According to sources from the Pankisi Gorge, at least 100 natives of the valley joined IS detachments. Nearly 15 people have already died during the hostilities. A total of over 200 people from Georgia are believed to be fighting in the East.

“Georgian citizens are recruited for the IS by the Pankisi followers of radical Islam,” says Meka Khangoshvili, a representative of the Chechen diaspora, who sees the situation as a threat to this particular region and to all of Georgia. “If this situation persists and the state fails to take appropriate measures, there will be no young people left in the valley, which poses a potential threat for the gene pool. And if we do not put an end to the outflow of young, Russia will use these facts in its favor, while continuing to accuse Georgia of favoring terrorists and extremists,” said Meka Hangoshvili.

However, judging from the comments of Georgian officials, there will be no barriers to stop the young people from the Pankisi heading to the war. To illustrate this, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia, Vakhtang Gomelauri, acknowledged in his comments on the disturbing trend that the Ministry of Internal Affairs is unable either to prevent adult citizens from going to Turkey or any other country about their business or to control where they are going from there.

“In some cases, officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have managed to prevent the departure of young people to the war-torn area. However, notably, not everyone who is leaving, for example, for Turkey, can be proved to be intending to go to Syria and fight. This problem did not arise yesterday and not today, but has been developing for a whole decade. It is regrettable, but in most cases we can do nothing to prevent them from going,” said Vakhtang Gomelauri. Deputy Minister also said in this regard that the specific case of the most recent flight of the 16 and 18-year-old Pankisi boys had been investigated and that it had been found that the police officer who conducted the examination at the Tbilisi airport made an error by letting them board the plane, for which he was punished administratively.

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili urged not to dramatize the situation. “The whole world is trying to prevent radical Islamist groups in the East from attracting new members, all in vain, and Georgia is no exception. The government has nothing to do with it. Let me remind you that over a hundred residents of the Pankisi Gorge went to war in Syria back under President Saakashvili. And it has been at most 4-5 people under the current government,” said Irakli Garibashvili to journalists. According to him, the “Islamic State” is a headache for the whole world, world leaders do not seem to be finding a way out of this situation and this issue cannot be solved in one fell swoop. “No one knows what preventive action should be taken and how. We are worried about every Georgian resident who went to fight in Syria, but we are unable to solve the problem which is distressing the entire world,” said Mr. Garibashvili calling for the Georgian media immediately to stop publishing speculations on Syria and disturbing the Georgian society.

Earlier this year, the Georgian parliament adopted a special amendment to the law, according to which joining and participating in illegal groups operating in a foreign state, or taking part in exercises organized by such groups is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 to 10 years. The parliament also tightened the anti-terrorism legislation which provides for a sentence of 6 to 9 years in prison for visiting a foreign country to take part in terrorist activities, their preparation or similar activities, as well as illegal paramilitary exercises. However, not many seem to have been frightened by the more severe measures. And, most importantly, the low socio-economic level of development, the unemployment which leads young people to seek at least some income, which is successfully used by all kinds of envoys.

Today, three Georgian regions can be considered as suppliers of manpower in the IS units. These include the already mentioned Pankisi Gorge, Kvemo Kartli, a region densely populated by Azerbaijanis, as well as the Autonomous Republic of Adjara with a large Muslim population, and which, according to some experts, has been under the irreversible influence of Turkey.

The troubling situation unfolding in Georgia is so alarming that it has raised comments from the US Ambassador Richard Norland. “The U.S. and every country in Europe are facing the same problem of young people succumbing to appeals for radicalization from certain elements. We all have a challenge to unite economic, social, political and security measures to deal with the outflow of both young and older people to the world’s hot spots. Georgia’s situation is not unique. We greatly appreciate our cooperation with the Georgian government in dealing with this common problem,” said the Ambassador.

In the meantime, experts are already talking about a period when youn people who have had enough to war, have been trained in camps and have been out of work for one reason or another will begin to return home, where they are still not going to find a job or a better quality of life. And, of course, thereg is no particular need to describe alarmist scenarios.

Yuri Simonyan, columnist of “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”, exclusively for the online-magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Source: RIA

In Sochi, on 24 November the presidents of the Russian Federation and Abkhazia Vladimir Putin and Raul Khajimba signed a Treaty between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia on Alliance and Integration. This document was the result of joint efforts by Moscow and Sukhumi, prior to which drafts of the treaty developed independently were rejected: the Abkhaz side would reject the Moscow version, and the Russian side would reject the Sukhumi version.

Thus, the treaty of alliance, drawn up on a parity basis and containing compromises and signed by the presidents of the two countries, on top of all that served as a concrete response to the criticism that Russia is unable to build true partnerships with notoriously weak states, and operates in this issue from the perspective of power and imposing its own interests. Sukhumi was not satisfied with those provisions in the Russian version of the Treaty of Alliance that essentially entailed delegating a part of sovereignty to Russia. This included, in particular, the establishment of some supranational military, law enforcement structures and fiscal institutions. The article on increasing social benefits was surprising: the local budget is entirely dependent on Russia, and the treaty contained mention of increasing payments to residents of Abkhazia who are citizens of the Russian Federation – indeed, most of the citizens of Abkhazia possess secondary Russian citizenship, but what about those who have only an Abkhazian passport? Do they all have to take Russian citizenship too? And finally, the idea of simplified granting of citizenship to Russians was categorically unacceptable to the Black Sea republic – the Abkhazians with a population of 150,000 already have difficulty claiming the advantage of the “titular nation”, and have always feared ethno-demographic changes.

The relaxation of the rules of citizenship automatically opened the possibility of acquiring land and property in Abkhazia, which is prohibited to foreigners. “And who said that the country would not immediately be overwhelmed by an influx of immigrants from Russia’s troubled regions?” This question was often posed in Sukhumi when the Russian draft of the treaty was under discussion. “In the Russian draft Russian interests were originally laid out and given priority, and Abkhazian interests were given little attention. But this is a common thing, any country participating in the development of such a treaty tries to take care of itself,” said the Abkhazian political scientist Inal Khashig.

The counter offer, the Abkhazian version of the treaty, was developed by at least two institutions: the Administration of the President of Abkhazia and Parliament. In contrast to the Russian version, in Sukhumi they did their best to present their interests in the document and protect them. And it worked. For example, the final version of the treaty left out the item on the simplified granting of Abkhazian citizenship to Russians that so disturbed the local community.

“The new treaty ensures the independence of our country and at the same time strengthens ties with Russia.” “The new draft of the treaty was discussed in Abkhazia widely and openly. We worked completely transparently,” said the Abkhazian President Khajimba. “Russia reacted with sincere understanding for our position. An equal, mutually respectful dialogue took place.”

