A region in need of economic development will receive “lots” of financial assistance. As usual, the West is protesting but not actually doing anything, as it knows that it is not willing to do the same without strings attached. This is for one very good reason: the West has more to gain from this agreement than either Abkhazia or Russia do, as it, especially the United States can use it to fan the coals of discord and maintain the status quo in Georgia.

All the while the real stakeholders to disputes over Abkhazia know very well the significance of the railway link and what gains can it bring for alternative conflict resolution. Georgia knows it history, one that it would like to conveniently forget. It cannot now claim in retrospect that it sent troops in to protect the railway line and then try to block an opportunity to rebuild it, connecting it to Georgia proper.

Rail links with Abkhazia will bring about better diplomatic links. Khajimba is right to say that “Georgians themselves should be interested in restoration of the Abkhazian railway,” and express surprise that the Georgian side “has not objectively considered the option as yet.’’

Abkhazia has nothing to fear from railway links with Georgia now that a security agreement has been signed with the Russian Federation. Only the Russians would be able, in practical terms, to use these for aggressive purposes. However, that would serve no purpose in today’s reality. Abkhazia will never take any offensive action without Russia’s approval. So we have a balance that can now be maintained by normal economic relations.

Armenia also wins in the potential restoration with a substantial economic interest in the line. Involving Georgian and Armenian companies, with or without state support, in rebuilding the line would prevent Russia doing anything the others didn’t agree with and couldn’t stop. Potential Russian aggression would be stopped in its tracks, as it were. Being pragmatics has the greatest potential now to bring about benefits to all.

But for the US and its NATO allies Abkhazia is the latter-day Afghanistan, the mistake waiting to happen for anyone who wants to get involved in its affairs to continue proxy conflicts. It is clear that no one can win, especially not the Abkhaz and Georgians themselves. Sooner or later Russia will be as concerned as Georgia about trying to find a way out – and there is one project which might just save everyone enough face to let everybody gain with dignity, and it is the link that can provide that, if implemented.

Fast tracking “Normal Relations”

The link serves a variety of purposes, which are more to do with exposing US double standards than anything else. But the bluff Georgia and its US allies can call is a railway line, as they still want to meddle in regional affairs. Let us not forget the Armenia issues, and its economic plight because of the yet resolved conflict with Azerbaijan over an ethnic Armenian enclave.

There used to be a rail link between Russia and Armenia which went through Abkhazia and Georgia. Indeed, one of the harbingers of the long preplanned 2008 war was the restoration by Russian military engineers of part of the Abkhaz section of this line.

Armenia is still under international blockade as a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and many of the routes into and out of it remain closed as they pass through its enemy Azerbaijan or other countries allied with Turkey. It is another territory being largely bankrolled by Russia, though which almost all of its goods go in and out.

The restoration now provides Russia the golden opportunity to demonstrate it has broader good intentions not only with Georgia but the region a whole. It can kill several birds with one stone by finishing the job, and the West can do the same by letting it.

Georgia can defray its own claimed fear of Armenian separatism by economic collaboration, as ethnic Armenians being dominant in the Javakheti, South Georgia, bordering Turkey, and numerous in other Georgian regions, by rebuilding this line rather than investing in the previously mooted high-speed highway project which would link Javakheti with Armenia rather too closely for comfort.

All the while Russia can continue to demonstrate that its presence in Abkhazia is not designed to provide a military threat but has broader regional benefits. Restoring the railway line would associate Russia with civil improvement projects as well as guns and would provide some justification for the sheer number of troops in Abkhazia, who could be deployed on this project.

Win-Win Situation

Both the US and Georgia could demonstrate that they are not against the economic improvement or Abkhazia and are only objecting to the unauthorized Russian presence, and its military aspect, rather than improvements to the region as a whole Russia is equipped to carry out. All sides can also demonstrate goodwill in the current peace talks impasse, in which Georgia does not recognize the Abkhaz delegation or have official diplomatic relations with it or Moscow, by showing they are prepared to work together on practical projects and leave political disputes and formulas to one side.

So the West still wants to gain by the creation of an untenable situation in Abkhazia. But in reality it can ask Russia to put its money where its mouth is by promoting a project which helps all sides without prejudice. Russia has nothing to gain by ignoring such overtures – and cannot complain about the expense, given the enormous guarantees made to Abkhazia designed to serve Abkhazia regional stablity.

Symbol and reality

Few now remember that the Abkhaz-Georgian war of the nineties was ostensibly fought to protect rail wagons exporting food and wine to Russia. These were being robbed en route, and the Georgian National Guard was sent in to protect the line. As Georgian president of the time Edward Shevardnadze told the press, “trains running from Sochi to Sukhumi were being attacked and robbed all the time. Russia, Ukraine and other countries wrote to us in protest and demanded that we do something about it. The police weren’t up to the task so we had to send in the army.” 

The ragtag National Guard was not actually an army but an extension of the criminal gangs, which is not a figure of speech, who put Shevardnadze in power in the first place. Predictably they proceeded to Sukhumi, ransacked the city, and went on a campaign of looting and raping. A situation which could have been peacefully resolved by real leadership turned into a full-fledged civil war.

The 60,000 IDPs created by this have not been returned to this day. The conflict did however suit Shevardnadze: either he would wipe the Abkhaz off the face of the earth, thus resolving that problem, or destroy the criminal gangs and take over their business, ultimately succeeding in the latter. The lives lost and displaced were not part of this typical calculation, but this is what the world came to expect from man Bill Clinton was praising for having “embraced democracy” at exactly this time.

Conclusion

The West now has an opportunity to use the rebuilding of the Russia-Abkhazia-Georgia-Armenia railway link as a means of fostering good relations which will help everyone move on from their present untenable positions. The West, too, is in an impossible situation in Georgia. It has backed the wrong horse for so long – because it has made it the wrong horse – that there is no longer a point to its dirty tricks, as plenty of other countries are equally well equipped to be the CIA arms transit hubs and terrorist training camps for the next round of US interventions. The political deadlock over Abkhazia can continue as usual but be rendered irrelevant by rebuilding the railway line.

