It was at this meeting that Hassan Rouhani announced in the presence of journalists that Iran had suspended the supply of uranium hexafluoride to gas centrifuges installed at the pilot uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. President Putin was satisfied that the priority right to announce it had been granted to Moscow. The fact of this suspension was confirmed by the IAEA inspectors soon after that.

As a result of negotiations in Moscow, Rouhani won the support of Russia on the nuclear dossier issue on the level of the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors. This fact allowed Tehran to avoid international sanctions that might have been imposed against the IRI by the UN Security Council as early as in 2003-2004. In the meantime, Rouhani managed to establish personal relationship with Vladimir Putin.

The second meeting of Hassan Rouhani and President Putin was held in February 2005, when the main concern was the issue on attracting foreign countries to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. This meeting was required as negotiations with the EU “Big Three” reached a deadlock. In the latter case, Iran’s nuclear dossier could have been reviewed by the UN Security Council.

In the course of this meeting Vladimir Putin promised nothing to Hassan Rouhani, but agreed to act as a mediator between Washington and Tehran to resolve the nuclear crisis. Changing the position of Russia was determined by the fact that the IRI could not prolong the suspension of uranium enrichment at Natanz anymore. Vladimir Putin brought to notice of Iran that in case Iran resumed gas centrifuges operation, its nuclear dossier would probably be submitted to the UN Security Council. And Russia would not be able to prevent it.

Above mentioned facts convince us that Russia was engaged in a partnership dialogue on nuclear field with Iran in 2003-2005. It did not seek any additional benefits and tried to help in resolution of the nuclear crisis. Moscow tried to pursue similar policy in future despite strong pressure from the US and other Western states. Hassan Rouhani of all people understands it.

The contact between President Putin and Hassan Rouhani that was established earlier cannot be developed in full so far, despite a great number of bilateral meetings. And there are a number of reasons for this. First of all, Hassan Rouhani is a political figure complex for the perception, close both to conservatives and reformers. That is why his policy is difficult to predict, especially given the dependence of Rouhani on the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Secondly, Hassan Rouhani victory in the presidential elections in 2013 could bring back the control over executive power in the country to the Iranian clergy dissatisfied with the rapid growth of political, military and economic power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In 2014, President Hassan Rouhani tried to restrict the IRGC activities in the economy. In response, a smear war against the President’s team which was accused of corruption was launched. As a result, the IRGC won, and in late 2014, Hassan Rouhani was forced to publicly praise the IRGC activities in the economic sphere.

Thirdly, Moscow was extremely concerned about the expansion of the US-Iranian contacts on the level of the US Secretary of State John Kerry and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran Mohammad Zarif. Later these concerns intensified when US and IRI started limited military cooperation and interaction of the security services in Iraq. The latter also took place in Afghanistan.

Hassan Rouhani determined the main objectives of his administration as economic recovery under growing pressure of sanctions, and normalization of relations with the West. At the same time, they did not include the refusal of the Iranian principles. According to President Rouhani it was necessary to curb the US power that stood in the way of Iran’s economic progress. But this task turned out to be extremely difficult to execute.

The progress of the Iranian-Western relations is obviously dependent on successful resolution of the nuclear crisis. However, in reality it did not happen even after April 2, 2015 when IRI representatives and the Six international mediators on the Iranian nuclear crisis resolution (five permanent UN Security Council members and Germany) reached the “interim agreements” on the major principles of the Agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme in Lausanne (Switzerland). These agreements are rather a publicity stunt than an attempt to resolve the nuclear crisis. The reason is that the specified agreement is not based on the principle of “gradualism and reciprocity”, and its implementation will take at least 10 years. Neither will all the unilateral sanctions against Iran be lifted. First of all, it concerns the USA as the Obama Administration may only suspend these sanctions. As a result, Iran will keep its nuclear potential that can be used for nuclear weapon creation in future, while the USA will get an opportunity to control the Iranian nuclear activity with the help of the IAEA inspectors. This means rather fixation of the current level of Iran’s nuclear program than the resolution of the examined crisis.

Returning to the consideration of the Russian-Iranian relations, it is necessary to note that on September 13, 2013, Hassan Rouhani participated in the SCO summit held in Bishkek. This was his first foreign visit as the country’s President. On the sidelines of the summit, President Rouhani took part in bilateral meetings with the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Chairman of PRC Xí Jìnpíng. During these meetings, they exchanged views on the Syrian crisis and Iran’s nuclear issue, which revealed the similarity of their positions. However, no breakthrough in relations occurred, which indicates the complexity of this process with the new Iranian leadership.

Moscow still has concerns that Tehran may improve its relations with the West bypassing Russia, which is why the Russian Federation is interested in establishing closer (partnership) relations with Iran. The IRI is still cautious on this issue so far. According to Russian experts, “it is conditioned by two blocks of reasons: economic and political. The first one lies in the fact that the major concern of the acting Iran’s government is improvement of the country’s economic situation that is strongly disrupted by sanctions (in this respect China will be more helpful than Russia)… Secondly, the current leadership of Iran is seeking direct negotiations with the United States.” The telephone conversation of Presidents Obama and Rouhani on September 27, 2013 in New York confirmed it.

However, a tendency favourable for the development of Russian-Iranian relations is now observed inside Iran. It is determined by a gradual ebbing of influence of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the richest person of Iran, the country’s ex-President and a supporter of Iran rapprochement with the West. It was he who greatly contributed to Hassan Rouhanni’s rise to power. Hashemi Rafsanjani desperately hoped to become a new Rahbar (Supreme Leader) of Iran. For this purpose he earlier chaired the Experts Council (this body elects Rahbar). But unexpectedly for many people, the Experts Council was chaired not by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani but Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdii, the former head of Iran’s judicial system. The latter is a severe opponent of the West.

Iran is now considering the issue on the successor of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, but the current state of his health is not as bad as the media tends to describe. In 10 months, the Experts Council members will be completely re-elected. Supporters of the reformers expect that they will be able to change the situation in their favour. But it is more probably that the conservatives will strengthen their positions. This will promote strengthening of the Russian-Iranian relations.

In addition, the next challenge for Hassan Rouhani will be the next year’s elections of the Mejlis (Iran’s parliament). Strengthening of conservative positions there will give evidence that it will be difficult for Hassan Rouhani to remain the President for the second term.

A serious limiting factor for development of relations between the Russian Federation and the IRI is an extremely low bilateral commodity turnover (it amounted to less than 1 billion dollars in 2014). This situation can be fundamentally improved by establishment of a joint account or bank for settlements in national currencies, as well as implementation of the major projects in the economic sphere: construction of two power generating units at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, building “the power bridge”, participation of Russian companies in the reconstruction of Iran’s railways, and a significant expansion of cooperation in gas markets and supplies of agricultural products that partially compensate for the losses suffered by Russia from sanctions imposed by the West. Let us examine some of these projects in detail.

Implementation of the project of “the power bridge” includes export of 500 MW of Russian electric power to Iran, construction of new power generating facilities in IRI, and almost a complete modernization of the Iranian electricity distribution network. Its cost amounts to $8-10 billion. Owing to the Tehran decision to switch to mutual settlements in the national currencies with Moscow, no serious “appreciation” of the contract for the two countries will happen.

Apart from it, the Bushehr NPP was launched at full capacity in summer 2013 under the control of the IAEA. This allowed raising the issue on the construction of another two power generating units with the capacity of about 1.2 (1.5) GW each. This construction implies the transfer of technologies non-critical for nuclear proliferation to the Iranian party. It is regarded as a continuation of the already implemented contract.

Currently, Russian experts are carrying out an engineering survey on the sites of the future second and third power generating units of the Iranian Bushehr NPP. Completion of their works is planned for August 2015. This will allow obtaining basic data required for the launch of design. The construction itself can be launched as early as this autumn. In addition to electric power production, the specified units will carry out large-scale seawater desalination.

In 8 years, the second power generating unit of the Bushehr NPP is planned to be put into operation, and the third will be commissioned two years later. The corresponding contract on the construction of two new power generating units of the Bushehr NPP was signed in Moscow in late January 2015 as a part of the next round of consultations on cooperation of Russia and Iran in the nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Another direction which may be developed under bilateral cooperation includes a comprehensive assessment of the safety of the Iranian nuclear facilities by Russian experts. The need for it is determined by the lack of experience of Iranian experts and the corresponding assistance of the IAEA, as well as by the availability of worn-out and obsolete nuclear facilities in Iran. First of all, it concerns the Tehran research reactor, where a long-term operation in the absence of fresh nuclear fuel led to a significant reduction in the reactor power. It made the possibility of testing nuclear fuel produced in Iran for this reactor extremely problematic.

The issue of the delivery to Iran of five battalions of air defence system ZRK S-300VM Antey-2500 instead of previously non-delivered five battalions of ZRK S-300PMU-1 is being considered. The corresponding proposal was officially sent to Tehran three months ago. If this proposal does not satisfy IRI, then discussion of delivery of S-400 Triumph will be possible, but to do so it is required to agree not only its cost, but also the term of supply, as the contract on the delivery of 4 battalions of such air defence systems worth $1.9 billion to China was signed in September 2014. And the Russian Federation Armed Forces shall obtain 56 regiments of S-400 by 2020.