 Russian President Vladimir Putin, commenting on the signed document, recalled the substantial Russian investments that are to revive the Abkhaz economy and create the conditions for the gradual reduction of Russian cash injections while proportionally consolidating the local economy. Thus, from 2015 to 2017, Abkhazia will receive up to 4 billion roubles annually. In addition, in the future, the Black Sea republic will receive an additional 5 billion roubles. In the territory of Abkhazia a joint formation of troops will be established from the Abkhaz and Russian armed forces under Russian command. And to protect the Abkhaz-Georgian border along the Inguri River Russian and Abkhazian units will work together. It is worth mentioning that the treaty stipulates that Abkhazia will participate fully in the “integration processes in the post-Soviet space, implemented on the initiative of and/or with the assistance of the Russian Federation.” It is remarkable, but at the same time ambiguous.

How, for example, will Abkhazia participate in such alliances as the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), if all the other members of these associations do not recognise the independence of Abkhazia and support the principle of Georgia’s territorial integrity? In Georgia itself the response to the alliance treaty between Russia and Abkhazia is negative. Another of Putin’s proposals was met with bayonets when it was announced at the final joint press conference after signing the treaty. The Russian leader, in particular, suggested that his Abkhaz colleague consider the option of the full restoration of the railway in the Georgian direction and onwards to Armenia.

 The implementation of this project is important for Russia. The restoration of railway connections through Abkhazia and Georgia, firstly, would facilitate the infrastructural connection both with Armenia and the Russian military base, and secondly would partially unlock the allied state “clamped” in the Azerbaijani-Turkish vice. It is clear that Yerevan is also extremely interested in revitalising the route. However, the Georgian Foreign Ministry had to announce a firm ‘no’ to this project, since it “did not begin to take into account the official interests of Tbilisi.” They are known to be radically at odds with the Russian-Abkhazian treaty.

Therefore, negotiations on the rail road, the operation of which may to some extent change the balance of power in the region, could be protracted, even if Putin’s proposal may seem attractive to Sukhumi from the standpoint of obtaining transport income. However, this is quite a differernt story. In the meantime it is clear that by signing on 24 November in Sochi the treaty on alliance and integration between Russia and Abkhazia, Vladimir Putin and Raul Khajimba turned a new page in Russian-Abkhaz relations.

Yuri Simonyan, columnist of “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”, exclusively for the online-magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

What’s even worse, the people involved in the conflict are not just common citizens, but officials. Representatives of the local department of the “Georgian Dream” party, who are allegedly patronized by a “highly respected member of parliament” beat one of the leaders of the Khalatsani village administration in the Pankisi Gorge. The conflict escalated, and a few more Kists were injured in the second and the third “rounds”. Spetsnaz troops were deployed in the region to resolve the conflict. Four people were arrested, and, according to various estimates, from 3 to 7 injured people are in a district hospital.

The widely covered conflict, it is said, started several years ago, when today’s opponents got involved in a car accident and postponed the conflict “until the right moment.” It has probably come. Fights in the Kakheti region, known as the “wine cradle of Georgia,” do take place. The fact that officials provoke each other on purpose is not surprising. Separation on religious grounds is disturbing, even dangerous under current circumstances, but it can be overcome. However, the fact that conflicts, where the religious factor is present to this or that extent, take place more often in Georgia may be catastrophic for the country where not less than 200 thousand people are Muslims. These conflicts are sometimes outrageous.

Less than a month ago, serious riots took place in the village of Mokhe in the Adigeni district, in South Georgia. Ten people were arrested, and ten more were hospitalized. Back then local Muslims took an overly active part in protesting against the decision of the secular authorities to turn an emergency building in the center of the village into a library, declaring it authorities’ property. Christian residents of the area stood by the officials.

This is not the first time that conflicts with a religious overtone occurred in Adigeni. Shortly before the above-mentioned events, in the village of Chela the secular officials authorized the dismantling of a collapsible minaret. The authorities concluded that it was imported to Georgia from Turkey without payment of customs fees. The dismantling of the minaret escalated the rage of the Muslims in the region.

Adigeni is the second biggest district in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region. In the south it borders Muslim Turkey and in the west – the Autonomous Republic of Adjara, where a third of the population is also Muslim. The Samtskhe-Javakheti region is troubled, economically depressed. Three out of six districts of the region are inhabited by Armenians, and this makes the situation more difficult. They also live in three other districts. Some of the Meskhetian Turks, deported during World War II, should be allowed to return to that area, according to Georgia’s international obligations. There is no need to speak about the Turkish-Armenian relationship, for it is well known. Muslims are convinced that their rights are violated, and that contributes to already existing problems. In fact, the authorities’ action in the village of Chela cannot be logically explained. How much money could their budget lose because of unpaid custom fees on an imported minaret? It is difficult to calculate the exact figure. However, taking into account Georgian liberal fiscal legislation, it hardly can be a sum worth escalating a religious conflict over. Muslims are now systematically staging protests. Muslims who live in neighboring Adjara are ready to “help” Adigeni. Discontented voices have been heard in Turkey as well. Authorities eventually gave in and reinstalled the minaret. Muslims not only achieved their aim, but arrived at the following conclusion: a conjoint protest can be effective.

That is why it was hardly surprising when they were involved in disturbances in another village, Mokhe. This time Muslim discontent was provoked by the authorities’ decision to build a shopping mall in an abandoned emergency building. A library, according to another version. They declared themselves owners of the abandoned building on the grounds that it once was a mosque. As mentioned above, this resulted in unrest, and some people were injured or arrested. The authorities gave in once again – the court took charge of the building. In Mokha Muslims are not going to give in. If the court does not pronounce judgement in their favor – there will be new protests. The story of the building is quite simple.

There was a church on its site, which was destroyed by the Turks during another seizure of Samtskhe-Javakheti. The church debris was later used to build a religious building for Muslims. During Soviet times it was razed to the ground, and in its place a cultural center was build, which eventually fell into decay. Today’s conflict started because of that very building.

Some security experts believe that increasingly frequent conflicts with a religious component, which are not, by the looks of it, interconnected, should be dealt with extremely cautiously. Events of recent years have proved that it is hard to predict the mood in the Muslim world from the outside. Each conflict in Adigeni has an underlying reason, as well as conflicts in Kakheti, but they all may be parts of the country’s destabilization plan. As practice proves, destabilization on a religious basis has most severe consequences. In this connection it is worth remembering the recent “informational provocations”, when anonymous bloggers uploaded to YouTube videos which were aimed at inciting hatred in the Muslim world towards early Christian Georgia.

The video message of the militant, who fights for the Islamic State, Omar al-Shishani (Baritashvili) is also quite illustrative in this regard. The man, born in the Pankisi gorge, has threatened to return home and “restore order”, first, at home, where the Muslims are being infringed, and then in Russia which has neutralized his brothers in faith in the North Caucasus. Al-Shishani is not the only Muslim from Georgia who is participating in the war in the East. According to some information, there can be a hundred or even more of them. This is not a force that can bring about big troubles, but it will very likely lead to local disturbances.

Alexander Rusetsky, the head of the South Caucasus Institute for Regional Security, thinks that the inter-confessional situation in Georgia has generally deteriorated. “In order to maintain balance, secular authorities should keep their heads cool, and spiritual leaders should avoid confrontation by reminding their congregation about love and tolerance: the fundamental bases of any religion,” he said to the reporter of “Novoe Vostochnoe Obozrenie”.