Henry Kamens, columnist, expert on Central Asia and Caucasus, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The signed treaty envisions the creation of a common defence and security space and stipulates that joint actions will be taken to protect the “Abkhazian-Georgian border” and Russia will supply economic assistance to the region, which it regards as an independent state.

Under international law, Abkhazia is still part of Georgia and the vast majority of the world’s nations recognise it as such. On that basis, Russia cannot sign an agreement with it as an independent entity, or do anything else there, without the permission of the Georgian government. Therefore the usual Western media outlets are claiming that the agreement is “detrimental to ongoing efforts to stabilise the security situation in the region.”

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has condemned the treaty and said that the alliance strongly supports Georgia’s sovereignty. “This so-called treaty does not contribute to a peaceful and lasting settlement of the situation in Georgia,” he said. Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said that “Just like earlier agreements signed between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia, this violates Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, contradicts principles of international law and the international commitments of the Russian Federation, including the 12 August 2008 Agreement and its Implementing Measures of 8 September 2008.”

So what are these things these dignitaries are talking about – “sovereignty”, “territorial integrity”, “and security?” No one is bothering to define these terms. Not because they can’t, but because doing so automatically weakens their position to such an extent that they would find it very difficult to make such claims in future.

Georgia’s Sovereignty

Georgia is supposed to be an independent sovereign state, making its own decisions on matters which affect it. Like most of the developing world, this sovereignty is more apparent than real: any decisions made must be in line with the self-declared “national interests” of Georgia’s biggest partners, because it does not have the means to pursue its own national interests. But there are particular quirks to the Georgian situation which make any claim to “support its sovereignty” even more of a joke.

For a start – when did Georgia become independent? It declared itself such in 1992, after the virulently anti-Soviet Zviad Gamsakhurdia gained control of the local Soviet. This was an act of the “self-determination” which is so often invoked as a principle when it suits the West to do so: the Maidan Square demonstrators were allegedly exercising their “right to self-determination” before fascist thugs were inserted to take matters out of their hands, while the referendum in Crimea, also self-determination, was not recognised.

Yet Georgia’s independence and sovereignty were not recognised by most countries while Gamsakhurduia was in power. It is often forgotten that the West publicly opposed the breakup of the Soviet Union, as Lithuanians in particular know very well, because it suddenly saw the “Evil Empire” as a friend. More particularly, it didn’t want the Soviet Union’s resources falling into several pairs of hands when there was hope it could tie one.

Gamsakhurdia reminded the West of all its own rhetoric against the Soviet Union, agreeing with every word and basing his rule on removing every last vestige of this evil from Georgia. 87% of the Georgian population supported him in the first presidential elections. But the West didn’t want to hear. So Georgia wasn’t independent and Gamsakhurdia had to go, regardless of what its electors said. Tellingly, one of the criticisms of Gamsakhurdia was that he had “failed to find a common language with the West”, whereas in fact his language was identical to that used by the West for the previous seventy-five years.

Gamsakhurdia was removed in a coup conducted by criminal gangs which no Western country would regard as legal if it happened within their borders. Nevertheless, this was supported by the West. Eduard Shevardnadze was then installed to replace him, having made himself the darling of the West in Soviet times but alienated any support he might once have had in Georgia. After declaring war in the 87% of “Zviadists”, he was told by Bill Clinton he had “embraced democracy”, a claim for which Clinton himself should have been tried for treason.

Shevardnadze was eventually removed, through US agitation, when his continual ballot-rigging and institutional corruption got too much for the US to bear. More specifically, it had thought it could use Shevardnadze for its own dirty purposes and found he had turned the tables and was using the West to serve his own dirty purposes. The West couldn’t take the humiliation. So in came Mikheil Saakashvili, the equally corrupt murderer and extortioner who ended up the same way when he jumped the gun of the pre-planned US invasion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to try and claim the glory for himself.

This is how much the West cares about Georgia’s sovereignty. If it had any respect for the notion it would not repeatedly have changed its government to suit itself. The Georgian people would know they could choose the leaders they want, not the ones the West allows them to choose from, and Georgia would be able to generate its own income, through being granted access to markets and promoting its many fine products and virtues, rather than being diplomatically forced to depend on “aid agencies” which have long been shown to be fronts for gun running and worse.

Territorial Integrity

So the West believes Abkhazia is part of Georgia and defends this principle. Really?

According to the West the current problems between Georgia and its breakaway regions date from Gamsakhurdia’s time. We are told that he said “Georgia for the Georgians” and wanted to persecute minorities. We are not told when he is supposed to have said this however. Nor are we told that Gamsakhurdia guaranteed Abkhazia an autonomous parliament of its own in which the Abkhaz would have a permanent majority, despite the fact they only accounted for 10% of the population of Abkhazia at the time.

If anyone was discriminated against in Gamsakhurdia’s Abkhazia, it was everyone except the Abkhaz. Indeed, it was his actions which enabled the separatists to gain control of the local parliament and declare their independence. He was then condemned by the West for refusing to grant this independence. Apparently the West had exactly the opposite view when Georgia was briefly sovereign to the one it professes now.

The present Georgia-Abkhaz problems do not derive from Gamsakhurdia, as is often stated, but from Eduard Shevardnadze’s attempt to take control of the province in 1993. This was a typical act of calculation: either he would resolve the problem by slaughtering the Abkhaz, or the criminal militias who had put him in power, who were the basis of the force sent, would be defeated themselves, leaving him free of their influence.

This action, too, was supported by the West. It then spent years arming Georgia to retake its territories and agreed to support an invasion of them, as the Georgia-based US commanders confirmed when drunk. When Saakashvili went in ahead of the planned date it did not support him. It also denied selling him the cluster bombs used, despite the labels found on them, and did nothing to stop Russia’s active support of the separatists in both regions, thereby demonstrating it was using the dispute to sell arms, and make Georgia ever more dependent on it, rather than actually try and restore its territorial integrity.

Furthermore, territorial integrity is meaningless if the territory is not controlled by the government of that country. No Georgian ever voted for the country to become the regional arms dealing and transit hub, the main supply route the US uses to get arms to the groups serving its purposes in other countries, such as ISIL. Nor did they vote for the Pankisi Valley to become a terrorist training camp. Such actions provoke reactions, and the enemies the US makes through them are much more likely to attack small, nearby Georgia than the big, faraway US. This is how much the West respects Georgia’s territorial integrity as a state.

