-political alliance and its practical activities have so far focused mainly on the “humanitarian” sphere, conditioned primarily by the task of combating COVID-19.

But the motive of opposing the spread of the China’s political influence in the IPR can also be seen in the Quad. Whether it will become the core of the “Asian NATO” that Washington has been pursuing for nearly two decades seems to depend critically on India’s positioning in the game unfolding in the region.

So far, despite the obvious shift towards Washington in New Delhi’s foreign policy in recent years, the country’s leadership has refrained from participating in the formation of a binding military-political alliance with an anti-Chinese orientation. Whether this positioning of Delhi will continue will depend entirely on the development of Sino-Indian relations in their “full format,” as well as in such important “details” as the continuing mutual territorial claims.

Comments on the signing of the RAA mention the recent acronym AUKUS, made up of the initial letters of three countries (Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States) that formed this configuration for the purpose of coordinating military activities in the IPR. So far, the motives of its emergence are not very clear, considering that this “trinity” is already connected by paired military-political alliances. Even without AUKUS, the US has long felt at home in Australia (Darwin, Perth).

Perhaps this configuration is also seen as a potential core of the same “Asian NATO.” But this prospect also depends entirely on India and Japan joining AUKUS. Again, with respect to India, this development looks unlikely.

But it is equally unclear for Japan, whose leadership, on the way to increasing the importance of the military component in its foreign policy, is confronted with a generally anti-war attitude among its own population. Its people (much like the people of Germany) learned from experience that it is possible to achieve tangible political goals in the international arena without breaking the ribs of its neighbors, and without risking their own.

Just wait and see how the ratification process of the RAA, rather limited in its scope and military and political significance, will go through Parliament. The said process is provided for by its Article 29, according to which the document enters into force five days after the exchange, through diplomatic channels, of communications on the completion of the relevant “internal procedures bringing this Agreement into force.” A year ago it was predicted that at least some kind of amendment might appear in it during the debate in the Japanese parliament. This would mean a subsequent (likely just as lengthy) discussion by the parties on a new version of the text of this document.

If this process succeeds, the RAA will, once again, confirm the trend toward an increasing military component in the overall expansion (or, rather, “return”) of Japan’s all-round presence in the IPR.

It is also worth noting that the signing of the Japan-Australia RAA coincided with another US-Japan 2+2 meeting, that is, with the participation of foreign and defense ministers of both countries.

This, however, is another story for another time.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

]]> https://journal-neo.org/2022/01/17/kishida-and-morrison-sign-the-japan-australia-reciprocal-access-agreement/feed/ 0 https://journal-neo.org/2022/01/03/sino-japanese-relations-in-2021/ https://journal-neo.org/2022/01/03/sino-japanese-relations-in-2021/#comments Mon, 03 Jan 2022 03:40:46 +0000 https://journal-neo.org/?p=173278

The development of the situation in the Indo-Pacific region, where the entire global political map of the 21st century will be increasingly determined, is significantly influenced by the state of affairs in each side of the Asian Triangle: China, India, Japan. Moreover, one should expect only an increase in this influence as the significance of the US presence in the world arena decreases.

The development of relations in two sides of the designated triangle deserves special attention, namely: China-India and China-Japan. The overall picture, reflecting the political aspects of the current state of these relations, is dominated by dark tones. Still, towards the end of 2021, it was possible to note hints of some glimpses in it with caution. Let us briefly touch upon the results with which the development of Japanese-Chinese relations came to the end of 2021.

Once again, it should be noted that “Asia’s paradox”, attributed to the former South Korean President, Park Geun-hye, now in prison, is clearly present. However, her services to her country, associated primarily with attempts to improve relations with Japan, are still awaiting evaluation.

The aforementioned paradox boils down to a directly opposite picture of the state of affairs in the trade, economic and political spheres of paired relations between almost all leading Asian countries. The first looks quite positive and, as a rule, thrives, while the second is assessed negatively to varying degrees.