Yuri Simonyan, columnist of “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”, exclusively for the online-magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Georgia sat on the sidelines during the presidential election in the breakaway autonomous republic, but it nevertheless watched intently as the process played out. What follows is an analysis of the near-term prognosis for the situation. Alexander Rusetsky, a noted analyst and the director of the Caucasus Institute for Regional Security, shared his thoughts on how the relationship between Tbilisi and Sukhumi might unfold, what sorts of prospects exist for nurturing contacts, and how the regional situation is shaping up going forward.

Q. A new president is about to take office in Abkhazia. Should we expect that to somehow foster a better relationship between Tbilisi and Sukhumi, with more efficacy than the multiparty negotiations in Geneva that have been the only way of bringing the two sides together?

A. I’m not ruling out a new round of confrontation in Abkhazia. Following the undoing of the unionists who supported Tbilisi, a dispute started between the separatists, who support independence for Abkhazia, and the irredentists, those of a pro-Moscow bent who want to join Russia. Irredentist-minded political forces are now rising to power, leaving the separatists out in the cold. So the crisis of legitimacy in Abkhazia (from Tbilisi’s standpoint) has risen to a whole new level.

The present administration does not reflect the interests of the majority of the population of Abkhazia. To support my point, let me draw attention to the 200,000 people who were expelled from Abkhazia, and to the more than 20,000 Georgians still living in Abkhazia who were denied the right to vote in the last election. These people were driven out of political life. The supporters of Abkhaz independence, the separatists, may soon find themselves in a similar position. I am leaving open the possibility that the persecution of civil society and of leaders of existing NGOs will intensify. Through entrapment, they will be “caught” consorting with “Western intelligence services.” The same scenario that is playing out in Russia will spread into Russia’s spheres of influence in the Near Abroad.

On the other hand, Tbilisi could link up with the irredentists, who have Moscow behind them. Up to this point, Tbilisi and the West have bet unsuccessfully on the separatists. Although this may seem strange to say, the new format could end up working better, for the simple reason that Moscow is not going to block it. Every attempt to establish a basis for strategic talks with the separatists has failed because Moscow is not amenable to such action. The Abkhaz separatists neither had nor could have had sufficient pull to wage the politics of independence.

If negotiations bear fruit and the irredentists, unionists and separatists start cooperating, Abkhazia may achieve a greater level of economic and political independence and sustainable development.

The Geneva course is dead, in my opinion. Moscow and Tbilisi have to be the principal parties in the negotiations. The fragmented political segments of Abkhaz and South Ossetian society must be full-fledged participants in the negotiating process. International organizations should have clear entitlements to balance the asymmetry of tiny Georgia on the one side and nuclear great power Russia on the other.

Q: Before 2008, that is, prior to Russia’s recognition of the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, many joint projects (Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian, and even three-way or multilateral) were carried out. Now what? Are any of the several hundred NGOs still there and continuing to address the problems of both places, since they have a partner on the other side?

A. There are nongovernmental organizations like that. But they are under extremely tight control, especially in Tskhinvali, and are considered agents of Western political persuasion. Further problems have arisen for them as well, rather serious ones, according to my sources. However, I think that if the West, Moscow and Tbilisi institute the right policies for the job, it is possible to create mechanisms to ensure serviceable civil society institutions in these regions. In that respect, I want to mention that NGOs everywhere in divided societies, including organizations created by those driven from their homes, must have regular upkeep. The institutions of civil society mustn’t function as tools of confrontation or a means of advancing the agenda of one geopolitical actor or another. Instead they should be peacekeeping resources that focus on enhancing civil safety and providing sustainable development for communities and society as a whole. I hope Moscow can reassess the situation and find some way to engage the West in a dialogue on cooperation to support the development of civil society institutions.

Q. Can Tbilisi be said to have any real ties to Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, along humanitarian lines at least?

A. They have always had ties at every level. No matter how the conflict evolves, the attraction between people is growing stronger, as is the hatred of all the political figures who have inflicted this ongoing tragedy on the people for more than 20 years.

Q. A number of Abkhaz leaders have stated the premise that if the fate of our people is to be assimilated, then we will assimilate with the Russians. Is there any chance of overcoming such profound dislike for Georgia?

A. When phrases like that circulate in the mass media, the result is an escalation of conflict and a degradation of national dignity. The Abkhaz are bearers of a complex psychosocial phenomenon. Abkhaz society is not homogeneous; it is filled with an assortment of conflicts. In general, “Abkhaz” can be regarded as having connotations of both ethnicity and citizenship. The muhajirs who were banished to Turkey by the Russian Empire generally do not identify themselves with the term “Abkhaz.” It’s the same thing as when an Azerbaijani from Shusha is referred to as an Artsakhite. Thus the constitution adopted after the war is called the Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia (Apsna). And that is not wordplay; it is the crux of the conflict. Early in the 1990s, well-known practitioners of peace studies deemed the Abkhaz conflict a philological one. They did so with good reason. Some residents of Abkhazia detest Georgians, some Russians, others Armenians, and still others Turks. This resulted from specific traumas of body and soul that the people suffered. So it has to be dealt with as a psychosocial problem, not a foundation on which to erect political structures.

Q. Abkhazia insists on following its own path to development. South Ossetia occasionally talks about joining the Russian Federation. How realistic do you consider the plans of these partially recognized republics?

The question itself uses terminology that creates an inaccurate picture of what’s happened. These are regions of conflict. Societies are splintered here. So the phrasing “Abkhazia insists on following its own path to development” represents the position of the Abkhaz separatists but not the position of the unionists who desire reunification with Georgia or the position of the irredentists who seek maximum integration with the Russian Federation. And the phrasing “South Ossetia periodically speaks of joining Russia” expresses the wishes of the Ossetian irredentists, but it does not reflect the interests of the Ossetian separatists who want independence. And that also leaves out the people who were victims of ethnic and political purges and who are understandably unionists with a pro-Georgia orientation. It is with profound conviction that I say this: These quasi-political formations will have no chance of success unless they strive to build within themselves an ingrained civil peace.

Yuriy Simonyan, columnist of Independent Newspaper, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

The people fleeing their homeland were initially helped by Yezidi House of Georgia, which provided them with temporary housing on the outskirts of Tbilisi. The head of the Spiritual Board of Yezidis in Georgia, Pir Dima, met with them. Along with the director of Yezidi House, Agit Mirzoev, he helped the newcomers make the requisite appeals to Georgian authorities for refugee status. Irakli Kokaia, a spokesman for the Georgian Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation, told reporters that all documents will be considered, but he added that certain procedures have to be followed and that a defined time period is necessary for authorities to render a decision.

“According to Georgian law on humanitarian and refugee status, a person who was forced to leave his homeland will receive a monthly stipend of 45 lari, is eligible to obtain a basic education, and has the right to a package of insurance coverage,” Kokaia said.