Security

Does the presence of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia without the agreement of the Georgian government compromise Georgia’s security?

The Russian troops in Georgia have done their jobs in a professional manner. The separatist militias they previously sponsored were, indeed, a lawless bunch. The security of the populations living either side of the barbed wire fences erected as “national boundaries” by the Russians are much more secure than they were when separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia relied on their militias to retain control of their regions.

The presence of Russian troops supposedly threatens the annexation of the breakaway regions. The presence of NATO in the Baltic States, and Georgia, threatens the annexation of regions of Russia. It is just as likely that South Ossetia will unite with North Ossetia, part of Russia, in a NATO-backed rump state than in a Russian-dominated one. We are expected to accept the diplomatic assurances that NATO has no such intentions, whilst not accepting Russia’s similar assurances.

The implication of the Western position is that Russia will annex Abkhazia and perhaps Georgia too. As long as the West betrays its own values Russia will do what it wants. The backlash against “political correctness” in Western Europe shows us what happens when genuine principles become meaningless words.

Henry Kamens, columnist, expert on Central Asia and Caucasus, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Source: RIA

In Sochi, on 24 November the presidents of the Russian Federation and Abkhazia Vladimir Putin and Raul Khajimba signed a Treaty between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia on Alliance and Integration. This document was the result of joint efforts by Moscow and Sukhumi, prior to which drafts of the treaty developed independently were rejected: the Abkhaz side would reject the Moscow version, and the Russian side would reject the Sukhumi version.

Thus, the treaty of alliance, drawn up on a parity basis and containing compromises and signed by the presidents of the two countries, on top of all that served as a concrete response to the criticism that Russia is unable to build true partnerships with notoriously weak states, and operates in this issue from the perspective of power and imposing its own interests. Sukhumi was not satisfied with those provisions in the Russian version of the Treaty of Alliance that essentially entailed delegating a part of sovereignty to Russia. This included, in particular, the establishment of some supranational military, law enforcement structures and fiscal institutions. The article on increasing social benefits was surprising: the local budget is entirely dependent on Russia, and the treaty contained mention of increasing payments to residents of Abkhazia who are citizens of the Russian Federation – indeed, most of the citizens of Abkhazia possess secondary Russian citizenship, but what about those who have only an Abkhazian passport? Do they all have to take Russian citizenship too? And finally, the idea of simplified granting of citizenship to Russians was categorically unacceptable to the Black Sea republic – the Abkhazians with a population of 150,000 already have difficulty claiming the advantage of the “titular nation”, and have always feared ethno-demographic changes.

The relaxation of the rules of citizenship automatically opened the possibility of acquiring land and property in Abkhazia, which is prohibited to foreigners. “And who said that the country would not immediately be overwhelmed by an influx of immigrants from Russia’s troubled regions?” This question was often posed in Sukhumi when the Russian draft of the treaty was under discussion. “In the Russian draft Russian interests were originally laid out and given priority, and Abkhazian interests were given little attention. But this is a common thing, any country participating in the development of such a treaty tries to take care of itself,” said the Abkhazian political scientist Inal Khashig.

The counter offer, the Abkhazian version of the treaty, was developed by at least two institutions: the Administration of the President of Abkhazia and Parliament. In contrast to the Russian version, in Sukhumi they did their best to present their interests in the document and protect them. And it worked. For example, the final version of the treaty left out the item on the simplified granting of Abkhazian citizenship to Russians that so disturbed the local community.

“The new treaty ensures the independence of our country and at the same time strengthens ties with Russia.” “The new draft of the treaty was discussed in Abkhazia widely and openly. We worked completely transparently,” said the Abkhazian President Khajimba. “Russia reacted with sincere understanding for our position. An equal, mutually respectful dialogue took place.”

 Russian President Vladimir Putin, commenting on the signed document, recalled the substantial Russian investments that are to revive the Abkhaz economy and create the conditions for the gradual reduction of Russian cash injections while proportionally consolidating the local economy. Thus, from 2015 to 2017, Abkhazia will receive up to 4 billion roubles annually. In addition, in the future, the Black Sea republic will receive an additional 5 billion roubles. In the territory of Abkhazia a joint formation of troops will be established from the Abkhaz and Russian armed forces under Russian command. And to protect the Abkhaz-Georgian border along the Inguri River Russian and Abkhazian units will work together. It is worth mentioning that the treaty stipulates that Abkhazia will participate fully in the “integration processes in the post-Soviet space, implemented on the initiative of and/or with the assistance of the Russian Federation.” It is remarkable, but at the same time ambiguous.

How, for example, will Abkhazia participate in such alliances as the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), if all the other members of these associations do not recognise the independence of Abkhazia and support the principle of Georgia’s territorial integrity? In Georgia itself the response to the alliance treaty between Russia and Abkhazia is negative. Another of Putin’s proposals was met with bayonets when it was announced at the final joint press conference after signing the treaty. The Russian leader, in particular, suggested that his Abkhaz colleague consider the option of the full restoration of the railway in the Georgian direction and onwards to Armenia.

 The implementation of this project is important for Russia. The restoration of railway connections through Abkhazia and Georgia, firstly, would facilitate the infrastructural connection both with Armenia and the Russian military base, and secondly would partially unlock the allied state “clamped” in the Azerbaijani-Turkish vice. It is clear that Yerevan is also extremely interested in revitalising the route. However, the Georgian Foreign Ministry had to announce a firm ‘no’ to this project, since it “did not begin to take into account the official interests of Tbilisi.” They are known to be radically at odds with the Russian-Abkhazian treaty.

Therefore, negotiations on the rail road, the operation of which may to some extent change the balance of power in the region, could be protracted, even if Putin’s proposal may seem attractive to Sukhumi from the standpoint of obtaining transport income. However, this is quite a differernt story. In the meantime it is clear that by signing on 24 November in Sochi the treaty on alliance and integration between Russia and Abkhazia, Vladimir Putin and Raul Khajimba turned a new page in Russian-Abkhaz relations.