China ranks first among Japan’s foreign trade partners. In 2020, China accounted for 22.1% of Japanese exports, while the key military-political ally of the United States with 18.5% is in second place. In turn, for China, Japan is the third market for its products (after the United States and Hong Kong). The percentage between the three leaders looks like: 17,5%, 10,5%, 5,5%

On January 1, 2022, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), signed in November 2020, entered into force and had been ratified during 2021 by all 15 participants. The main ones in this association, potentially comparable in importance to the EU, are China and Japan.

In September 2021, there was an official application  requesting China to  join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) regional association with Japan as its unofficial leader.

Against the background of such trade and commercial “bonding,” the political sphere of Sino-Japanese relations looks like a sharp contrast. And the main irritating element in this area remains the US-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960, loyalty to which and the willingness to take all necessary measures to strengthen it further has been expressed by every prime minister of Japan. It invariably becomes his first public act right after taking the highest public office. At every such moment, Japan confirms its positioning “shoulder to shoulder” with a key ally in the process of its geopolitical confrontation with China. The last government was headed by Fumio Kishida.

However, in the past 10-15 years, there has been an inevitable leveling of responsibilities with members of the American-Japanese alliance. Let us emphasize that with the encouragement of this process from the United States, whose leadership (long before the period of Donald Trump’s Presidency) took a course towards reducing the scale of American involvement in international disputes.

By assuming more obligations, Japan also gains more freedom of conduct in the international arena. It has not yet led to any significant positive changes in Tokyo’s policy towards China. The presence of Japan in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean is becoming more and more noticeable, including the military, which manifests itself, in particular, in the form of an increase in the scale of Japan’s participation in joint exercises with the United States, some European countries, Australia and India. These exercises are increasingly being conducted under Japanese command.

Military activity is also increasing in the area of the five uninhabited Senkaku Islands located in the East China Sea controlled by Japan, but which China claims to own, where they are called Diaoyu Dao. The topic of more and more frequent military exercises based on the scenario of “unexpected capture” of these islands by some “foreign forces” was raised by General Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China during a video conference with his Japanese counterpart Nobuo Kishi on December 27, 2021.

All of the above refutes the popular postulate from the propaganda about the “occupation” of Japan, that allegedly does not allow it to pursue a “more nationally oriented” foreign policy. Japan is still mainly interested in the American “occupation” (by the way, earning a lot on trade with the “occupier”. And this interest should remain for the near future. Therefore, the anti-American discontent expressed by the current Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, Denny Tamaki, is a real headache for Tokyo. Okinawa is home to three-quarters of the US military contingent based in Japan.

As noted more than once in the NVO, Japan is increasingly declaring its presence in the Taiwan issue, the most painful for Beijing. Its object is located near the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands. This activity is acquiring a scale that allowed a representative of some Japanese-Taiwanese non-governmental organization to designate the year of Taiwan that ended in 2021 in the long-term process of “supporting a free and democratic nation”. In the last phrase, everything is noteworthy, and above all, the designation of Taiwanese as an independent “nation”.

However, not everything entirely fits into the overall not cheerful picture of the political sphere of Sino-Japanese relations. Tokyo’s attempts to designate some independence in relations with Beijing were manifested in the issue of the “diplomatic boycott” initiated by Washington of the upcoming Winter Olympics in China. Over the next month, on behalf of the government of Fumio Kishida, it was announced that it would “itself” decide on the format of its representation at the 2022 Winter Olympics. It seemed that Tokyo was playing a risky game on this issue.

But it looks like the Japanese government had much more information than that available to “outsiders.” As it turned out during the regular press conference of the official representative of China’s Foreign Ministry held on December 27, this department received applications for 18 visas for visiting the country by employees of the (mainly) Department of State, as well as the US Department of Defense. The visit to China includes the period of 2022 Winter Olympics. That doesn’t sound like Washington’s “diplomatic boycott” of this event. Moreover, during the same press conference, it was stated that forty more similar applications are expected from the United States.

Also, the government of Japan probably had some information about this. On December 26, it was announced that although the members of the Cabinet of Japan will not be going to the 2022 Winter Olympics, the chairman of the Japanese Olympic Committee, famous former judoka, Yashuhito Yamashita, and the president of the Tokyo 2020 Organising committee, formerly a renowned athlete, Seiko Hashimoto will be going to China It is impossible to imagine the functioning of these organizations without the closest interaction with the Cabinet of Japan.