Thus, the former state of the Russian-Iranian relations which was characterized as “cautious partnership” is a relic of the past. Resolving the common regional problems in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen or Nagorno-Karabakh requires closer bilateral cooperation. The current economic situation that is unfavourable for our countries due to unilateral financial and economic sanctions on the part of the West also presses hard for this cooperation. Its improvement on the bilateral level is quite possible via implementation of the above mentioned projects. At the same time, the danger of changes in the world oil prices and the entry of Iran’s natural gas in European market in case of the lifting of the corresponding unilateral sanctions against IRI should not be exaggerated.

Against the backdrop of some improvement in the relations between Iran and the West, in order to establish a real Russian-Iranian partnership it is necessary, first of all, to form a new common agenda for negotiations, abandoning such projects as the exchange of Iranian oil for Russian goods. At the same time, the transition from military-technical to bilateral military cooperation is becoming more urgent. Such an agenda for negotiations is being prepared now. Its approval can take place in the second half of this year, if the first official visit of President Vladimir Putin to Tehran in the history takes place.

Vladimir Yevseyev, Ph.D, Head of Caucasus Department of the CIS Institute, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

It is quite obvious that Russia cannot substitute the West and in particular European countries with someone else. It is impossible for historical and cultural reasons, the abundance of industrial relations, geographical proximity and so on. Moscow can however substantially weaken such dependency through the strengthening of political, military, financial and economic relations with other countries which are friendlier and less susceptible to pressure from Washington. Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) holds a special place amongst countries friendly to the Russian government, and strategic dialogue is being actively developed with it.

It should be mentioned that the visit to Moscow at the end of January 2015 by the special representative, the foreign policy adviser of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Akbar Velayati, was highly valuable to the development of Russian-Iranian relations. During this visit Ali Akbar Velayati met with President Vladimir Putin and delivered a personal message from the Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei.

Beside him, the Russian representatives during the meeting with President Vladimir Putin were: the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov and Minister of Energy Alexander Novak. It was not accidental that the latter was present. He was instructed to explore the possibility of new, “non-primary” forms of economic partnership between our countries amidst the collapse of world oil prices, calling into question the practicability of “the big oil contract” between Moscow and Tehran (“Iranian oil in exchange for Russian goods”).

The main issue was preparing a new agenda for Russian-Iranian talks. In the economic sphere, it involves the realization of 5 major ready-to-implement projects: the construction of two new reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the creation of an “energy bridge” through Azerbaijan territory, the reconstruction of the Iranian railway, as well as a significant expansion of cooperation in the spheres of gas and agricultural products supply. This will partially replace Russian losses from financial and economic sanctions imposed against it by the West.

Further strengthening of relationship between our countries is encouraged by the fact that Tehran, as much as possible, restrains the development of economic relations with Beijing in view of the real danger of expansion of the Chinese goods on its market. Since the economic potentials of said countries are incomparable, the opening of its market to the People’s Republic of China will lead to serious problems for some industries of Iran. In these circumstances Tehran is very interested in the expansion of the Russian presence in the Iranian economy, especially in its strategic sectors such as energy, industrial equipment, transportation, and others.

Nevertheless, cooperation on regional security is not of lesser interest, especially in view of prolongation and intensification of crises in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. Positions of Moscow and Tehran coincide on the majority of aspects. They are particularly interested in the restriction of American, Saudi Arabian and to some extent Turkish activities. This allows to raise the matter of Moscow and Tehran creating new security systems in the Near and Middle East, Central Asia and South Caucasus. The distinguishing factor is that the said systems of regional security will be founded on a non-bloc basis and consideration of the interests involved in this process states.

And the composition of specific participants of regional security systems will be determined by a number of factors, among which we should highlight not only the friendly stance towards Moscow and Tehran but also the possibility of actual participation in the settlement of regional problems. For example, Kazakhstan is the most likely partner in Central Asia. It is more difficult with regards to Afghanistan or Syria where Moscow and Tehran see different participants of such systems. Specifically in settling the Afghan problem Iran would like to involve India, while the Russian Federation wants to involve Pakistan.

A similar situation exists in Syria where a possible offer to Egypt to participate in a new security system may encounter opposition from not only Tehran but also Damascus. The reason for this is that Egyptian authorities are too financially dependent on Riyadh as shown for example in their support of the international coalition against the Houthis in Yemen. But in reality Cairo isn’t planning on getting involved in this armed conflict until there is a real threat of closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden of the Arabian Sea. This strait allows the transportation of marine cargo, including oil-tankers, to the Suez Canal and then onward to Europe.

One should especially consider the matter of establishing a security system in the South Caucasus. Here, Russia and Iran are compelled to rely on a rather difficult partner – Turkey. Nevertheless, it is entirely possible, despite Turkey’s membership to NATO, aspiration to enter into the European Union and considerable regional ambitions. The basis for this is the fact that the Russian government managed to build a partnership relation with Ankara in political and economic spheres. It was facilitated by several factors: economocentrism, geographical proximity and historically determined commitment to avoid mutual confrontation.

Of course there remain serious misunderstandings between Moscow and Ankara on the Syrian and Yemen issues. In particular, the President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is still convinced that the removal from power of Bashar al-Assad, including by force, is necessary. As a consequence, Turkey remains a breeding ground of radical Islamist terrorists and provides them with considerable support in conducting military operations against the Syrian Army. Moreover, Turkey tries to convince the USA of the need to create, near the Syrian-Turkish border, a buffer zone to locate the Syrian opposition leadership, the multitudes of refugees and training camps for militants. But even there the Turkish army does not get involved in the fighting.

It is a different situation in Iraq where Turkey is actively coordinating with the leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan, the President Masoud Barzani, in the economic sphere in exchange for a serious commitment not to interfere with the internal Turkish affairs, especially on the Kurdish question. Simultaneously, attempts are made to negotiate with the leaders of the “Islamic State”, which is reasonable considering the previous involvement of the Turkish secret service in the military preparation of Islamists for Mosul takeover.

Serious activity of Ankara is observed in Yemen in opposition to Shiite Houthis that is caused by its dependence on Riyadh and its own regional ambitions. But all of this has no direct link to a security system in the South Caucasus.

All in all, Russia and Turkey have enough difficulties cooperating in the Near and Middle East because of opposing views on the events in Libya, Egypt, Syria and Yemen. At the same time, cooperation between the two countries on Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine is possible. But this is practically non-existent in regards to Iranian-Turkish cooperation that is more of an economic nature.

There are considerably more opportunities present for cooperation between Moscow, Tehran and Ankara in the South Caucasus. At a first glance, serious opposition is observed on the issue of ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh. But Russia, Turkey and Iran do not want to be drawn into a regional war with unpredictable consequences. Limited interaction of Moscow and Ankara on Abkhazia and even Adjara is also possible.

More importantly, the joint efforts of the three countries to prevent the destabilization of Azerbaijan, where the decline in oil production, the radicalization of first and foremost the religious society and the brutal suppression of ethnic conflicts and any dissent are all increasingly growing socio-economic problems. This is partially resolved by the mass migration of the working population to Russia. However, against the background of said economic problems, including financial and economic sanctions of the West, a part of labor migrants will return to Azerbaijan and, not finding work there, will participate in anti-government protests under religious slogans.

Special attention should be given to the issue of Russian-Iranian and Russian-Turkish relations in the conditions of the financial and economic sanctions imposed by the West against Moscow. For instance, according to Turkish sources, exports to Russia in 2013 were at an estimated $7 billion, of which $1.2 billion accounted for the product category that fell under the retaliatory sanctions of Moscow against European states, including fresh fruit and vegetables. The members of Turkish association of agricultural products exporters came up with an idea to equate the Russian import customs duties for goods from Turkey to European custom duties, which would allow increasing the above-mentioned $1.2 billion to $3-4 billion annually. In turn, Rosselkhoznadzor exceptionally allowed Turkey to import fruit and vegetables into Russia through the territory of Ukraine, notwithstanding the ban on import and transit of all vegetable products from this country, imposed on October 22. To do this Turkey assumed liability for the safety of such a transit.

Both Turkey and Iran are certain that “sanctions are not the way that leads to expected results in politics.” And they are not compelled to observe them if such sanctions were taken unilaterally, i.e. bypassing the UN Security Council. As a result Turkey, despite strong pressure from the USA and its European allies, refuses to implement financial and economic sanctions against the Russian Federation, which serves as the foundation for the development of bilateral relations. In respect of Iran that practically has been under unilateral sanctions from the West since the moment of its inception, it is in principle impossible.

Globally, Russian-Turkish relations have good economic prospects, which will allow for bilateral trade to double by 2020, representing $65 billion per year. It serves as a reference for Moscow and Tehran, who should in the near future reach the $5 billion level in turnover with the prospect of increasing it to $10 billion (but even that will not allow them to reach the level of current trade relations between Turkey and Iran with an annual range of $15 billion). The move in this direction will allow our countries to build a solid foundation of trilateral relations, which is a prerequisite for the organization of a new security system in the South Caucasus.