Yuri Simonyan, columnist of “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”, exclusively for the online-magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Prior to the Sochi Winter Olympics, which took place very near Abkhazia, we were told that the Ochamchire base was being rapidly expanded. These claims soon proved fraudulent, but this is not now being reported. This is because they were intended, at that time, to create a link in people’s minds with those made prior to a previous Olympics – the Summer ones in Moscow, 1980. They were supposed to create a link to try and justify, long after the event, the media’s role in that whole sordid affair.

The 1980 Olympics were of course held against the backdrop of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which had provoked worldwide condemnation. Several countries, including the US, boycotted those Olympics in protest at the invasion.

But as we recall, it was not the US or any other Western country which removed the Soviets from someone else’s country. Afghans themselves did this, as they have done throughout their history when confronted with foreign powers trying to take them over. They were helped by Western arms and money, but that was as far as it went. For all their high-sounding words, no Western government had any intention of applying its own principles and removing the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.

The 2008 Russia-Georgia war was a military success for Russia but a PR disaster. Georgia was automatically right, regardless of its reasons for going into South Ossetia and its actions there, and Russia automatically wrong because it sent its troops into someone else’s country.

In itself, this position is correct. But if you really think that matters, why not do something about it? NATO bases have been creeping ever closer to Russia for years, and Georgia is so desperate to join NATO it allows the CIA to train all its inserted terrorists there and inject biological agents into the cattle to see how many Georgians die of eating them. If the West doesn’t agree with Russia being in Abkhazia, it can easily send troops in to get it out. It has no intention of actually doing so – hence all the fuss about the naval base.

We are supposed to believe these protests are sincere and somehow mean something. Russia knows better, so does the world. But governments and media still want to run away and wash the blood off their hands, so the same sort of PR is being recycled yet again.

On the ground

It is true that Russia planned to expand the Ochamchire base back in 2009, as widely reported at the time. It soon announced however that it had abandoned such plans because they were not practical. This was not widely reported, although following the logic of the other reports it should have been shouted from the rooftops as a “Russian retreat” from its “morally untenable” position.

The plans were impractical because Ochamchire is a heavily silted shallow water port which is unable to host a major Black Sea Fleet contingent. In 2009 it was described as being able to host only up to10 smaller navy and Coast Guards warships. We were therefore told, to justify the initial allegations, that Russia is planning to deepen the port and build a significant land infrastructure. Take a tour of the silted up ports around Europe which have necessarily been abandoned and you will see how absurd this claim is.

Alarm bells should have rung in the heads of proper journalists when this story was broken by the Jamestown Foundation.

It claimed that it had obtained this information from a “trusted intelligence source”. In fact it had obtained it from official news channels such as Russia Today, which had openly broadcast this information.

Why lie about such a thing? We are meant to believe that what Russia is doing is so sinister it would never be admitted in public, even though it has been. Why? Because the open declaration which actually occurred would have to be treated as an openly aggressive act, if it really had the meaning the Jamestown Foundation put on it. That would mean taking real action. Releasing such a report is another Western attempt to run away from putting its guns where its mouth is, and pretending it has a right to do so.

On previous ground

The ultimate removal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, after a huge quantity of death and destruction, was hailed as a Western success. It was so much of a success that the war continued for 30 years, as different groups of these “freedom fighters” fought among themselves for control of the country and terrorised the whole population in the process.

Eventually the West really did send troops in to achieve its objective of removing the Taliban, which had been demonised but was no worse in practical terms than the other bands of pseudo-Islamic warlords it had displaced without a major battle, initially welcomed by a population weary of fighting. Again, there was a reason troops were sent in at that particular point, and again not a good one.

The Taliban had to be removed because it had tackled the heroin trade, contrary to Islam, and proceeded to kill off the infidel users and those who sold it. The US heroin epidemic would never have occurred if the US had not been controlling its manufacture and supply with the help of NGOs and other distribution networks. Protecting that trade, rather than the welfare of people or a country, was sufficient reason to send in troops.

Throughout the civil war period Afghans formed the largest world refugee population. Western countries always believe they are a target for refugee immigration, but in fact only a tiny portion of the world’s asylum seekers ever make it to the West from elsewhere, something between 5 and 10% in a given year.

Afghans claiming asylum soon found that the horror stories they told of the threats they faced there, remarkably similar to the PR spouted in the Western PR when it suited it, were dismissed as a pack of lies when they were told to support an asylum claim. People with no hope in their own country were herded into camps, left to live on next to nothing, prevented from working for long periods and in some cases sent back to war zones. This is the support the “victims of Soviet aggression” were given in the real world.

Once again, the West did everything it could to run away from its own responsibility by pretending that the Afghan conflict no longer really existed, or mattered, as doing otherwise would have meant stopping it. Now it is even negotiating to ensure the Taliban has a continuing presence in the Afghan government, having done a deal over the heroin, regardless of the lives sacrificed removing it from power.

So is this what can be expected in Abkhazia? Will using PR as a cover for blatant hypocrisy claim thousands more victims in “faraway countries, of which we know nothing”?

New twist

The previous claims about the Ochamchire base have not as yet been substantiated by anything which has happened on the ground. I know, I’ve been there. When I crossed the border in late August the Russian border guards posted there were complaining they had not seen the sea yet [it is less than ten miles away], and these would-be naval recruits spend their time drinking vodka with the Enguri Crossing border guards. If work which can’t succeed anyway is actually being undertaken, it must be so deep underwater that only submarines which never surface can be doing it.

This being so, reporters who are never actually sent to see this “hot story” for themselves have invented a new justification for their claims. We are now told that the Russians have their eye on a short strip of railway between Crimea and Russia and are desperate to stop it falling into the hands of Poroshenko and his chocolate soldiers. For this reason, we are told, Russia needs a naval base in Abkhazia.

As is well known, Crimea is controlled by pro-Russian Ukrainians and the local population have voted to become part of the Russian Federation, in a Russian-organised referendum which nevertheless has more legality than, for example, the US Declaration of Independence. If Russia wants a rail link it can build one, for a fraction of the cost of building a big naval base. This will then be protected by ground troops, who can see and address any threat, rather than sailors who can only respond by firing improbably long-distance rockets from their ships.