That amount, 45 lari, is worth about 30 U.S. dollars. It is impossible to make ends meet in Georgia on such a sum. But the realities there are that poverty was present before the refugees and displaced persons arrived, and that despite the transition of power in the government and the big promises, the situation has not changed much for the better. “Our ministry is working jointly with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), money is also being allocated for housing rental,” Kokaia said, but he struggled to specify exactly how much.

Agit Mirzoev met with Gunther Bechler, a Swiss diplomat to Georgia, regarding the refugees from Iraq. Bechler will pass along an aid request to the EU. Mirzoev also spoke with representatives of the embassies of the United States, Poland and Turkey, and he said those countries will likewise consider providing aid to Yezidis who left Iraq out of concern for their safety. Georgia is likely to offer the refugees asylum, he said, in addition to refugee status, a monthly stipend and an extra $240 a month per person from the UNHCR. “But it is difficult to expect any more than that,” Mirzoev said, so more attention from the global community is needed. Mirzayev added that “in the days ahead, we anticipate the arrival of 100 more refugees who have already asked us for help.”

One of the Yezidi refugees 38-year-old Sabah, who arrived in Georgia with her three children and a pregnant wife out of town Ba`shiqah-Barzan, told reporters through a hell of flour and had to go, until I realized that he was safe. “The last few months, the militants of the terrorist organization” Islamic state “pursue Yezidi men tortured, raped women, and children turning to Islam,” – he said. According to him, Ba`shiqah-Barzan is located a few dozen kilometers from Mosul, and when Mosul was captured terrorists in his hometown quickly learned that non-Muslims they put before a choice: to change their faith, to pay a fee or die.

“Of course, we did not want to leave Iraq, to leave our homes, and all the way up until the last minute we held out hope that the army would stop the extremists’ attacks. But as it turned out, we had to abandon all of belongings and flee,” said Sabah. He said the militants’ ranks included not only local fighters but also many people who came from as far away as Europe. “We came to Georgia through Turkey. We could have stayed there, but Turkey is a Muslim country, and it’s much easier for us to find things in common with Christians. They accept us as we are and don’t broach the subject of religion. I think a lot of our compatriots will follow us. That’s because Yezidis have been living in Tblisi for a long time” Sabah stated.

Meanwhile, the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic announced its willingness to accept Yazidi refugees from Irak. Baku’s reaction was swift. Officials in Azerbaijan declared that settlement in “ancient Azerbaijani lands without permission of a legitimate authority” is not allowed. The also called attention to the expulsion of local Azerbaijanis, who have been waiting many years for resolution of the conflict so they can return to their homes.

“The authorities of Azerbaijan once again outlined the essence of their nationalistic policy,” said David Babayan, a representative of the Nagorno-Karabakh government. “Their position in relation to the Yezidis is further proof that for Artsakh ( original name of Nagorno-Karabakh) there is no way back to Azerbaijan. We will not come back, and Baku needs to come to grips with that.”

“The resettlement of Iraqi Yazidis in occupied territories is eloquent testimony to the failure of the policy of Armenization in Azerbaijani occupied territory,” said Ilgar Velizade, head of the South Caucasus Political Science Club in Baku. According to him, the Armenian population in the region is in no hurry to occupy settlements where Azerbaijanis once lived and have been vacant for 20 years. “Even the vast majority of Syrian Armenians fleeing the terror and the war at home prefer to live in neighboring Lebanon and other countries,” Velizade remarked to a correspondent for NVO. “Now the Armenian government is trying to settle this land with Yezidis and with Kurds, who a century ago were settled in eastern Turkey, which was once inhabited by Armenians, so they’re creating a problem for themselves. As for Azerbaijan’s reaction, it is absolutely fair because the world rightly considers that Azerbaijani land.” According to the analyst, by artificially altering the ethnic balance in the region, Armenia is creating new risks that threaten to destabilize the already fragile security construct.

Commenting on the situation for the New Eastern Outlook, Alexey Martynov, the director of the Moscow Institute of New States, said: “Nagorno-Karabakh’s willingness to take in Yazidi refugees from the war in Iraq speaks of the profound government humanitarianism of Karabakh. The government itself is not in the best position. However, because it understands and remembers what war is, and in fact survived the humanitarian catastrophe in the early 90’s by building its own independent (albeit unrecognized yet) state, while maintaining that the most valuable thing is the people, their children, Nagorno-Karabakh is willing to help the refugees. What’s wrong with that? Who could be opposed in this situation? Nobody except people who want war, destruction and bloodshed. Despite the typical idle threats from Baku, Nagorno-Karabakh is sure to accept the Iraqi Yazidis. And in Nagorno-Karabakh there is plenty to go around for everyone. I think the assistance Nagorno-Karabagh gives to Iraqi refugees will not go unnoticed in the international arena. “

Yuriy Simonyan, columnist of Independent Newspaper, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

The revelation coincided with an announcement by the Greek Chief Prosecutor’s Office that Saakashvili was the target of an international and that Interpol had issued a red notice for him. However, it appeared that the two events are unrelated. Saakashvili, whose pleasure-seeking tendencies are well-known, allegedly attracted the attention of Greek police with his overly emotional behavior, and not for the reasons law enforcement agencies announced.

To recap, Georgia’s former head of state is charged under several articles: abuse of power in his harsh suppression of opposition rallies, confiscation of assets of the late tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili, embezzlement from his Imedi television company, and embezzlement of $ 10 million from the national treasury. This is not a comprehensive list of legal violations. It can be lengthened considerably. A study of the causes of the war in August 2008 and Georgia’s defeat in it is not yet complete. There are questions for the ex-president about the investigation, about the murder of a young bank clerk Sandro Girgvliani by senior officers in the Interior Ministry and about the death of Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania. Investigators are focusing on businesses close to Saakashvili, his closest relatives and his estate and also the costs of the president’s foreign trips and private trips.

The announcement that Saakashvili was being sought occurred after he twice refused to show up at the prosecutor’s office to testify and answer investigators’ questions. All of that was going on at the same time Saakashvili was in Ukraine making anti-Russia and anti-Putin speeches. That coincidence allowed his supporters to accuse Georgian authorities of taking cues from the Kremlin. Even Saakashvili gladly latched on to that narrative, specifically accusing his chief opponent, former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili of working on Putin’s behalf. “I pose a threat to the Russian president, and marking me as a wanted man hinders me from going around the world in the fight against Russian totalitarianism,” Saakashvili said at a Ukrainian rally. In private, people close to the former president suggest that he seems to genuinely believe that he has a messianic calling for opposition to Russia, so naturally he takes the side of the West.