Nevertheless, the Chinese Global Times assessed this decision as a “failed balancing act”, displeasing both for China and the USA.

It should be added that it’s better this way than recklessly following the “elder (overseas) brother”. This was typical (with few exceptions, sometimes significant ones) for the entire post-war period of Japan’s relations with China.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Tensions over the proliferation of nuclear weapons have recently increased significantly amid problems with the nuclear deal with Iran, of which one of the signatories to it, the United States, withdrew on the initiative of ex-President Donald Trump in 2018, and the current White House administration has so far unsuccessfully tried to restore it, but on new terms. It should be recalled that the nuclear agreement with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan, was concluded in 2015 during the Barack Obama administration. Besides Iran and the USA, the agreement was signed by Great Britain, France, Germany, the EU, Russia and China.

Recently, tensions over the proliferation of nuclear weapons have risen again, largely due to the rhetoric of some leaders hinting at a return to the era of nuclear buildup around the world, which has already sparked fears about Iran’s nuclear stockpile. Israel has become an active initiator in this regard: without advertising its own nuclear reserves and without signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons approved by the UN General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII) of June 12, 1968, it is, in its regional counteraction against Iran, actively trying to involve in it both Washington and several other Western powers.

It seems that the world is very far from “coming to its senses”, given that millions of kilotons are currently in service in various countries around the world. Among them, nuclear states possess approximately 15 thousand warheads, the majority of which belong to the United States and Russia. According to experts from the Arms Control Association, less than 10 thousand of them are in service, while the rest are awaiting dismantling.

Only five states possessing nuclear weapons are recognized in the world: China, France, Russia, Britain and the United States. They are officially recognized as such by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in 1970. This Treaty recognizes and legitimizes their nuclear arsenals, but they should not strengthen or maintain them permanently. In fact, on the contrary, they committed themselves to eliminating nuclear weapons.

There are four countries unofficially possessing nuclear weapons: Pakistan, India, Israel and South Korea These countries have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and together they have approximately 340 such weapons.

Against this background, various international platforms and media are actively discussing Iran today, in respect of which Israel and the United States are taking active measures to prevent its possession of nuclear weapons.

Iran began developing its own nuclear energy in the 1950s during the reign of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979), a staunch US ally in the Middle East at that time. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, within the framework of the Atoms for Peace program, at the supported this initiative by signing an agreement with Iran on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in 1957. In accordance with this document, Washington undertook to supply Iran with nuclear installations and equipment and train specialists. The first low-power reactor was delivered to the United States to the nuclear research center of Tehran University in 1959.

An increasing number of American politicians and the media engaged in Tel Aviv have been lately involved in the excitement raised by Israel over Iran’s nuclear program, which in the official statements of the Iranian authorities has repeatedly stated that it does not intend to develop nuclear weapons. Several sources reported at once that Iran was very close to the creation of a nuclear charge. “Iran needs about a month to get enough material to make one nuclear charge,” The New York Times recently wrote. According to experts, about 15-20 kg of weapons-grade uranium are necessary to create a uranium bomb. As stated in the joint statement of the foreign ministries of Great Britain, France and Germany, circulated recently, the volume of nuclear materials currently possessed by Iran after their additional enrichment will be enough to create more than one nuclear charge.

Against this background, as well as amidst the ongoing measures to restore the nuclear deal with Iran and the active information attacks by Israel (with a number of Tel Aviv-oriented American politicians) on Tehran’s nuclear program, it is quite remarkable how these anti-Iranian political forces completely ignore the already significant nuclear reserves sufficient for the production of atomic bombs by other “unofficial” nuclear powers.

In this regard, it is enough to look at Japan, which is the most serious military ally of the United States in Southeast Asia.

As you know, after the defeat in World War II, the new Japan was forced to abandon any development of nuclear weapons. Although there is no official information about the presence of nuclear weapons in Japan, which is a distinguishing feature of a truly strong military machine, nevertheless, according to the conclusion of many experts, this country needs very little time to create them. Moreover, today Japan has the necessary scientific and technical potential, as well as a significant amount of fissile radioactive material.