Russia and Iran have an important role to play in the formation of security systems in the Near and Middle East, Central Asia and South Caucasus. They are able to offer a new principle of their creation based on the non-bloc structure and consideration of the interests of states involved in this process. It is already possible to implement it in the South Caucasus due to the interest of our states and Turkey in maintaining stability in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh and nearby Azerbaijan. The basis for this is to strengthen cooperation of these states in the economic sphere.

It is quite obvious that Russia cannot substitute the West and in particular European countries with someone else. It is impossible for historical and cultural reasons, the abundance of industrial relations, geographical proximity and so on. Moscow can however substantially weaken such dependency through the strengthening of political, military, financial and economic relations with other countries which are friendlier and less susceptible to pressure from Washington. Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) holds a special place amongst countries friendly to the Russian government, and strategic dialogue is being actively developed with it.

It should be mentioned that the visit to Moscow at the end of January 2015 by the special representative, the foreign policy adviser of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Akbar Velayati, was highly valuable to the development of Russian-Iranian relations. During this visit Ali Akbar Velayati met with President Vladimir Putin and delivered a personal message from the Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei.

Beside him, the Russian representatives during the meeting with President Vladimir Putin were: the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov and Minister of Energy Alexander Novak. It was not accidental that the latter was present. He was instructed to explore the possibility of new, “non-primary” forms of economic partnership between our countries amidst the collapse of world oil prices, calling into question the practicability of “the big oil contract” between Moscow and Tehran (“Iranian oil in exchange for Russian goods”).

The main issue was preparing a new agenda for Russian-Iranian talks. In the economic sphere, it involves the realization of 5 major ready-to-implement projects: the construction of two new reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the creation of an “energy bridge” through Azerbaijan territory, the reconstruction of the Iranian railway, as well as a significant expansion of cooperation in the spheres of gas and agricultural products supply. This will partially replace Russian losses from financial and economic sanctions imposed against it by the West.

Further strengthening of relationship between our countries is encouraged by the fact that Tehran, as much as possible, restrains the development of economic relations with Beijing in view of the real danger of expansion of the Chinese goods on its market. Since the economic potentials of said countries are incomparable, the opening of its market to the People’s Republic of China will lead to serious problems for some industries of Iran. In these circumstances Tehran is very interested in the expansion of the Russian presence in the Iranian economy, especially in its strategic sectors such as energy, industrial equipment, transportation, and others.

Nevertheless, cooperation on regional security is not of lesser interest, especially in view of prolongation and intensification of crises in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. Positions of Moscow and Tehran coincide on the majority of aspects. They are particularly interested in the restriction of American, Saudi Arabian and to some extent Turkish activities. This allows to raise the matter of Moscow and Tehran creating new security systems in the Near and Middle East, Central Asia and South Caucasus. The distinguishing factor is that the said systems of regional security will be founded on a non-bloc basis and consideration of the interests involved in this process states.

And the composition of specific participants of regional security systems will be determined by a number of factors, among which we should highlight not only the friendly stance towards Moscow and Tehran but also the possibility of actual participation in the settlement of regional problems. For example, Kazakhstan is the most likely partner in Central Asia. It is more difficult with regards to Afghanistan or Syria where Moscow and Tehran see different participants of such systems. Specifically in settling the Afghan problem Iran would like to involve India, while the Russian Federation wants to involve Pakistan.

A similar situation exists in Syria where a possible offer to Egypt to participate in a new security system may encounter opposition from not only Tehran but also Damascus. The reason for this is that Egyptian authorities are too financially dependent on Riyadh as shown for example in their support of the international coalition against the Houthis in Yemen. But in reality Cairo isn’t planning on getting involved in this armed conflict until there is a real threat of closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden of the Arabian Sea. This strait allows the transportation of marine cargo, including oil-tankers, to the Suez Canal and then onward to Europe.

One should especially consider the matter of establishing a security system in the South Caucasus. Here, Russia and Iran are compelled to rely on a rather difficult partner – Turkey. Nevertheless, it is entirely possible, despite Turkey’s membership to NATO, aspiration to enter into the European Union and considerable regional ambitions. The basis for this is the fact that the Russian government managed to build a partnership relation with Ankara in political and economic spheres. It was facilitated by several factors: economocentrism, geographical proximity and historically determined commitment to avoid mutual confrontation.

Of course there remain serious misunderstandings between Moscow and Ankara on the Syrian and Yemen issues. In particular, the President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is still convinced that the removal from power of Bashar al-Assad, including by force, is necessary. As a consequence, Turkey remains a breeding ground of radical Islamist terrorists and provides them with considerable support in conducting military operations against the Syrian Army. Moreover, Turkey tries to convince the USA of the need to create, near the Syrian-Turkish border, a buffer zone to locate the Syrian opposition leadership, the multitudes of refugees and training camps for militants. But even there the Turkish army does not get involved in the fighting.

It is a different situation in Iraq where Turkey is actively coordinating with the leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan, the President Masoud Barzani, in the economic sphere in exchange for a serious commitment not to interfere with the internal Turkish affairs, especially on the Kurdish question. Simultaneously, attempts are made to negotiate with the leaders of the “Islamic State”, which is reasonable considering the previous involvement of the Turkish secret service in the military preparation of Islamists for Mosul takeover.

Serious activity of Ankara is observed in Yemen in opposition to Shiite Houthis that is caused by its dependence on Riyadh and its own regional ambitions. But all of this has no direct link to a security system in the South Caucasus.

All in all, Russia and Turkey have enough difficulties cooperating in the Near and Middle East because of opposing views on the events in Libya, Egypt, Syria and Yemen. At the same time, cooperation between the two countries on Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine is possible. But this is practically non-existent in regards to Iranian-Turkish cooperation that is more of an economic nature.

There are considerably more opportunities present for cooperation between Moscow, Tehran and Ankara in the South Caucasus. At a first glance, serious opposition is observed on the issue of ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh. But Russia, Turkey and Iran do not want to be drawn into a regional war with unpredictable consequences. Limited interaction of Moscow and Ankara on Abkhazia and even Adjara is also possible.

More importantly, the joint efforts of the three countries to prevent the destabilization of Azerbaijan, where the decline in oil production, the radicalization of first and foremost the religious society and the brutal suppression of ethnic conflicts and any dissent are all increasingly growing socio-economic problems. This is partially resolved by the mass migration of the working population to Russia. However, against the background of said economic problems, including financial and economic sanctions of the West, a part of labor migrants will return to Azerbaijan and, not finding work there, will participate in anti-government protests under religious slogans.

Special attention should be given to the issue of Russian-Iranian and Russian-Turkish relations in the conditions of the financial and economic sanctions imposed by the West against Moscow. For instance, according to Turkish sources, exports to Russia in 2013 were at an estimated $7 billion, of which $1.2 billion accounted for the product category that fell under the retaliatory sanctions of Moscow against European states, including fresh fruit and vegetables. The members of Turkish association of agricultural products exporters came up with an idea to equate the Russian import customs duties for goods from Turkey to European custom duties, which would allow increasing the above-mentioned $1.2 billion to $3-4 billion annually. In turn, Rosselkhoznadzor exceptionally allowed Turkey to import fruit and vegetables into Russia through the territory of Ukraine, notwithstanding the ban on import and transit of all vegetable products from this country, imposed on October 22. To do this Turkey assumed liability for the safety of such a transit.

Both Turkey and Iran are certain that “sanctions are not the way that leads to expected results in politics.” And they are not compelled to observe them if such sanctions were taken unilaterally, i.e. bypassing the UN Security Council. As a result Turkey, despite strong pressure from the USA and its European allies, refuses to implement financial and economic sanctions against the Russian Federation, which serves as the foundation for the development of bilateral relations. In respect of Iran that practically has been under unilateral sanctions from the West since the moment of its inception, it is in principle impossible.

Globally, Russian-Turkish relations have good economic prospects, which will allow for bilateral trade to double by 2020, representing $65 billion per year. It serves as a reference for Moscow and Tehran, who should in the near future reach the $5 billion level in turnover with the prospect of increasing it to $10 billion (but even that will not allow them to reach the level of current trade relations between Turkey and Iran with an annual range of $15 billion). The move in this direction will allow our countries to build a solid foundation of trilateral relations, which is a prerequisite for the organization of a new security system in the South Caucasus.

Russia and Iran have an important role to play in the formation of security systems in the Near and Middle East, Central Asia and South Caucasus. They are able to offer a new principle of their creation based on the non-bloc structure and consideration of the interests of states involved in this process. It is already possible to implement it in the South Caucasus due to the interest of our states and Turkey in maintaining stability in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh and nearby Azerbaijan. The basis for this is to strengthen cooperation of these states in the economic sphere.