One of the many signs that Russia knewt that something fishy was going on in Georgia before the conflict of 2008 was the fact that a few weeks before it took place a detachment of Russian military engineers restored a railway line in Abkhazia. It didn’t take long, and they didn’t need a naval base to do it. Whatever the rights and wrongs of that action, it demonstrates what Russia can do if it wants, without fanfare.

We protest, but we are never going to do anything. We don’t really have the values we say we have, but we have to pretend because we know our real values and actions are worse. And, of course, if something happens in a place with a long and unpronounceable name it must be suspicious. Welcome to Western journalism.

Conclusion

The West is using the spectre of a big Russian naval base in Ochamchire to run away from acting according to its own principles and justify its many previous instances of doing so. Protesting about it, and telling unsubstantiated stories about it, are meant to cover the fact that if the West really objected to Russia’s actions it would try to remove Russia from Abkhazia, but has no intention of doing so, and therefore has no real objection to the things it says are going on.

Pragmatists may argue that principles have to be sacrificed in real, practical situations. But as we have seen in Afghanistan, the West’s own friends have to pay a high price for such hypocrisy. The West has never repudiated its refusal to counter the Soviet invasion with anything real. It is continuing to pursue the line that protesting with words, but not actually doing anything, is justified, and the destruction and misery inflicted on others in consequence is merely acceptable collateral damage.

As long as the West objects to the Russian presence in Abkhazia but doesn’t believe in its own principles we will hear story after story to justify previous unprincipled inactions. Pragmatists themselves are well aware that you cannot resolve any problem by refusing to address the real issue. But the hard, practical consequences of the West’s actions, not Russia’s, are always the last thing the West actually wants us to see.

Seth Ferris, investigative journalist and political scientist, expert on Middle Eastern affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Georgia sat on the sidelines during the presidential election in the breakaway autonomous republic, but it nevertheless watched intently as the process played out. What follows is an analysis of the near-term prognosis for the situation. Alexander Rusetsky, a noted analyst and the director of the Caucasus Institute for Regional Security, shared his thoughts on how the relationship between Tbilisi and Sukhumi might unfold, what sorts of prospects exist for nurturing contacts, and how the regional situation is shaping up going forward.

Q. A new president is about to take office in Abkhazia. Should we expect that to somehow foster a better relationship between Tbilisi and Sukhumi, with more efficacy than the multiparty negotiations in Geneva that have been the only way of bringing the two sides together?

A. I’m not ruling out a new round of confrontation in Abkhazia. Following the undoing of the unionists who supported Tbilisi, a dispute started between the separatists, who support independence for Abkhazia, and the irredentists, those of a pro-Moscow bent who want to join Russia. Irredentist-minded political forces are now rising to power, leaving the separatists out in the cold. So the crisis of legitimacy in Abkhazia (from Tbilisi’s standpoint) has risen to a whole new level.

The present administration does not reflect the interests of the majority of the population of Abkhazia. To support my point, let me draw attention to the 200,000 people who were expelled from Abkhazia, and to the more than 20,000 Georgians still living in Abkhazia who were denied the right to vote in the last election. These people were driven out of political life. The supporters of Abkhaz independence, the separatists, may soon find themselves in a similar position. I am leaving open the possibility that the persecution of civil society and of leaders of existing NGOs will intensify. Through entrapment, they will be “caught” consorting with “Western intelligence services.” The same scenario that is playing out in Russia will spread into Russia’s spheres of influence in the Near Abroad.

On the other hand, Tbilisi could link up with the irredentists, who have Moscow behind them. Up to this point, Tbilisi and the West have bet unsuccessfully on the separatists. Although this may seem strange to say, the new format could end up working better, for the simple reason that Moscow is not going to block it. Every attempt to establish a basis for strategic talks with the separatists has failed because Moscow is not amenable to such action. The Abkhaz separatists neither had nor could have had sufficient pull to wage the politics of independence.

If negotiations bear fruit and the irredentists, unionists and separatists start cooperating, Abkhazia may achieve a greater level of economic and political independence and sustainable development.

The Geneva course is dead, in my opinion. Moscow and Tbilisi have to be the principal parties in the negotiations. The fragmented political segments of Abkhaz and South Ossetian society must be full-fledged participants in the negotiating process. International organizations should have clear entitlements to balance the asymmetry of tiny Georgia on the one side and nuclear great power Russia on the other.

Q: Before 2008, that is, prior to Russia’s recognition of the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, many joint projects (Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian, and even three-way or multilateral) were carried out. Now what? Are any of the several hundred NGOs still there and continuing to address the problems of both places, since they have a partner on the other side?

A. There are nongovernmental organizations like that. But they are under extremely tight control, especially in Tskhinvali, and are considered agents of Western political persuasion. Further problems have arisen for them as well, rather serious ones, according to my sources. However, I think that if the West, Moscow and Tbilisi institute the right policies for the job, it is possible to create mechanisms to ensure serviceable civil society institutions in these regions. In that respect, I want to mention that NGOs everywhere in divided societies, including organizations created by those driven from their homes, must have regular upkeep. The institutions of civil society mustn’t function as tools of confrontation or a means of advancing the agenda of one geopolitical actor or another. Instead they should be peacekeeping resources that focus on enhancing civil safety and providing sustainable development for communities and society as a whole. I hope Moscow can reassess the situation and find some way to engage the West in a dialogue on cooperation to support the development of civil society institutions.

Q. Can Tbilisi be said to have any real ties to Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, along humanitarian lines at least?

A. They have always had ties at every level. No matter how the conflict evolves, the attraction between people is growing stronger, as is the hatred of all the political figures who have inflicted this ongoing tragedy on the people for more than 20 years.

Q. A number of Abkhaz leaders have stated the premise that if the fate of our people is to be assimilated, then we will assimilate with the Russians. Is there any chance of overcoming such profound dislike for Georgia?

A. When phrases like that circulate in the mass media, the result is an escalation of conflict and a degradation of national dignity. The Abkhaz are bearers of a complex psychosocial phenomenon. Abkhaz society is not homogeneous; it is filled with an assortment of conflicts. In general, “Abkhaz” can be regarded as having connotations of both ethnicity and citizenship. The muhajirs who were banished to Turkey by the Russian Empire generally do not identify themselves with the term “Abkhaz.” It’s the same thing as when an Azerbaijani from Shusha is referred to as an Artsakhite. Thus the constitution adopted after the war is called the Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia (Apsna). And that is not wordplay; it is the crux of the conflict. Early in the 1990s, well-known practitioners of peace studies deemed the Abkhaz conflict a philological one. They did so with good reason. Some residents of Abkhazia detest Georgians, some Russians, others Armenians, and still others Turks. This resulted from specific traumas of body and soul that the people suffered. So it has to be dealt with as a psychosocial problem, not a foundation on which to erect political structures.