However, Saakashvili exaggerated his problems. His freedom to travel the globe has not been inhibited in any way. Georgia has so far been unsuccessful in getting him put on Interpol’s wanted list. Perhaps that explains why Saakashvili was defended by influential American senators and a number of European politicians. But the former president has noticeably fewer famous “advocates” than he did before. Georgia’s new government is not remaining idle in the international arena. It held several meetings in Washington and European capitals, and prominent Western lawyers were invited to Tbilisi. And it is evident that at all these get-togethers, Georgian officials provided documented proof of some of Saakashvili’s misdeeds. Even if it’s something as trivial as his purchase of nine expensive suits during the nine years of his presidency. The long and the short of it is that to one degree or another, Saakashvili’s successors have become convinced of his culpability. There aren’t as many people defending him. However, the possibilities that are still left apparently are enough to ensure that the former Georgian president’s life won’t be all that dull. Now the question is whether there are enough of them to override Tbilisi’s intention to put him on the international wanted list. But even if the Georgian authorities’ plan works out, there are still doubts that Saakashvili will be arrested in any European country at Georgia’s request. Not to mention the United States or Ukraine, where he has most often been in recent years.

The new plan by Georgia’s chief prosecutor, observers note, appeared almost immediately after Saakashvili met with members of the United National Movement (ISNA) at the Georgian-Turkish border. He was on the Turkish side, of course, where he was safe from arrest. During the “exit conference,” Saakashvili criticized Georgian authorities, predicted the downfall of the country in the near future, and indeed instructed his audience to establish new political and social movements capable of fighting Ivanishvili, the government and the parliament.

These “subversive” activities by Saakashvili, according to some experts, have all the members of the UNM very concerned about the billionaire Ivanishvili. A prominent representative of UNM, David Darchiashvili asserted that “this oligarch has orchestrated a bloodless coup in Georgia as ordered by Putin. He is afraid of Mikheil Saakashvili and will not rest until he sees the ex-president behind bars, right next to the former prime minister Vano Merabashvili, former Tbilisi Mayor Gigi Ugulava, former Defense Minister Bacho Akhalaia and other leaders of the United National Movement.” However, the view that Saakashvili is the victim of political persecution is held only by the UNM and a few NGOs and experts close to the former ruling powers. Most of Georgian society believes that the former president and his party are the main culprits for the ills of the country. However, there are individuals who have their own explanation for what is happening.

Konstantin Chikviladze, a lawer and expert on Russian-Georgian relations, is certain that the Georgian government is staging “a cynical farce” for the public. “I am convinced that the new Georgian leadership, like its predecessors, is a submissive lackey of the United States. In all its actions and doings, it is guided by the directives of its patron. The demonstration of its willingness to bring Saakashvili to justice is a message primarily for domestic consumption to convince the people who fully believed pre-election promises that something is being done the sake of justice,” Chikviladze told a correspondent for NVO. According to him, the authorities are well aware that the West is not keen on arresting Saakashvili. He’s their guy. They haven’t cast him aside, and therefore Georgia is not going to get involved in a confrontation with the United States and Europe.

“International hunt,”red notice,” they’re nothing but hot air. Even if Saakashvili is added to Interpol’s wanted list, I don’t think he will stand trial in Georgia,” concluded Chikviladze. He also dismissed the reports that Saakashvili had been arrested on Santorini or Kos. “According to my information, those are rumors. There were no incidents involving him. And he wasn’t even on those Greek islands on the days in question,” said Chikviladze.

All the same, where there’s smoke, there’s fire. Georgia’s ambassador to Greece, David Bakradze, said that a yacht had recently been detained with Saakashvili and former Ajarian leadr Levan Varshalomidze aboard as they were sailing from Turkey to Greece. Bakradze had difficulty providing an exact reason for what prompted the stop, but he said that if the Greek police had stopped the boat at Georgia’s request, they had no right to prolong the detention because the protocol for declaring Saakashvili a wanted man had not been carried out. As a result, the yacht stayed on Samos for about four hours and then set off in the opposite direction, toward Turkey.

Yuriy Simonyan, columnist of Independent Newspaper, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

Iran and Armenia will soon start negotiations on a free trade area (FTA). The initiative was suggested by Tehran when its official representative put forward the proposal a few days ago. How realistic is it that this project will be implemented and what benefits will it have for the parties – the correspondent of the New Eastern Outlook (NEO) is asking these and other questions from Deputy Director of the Noravank Foundation, a think-tank in Yerevan, and an Iranian studies expert Sevak Sarukhanyan.

Firstly, how serious is the proposal to establish a free trade zone taking into account the fact that Iran continues to remain under Western sanctions, albeit they are slightly softening? Secondly, does it not contradict the plans of Armenia to join the Customs Union (CU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)?

The idea of creating a free trade zone between Iran and Armenia is not new. It, with varying intensity, has been discussed for twenty years. In recent years it has been hardly spoken about, and apparently its existence is somewhat forgotten. Now the idea has re-emerged for two reasons.

Firstly, Iran is still under sanctions and is attempting to liberalize its trade and economic relations with its closest neighbors. In Tehran, this line is called the policy of establishing free trade zones and free terminals. With these structures in place, Iran is attempting to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the sanctions.

Secondly, in Armenia there has been a certain reinterpretation of economic cooperation with Iran due to the fact that trade with that country has steadily declined, and, if nothing is done, our cooperation will soon be limited solely to energy. The FTA is a good tool to maintain and increase trade and to develop relations with Iran.

The fact that the idea has once again been revived is probably due to the fact that Karen Chshmaritian has been reappointed to the office of Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Armenia; during his previous term, the trade and economic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran developed rapidly and steadily. The FTA does not conflict with Armenia’s accession to the Customs Union in the same way as the emerging Iranian-Turkish FTA is not contrary to Turkey’s FTA with the European Union. The free trade zone should not be interpreted to mean that the goods produced in Iran can enter the territory of the Customs Union free from customs duties. This is a purely an Armenian-Iranian project and all Iranian products coming from the territory of Armenia to the territory of the Customs Union will be subject to customs duties.

How strong, in your opinion, is the political component of the project of creation of a free trade area between Iran and Armenia, especially if we take into account Iran’s jealous attitude towards the ambitious and outspoken Turkish claims to being a regional leader?

I do not see any political subtext to this project. There probably would be such a subtext, if the Iranian side was seeking to “reach out” to the heart of the Armenian government through economic channels just like it once tried to do in Georgia through investments in Adjara. Iran does not need to use this strategy with Armenia because the political cooperation between the two countries has been ahead of our economic cooperation.

Does it mean that the political relations between Yerevan and Tehran are more developed compared with the economic relations; and how are they different?

Our political relations are of course more developed than our economic relations. Yerevan has never taken steps that would affect the vital interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran. For example, Armenia has never aspired to join NATO and has never suggested that its territory could be used to carry out any operations against Iran. By the same token, Iran has never been involved in the politics of embargoes against Armenia. Iran has twice blocked anti-Armenian resolutions in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which was at the time called the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). I should also note that, Armenia and Iran share common interests with regard to the issues of regional policy,. Here, by “Armenian”, I mean not so much the government of Armenia, but rather Armenian communities and their organizations in the region. For example, the oldest Armenian party in Lebanon, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (also known as Dashnaktsutyun), is in an alliance with the pro-Iranian Hezbollah. In Syria, the Armenian community as a whole is extremely opposed to overthrowing the Bashar al-Assad regime. All this creates a certain context that affects the relations between our countries. It is important that these relations are not let to free-float in the autopilot mode. And this may happen if there are no new projects or ideas. The FTA is able to give momentum to the development of Armenian-Iranian cooperation which may eventually subside if there are no new ideas and no practical action is taken.