Vladimir Yevseyev, Ph.D, Head of Caucasus Department of the CIS Institute, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

]]> https://journal-neo.org/2015/04/11/rus-rol-rossijsko-iranskogo-sotrudnichestva-v-formirovanii-novy-h-sistem-regional-noj-bezopasnosti/feed/ 0 https://journal-neo.org/2014/07/16/rus-rossijsko-iranskoe-sotrudnichestvo-v-sfere-regional-noj-bezopasnosti-chast-1/ https://journal-neo.org/2014/07/16/rus-rossijsko-iranskoe-sotrudnichestvo-v-sfere-regional-noj-bezopasnosti-chast-1/#comments Tue, 15 Jul 2014 23:30:18 +0000 http://journal-neo.org/?p=12753 In recent years, a Greater (widened) Middle East, which additionally includes Central Asia and the Caucasus, is gaining the attention of the international community more and more. In the past such attention has been connected with many of the world’s oil and natural gas reserves and ways to transport them, as well as numerous regional conflicts, some of which were armed. Subsequently, because of the “Islamic wakening” (a more precise term than “Arab spring”) and the continued intervention of the U.S. and its allies in foreign states’ internal affairs, internal instability has intensified greatly in the region, to the point of becoming a threat to the national interests of the Russian Federation and its allies within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), including leading regional players: The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and Turkey.

The security situation in the Greater Middle East is growing worse. For example, the Afghan problem poses a potential threat to all surrounding states, for example by the growing illicit export of narcotics and by radical Islamic ideas. Presidential elections in Afghanistan in this case do not inspire optimism. American protege Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, previously the country’s Minister of Finance, won the elections in their second tour. He clearly supports signing the “Security And Defense Cooperation Agreement Between The United States Of America And The Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan.” This will ensure the presence of American troops in the country until 2024, when it is expected that American soldiers will be under U.S. jurisdiction, that is, they may not be brought to justice in Afghan courts.

However, victory in the Afghan presidential elections was due to a large extent to multiple forgeries of the outcome. This gives another candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, previously the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs, a foundation upon which to not only challenge the election results, but also to start fighting for the forceful outing of the American appointee. All of this is occurring against the backdrop of the significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in Afghanistan, planned by the end of 2014, and the American withdrawal from the Manas international airport Center of transit. The above-mentioned parties more emphatically require the formation here of a unified security system, with the participation of all interested states, including Russia, Iran, Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Unfortunately, China has been reluctant to participate in this process in view of the desire to make an agreement with the Afghan Taliban. Presumably this will provide Beijing significant advantages if at some point the Taliban comes to power in Kabul.

The U.S. military presence deserves separate consideration as do, perhaps, some of their allies (for example, Germany) in Afghanistan after 2014. According to available data, 6.0 to 13.6 thousand foreign troops will remain in the country, which would not be enough to contain various kinds of extremists. Because of high corruption, lack of training and equipment, and vulnerability to radical Islamist propaganda, national armed forces and law enforcement structures would not be able to do this. Particularly, only 7% of all Afghan army military units (1 in 23 brigades) and 9% of structural police units have a sufficient level of training to fight the Taliban, a level which allows them to act on their own with minimum support from foreign troops.

Not only Beijing, but Washington and Kabul as well have high hopes for negotiations with the Afghan Taliban. Most likely, this will lead to significant concessions on the part of the former three parties, resulting in the “soft Islamization” of Afghanistan in the best case, or the capture by the Taliban of authorities in Kabul in the worst. In such an environment, Afghan drug trafficking will increase significantly, as well as weapons smuggling, militia and radical ideas on the territory of neighboring Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and parts of Kyrgyzstan. In one possible scenario, the Taliban, in conjunction with Al Qaeda fighters and “The Uzbek Islamic movement,” will create a political and military base in the Warduj district of the Badakhshan Province and gradually expand to neighboring districts Jurm and Yumgon. This would be the preparations for the Taliban capture of Northern Afghanistan that would constitute a real external threat for Central Asian states. Leaders of the said states clearly understand this, but would not be able to resist it without foreign aid. At the same time, Dushanbe and Bishkek are counting on military assistance from Moscow, and Tashkent – from Washington.

It is entirely possible to avoid a negative scenario of events in Afghanistan, especially considering that Iran has serious leverage there, first and foremost over relatives of Tajiks and Hazaras. Iran has provided this country with substantial economic assistance. For example, in 2008, Iran built the Herat-Khwaf railroad, which includes 76 km on Iranian territory and a 115 km section on the territory of Afghanistan. And even in powerful heroin pressure conditions, Iran continues to give shelter and work to hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees.

Moscow and Tehran’s positions on the Afghan problem largely coincide. Russia is in favor of a complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the country and building a dialog between the country’s different political forces. At the same time, the Taliban once again coming to power in Kabul is not desirable for Russia because of the inevitable growth of non-traditional security threats that would result. Therefore, the Russian Federation and Iran need to coordinate their efforts in that matter, both on a bilateral basis and through establishing contacts between Iran and CSTO.

An extremely complex situation remains in the Syrian Arab Republic (ATS). The winter international conference “Geneva-2″ has had very limited success, and Syria’s 2014 presidential elections were recognized as non-legitimate even before they took place by the West and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. This allowed the U.S. and their allies to raise the question of the need for a sharp increase in the volume of and the range of weapons, including portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank rocket launchers, in order to arm the opposition to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad. In particular, the United States provides the so-called “moderate opposition” $500 million in different kinds of weapons and military equipment. There is no doubt that a large portion of this is in the hands of radicals because of both forceful capture and the sale of American weapons on the region’s “black” market.

This happens when opposition forces are radicalized, when the moderate Syrian free army continues to degrade and its successor is not only the Islamic front, but the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, (ISIS) which until recently was generously financed by Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the latter organization has announced the creation of an Islamic state (caliphate) on the territory of Iraq and Syria that could lead to the disintegration of Iraq and the changing borders of all the surrounding states.

In addition to this, with tacit support from Ankara and possibly Washington, Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani called upon the regional parliament to establish a commission for preparing a referendum on Kurdish independence. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki has sharply condemned Kurdish leadership’s actions, including the armed seizure of the town of Kirkuk and its surrounding oil-rich areas. This caused real concern in Iran, where there is a significant Kurdish diaspora.

Iran has the greatest influence on Iraqi Shiite Arabs, who constitute the majority of the country’s population. Due to a long border that adjoins the two countries, many Shi’ite religious shrines in Iraq, the need to maintain transport corridors in Syria, and a variety of other reasons, Iran has been actively involved in the resolution of the Iraqi crisis. In particular, no less than three battalions from the Islamic Revolution Guard and most likely the Iranian aircraft fleet are fighting in Iraq, with a view to preventing the forceful overthrow of Nuri al-Maliki’s government and the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state. And once again Moscow and Tehran have the same stance on the subject. This is reflected, for example, by the fact that on June 28th at the request of the national government, five Russian Su-25 assault crafts were redeployed to Iraq and are now deployed at the Al-Mutkhana base near Baghdad. Tehran, for its part, delivered to Iraq a batch of its “Ababil” unmanned intelligence aerial vehicles. They are now posted on the Rashid airbase, also under Baghdad, and are run by Iranian specialists. It is keeping the state in the air that now prevents the Sunni militia from organizing any large-scale offensive operations.

There is still much uncertainty regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. At the end of G. W. Bush’s presidency, this almost led to regional war with unforeseeable consequences. Now the situation has improved considerably thanks to Irani President Hassan Rouhani’s efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis, as reflected in the “joint plan of action” agreement signed on November 24th 2013 in Geneva. In the near future a more comprehensive agreement between representatives of Iran and the six international mediators may be signed to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. However, contrary to some expectations, this will not lead to seriously closer American-Iranian ties, firstly because of deep differences of opinion on resolving Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan crises, and because of Washington’s reluctance to completely remove unilateral economic and financial sanctions from Tehran. This process is planned to take ten years, so for the time being the question is one of lifting only banking sanctions from Iran. This will, on one hand, retain American and Iranian opposition, although at a substantially lower level. On the other hand, the Iranian side will have new opportunities for interaction with its partners in military-political and economic spheres.

Russia is undoubtedly the most attractive regional partner for Iran. This is because of coinciding positions on most regional and global problems as well as the persistent desire to strengthen not only political and economic, but also military cooperation. Consequently, “constructive” partnership between the two states may be possible, and in the long term, even strategic partnership may be possible. In particular this implies that, with active support from Russia, main Iranian natural gas pipelines will be sent to the east (Pakistan, China, India). The process of involving Iran in Eurasian integration and establishing cooperation between Iran and CSTO member states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia will continue. At the first stage of the process, the latter can be realized through establishing working contacts at the level of the Analytical Association of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

In spite of some problems, Turkey retains high credibility throughout the region. It shows steady economic growth and serves as a transit corridor for petroleum for many countries. In these circumstances it would be useful to involve Turkey in a Russian-Iranian dialog with a view to enhancing regional stability and countering such non-traditional security threats as Islamic extremism and terrorism. The Russian initiative to establish a universal center within SCO to counter new challenges and threats, which, as a rule, come from non-regional players (the U.S. and other NATO member states) is extremely relevant here.