Q. Abkhazia insists on following its own path to development. South Ossetia occasionally talks about joining the Russian Federation. How realistic do you consider the plans of these partially recognized republics?

The question itself uses terminology that creates an inaccurate picture of what’s happened. These are regions of conflict. Societies are splintered here. So the phrasing “Abkhazia insists on following its own path to development” represents the position of the Abkhaz separatists but not the position of the unionists who desire reunification with Georgia or the position of the irredentists who seek maximum integration with the Russian Federation. And the phrasing “South Ossetia periodically speaks of joining Russia” expresses the wishes of the Ossetian irredentists, but it does not reflect the interests of the Ossetian separatists who want independence. And that also leaves out the people who were victims of ethnic and political purges and who are understandably unionists with a pro-Georgia orientation. It is with profound conviction that I say this: These quasi-political formations will have no chance of success unless they strive to build within themselves an ingrained civil peace.

Yuriy Simonyan, columnist of Independent Newspaper, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

The CEC Chairman Batal Tabagua stated that all votes were counted so there can be no significant changes to the results announced. Observers from almost fifty countries reported no major electoral violations. The only major obstruction to voting occurred at a polling station in Turkey, which was closed by the local police on a pretext that they received a warning of a possible bomb attack. However, the search didn’t last for long so after a short pause the voting continued. Sukhumi officials assumed that this was a case of the behind-the-scenes manipulations of Tbilisi that must have reminded its allies in Ankara that they should be manifesting support to the territorial integrity of Georgia. But since the voting process was actually carried on this allowed Sukhumi to proclaim the “victory of the Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey over the Georgian diplomacy.” The other two Abkhaz polling stations abroad — in Cherkessk and Moscow were operating normally.

The result of this presidential election was predictable. It was clear that Raul Khadjimba will be able to gain upper hand in the second round of the election, but he has actually managed to secure a victory in the first one. He has succeeded in obtaining an impressive level of public support which allowed him to become the president of Abkhazia on fourth try. Sergei Markov a member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation has confined to NEO that Raul Khadjimba has been able to withstand a punch throughout all of his career, so now one can only be curious about how Khadjimba is going to cope with the presidential challenges he is about to face.

The task at hand is the reform of the public administration that fell the victim of Khadjimba’s predecessor Alexander Ankvab who concentrated all power in his hands and single-handedly solved the most petty issues. The newly elected president is going to re-balance the responsibilities of the government institutions by transferring a number of his authorities to the Parliament and the Cabinet.

One more important concern — is the improvement of the local economy efficiency levels. This goal is a particularly challenging matter if one is to consider the political status of Abkhazia — it’s a partially recognized Republic, so there would be no easy way of attracting investors. Therefore, some experts believe that this goal can only be achieved by a major liberalization of the legislation and by providing the business elite with certain guarantees. At the same time it is crucial to optimize Russian aid spending by identifying the promising areas of the Abkhaz economy. In fact they have been defined a while ago — those are tourism and agriculture. These are the niches that can in today’s Abkhazian environment that can only be compared to a blockade be more or less developed. However, these areas demand some major legislative changes. In particular, many potential investors are deterred by the fact that the current legislation “does not encourage” the involvement of foreigners in the agricultural sector.

Sergei Markov expressed the hope that Raul Khadjimba would be a leader capable of taking the right decisions. “The long political struggle has made him a strong experienced politician. Now he can fully rely on the people’s trust, “- said Markov. According to him, Raul Khadjimba is faced with one major challenge - to consolidate the Abkhazian elite, which, after the most difficult election of 2004 that has nearly drove the country into civil war, has largely remained divided into two camps. “In this quest Sergei Shamba, a former Prime Minister who cannot be attributed to any of the two groups can be of extremely helpful. He took his election defeat three years ago with dignity, therefore he remains an extremely influential politician in Abkhaz society. It seems that the newly elected president is well aware of this fact since he was assisted by Sergei Shamba all through the second half of his election campaign,”- said Markov.

Another Russian political scientist, the head of the International Institute of the Newly Established States Alexei Martynov agrees that those evaluations are accurate. He told told NEO that he is curious to see how will Raul Khadjimba manage the creation of a “team of professionals, businessmen and managers that Abkhazia needs today” “The West, as it was expected, announced the lastest presidential election illegal. This was inevitable and the young Abkhaz state could not expect anything else. The principal difference is in the fact that its sovereignty is recognized by Russia, “- said Martynov. According to the head of the IINES, the expansion of recognition is an important tasks, but it’s miles away from being a top priority. “What is really important now is the socio-economic development of the country. In the second stage – the improvement of its diplomatic relations with the neighboring countries: Russia and Georgia “, – told Alexei Martynov. Without a successful resolution of the above stated issues it will be almost impossible to ensure the dynamic development of Abkhazia.

Yuriy Simonyan, columnist of Independent Newspaper, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Elections for the fourth President of the partially recognized Republic of Abkhazia will be held on August 24th. Four candidates are running for the presidential office – all of them former security officials: former head of the KGB of Abkhazia, also former defense minister, ex-prime minister and ex-vice-president MP Raul Khadjimba, taking chances for a fourth time, ex-minister of Internal Affairs

The front-runner of the election campaign is Raul Khadjimba. And this is probably not a surprise. A political heavyweight, the hero of the Georgian-Abkhazian war, he was the favourite to become President in the eyes of the legendary first president of Abkhazia Vladislav Ardzinba. Finally, it was Khadjimba who was the unofficial leader of the opposition which united against President Alexander Ankvab and started protests in May demanding his resignation. Ankvab after consultation with his supporters and the Moscow representative, President Putin’s aide Vladislav Surkov who came to Sukhumi during the confrontation, announced his early resignation from the presidency on June 1.