Thus, according to the Chinese Internet portal Sohu, Tokyo has a stock of already processed nuclear raw materials for 6,000 nuclear devices (!). For several years, Japan hid this from both its allies in the United States and from other countries. It should be noted that this number is the level of Russia and the United States, which have, according to the estimates of competent experts, 7000 and 6800 of them, respectively, while France has 300, China – 270, North Korea, according to various estimates, from 10 to 60. Meanwhile, Iran only has one nuclear device!

At the same time, the Sohu portal also indicates that for several years Tokyo, within the framework of its nuclear energy, has enriched and processed raw materials to a level that allows them to create weapons. With no criticism from today’s Iranian opponents. Although the Chinese exposing material does not name specific volumes, these could be several dozens of tons, at least.

As for the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, one must not forget that Japan is a leading space power, its spacecraft landed on an asteroid and delivered matter from there to Earth, and its launch vehicles are exceptionally reliable.

Hence, a natural question arises: who is really orchestrating the campaign to punish Iran for its nuclear program, while an active US ally under the former’s cover has already accumulated a world-destroying potential of raw materials for several thousand atomic bombs?  Isn’t the anti-Iranian information campaign of the United States and Israel a cover for Japan to secretly create its own nuclear potential without appropriate control by the world community?

Vladimir Odintsov, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Not only has the coronavirus pandemic become worse in Japan lately, but so have the new government’s territorial claims. As soon as Fumio Kishida, Japan’s new Prime Minister, took office in October, he hastened to announce a new round of the land of the rising sun’s territorial claims. As regional media outlets stress, Tokyo has become increasingly assertive in demonstrating competing claims to all of its closest territorial neighbors, including the governments of Russia, North Korea and Taiwan.

According to new Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Russia needs to return all four islands of the Greater Kuril Chain to Japan. Shinzo Abe’s plan, which envisaged the return of only two, Shikotan and Habomai, is considered unrealistic by the new prime minister. Nor is he persuaded that these conditions lie at the heart of the declaration accepted by both sides in 1956.

In his statements, the new prime minister repeatedly referred to Japanese public opinion, pointing out that most Japanese, according to polls, did not support Abe’s “two-plus-alpha” deal. At the same time, Kishida admitted that economic ties with Russia were important but insisted that all projects in the Kuril Islands should not be under Moscow’s jurisdiction.

In its “Kuril claims,” Tokyo has not tired of sending Moscow its notes of protest in case of any Russian activity in the Kuril Islands, which belong to it by right after World War II, whether it be the official visits from Russian authorities, Moscow’s intensified economic activities there, or training maneuvers of the Russian army amid the recent escalation of provocative actions of the Pentagon in the region.

In addition to the “Kuril claims,” Japan has recently begun to press its territorial claims against Russia regarding not just the Kuril Islands but also the territory of West Antarctica, In support of these new claims, the Japanese National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR) has even issued a report stating that the coast of Marie Byrd Land allegedly belongs to Japan, “as in West Antarctica in 1911-1912 there was a Japanese Arctic expedition.” At the same time, the presence of the Russian Station has been declared “illegal” by Tokyo based on this report. And the interest in this particular area of Antarctica is straightforward – gas reserves have been found there.

Japan missed the moment, that the given territories of Mary Baird Land, and Ellsworth Land were opened by Russian travelers long before the Japanese were there. In 1820, Russian explorers Admiral Faddey Bellingshausen and Admiral Mikhail Lazarev, who discovered the territory, arrived in Antarctica. Officially, the territory of Antarctica is neutral and claims to any areas are prohibited by the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, of which Japan is a signatory. Recently, however, Japan, like some other countries, has expressed an interest in certain territories by claiming them.

Russkaya is a Soviet and Russian Antarctic station located in West Antarctica on the coast of Mary Baird Land, on a small outcrop of bedrock near Cape Burks. Russia has seven active scientific stations in Antarctica. Another two stations were closed in 1989 and 1995.