It is clear that the situation in the regional security council largely depends on the interaction between Russia, Iran and Turkey, which is characterized by both traditional rivalry and sustainable cooperation. In particular, Tehran and Ankara constantly vacillate between confrontation and mutually favorable diplomatic relations, having a number of strategic differences on issues of regional security and economic cooperation. Both countries have openly expressed their desire to become a regional leader. They have chosen different political development plans along with their corresponding tactics for influencing the Greater Middle East. Nevertheless, leadership of both countries is based on a well-known approach in diplomacy: “a flawed peace is better than no peace at all,” which has first been confirmed by the results of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Tehran at the end of January 2014, and then by President Hassan Rouhani’s return visit to Ankara in the first half of June.

In the course of the first visit, Iran did not call attention to Turkey’s unfriendly acts of installing Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems and other missile defense system elements, or to the two countries’ diametrically opposed positions on Syria. They still cannot come any closer to agreeing on these issues. As a consequence, pragmatism has appeared in President Hassan Rouhani’s diplomacy, which is based on the understanding that although Iran plays an important role in the Greater Middle East, it is not the only role. Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognizes Turkey’s right to conduct its own military policy, which to a large extent depends on Ankara’s obligations in accordance with its NATO membership and allied relations with Washington. This determines the predictability of Iranian diplomacy with regard to Turkey, for which the priority of bilateral cooperation is expanding economic and trade relations. Tehran has a lot of experience in just that.

President Hassan Rouhani’s return visit to Ankara confirmed this. The goal then was to double Turkish-Iranian trade up to 30 billion dollars per year. They also discussed the fight against terrorism and extremism in the region, as well as the situations in Egypt, Syria and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.

However, Ankara is concerned about prospects for Iranian and Turkish relations after a possible improvement in relations between Iran and the West. It is clear that after the partial lifting of financial and economic sanctions against Iran, Tehran’s sway in regional processes could seriously increase. As a result, Turkey may lose its status as a regional superpower. According to a number of Russian experts, the differences in possible development models for Iran and Turkey favor Tehran first of all, in terms of foreign policy. And rivalry between Turkey and Iran is developing along parallel lines. This forces the U.S. and the E.U. to come to terms with the idea that in the near future, they may have to deal with one of these Islamic countries’ hegemony in the region.

Another regional leader, Saudi Arabia’s claims are based on support for radical Islamic forces. Its support from the West is temporary in nature, for example, as regards Syria and Iran. In these circumstances, some in the U.S. and Europe consider Iran a sufficiently predictable and reliable partner. The West, of course, bound by allied obligations with NATO, would prefer to make a choice in favor of Ankara. But Iran does not intend to back down. This is why its market attracts western companies, so that they, in turn, would fight for the relaxation of the extremely strict financial and economic sanctions against Iran.

Russia is, at the same time, developing a policy of partnership with both Iran and Turkey. Moscow is interested in strengthening political cooperation between Ankara and Tehran, while the American administration considers any Iranian and Turkish interaction on key issues of the Middle East unacceptable.

However, differences remain, firstly on the Syrian issue. And they may get even worse, if Ankara does not abandon plans to forcibly overthrow the legal Government of Syria and to grant independence to Iraqi Kurdistan. But, in spite of Turkey’s serious economic ties with Moscow and Tehran, Ankara continues to focus only on the Syrian opposition, and sometimes serves as a conduit of American national interests.

This convinces us of the need to strengthen bilateral relations with Iran in all fields and make them a strategic partner. In the future this process could include Turkey, where, in case of a substantial reduction in western influence, national interests could quite possibly take priority over NATO allied interests. Only after that would it be possible to build a new system of regional security on a trilateral basis for the purpose of establishing peace and stability in the Greater Middle East, excluding any armed conflicts, developing mutually beneficial economic cooperation and strengthening integration processes, as well as strengthening ties in the fields of science, culture and sports.

Of course, in the Greater Middle East as a whole as well as in its individual parts (for example, the southern Caucasus), significant security threats remain. This is due to unresolved Afghan, Iraqi and Syrian problems, lack of regulation in the Iranian nuclear crisis, as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and Georgia’s territorial integrity. But this only underlines the urgent need to establish a new regional security system there, based on the national interests of all states, and independent of their affiliation to any military-political associations and unions. “A platform for stability and cooperation in the Caucasus” could be its basis, as proposed by Turkey in August 2008.

There is no doubt that activating OSCE Minsk Group’s work, a significant improvement in Russian-Iranian and Russian-Georgian relations, and strengthening integration processes in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus will significantly reduce the potential for conflict in the Greater Middle East with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the current problems. There will be additional opportunities for this once Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and possibly the Republic of Tajikistan join the Eurasian economic union, which is currently in its formation stage.

In this way, Russian-Iranian cooperation for regional security is further reinforced. This allows us now to think about “constructive” partnership between Russia and Iran and to raise the question of the viability of establishing a strategic partnership between our two countries in the future.

Vladimir Yevseyev, Director of the Center for Social and Political Studies, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The United States and its European partners immediately and unconditionally supported the new government in Kiev. This convinced many people about their direct involvement in the military coup, which was interpreted as a revolution against the hated regime of Viktor Yanukovych. If we analyze attentively all the events which took place in Kiev, the composition of the Maidan and the recent actions of the Supreme Rada, the attempts of a limited number of nationalists to impose their will on the Ukrainian people become apparent.

In such circumstances, Russia was forced to act, not to capture Ukrainian territories, but to ensure the safety of the Russian-speaking population. In particular, the Crimea was on the verge of a civil war since the Crimean Tatars, whose number, according to the population census conducted in 2001, was only 245,000 of the total population of 2.41 million, formed parallel authorities and presumably had weapons. Following the example of the Maidan, and with the tacit support of Turkey, the Crimean Tatars were ready to seize power in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. With a broad support from the local population, Crimean authorities, relying on friendly Russia, managed to paralyze the attempts aimed at destabilizing the situation on the peninsula by individual representatives of the Crimean Tatar people and the new government in Kiev. This created the conditions for the Crimean people for a free expression of their will as to their fate, via a referendum, the conditions of which fully comply with all European standards.

The information war, waged against Russia, allowed forming an extremely negative attitude in the West to President Vladimir Putin and his foreign policy. There have been clear attempts to demonize the Russian Federation, which allegedly threatens neighboring states by its actions and seeks to annex their territories. At the same time, they forget that it was the West that played a negative role in the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and enforced the separation from the country Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija . Similar actions were repeated in other regions, resulting, for example, in the de facto disintegration of Libya and Iraq.

There is no doubt that the events in Ukraine and Crimea will have a serious impact on the security of not only Europe, but also of the remote areas of the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus. First, in the conditions of an extremely sharp confrontation between Russia and the West, we should forget about any nuclear arms reductions, mutual trust in the military sphere and joint addressing of problems of nuclear weapons proliferation. This will result in the race of both conventional and nuclear weapons and blocking of efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis, Afghanistan and other issues of regional security.

Second, in view of the imminent introduction of not only political, but also economic sanctions against Russia by the U.S.A. and the EU, Moscow will try to compensate for the losses by an increased cooperation with China, Japan, Turkey and Iran. The interaction with the latter state is the most promising, as a trade-oil agreement is being prepared, under which Russian goods will be supplied to the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in exchange for Iranian oil. Starting with the volume of 100-200 thousand barrels of crude oil per day, Moscow can bring these volumes to 500,000 barrels in the future. Some of this oil will be re-exported to China, which will allow Beijing to increase the purchases of Iranian oil significantly, without aggravating relations with Washington.

Another area for Russian-Iranian cooperation is in the nuclear sphere. In the near future, Russia can start the construction of not only the second, but also the third unit of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran. This can be represented as a continuation of the previously signed contract for the completion of the construction of the first power unit there. We should recall that Tehran has faithfully fulfilled the conditions of the first stage of the “Joint Action Plan” – an interim agreement between the representatives of Iran and the “six” international mediators (the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis, signed at Geneva on November 24, 2013. This was reflected in the relevant report by the IAEA Director General.

Of particular interest to the parties is the sphere of military and technical cooperation, which is limited to UN Security Council Resolution 1929 for the present. However, apart from the Russian Federation Presidential Decree No. 1154 of September 22, 2010 “On measures to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1929 of June 9, 2010”, nothing prevents supplying air defense systems to Iran. According to this decree, it was prohibited to supply surface-to-air missiles (SAM) S-300 to Iran. The latter resulted in a claim for $4 billion against the Russian state-owned Rosoboronexport OJSC in the International Arbitration Court in Geneva. This question may be closed on the basis of delivery of SAM S-400 to Iran, which will significantly expand the range of arms and military equipment supplied by Russia.

There are other areas of mutual interest, where major contracts can be signed rather quickly. In this case, the bilateral trade, which amounts to about $2 billion per year now, may be increased by many times.