Until recently, the chances of the other three candidates for the post of Presidency were considered to be equal and without any prospects for victory. However, recent polls have shown Aslan Bjania take the lead, breaking away from Dzyapshba and Kishmariya; polls have also shown a decline in ratings for Khadjimba. According to Sukhumi political analyst Inal Khashig in his interview to New Eastern Outlook: “it seems that there will definitely be a second round”.

The main distinguishing feature of the current election campaign is total calmness. During discussions, the candidates do sometimes accuse and rebuke each other. However, all this is done solely to entertain the audience in order to increase their electoral base. Or, in other words, the rivals are not defaming each other. The biggest scandal in the country has already taken place: the disenfranchising of some 22 thousand Georgians in the Gali and Tkvarcheli districts. The former Abkhazian authorities provided them with passports of citizens of the republic, while they already held Georgian citizenship. Under the legislation of Abkhazia, this is prohibited; second citizenship can only be Russian.

According to Abkhazian political analyst Ibrahim Chkadua the violation of the law was twofold. Firstly, as already mentioned, second citizenship can only be Russian. And secondly, Abkhazian passports were given out to these people by specially created district commissions, whereas the issue of citizenship is the exclusive prerogative of Abkhazia’s central government.

“Thus, the parliament and the executive branch of Abkhazia, by suspending Abkhazian citizenship for this citizen category, have corrected the legislative violation committed by the previous government. No one is depriving these individuals of Abkhazian citizenship. They have been briefly deprived of the right to vote. Firstly, they will receive a residence permit in Abkhazia, and then the authorities in accordance with the law will consider their petitions for citizenship of the Republic with the restoration of rights to the fullest extent,” said Ibrahim Chkadua in his interview to NEO.

At any rate, this played into the hands of Raul Khadjimba. Of all the candidates, he is the least popular among the Georgian population of Abkhazia. And it turns out that his rivals have lost votes of about 22 thousand Georgians, who are unlikely to want to see Raul Khadjimba as President.

Inal Khashig considers the prevailing situation in Abkhazia Inal Khashig to be calm. “All the candidates have fairly equal opportunities as far as the election campaign is concerned. Unlike previous years, I do not see any overbalance in favour of anyone. Not one candidate is being promoted in the media as was the case in the past. The population’s attitude to the elections remains the same: people are willing to vote for a specific candidate, not really contemplating the candidate’s program. According to the latest polls, Raul Khadjimba is supported by approximately 42% of the voters, and his main rival Aslan Bjania accounts for about 33%. I think this is a normal situation. The elections, in my opinion, will be interesting and this is a good thing, though, they will not be as dramatic as in 2004 when they almost resulted in civil strife” commented Inal Khashig.

According to the political analyst, another advantageous difference is the absence of messages from outside of Abkhazia, i.e. from Russia, Turkey, and even Georgia, which is not reacting at all (not even evaluating candidates’ opportunities) to what is happening in the republic. “It seems that this time, if nothing happens, Abkhazian society without any hints from outside will select the head of the republic, and it will be a purely inner choice of the Abkhazian people,” remarked Hashig.

Georgia, although pointedly standing aside from the presidential election in Abkhazia, is closely monitoring what is happening in the breakaway republic. Georgian State Minister for Reconciliation and Civil Equality Paata Zakareishvili told our NEO correspondent: “Despite the fact that the so-called elections being held in Abkhazia do not comply with Georgian and international law, and thus the results of the elections will not be considered legitimate, it is very important for us to know what is happening on the territory of Abkhazia.” “It is important that the process takes place peacefully, without any human rights violations, and that the elections do not develop into any acts of violence, which has happened before. We do not want the people to be the victims of repressive actions, “added Zakareishvili.

The State Minister in his interview with the author stressed that “whoever becomes the leader of Abkhazian society, it is important for us to work with them.” “We are not placing emphasis on any candidate. We are not talking about selective cooperation as in: we will cooperate only with this candidate, and if the other one wins, we will not try to patch up relations. We will cooperate with a leader who can and will speak on behalf of the population of Abkhazia,” said Zakareishvili.

The Georgian State Minister did not evaluate the suspension of voting rights of the majority of the Georgian population in Abkhazia. “For Georgia, it is important that double standards are not applied in regard to those individuals living in Abkhazia and that their human rights are not violated. We are not considering the aspect of political rights. This area is occupied by Russian forces, that is why we believe that the situation there is managed by Moscow. Therefore Moscow bears responsibility for the violation or the observance of the political rights of the people living on this territory,”- said Zakareishvili

Yuriy Simonyan, columnist of Independent Newspaper, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

]]> https://journal-neo.org/2014/08/19/rus-abhazskij-vy-bor/feed/ 0 https://journal-neo.org/2014/07/04/abkhazia-a-false-flag-in-the-making/ https://journal-neo.org/2014/07/04/abkhazia-a-false-flag-in-the-making/#comments Fri, 04 Jul 2014 00:59:03 +0000 http://journal-neo.org/?p=12503 The South Caucasus has a surprisingly number of links with US Department of Defense contractors. This is highly questionable, especially given how far away Georgia and the region is from the United States. Though we usually find out about their deeds after the event, it seems that at the moment one contractor at least is casting actors for the next possible false flag attack, or staged media event.

Something is clearly going on around the border of Abkhazia, which broke away from Georgia proper in the early 1990s after a bloody conflict. Mobius Industries USA, Inc. is hiring Georgian-speaking Cultural Advisor/Roleplayers in the US to help support America’s Military’s Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Program.

Mobius Defense claims to be in continuous search of Professional Role Players from all cultures, but in its list of desired cultures and languages there is no mention of Georgian. As this list was compiled in 2012, Georgian is a new addition to its portfolio.

Actors and stage

So what? You may say. The “crisis actors” recruited by Mobius act out training scenarios in a realistic town, village or training room on a military training site in the US. They pretend to be ordinary villagers, public officials (mayors, advisors, judges), insurgents, policemen, interpreters or army and other military personnel. Their purpose is to convincingly recreate the political, religious, cultural, and economic relationships found within the applicable community for training purposes.

Many academic papers can now be found which support the need for the US military to employ crisis actors. This practice is said, amongst other things, to help commanders identify and develop the leadership requirements of the modern fighting force. However their real use has long been known, which is precisely why so many papers have been written which do not mention it.