As for the claims to the Kuril Islands, Japan continues to use, among others, the thesis of the alleged “indigenous population of the Ainu” there, which Japan recently began to more and more strongly refer to as the Japanese indigenous population. At the same time, the Japanese government continues not to fulfill the already announced claims of Ainu activists, such as bringing national legislation on the Ainu people into full conformity with the provisions of the relevant UN Convention, immediately granting the national minority the right to continue traditional fishing without restrictions, etc.

However, the ardent advocates of such a policy in Japan should not forget that their active exploitation of the northern territories, including the emphasis on “the Japanese origin of the Ainu population,” may cause the “southern territories issue” to arise in Russia as well.

The aboriginal population of the Kurils Islands, Sakhalin and Japan (Hokkaido and Ryukyu) are not the Japanese, as the ignorant people suppose, but the ancient people of Ainu who appeared in the Far East more than 12 thousand years ago and created the Neolithic culture called Jōmon, with the necessary scientific evidence written in the book “The History of Japan since ancient times until 1868,” by the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Even many of the names we mistakenly ascribe to Japanese origins are actually derived from the Ainu language. For example, Tsushima (対馬), a Japanese island (now archipelago) in the Sea of Japan (part of Nagasaki Prefecture, it was a separate administrative unit until 1872), means “far away” in the Ainu language and has nothing to do with the Japanese language. Mount Fuji is one of the main symbols of present-day Japan and means “granny” in the Ainu language. The name of an early Japanese state in the Yayoi period that is mentioned as early as the Chinese historical chronicle Yemayi guo (Jpn 邪馬台国 Yamatai koku) translates to “here the sea cleaves the land” from the Ainu language. The Japanese came to the Japanese islands ten millennia after the Ainu from the Korean Peninsula.

The Ainu differs from the Mongoloid populations of the Far East and Asia. They are tall, have light skin, Caucasian features, abundant hair on the head, face and body, and the women’s clothing resembles the Caucasus’s. Unlike Japanese traditions, the Ainu lived in log cabins and were excellent warriors, proficient in the art of fighting with two swords. It was from them that the Japanese adopted the Samurai code of conduct, known as Bushido, and the harakiri. The Japanese had been at war with the Ainu for a long time and pushed them to the north, but they could only take over in the 18th century after the invention of artillery. The surviving Ainu fled to the mountains or by sailing to the islands of their tribesmen.

The Russian Empire took the Ainu people under its patronage, and under the treaty of 1855, it never rebelled. The indigenous people of South Kurils were also indigenous to northern Hokkaido, and today they continue to live on that island, which is part of Japan.

So Russia, in response to Tokyo’s recent territorial pandemic, also has every reason to take them under its protection again, as it did two hundred years ago, asserting its rights to Hokkaido.

Valery Kulikov, political expert, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

On October 31, lower house election was held in Japan, the primary outcome of which can be summed up as the preservation of the domestic political status quo. With some noteworthy caveats, as discussed below.

The final data published on the distribution of the parliamentary seats received by the opponents show that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party maintains a comfortable majority, 261 of the total 465 seats in the lower house, having lost only 15 seats, that is, less than 5%, compared to the previous results.

This result is not bad at all, given the seriousness of all sorts of internal problems stemming from public doubts about the adequacy of actions on the part of recent Cabinets of Ministers of Liberal Democratic Party in the ongoing Covid-19 epidemic. It is safe to say that current Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who became leader of the Liberal Democratic Party in late September, passed his first significant test quite successfully. Apparently, the voters preferred to leave all the various burdens of accumulated costs on the shoulders of the party’s former leadership, allowing the new leader to prove himself positively.

The Komeito Party, the Liberal Democratic Party’s minority partner, which stands, as Buddhists should, for everything good and against everything bad, has added three seats to its previous 29. Together they have 293 mandates, which means they are now 12 seats short of the two-thirds in the lower house needed to start the tough procedure for amendments to the Constitution that has been in force since 1947.

For the Liberal Democratic Party, the main target of such amendments has for decades been the anti-war Article 9. Mind you, it cannot be said to have proved an insurmountable obstacle to Japan’s military buildup. The current armed forces of the country, which, incidentally, are still referred to with a euphemism “Japan’s Self-Defense Forces,” are a clear evidence of this. The Self-Defense Forces will assume internationally common features if the statement made last fall by the current Minister of Defense Nobuo Kishi regarding the need to acquire the potential for delivering “preventive” strikes against targets in the territories of neighbors, which are considered a source of specific threats, is implemented.