Several years ago, they also talked about the agreements signed to set up common Armenian-Iranian energy initiatives and even about the construction of a refinery in the Armenian border areas with Iran, about projects in the transport sector. What is the status of these projects at the moment?

Unfortunately, there are no agreements between Armenia and Iran in these fields. Only memorandums of understanding were signed at a certain point. The projects certainly look very interesting. There were plans to build a new high-voltage transmission line running from Armenia to Iran. Financing was planned to come from the Iranian side. But the project was unable to raise funds because of the sanctions. Currently, Iran has no money to invest abroad. And there is no acute need of receiving electricity from Armenia either. There were also plans to build a petroleum pipeline or a product pipeline as it was called in the project on energy supplies from Iran to Armenia. But the project got stuck because Iran who is experiencing a shortage of gasoline is not exporting it anywhere. As a matter of fact, I had doubts about this project before as well. The idea of construction of an Iranian-Armenian railway was and still remains relevant. But it will completely lose its value after the commissioning of the Qazvin-Rasht-Astara railway line which will connect Iran’s railway system with Azerbaijan and Iran will have a further exit point to Russian and Georgian ports. If this line is put into operation, then Iran will have no need for a railway to Armenia for purely economic reasons. Especially taking into account that currently, the Abkhazia railway does not connect the South Caucasus region with Russia.

There was also a very promising proposal by Iran to Armenian truckers to introduce zero transit tariffs not only on Iranian roads, but also in the Iranian ports of Bandar-e Anzali and Bandar Abbas.

This too, unfortunately, did not amount to anything.

What is the reason for the economic relations between the two neighboring countries to remain at a level where they are clearly not reaching their potential?

I call the cause “excessive relations”, there has not yet been a real breakthrough in the economic development of Armenia and Iran and even the existing joint projects will often seem superfluous.

Yuriy Simonyan, columnist of Independent Newspaper, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The CEC Chairman Batal Tabagua stated that all votes were counted so there can be no significant changes to the results announced. Observers from almost fifty countries reported no major electoral violations. The only major obstruction to voting occurred at a polling station in Turkey, which was closed by the local police on a pretext that they received a warning of a possible bomb attack. However, the search didn’t last for long so after a short pause the voting continued. Sukhumi officials assumed that this was a case of the behind-the-scenes manipulations of Tbilisi that must have reminded its allies in Ankara that they should be manifesting support to the territorial integrity of Georgia. But since the voting process was actually carried on this allowed Sukhumi to proclaim the “victory of the Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey over the Georgian diplomacy.” The other two Abkhaz polling stations abroad — in Cherkessk and Moscow were operating normally.

The result of this presidential election was predictable. It was clear that Raul Khadjimba will be able to gain upper hand in the second round of the election, but he has actually managed to secure a victory in the first one. He has succeeded in obtaining an impressive level of public support which allowed him to become the president of Abkhazia on fourth try. Sergei Markov a member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation has confined to NEO that Raul Khadjimba has been able to withstand a punch throughout all of his career, so now one can only be curious about how Khadjimba is going to cope with the presidential challenges he is about to face.

The task at hand is the reform of the public administration that fell the victim of Khadjimba’s predecessor Alexander Ankvab who concentrated all power in his hands and single-handedly solved the most petty issues. The newly elected president is going to re-balance the responsibilities of the government institutions by transferring a number of his authorities to the Parliament and the Cabinet.

One more important concern — is the improvement of the local economy efficiency levels. This goal is a particularly challenging matter if one is to consider the political status of Abkhazia — it’s a partially recognized Republic, so there would be no easy way of attracting investors. Therefore, some experts believe that this goal can only be achieved by a major liberalization of the legislation and by providing the business elite with certain guarantees. At the same time it is crucial to optimize Russian aid spending by identifying the promising areas of the Abkhaz economy. In fact they have been defined a while ago — those are tourism and agriculture. These are the niches that can in today’s Abkhazian environment that can only be compared to a blockade be more or less developed. However, these areas demand some major legislative changes. In particular, many potential investors are deterred by the fact that the current legislation “does not encourage” the involvement of foreigners in the agricultural sector.

Sergei Markov expressed the hope that Raul Khadjimba would be a leader capable of taking the right decisions. “The long political struggle has made him a strong experienced politician. Now he can fully rely on the people’s trust, “- said Markov. According to him, Raul Khadjimba is faced with one major challenge - to consolidate the Abkhazian elite, which, after the most difficult election of 2004 that has nearly drove the country into civil war, has largely remained divided into two camps. “In this quest Sergei Shamba, a former Prime Minister who cannot be attributed to any of the two groups can be of extremely helpful. He took his election defeat three years ago with dignity, therefore he remains an extremely influential politician in Abkhaz society. It seems that the newly elected president is well aware of this fact since he was assisted by Sergei Shamba all through the second half of his election campaign,”- said Markov.

Another Russian political scientist, the head of the International Institute of the Newly Established States Alexei Martynov agrees that those evaluations are accurate. He told told NEO that he is curious to see how will Raul Khadjimba manage the creation of a “team of professionals, businessmen and managers that Abkhazia needs today” “The West, as it was expected, announced the lastest presidential election illegal. This was inevitable and the young Abkhaz state could not expect anything else. The principal difference is in the fact that its sovereignty is recognized by Russia, “- said Martynov. According to the head of the IINES, the expansion of recognition is an important tasks, but it’s miles away from being a top priority. “What is really important now is the socio-economic development of the country. In the second stage – the improvement of its diplomatic relations with the neighboring countries: Russia and Georgia “, – told Alexei Martynov. Without a successful resolution of the above stated issues it will be almost impossible to ensure the dynamic development of Abkhazia.

Yuriy Simonyan, columnist of Independent Newspaper, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The South Caucasus is a region of intertwining transport hubs and energy centres, it is a clashing arena of geopolitical interests of the world’s top players, it is a region, torn apart by internal contradictions, with a multitude of problems, but it is also a region with great potential which is difficult to implement due to a number of developments. At present, another problem, along with fierce disagreements, is the multi-vector direction undertaken by the universally recognized entities of international law: Georgia looks to the West, Armenia looks to Russia, Azerbaijan, in no small measure due to the country’s resources, strives to remain independent, however, the country is gradually integrating into the alliance of Turkic-Speaking States. Can such a different direction policy give stability to the region? For example, let’s assume a vertical column supported by three evenly tied ropes at an angle 120 degrees to each other. Can the laws of mechanics be effective in geopolitics?

The head of the political analysts’ Club “South Caucasus” (Baku) Ilgar Velizade explains the policy of Azerbaijan, characterized by the absence of a particular line of direction, as follows: the country due to its geographical position, unlike its neighbours Georgia and Armenia borders with the three largest countries of the region – Russia, Turkey and Iran. “This condition does not allow the country to carry out sudden geopolitical feints, which could have serious consequences both for Azerbaijan and its neighbours. At the same time, while organizing its foreign policy priorities, official Baku tries to take into account the realities of regional policy and incorporate them within the context of Azerbaijan’s interests,” said Ilgar Velizade in his statement to NEO.