Crisis actors are used to “manufacture consent”, in other words to concoct fabricated news stories or staged events which persuade public and politicians that a desired military intervention is justified. These stories produce what is now called the CNN effect, in which so many headlines are created that a world power has to be seen to be reacting to them, despite the fact the same country manufactured those stories to begin with, by tricks such as using poison gas and then blaming the other side, showing pictures of dead bodies without providing evidence of where they were taken and when, etcetera.

Several stunts of this nature have taken place in the Syrian conflict, as exposed in this journal and others. The direct involvement of the US in these activities, which it does of course deny if it comments at all, has been proven by the fact that the “terrorist weapons” being used by the designated enemy in a given conflict are almost always supplied by US manufacturers through US controlled smuggling routes, and there is paperwork to back this up. However the most recent revelation to come out of the US may be the most telling evidence of what games are actually being played by the guardians of democracy.

False flag exposed

The Boston Marathon bombings are currently being reinvestigated. Now the alleged suspects are either dead or in custody independent researchers have begun piecing together a reality much different to the one presented to the public by the news media, containing so many distortions of the truth that they could not have happened by chance, or by individuals acting alone, on impulse. We don’t know whether Mobius Industries wrote the manual, but someone in a position to influence events was clearly using one.

For example, the local SWAT team member insisted in a CNN interview that one suspect, Djokhar Tsanaev, had been captured with a gun after an exchange of gunfire. However, other police and FBI testimony clearly states that he was unarmed and there were no weapons on the boat he was captured on. The FBI has refused to explain why there had been gunfire at the scene, as several witnesses have said, when by its own testimony the suspect was unarmed. It has also refused to say why a different SWAT team is also claiming “credit” for the arrest, and issuing its own photographs to prove it.

Similarly, photos of the scene of arrest have been doctored. Those inside the boat are much darker than the ones outside, although the height of the fence behind the boat, visible in the photos, indicates that the light level should be the same. It is said that the suspect had a wound on his neck, but even the doctored photographs demonstrate this was not present until after he had surrendered and was assaulted by the officers, as is depicted in another photo.

Examining the footage of the actual bombings, one researcher has noticed the same person being interviewed twice by CNN, but presented as two different witnesses speaking at two different times and locations. There is also a strange object obscuring scenes of the rescue of an amputee, which is actually a number of different images of halves of the same person, separate, not attached to each other, which also appear at other points in the same footage. All this is being filmed by a news cameraman wearing sunglasses whilst filming.

No one has yet explained these deviations from the official version of events. What we know however is that people are being recruited by US defence contractors to pretend to be involved in crisis situations, as part of US military programmes, and the US military is preparing for some programme or diversion on the Abkhazian-Georgian border now.

We also know that the suspects in the Boston Marathon bombings were Chechens. The insertion of Chechen terrorists into the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, under a US programme, their nicer cars and higher standard of living than the Georgians in the same neighbourhood and the complicity of the Georgian government in this is now well-documented, being officially investigated by the new Georgian government and has seen at least one person, a British journalist Roddy Scott, murdered for trying to report it.

Why now?

The recruitment of Georgian crisis actors by a company which hasn’t wanted then before appears to be a response to a UN Declaration made on June 5, at the Sixty-eighth Session of the General Assembly. This recognised that Internally Displaced Persons from Abkhazia and Tskhknivali (South Ossetia) had the right to return to their homes, from which they were driven during the Georgian civil war of the early 90’s.

It reads, in part:

“Concerned about forced demographic changes, as well as the humanitarian situation resulting from armed conflict in Georgia, the General Assembly recognized today the right of all internally displaced persons, refugees and their descendants to return to their homes throughout that country, including Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia.”

The Assembly underlined the urgent need for unimpeded humanitarian access to all people in conflict-affected areas, favourable security conditions and for a timetable to ensure the voluntary, safe and dignified return of all internally displaced persons and refugees to their places of origin. It also called upon all participants in the Geneva discussions to bolster efforts to establish a durable peace, and take immediate steps to ensure respect for human rights.

As the UN made this declaration and jointly chairs the Geneva discussions its military will be expected to be part of ensuring the IDPs return. Strange, then, this resolution is only passed now and not before. Such a apparently worthwhile programme could have been undertaken long ago. It hasn’t because the conflicts between Georgia and its breakaway regions are frozen, with neither side able to accept the position of the other in either case. Keeping these conflicts frozen is therefore the prerequisite for keeping the IDPs out of Abkhazia and keeping the US in Georgia.

Why would the US want to do this? Maybe we should ask the staff of the US Embassy and various think tanks, especially those based in Tbilisi. Much is being discussed and decided in the shadows.

We could also ask why the local elections in West Georgia, the main hub of the US weapons smuggling programme as a number of investigative discoveries have made clear, are certain to be won by Saakashvili henchmen who have been thrown out elsewhere in Georgia, as both the opposition and even government lists are populated with them. These individuals are all linked with the Hudson and Potomac Institutes, US think tanks, as well as a variety of criminal gangs. It in more than coincidence that West Georgia borders Abkhazia and the Georgian military budget is expected to be topped up by the United States budget to levels close to prior to the 2008 Georgian-Russian war in light of events in Ukraine.

Conclusion

We have seen what “crisis actors” actually do. We have seen it in Syria and in Boston. If their work was as effective as the military claims, the US would be gaining ground in Syria rather than losing it and there would be no more Islamist terrorists in the Caucasus, like the ones who were shooting in Maidan Square and were given Georgian passports immediately afterwards.

The effect of their work is to cause conflict by manufacturing a justification for it. As their military usefulness is so limited, but that is the only reason given for employing them, the only reason they are ever introduced is when someone wants to manufacture a conflict. A US company is now recruiting such actors for a US defence programme for future deployments to a region next door to a main weapons transport hub, the port of Poti on the Georgian Black Sea coast.

Of course, if conflict erupts again in Abkhazia Russia will be blamed by the international community. Mobius International has been advertising for Russian crisis actors for a lot longer than Georgian ones. You have been warned!

Seth Ferris, investigative journalist and political scientist, expert on Middle Eastern affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.