It bears stressing once again that the presence of Article 9 in Japan’s current Constitution does not hinder the creeping process of “normalization” in Japan. But it will be easier, of course, once some constitutional constraint is kept out of the way. Fumio Kishida has repeatedly stated his intention to continue the efforts of his predecessors to introduce amendments to Article 9 that would at least legalize the existence of Japan’s armed forces. However, it should be noted that the Liberal Democratic Party’s partner, the Komeito Party, is being very cautious in this matter.

Nor does the bloc of five center-left opposition forces led by the Constitutional Democratic Party support such intentions by Liberal Democratic Party. The bloc began taking shape a year ago to organize opposition to the Liberal Democratic Party in the run-up to the upcoming parliamentary elections. The bloc participants managed to agree on nominating a single, most promising candidate in 70% of the total number (289) of majoritarian districts. The winners of these are the ones who fill the lower house of Japan’s parliament by two-thirds. The remaining third are representatives of the parties that received the highest number of votes in the inter-party contest.

The opposition coalition could only be considered a success if it defeated the ruling Liberal Democratic Party-Komeito tandem, depriving the latter of the right to form the country’s government. This would mean that the new government, which Fumio Kishida presented only on October 4 for approval by the previous parliament, would have to resign already at the first meeting of the new parliament  to be held on November 10.

But no miracle happened. Moreover, the opposition also suffered losses in the relatively few possessions it had before the election. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, the leader of the opposition coalition, sustained the most significant losses.  By gaining 96 seats instead of the previous 110, the CDP reduced the size of its faction by almost 13%. The defeat of the party is already regarded as “humiliating” and fraught with the change of its leadership.

The main reason for the coalition’s failure was the initial artificiality of its composition as the parties with sharply divergent basic ideological and political positions tried to establish cooperation between each other. Attention is drawn to the fact that over 80% of disciplined communists followed the recommendations of their leadership and voted in majoritarian districts for – ideologically alien to them – candidates from the CDP, while the members of this latter reciprocated less than 50% of the time.

Leaders of the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), which refused to join the coalition, pointed out the corrupt nature of the latter’s participants. This is interesting, to say the least, given that in its present form, the JIP is also a conglomeration of several political, mainly right-wing parties. The political “fodder” of the Japan Innovation Party is mainly in a field long mastered by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. As the results of the last election show, the JIP managed to “feed” on this field only partially. It found the other half of its votes in the opposition field.

Overall, the quadrupling of the JIP’s faction in Japan’s lower house represents the biggest upset of the past elections. In the author’s view, it is unlikely to be repeated in subsequent acts of the electoral process. Apparently, voters wished to add variety to the political party menu on offer with something fresh and spicy. But within reasonable limits. If this new “political dish” doesn’t appeal, we’ll indulge in something else tomorrow.

Turnout in the last general election, at 56%, was not high by Japanese standards, which is quite typical of the previous decade. In the 2000s, it exceeded 65%, reaching 70%, as was the case, for example, in 2009, when the Democratic Party, the predecessor of the current CDP, won. The third lowest level of voter turnout in the entire postwar period in 2021 can be explained by two factors: the fear of contracting the coronavirus and the noticeable erosion of fundamental differences in the key positions of the participants in the political process on the central issues of domestic and foreign policy.

The Prime Minister’s first statement since the last election was that he will draw up a stimulus package by mid-November to prop up the coronavirus-hit economy. During the election campaign, Fumio Kishida repeatedly spoke of the need to ease the conditions for private businesses and help the neediest. To this end, he is going to request in next year’s budget additional spending on projects estimated to cost “tens of trillions of yen” (that is, hundreds of billions of dollars).

Foreign policy was not a priority topic during Japan’s general lower house elections. Nothing fundamentally new is expected from the same Liberal Democratic Party government that has ruled the country almost continuously since the mid-1950s.

As early as next summer, Kishida will have to lead his party through another electoral cycle, which will be the re-election of half of the upper house of parliament.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

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