Under the influence of tens of billions of investments owing to the implementation of oil and gas contracts, Azerbaijan is changing rapidly. Huge financial resources are invested in projects, both domestically and abroad. This has a direct effect on Azerbaijan’s choice of foreign policy priorities. “Today what is more important for Baku is not to choose between East and West, but rather to improve its position in the region so that both East and West could be equally interested in maintaining stable, predictable and dynamic relations with Azerbaijan,” says Velizade.

At the same time, the regional priorities of Baku are evident: the format of bilateral relations, especially with its neighbours, the regional format as part of the five Caspian states (Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Azerbaijan), participation in the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States, relations with the EU and with individual EU countries, as well as with the United States. “By selecting a non-aligned status and by becoming a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Azerbaijan has essentially defined its vector of interest on the international arena. As a result, today Azerbaijan is a country that more or less successfully balances between the interests of the leading geopolitical and regional players,” comments Ilgar Velizade.

According to the political analyst, Azerbaijan acts as a bridge between the South Caucasus and the Caspian-Central Asian region rich in oil and gas. In addition, the country provides the shortest land route from Iran to Russia, which makes its transit position an important geopolitical factor. This has contributed to the fact that Baku is currently involved in three trilateral cooperation platforms in the region: Azerbaijan-Turkey-Georgia, Turkey-Iran-Azerbaijan and Turkey-Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan. “In the political structure of the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan acts as a bridge between the emerging platforms of cooperation, which gives the country’s foreign policy a more sustainable and inclusive structure in intraregional and international politics,” remarks Velizade.

Political analyst, research scientist at the Center for Regional Research of the Public Administration Academy of the Republic of Armenia Johnny Melikyan considers the root cause of a multi-directional foreign policy of the three countries of the South Caucasus to be the ethnic conflicts that broke out in the late 80s: the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh republic on one side, and Azerbaijan on the other) and the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts (between Georgia on one side; Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other).

“The attitude of the national elites of the new republics to the former union center, as well as the involvement of official Moscow into the above mentioned conflicts, have created conditions under which the foreign policy of the three South Caucasus countries is formed. However, over the years, all this has created a situation of balance of power and the disruption of such a balance in the region could lead to conflict,” said Johnny Melikyan in his interview to NEO.

However, in his opinion, in spite of confrontation and conflict, in the first half of the 1990s the policies of Tbilisi and Baku were almost in line with that of Yerevan. The two countries were part of the CIS, although their membership was confirmed at different times, and even part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Although, just like Uzbekistan, they chose not to renew their membership, preferring to become members of the GUAM alliance (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). Taking all this into account the three South Caucasus countries with varying degrees of intensity have cooperated with NATO, and later with the Eastern Partnership for cooperation with the EU.

“The problem of Russian-Georgian relations is well known. Azerbaijan, seeking to distance itself from both Russia and the West (the EU and the USA), while maintaining equal relations with all geopolitical players, has demonstrated commitment to the “seesaw policy”, the foundations of which were laid down, according to the Russian political analyst Sergey Markedonov, by the third president of the republic Heydar Aliyev. The essence of this policy is to be a friend both in Washington and Moscow and this has become the hallmark of Azerbaijan’s post-Soviet foreign policy.

As far as Armenia is concerned, it should be noted that in the mid-2000s, along with the increasing activities of European institutions in the South Caucasus, there was a decline of interest by Moscow to the region and to the former Soviet area. This gave Armenia an opportunity to shift towards European integration, at the same maintaining military and political ties with Russia. However, after President Vladimir Putin’s initiative to create a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Russia saw a change of priorities, including its priority in regard to the South Caucasus. Accordingly, Armenia also revised its relations with the EU, and set out on a course for integration into the EEU,” remarks Johnny Melikyan.

The Armenian political scientist believes that when scrutinizing regional relations, several mutual relation formats can be observed: Armenia-Russia, Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey, Azerbaijan-Russia, Armenia-Georgia, including the integrated formations: the EU-Georgia, the EU-Armenia, Armenia-EEU which due to sound relations between the states in the region have created a stable “status quo” and have maintained a balance of power that prevents the escalation of violence and conflict. “A confirmation of this is the recent escalation along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, as well as the battle line in Nagorno-Karabakh, where only after the intervention of Russia and the trilateral meeting of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia, tensions relatively decreased and the status quo remained unchanged,” points out Johnny Melikyan.

The Director of the Caucasus Institute for Regional Security (Tbilisi) Alexander Rusetsky tries to figure out why the South Caucasus gives preference to confrontation rather than to cooperation. “It is clear that neither the region as a whole, nor any of its constituent states benefit from confrontation. Thousands, millions if we take a larger historical period have been killed and maimed; there has consistently been an influx of migrants. The economy has been devastated. The total economic damage to the South Caucasus countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union is unaccounted for. There is no information on the number of victims the conflicts have claimed. And there are no estimated figures showing the level of development these countries would have reached if they had not been drawn into these fratricidal wars,” says Alexander Rusetsky.

In general, a common development strategy does not exist. Many even deny the existence of such a region. Although, it is worth remembering that erstwhile this region, then named the Transcaucasian Federation, was a co-founder of the USSR. And before that, it existed as the Transcaucasian Sejm. During Soviet rule, there was a specific regional policy which was very dynamic: starting from tourism and ending with the energy industry. Today, it is unclear how exactly to construe the South Caucasus and how to use this term. It is evident that if this issue remains unsolved, cooperation is out of the question.

Today the South Caucasus consists of three countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, which according to Rusetsky is not quite right. The AGA format (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Armenia), is one of the formats of South Caucasus cooperation, but not the only one.

Firstly, because part of Russia is also in the South Caucasus, since it is located below the Caucasus mountain range. Secondly, most of the north-eastern Turkey is in the South Caucasus and before 1919-1920, the South-Western Caucasian Republic (capital: Kars) existed on the territory of modern Turkey.

Thirdly, according to several authors, the north-western provinces of Iran are also part of the South Caucasus.

The fourth point is that Georgia, with part of its territory in the North Caucasus, cannot be considered only as a South Caucasus country, just as Russia cannot be considered as a North Caucasus country.

This is important to bear in mind, says Rusetsky, since in the context of the Greater South Caucasus there are multiple formats of cooperation, at the same time very confrontational. “I would divide the South Caucasian forms of cooperation into bilateral formats, trilateral formats, quartets, quintets and sextets. And by involving non-regional players other forms of multilateral cooperation emerge,” adds Alexander Rusetsky.

An example is the AGT format (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey), actively supported by the West and having a strong economic base owing to the oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, the South Caucasus gas pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum and the railway project Baku-Tbilisi-Kars, among others.

The second format is the IRA format (Iran-Russia-Armenia), having military, political and conspiratorial foundations. It exists, having no specific structure, but it can contend with the AGT project.