Moreover, Russia is even willing to follow a course on building a strategic partnership with Iran. Formally, this could be announced during an official visit to Tehran by President Vladimir Putin or his meeting with President Hassan Rouhani at the Caspian states summit, which will be held in Astrakhan in September of this year. Then the role of Russia in the Middle East will change fundamentally, as well as in the resolution of the Syrian crisis and the Afghan problem.

Third, strengthening of Russian-Iranian relations and quite possible improvement of Iranian- Turkish relations will give an opportunity to raise the issue of forming a non-aligned security system, in the South Caucasus at first. To do that, it is desirable to hold trilateral talks between Russia, Iran and Turkey in the near future, to develop common approaches to resolving conflicts in the region. This will allow formulating the concept of a new regional security system. As a result, this will be an opportunity not only to avoid a new war in the South Caucasus, but also to create a favorable environment for the resolution of problems of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Fourth, the strengthening of Russian-Chinese relations, up to becoming allies under certain conditions, is inevitable. This will mark the emergence of a multipolar world where the West will no longer dominate.

Thus, the U.S. has made a strategic error when it initiated an armed coup in Kiev. They hoped that they would significantly weaken Russia and the integration processes initiated by it in the post-Soviet space by directing Ukraine toward the West. In fact, Washington will reach quite the opposite effect. After a substantial strengthening of ties with China, Iran, Turkey and some other countries, Moscow will be one of the centers of a multipolar world, the interests of which will have to be considered by the Americans.

Vladimir Yevseyev, Director of the Center for Social and Political Studies, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

A total of 70 countries supported the “Enduring Freedom” operation, 40 of them agreed to join the United States on their quest. Russia in its turn agreed with the temporary deployment of U.S. military bases in the strategically important for the national interests of the Central Asian region.

Joint efforts removed from power and greatly weakened the Taliban movement. This created a good environment to limit their influence not only in Afghanistan but also in neighboring Pakistan, in the borderland areas where the Afghan militants found a refuge.

It would seem that the war on terror is close to completion. But President Bush Jr. did not have the political wisdom. Rather than continue the fight in Afghanistan, he switched to so tempting Iraq, and incidentally decided to reform the whole Middle East. A chain of endless wars has started in which there were no winners. Worse, the “Al- Qaeda” so strengthened that began to control large areas of Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Syria. In fact, the Americans nurtured it themselves by extremely ill-conceived policy of intervention in the internal affairs of other states. And Pakistan is no exception here, that can serve a perfect example of the Western ways of fighting international terrorism.

“Enduring Freedom”, held by the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan, ousted both the leaders of the “Taliban” movement and “Al –Qaeda”, and a significant number of radicals in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. So, in the end of December 2001, about 500 militants of the movement “Al- Qaeda”, who fled from Afghanistan, were seen near the city of Peshawar. Thus Pakistan was drawn in the anti-terrorism campaign. Today the terrorism matters are of utmost importance for Pakistan, since the Afghan Taliban militants have relocated to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

At this point the fight of Afghan Taliban was supported by Pakistani Pashtuns. The support movement started in the South Waziristan province but soon it spread all across FATA, when armed groups were assembled here and there in order to help the Pashtuns fighting NATO forces in the southern Afghan provinces. Washington demanded that Pakistani authorities should put an end to the new waves of militants coming across the Pakistani border. Islamabad decided to bring regular troops to FATA, which resulted in armed clashes.

Perhaps it was then Islamabad committed a serious error when it signed a secret agreement with Washington that allowed U.S. Special Forces units to conduct search and prosecute representatives of the “Al- Qaeda” in Pakistan. The specified agreement provided for against the militants not only land-based activities, but also the use of aircrafts. The aircrafts in the form of shock unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) (UAVs) have created for the Pakistani authorities the greatest challenge in recent years. The reason for this was that the actions of U.S. drones were not accorded with Islamabad. At the same time, their strikes occasionally resulted in significant casualties among the local population. Thus, according to Western reports, only in the period from June 2004 to September 2012 in Pakistan as a result of the UAV attacks 3,325 people were killed, including 881 civilians, 176 children among them.

Such activities had a negative impact on relations between the U.S. and Pakistan, even in the face of acute dependence of Islamabad on the U.S. The bilateral relations strongly deteriorated after November 25, 2011 when the U.S. helicopters killed border checkpoint of the Pakistani army “Volcano”, which led to the deaths of 15 and wounding of 24 (later it was 27 dead) soldiers. As a consequence of long ceased transit of U.S. supplies to the Allied Force in Afghanistan.

On November 28 American airstrikes destroyed a check post near a border village of Salala, leaving 24 Pakistani soldiers killed and 14 more wounded. This attack provoked a wave of anti-American protests all across Pakistan. As a result Pakistani authorities decided to close all the routes that supplied the allied forces in Afghanistan.

In December the Western media started to undermine the authority of Islamabad by trying to convince the people around the Globe that there’s a coup d’etat that should be taking place in Pakistan in the nearest future. In return Pakistan demanded to put an end to the usage of the U.S. drones in the Pakistani airspace. This demand was ignored by the U.S. since they believed (and continue to believe) that “drones are absolutely necessary for them to able to fight international terrorism”.

In the winter of 2011-2012 there was a new strain of relations between Washington and Islamabad. Then, in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan there were performances by local residents with the requirement to give them independence. They were attended by a small number of people. However, in early February 2012 the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress held hearings on the issue of Pakistani Baluchi, on 17 February, 2012 the U.S. Congress introduced a draft resolution calling for recognition of the rights of ethnic Baluchi in Pakistan for self-determination. In Islamabad, it was perceived as interference in internal affairs. As a result, the American ambassador was harshly protested.

But mutual suspicion remained due to increasing rapprochement between Washington and New Delhi. In these circumstances, the West began to accuse Pakistan of a low level of cooperation on the Afghan problem and covert support of the movement “Taliban”. Thus, the main blame for the apparent failure in the fight against international terrorism has shifted to Islamabad.

In September 2013, All Parties Conference was held in Islamabad at which all interested political parties discussed ways to achieve peace in the country. This conference was convened at the initiative of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to reach a consensus among all political leaders (stakeholders) on the issue of combating terrorism and enhancing security in Pakistan. The resolution was condemned in the West as one expected the newly elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to continue the fight against terrorism only by force led by the U.S. and its allies. Instead, at the beginning of the resolution, it was noted that during the war against international terrorism thousands of soldiers and local residents were killed, and as a result of illegal drone attacks and air strikes of NATO member countries had caused significant damage to the objects of social and economic infrastructure Pakistan.

The main objective of the conference was the comprehensive cessation of violence by terrorists and other radicals on the basis of a compromise acceptable to the parties. This is quite natural for a country whose internal situation is not sustainable. West was obliged to support this initiative of the Pakistani leadership, at least, to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan in the significant reduction of foreign military presence there. However, this did not happen. The article by Rob Crilly “Only in Pakistan Can the Taliban be Described as Stakeholders” published September 10, 2013 in the British newspaper “The Daily Telegraph” is Evidence of this.

First, the very title of this article is surprising. Americans have been trying to negotiate with the so -called moderate wing of the “Taliban” movement in order to resolve the Afghan problem. And it does not raise any objections to the West. Why cannot Islamabad do that? Are the Pakistani Taliban are more radical than Afghan ones, which they cannot negotiate? Maybe the U.S. and its allies are not interested in a stable Pakistan, which will pursue an independent foreign policy? Apparently, the latter assumption is well founded.

Second, the successful fight against terrorism and strengthening of internal security contribute to the development of the national economy and attract foreign investment.

Third, any concrete actions against international terrorism require a high level of mutual trust. Its absence cannot be replaced by any modern means, especially by the action of shock systems on the territory of another state.

Fourth, the author of the article did not take into account the fact that the vast majority of the ruling elite of Pakistan share the views of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the problem and urge the government to start a dialogue with all stakeholders.

Fifth, the problems of Pakistan should be decided only by the leadership of this country, which has the political will and determination in the fight against terror.

The culmination of a short-sighted policy towards Pakistan was the fact that on November 1, 2013 as a result of U.S. drone air strikes in Pakistani North Waziristan bordering with Afghanistan, where the leader of the movement “Taliban Pakistan” Hakimullah Masud was killed. And it came a day after the statement of the Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif to start peace talks with the Taliban. It resulted in breakdown of negotiations on yet started peace dialogue. There is no doubt that the policy of leading Western states has a negative impact on the situation in Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan.

Vladimir Yevseyev, the Director of the Center for Social and Political Studies, exclusively for the online magazine  ”New Eastern Outlook”.

The investigation examines the August 21chemical weapon missile strikes carried out against Western and Eastern Ghouta, located 16 km. apart from one another. At that moment, this territory was controlled by the armed opposition. The report states that the attacks were “using a surface-to-surface rocket system of approximately 330mm in diameter—likely Syrian-produced—and a Soviet-era 140mm surface-to-surface rocket system to deliver a nerve agent.”

Further, the report states that the opposition does not possess these types of rockets and launchers. However, the Syrian army does not possess them either, as they only have the 122mm Soviet BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launcher system (MRLS) and the Chinese 107mm Type 63 multiple rocket launcher (MRL), as well as, possibly, the 220mm Soviet 9P140 Uragan MRLS.

It is true that between 1967 and 1969, 200 Soviet 140mm BM-14-17 MRLS with a range of up to 9.8km were delivered to Syria. However, according to the authoritative investigation from Military Balance 2010, these systems were decommissioned. Nevertheless, MRLS of this type are still being used in Algeria, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Egypt, Yemen, Cambodia, Congo, North Korea and Cuba. Is it possible that, for the sake of this conspiracy, a few BM-14-17 systems were delivered to the opposition from one of these countries?

The issue regarding the 330mm rockets deserves further inspection. The Iranian artillery rocket Fajr-5 has a similar caliber (333mm), its warhead weighs 90kg and the rocket has a maximum range of 70-80km. Some sources say that it was used by Hezbollah against Israel in July of 2006. We cannot eliminate the possibility that this rocket was delivered to Syria. However, there has so far been no documented instances of this rocket being used together with a chemical agent.

Until there are conclusive facts, it is too early to speak of the possibility that the Fajr-5 rockets are being constructed on Syrian territory. It is also quite doubtful that Syrian specialists would develop their own warheads for an Iranian ballistic missile. It would be much easier to use their own chemical weapon delivery system in the form of planes (helicopters), ballistic missiles or artillery.

The Fajr-5 short-range ballistic missiles could only be launched from a considerable distance away from Ghouta, due to the rocket’s minimum firing range requirements. However, a logical question arises, and that is why did the American Space Surveillance Network fail to pick up the launching of eight rockets of this type (the number of rockets stated in the report)? Further evidence also needs to be provided to confirm the previous use of the 330mm rockets, outfitted with chemical weapons, by the national army against Syrian opposition.

It should also be noted that beginning in the late 1990s, there has been development of the Chinese 302mm WS-1solid fuel rockets (Turkish T-300) on Turkish territory, which have a range of up to 70km and a warhead weighing in at 150kg. The Turkish company Roketsan was able to modernize these older Chinese rockets with the newer model receiving the name TR-300. The range of this newer rocket was increased to 80-100km.

A few other nations also possess short-range ballistic missiles, such as Saudi Arabia. However, before we can claim that they were used together with chemical agents against Syrian civilians, it is necessary to have much more compelling evidence than simply a few witness’ accounts.

The Human Rights Watch report points out the alleged location of the Syrian rocket launcher systems before the attack on Ghouta. However, this location is outside the perimeters of the closest military base, which belongs to the Republican Guard’s 4^th armoured division. What was the point of bringing the MRLS to an unprotected area at night, where there was a high chance not only that it would get attacked by the armed opposition, but also that the opposition would be able to seize the chemical weapons in the process? Moreover, it should be taken into consideration that the elite troops within the Republican Guard carry the best weapons, not morally and physically obsolete ones.

It needs to be emphasized that Human Rights Watch representatives did not have access to Eastern and Western Ghouta. Their conclusions rest on interviews given by only 10 witnesses and 3 doctors who use Skype (the total number of injured was a few thousand people), which is clearly not enough to make a representative sample. The rest of the information in the report was circumstantial. Only one fact can be agreed upon — there was a chemical weapons attack in the region of Ghouta, but this was so obvious that it was hardly necessary to prove it to anyone.

The 140mm missiles could be fitted with chemical agents such as sarin, but the Soviet Union did not export chemical weapons to anyone. Such weapons were produced independently by a few nations on their own territories. The infrastructure for this type of development was created in Syria as late as the 1990s. However, by this time, they were already using the 122mm Soviet BM-21 Grad Multiple Rocket Launcher System. What would be the point of making chemical weapon warheads for the soon to be decommissioned MRLS BM-14-17, and then to place these warheads onto missiles from 1967? The remnants of precisely these types of missiles were found at the location of the chemical weapon attack. The powder charge in the rocket engine expires after 40 years, which is why launching the rocket in August of 2013 could have resulted in a deadly situation right at the launch installation. It is highly unlikely that the Syrian military would use these missiles in such close proximity to Damascus.

Furthermore, Syrian chemical weapons were manufactured only as a response to Israel’s nuclear potential, which arose only in the 1970s-1980s.

Of particular concern is the fact that in the Spring of 2004, Libya declared 4 tonnes of components to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which could have been utilized to make a chemical agent such as sarin. At the time that Colonel Gadhafi was overthrown in 2011, Libyan chemical weapons were not completely destroyed. A portion of the abovementioned components could have easily crossed over into Syria, considering Qatar’s active role both in the Libyan and the Syrian conflicts. According to Russian sources, radical Syrian opposition attempted to obtain chemical weapon components from abroad very recently.

The final assembly of the chemical warhead (its fragments could not be found at the site of the tragedy) and its placing onto a missile could have been carried out both within Syria and somewhere abroad. Considering the financial expenditures that Riyadh and Doha have already sustained with the goal of overthrowing the Assad government, the expenses that would be necessary to organize such an operation, as well as the entire conspiracy, would pale in comparison.

It is very disappointing to see that the well-known organization Human Rights Watch has started to partake in activities so unlike itself. As an investigation, their report, overall, simply repeats the information that was presented within the UN inspector’s chemical weapons report. Any further information is either questionable or very incomplete.

Vladimir Evseev, the director of the Center for Public Policy Research, exclusively for the internet magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

At first glance, the American arguments are flawless. But some readily apparent vexing details permit doubts about the veracity of those arguments. First, let’s start by discussing the caliber of the chemical weapons delivery systems. According to UN chemical weapons inspectors, unguided 140 mm rockets were used in the attacks. The UN inspectors suggested that Soviet BM-14-17 (MLRS) rocket launchers were used. However, Syria long ago removed those systems from its arsenal, and the army does not use them. They were replaced by modern Soviet 122 mm “Grad” (MLRS BM-21) and Chinese 107 mm Type 63 light rocket launchers. Syria may have also used 220 mm Soviet-made Hurricane rocket launchers (MLRS 9P140).

So how did the obsolete MLRS BM-14-17 systems get there? Perhaps they came with the rockets supplied by external opposition supporters who had previously obtained those sorts of weapons from the Soviet Union. As an alternative explanation, one cannot exclude the possibility that the opposition captured the munitions from Syrian weapons depots that might have held them.

In contrast to the Syrian army, the armed opposition is willing to use any weapons, including obsolete ones, just to seize power. The fact that the casualties include women, the elderly and children doesn’t matter to the radical opposition. This is evidenced by the recent killings first of 450 Kurds and then of more than 500 Alawites. The Syrian army behaves differently. It does not wage war on defenseless civilians.

Second, it is still impossible to accurately determine who carried out the chemical attack in Guta based on the geographical placement of the rocket launchers. Several types of rocket launcher can be covertly deployed between a Syrian military base and the site of the chemical attack, even with uninterrupted satellite surveillance. Considering that the attack took place in the early morning, the rocket launchers could have been moved under the cover of darkness using the blackout mode.

Third, rockets with an extremely long period of viability were used in the attack. Thus, judging from the markings on one of the unexploded rockets, an expert at the Center for the Study of Strategy and Technology, Mikhail Barabanov, concluded that the projectile had been produced in 1967 at Factory No. 179 (now the “Sibselmash” production facility in Novosibirsk). The obvious question is, “Why would the Syrian army use such old and unsafe rockets in its chemical operations?”

It should also be noted that Syria didn’t begin producing chemical weapons until the 1990s, following the establishment of manufacturing facilities in the mountainous region near Damascus, and at petrochemical plants in Homs (VX gas), Hama (sarin, tabun and VX gases) and Aleppo. Rockets can be outfitted with chemical weapons, but the time frame in which they were rolled out must match the timeline for production of chemical weapons, not be off by 25 years.

Fourth, U.S. officials rule out the possibility that the armed opposition has chemical weapons. This contradicts the available facts. For example, on March 19 2013, the opposition used sarin in an attack with a self-produced missile.

On May 30 this year, security forces in Turkey intercepted a car carrying 2 kilograms of sarin gas. They also arrested 12 members of “Jabat en-Nusra”, an organization with close ties to Al-Qaida.

Russia possesses information showing that members of the opposition in Syria and Turkey tried to buy 10 tons of chemical weapons components.

Fifth, the UN inspectors found a more potent form of sarin than that used by Saddam Hussein against the Kurds in 1988, yet there was no evidence of Syrian army involvement in the attack. That kind of weaponry might have been made recently with modern technology outside Syria. It must first be ascertained whether the sarin used in the attack exists in Syrian army stockpiles, and only then conclusions can be drawn about who used chemical weapons.

Sixth, the necessity of diffusing liquid sarin through the air can in no way preclude opposition involvement in the attack. Opposition fighters could have easily fired the projectiles from rocket launchers on the upper floors of buildings and equipped them with makeshift warheads.