Other leading formats of regional cooperation are: the Kislovodsk format (1 + 3), where Russia is trying to stabilize relations; the Caucasian Alliance ARTAG (3 + 2), here both Russia and Turkey assume the roles of stabilizers; the GITARA format, which Iran is about to join and finally Michael Emerson’s stability pact for the Caucasus known as the “Caucasus octave”: (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) plus (Russia, Turkey, Iran) plus (the US and the EU).

“In any case, it is necessary to realize that by simplifying the prospects of regional cooperation, which implies reducing it to the format of AGA (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Armenia) not many prospects come into view. Based on the current geopolitical and geo-economic interests of the various players, the South Caucasus security and cooperation system can only be seen as part of all the existing and possible formats.

Otherwise, the relevant confrontation line will be unclear. The creation of a common win-win strategy can be accomplished. For this to happen the perception of the current system has to be altered and all parties must come to a different level of analysis and decision-making,” says Rusetsky. According to the political analyst, this is an opportunity to organize cooperation between the different formats and an opportunity to actually address the issue of constructing a unified system of security and cooperation in the South Caucasus in terms of global security. It will also be an opportunity to create a multilateral system – the South Caucasus Regional Governance which will be a system of consultation and cooperation between the countries of the region, as well as an opportunity to create a single economic area of the Greater South Caucasus, with the participation of regional and non-regional players.

“The above can become a basis for defining the common regional strategy and courses of action. Discussions and consultations may begin within the OSCE format and in doing so will be dedicated to the 40th anniversary of this organization,” said Alexander Rusetsky in his interview to NEO.

Yuriy Simonyan, columnist of Independent Newspaper, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Elections for the fourth President of the partially recognized Republic of Abkhazia will be held on August 24th. Four candidates are running for the presidential office – all of them former security officials: former head of the KGB of Abkhazia, also former defense minister, ex-prime minister and ex-vice-president MP Raul Khadjimba, taking chances for a fourth time, ex-minister of Internal Affairs

The front-runner of the election campaign is Raul Khadjimba. And this is probably not a surprise. A political heavyweight, the hero of the Georgian-Abkhazian war, he was the favourite to become President in the eyes of the legendary first president of Abkhazia Vladislav Ardzinba. Finally, it was Khadjimba who was the unofficial leader of the opposition which united against President Alexander Ankvab and started protests in May demanding his resignation. Ankvab after consultation with his supporters and the Moscow representative, President Putin’s aide Vladislav Surkov who came to Sukhumi during the confrontation, announced his early resignation from the presidency on June 1.

Until recently, the chances of the other three candidates for the post of Presidency were considered to be equal and without any prospects for victory. However, recent polls have shown Aslan Bjania take the lead, breaking away from Dzyapshba and Kishmariya; polls have also shown a decline in ratings for Khadjimba. According to Sukhumi political analyst Inal Khashig in his interview to New Eastern Outlook: “it seems that there will definitely be a second round”.

The main distinguishing feature of the current election campaign is total calmness. During discussions, the candidates do sometimes accuse and rebuke each other. However, all this is done solely to entertain the audience in order to increase their electoral base. Or, in other words, the rivals are not defaming each other. The biggest scandal in the country has already taken place: the disenfranchising of some 22 thousand Georgians in the Gali and Tkvarcheli districts. The former Abkhazian authorities provided them with passports of citizens of the republic, while they already held Georgian citizenship. Under the legislation of Abkhazia, this is prohibited; second citizenship can only be Russian.

According to Abkhazian political analyst Ibrahim Chkadua the violation of the law was twofold. Firstly, as already mentioned, second citizenship can only be Russian. And secondly, Abkhazian passports were given out to these people by specially created district commissions, whereas the issue of citizenship is the exclusive prerogative of Abkhazia’s central government.

“Thus, the parliament and the executive branch of Abkhazia, by suspending Abkhazian citizenship for this citizen category, have corrected the legislative violation committed by the previous government. No one is depriving these individuals of Abkhazian citizenship. They have been briefly deprived of the right to vote. Firstly, they will receive a residence permit in Abkhazia, and then the authorities in accordance with the law will consider their petitions for citizenship of the Republic with the restoration of rights to the fullest extent,” said Ibrahim Chkadua in his interview to NEO.

At any rate, this played into the hands of Raul Khadjimba. Of all the candidates, he is the least popular among the Georgian population of Abkhazia. And it turns out that his rivals have lost votes of about 22 thousand Georgians, who are unlikely to want to see Raul Khadjimba as President.

Inal Khashig considers the prevailing situation in Abkhazia Inal Khashig to be calm. “All the candidates have fairly equal opportunities as far as the election campaign is concerned. Unlike previous years, I do not see any overbalance in favour of anyone. Not one candidate is being promoted in the media as was the case in the past. The population’s attitude to the elections remains the same: people are willing to vote for a specific candidate, not really contemplating the candidate’s program. According to the latest polls, Raul Khadjimba is supported by approximately 42% of the voters, and his main rival Aslan Bjania accounts for about 33%. I think this is a normal situation. The elections, in my opinion, will be interesting and this is a good thing, though, they will not be as dramatic as in 2004 when they almost resulted in civil strife” commented Inal Khashig.

According to the political analyst, another advantageous difference is the absence of messages from outside of Abkhazia, i.e. from Russia, Turkey, and even Georgia, which is not reacting at all (not even evaluating candidates’ opportunities) to what is happening in the republic. “It seems that this time, if nothing happens, Abkhazian society without any hints from outside will select the head of the republic, and it will be a purely inner choice of the Abkhazian people,” remarked Hashig.

Georgia, although pointedly standing aside from the presidential election in Abkhazia, is closely monitoring what is happening in the breakaway republic. Georgian State Minister for Reconciliation and Civil Equality Paata Zakareishvili told our NEO correspondent: “Despite the fact that the so-called elections being held in Abkhazia do not comply with Georgian and international law, and thus the results of the elections will not be considered legitimate, it is very important for us to know what is happening on the territory of Abkhazia.” “It is important that the process takes place peacefully, without any human rights violations, and that the elections do not develop into any acts of violence, which has happened before. We do not want the people to be the victims of repressive actions, “added Zakareishvili.

The State Minister in his interview with the author stressed that “whoever becomes the leader of Abkhazian society, it is important for us to work with them.” “We are not placing emphasis on any candidate. We are not talking about selective cooperation as in: we will cooperate only with this candidate, and if the other one wins, we will not try to patch up relations. We will cooperate with a leader who can and will speak on behalf of the population of Abkhazia,” said Zakareishvili.

The Georgian State Minister did not evaluate the suspension of voting rights of the majority of the Georgian population in Abkhazia. “For Georgia, it is important that double standards are not applied in regard to those individuals living in Abkhazia and that their human rights are not violated. We are not considering the aspect of political rights. This area is occupied by Russian forces, that is why we believe that the situation there is managed by Moscow. Therefore Moscow bears responsibility for the violation or the observance of the political rights of the people living on this territory,”- said Zakareishvili

Yuriy Simonyan, columnist of Independent Newspaper, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

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