Seventh, senior Syrian army officials’ radio transmissions intercepted by the Americans do not provide evidence of their decision about the military’s use of chemical weapons. Moreover, President Assad has forbidden them from doing so. The possibility that Syrian military personnel acted at their discretion in this regard does not appear strong in light of the fact that the army’s actions are monitored by the secret services.

In short, the U.S. could not provide conclusive evidence that Syrian National Army forces used chemical weapons against civilians in Guta on August 21. In particular, the means of delivering the chemical weapons were not possessed by the Syrian army, and the opposition could easily have obtained sarin gas. We can thus assume that in this instance the armed opposition carried out a massive provocation against Bashar al-Assad aimed at violently overthrowing him, with the means of American armed forces and their allies.

Vladimir Yevseyev, the Director of the Center for Social and Political Studies, exclusively for the online magazine  “New Eastern Outlook”.

There was a number of reasons that allowed the Syrian army to succeed on the battlefield:

1. A number of irregular militants groups were created by Assad’s regime, with a help provided by the Lebanon Islamist group “Hezbollah” and the Iraqi Shiites, managed to replace the most capable troops in the rear.
2. Due to the violent actions of the rebels in Syria, the initial level of support of the local Arab Sunni community deteriorated from the initial 50% to the present 10-15%. All in all around 40% of all the Syrian citizens don’t believe that someone can replace Assad today, he is regarded by many as the protector from the radical groups.
3. The Syrian army has managed to remarkably enforce its armed and air forces, by implementing field maintenance to keep the vehicles up and running.
4. The major investors in this conflict – Turkey and Qatar are both undergoing the processes of political instability.
5. Iran, despite all the sanctions brought upon its head by the West has nevertheless somehow managed to provide Syria with some form of financial assistance.

The West understands that they must considerably reinforce the rebels to allow them to hold their ground, but the fresh blood for cannon fodder is nowhere to be found. This was the reason why Bashar Assad was set up and latter blamed for the usage of chemical weapons, despite the fact that all the evidences were fabricated pretty crudely.

In this regard the four American destroyers patrolling the Mediterranean sea were immediately prepared to launch a strike on Syria, using the Tomahawk cruise missiles that can travel over 1.6 thousand kilometers, despite the fact that the Syrian soil has already witnessed the usage of chemical weapons before. The UN Commission on human rights have already been investigating four cases: two of them took place in Aleppo and Damask in 2012, another two happened in Aleppo and Idlibe this year. Yet the UN Commission investigating all of these cases failed to establish the nerve agents that were used in these attacks, as well as the means of delivery and the barbarians that were behind these crimes.

A group of experts from Russia has recently embarked on a trip to Syria to establish what did really happen on March 19 in Aleppo. Their findings that were later presented to the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon state that the nerve agent that was used in this ruthless attack against the civilians was sarine. The most likely side to resort on March 19 to the usage of WMD is the rebels, since a handcrafted shell was used as a delivery system to carry the sarine gas.

Another example of the Pentagon’s mindless games with WMDs is the case of a chemically loaded truck that was traveling across Turkey in the Syrian border direction. The local authorities arrested 12 people trying to smuggle two litres of sarine gus. It’s clear that the United States have been trying to set Bashar Assad up for a long time. The “keepers” of such a delicate load were the representatives of the Jabhat al-Nusra group.

Today President Obama is under the massive amount of stress from the Congress, from the media, from the different lobbies and on top of all from his immediate surrounding. It seems that everybody wants him to restore the public image of his country, to restore the American authority in the World. This is particularly true in the light after the toppling of the Egyptian ex-President Mohamed Morsi, that enjoyed all kinds of support from Washington.

It may seem that preventive air strikes that will target Syrian military targets can briefly restore the authority the United States have recently lost on the Middle East. According to the reports of the international press, Pentagon have already marked its targets. A list of ten objects that should go down in flames pretty soon starts with air fields and ends with the bases stationing AA units. This first preemptive strike can be carried out by the cruise missiles or even drones to limit the numbers of the future causalities among the US military personnel. But these strikes are unable to tip the scales in the Syrian face-off and the Assad regime will remain in place.

Moreover any form of aggression against Syria will force Tehran to provide it military assistance, along with supplying Syria with all kinds of conventional weapons.

Therefore it’s most unlikely that the United States do decide to attack Syria any time soon. And time is of utmost importance for the Assad’s regime, since all the tension and hysteria around the fabricated chemical attack should fade off really fast. The next time the White House decides to go to the mattresses they will have to devise yet another excuse that their dogs of war in Syria will pull out. For this reason the threat of the NATO military intervention is still a real threat for Syria, but for it to become a reality the United States will have to face some serious political consequences. Such a step will also affect the regional allies of Washington. Israel can face some serious consequences if the situation in Jordan will get out of hand, which is a quite realistic scenario since the number of the Syrian and Palestinian refugees there have surpassed the local population in sheer numbers. One can only hope that the White House does understand all this.

Vladimir Valeryevich Yevseyev is the Director of the Center for Social and Political Studies. This article was written expressly for New Eastern Outlook.

Pyongyang has stated that the spacecraft is intended for mineral exploration and weather tracking. That lets us conclude that the satellite carries remote sensing equipment operating in the visible and radio wavelengths. American reports say the spacecraft is rotating and is not transmitting, suggesting it is non-operational.

The United States and its allies displayed heightened concern during preparations to launch the North Korean rocket and during the launch itself. They did not rule out shooting it down if it presented a threat. In reality, however, they pursued a different goal: collection of technical intelligence on the Unha-3 rocket in order to determine the actual status of the Taepodong-2 ballistic missile development program. That was the reason they ship carrying an SBX-1 multifunction sea-based radar traveled from the Alaskan coast to the coast of Korea. Other systems were used for the same purpose: the FBX-T forward-based radar on the Japanese island of Honshu and Okinawa-based RC-135S Cobra Ball reconnaissance aircraft.

Information systems belonging to US allies were also put on alert. South Korea put the Green Pine radar it had recently acquired from Israel into operation. It is capable of detecting ballistic targets at ranges up to 500 kilometers. South Korea also employed Peace Eye AWACS planes it had recently purchased from the United States.

The Japanese decided to protect themselves in case the Unha-3 launch was a failure by deploying a Patriot PAC-3 antiaircraft system in the south of the country. The unified command of US and South Korean forces on the Korean peninsula went to a higher level of alert.

Shortly after the Unha-3 launch, members of the South Korean Navy recovered the oxidizer tank and fragments of the rocket’s first stage from the bottom of the yellow sea. Five South Korean warships were engaged in the search. Divers used a Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle for the operation. These efforts enabled a better understanding of the technological level of North Korean rocketry.

South Korean experts drew the following conclusions from an analysis of the data they obtained. First of all, the first stage rocket engines used a nitrogen-based oxidizer; nitrogen is a component of storable rocket fuel. In their opinion, liquid oxygen is preferred for use in a booster rocket. Second, the first stage was a cluster of four Nodong-B rocket engines, which are more advanced than those used in Nodong-1 single-stage liquid-fueled missiles. Third, a simulation of the rocket’s trajectory showed that it is technically capable of delivering a 500- to 600-kg warhead to a range of 10,000-12,000 kilometers. Fourth, the weld quality was poor, and imported components were used to manufacture the rocket’s airframe. That, however, did not violate the Missile Technology Control Regime.

In commenting on the significance of the accomplishment, I might mention that in February 2010 Iran showed the international community its Simorgh booster rocket, which is capable of putting a 100-kg satellite into low Earth orbit. Its first stage is powered by a cluster of four Nodong rocket engines, and a Qadr-1 missile is used for the second stage. The Simorgh and the Unha-3 are very similar. According to Western reports, Iran’s Simorgh rocket can deliver a 750-kg warhead to a range of 5000 kilometers if used as a ballistic missile. Reducing the warhead weight to 500 kilograms gives it a range of 5400 kilometers. With its upgraded first-stage rocket engines, it can apparently be said that the range of a North Korean missile based on the Unha-3 booster could be as much as 6000 kilometers with a 500-kg warhead. However, these estimates require experimental verification.

In addition, an important characteristic of a missile system is its combat readiness. If a missile’s lengthy preparation time for launch means there is a high likelihood it will be destroyed by the enemy, its maximum range must be deliberately reduced to improve its combat readiness.

There is no doubt that the Unha-3 launch violates UN Security Council resolution 1874, dated June 12, 2009, which requires the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to refrain from employing ballistic missile technology. That was confirmed in a statement by the President of the UN Security Council on April 16, 2012 demanding that North Korea’s leaders resume the moratorium on launching ballistic missiles. Pyongyang voluntarily introduced such a moratorium in 2000 and suspended it between 2006 and 2007.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has condemned the launch of the Unha-3. He believes this “provocative act” may have negative consequences for peace and stability in the region. Seoul supported that point of view. The events evoked “deep regret” in Russia and China. US National Security Council spokesman Tommy Vietor said, “North Korea is only further isolating itself by engaging in such provocative acts.”

Nevertheless, not even the statement by the President of the UN Security Council was adopted. And the international community’s relatively mild reaction was to be expected because the Unha-3’s trajectory did not carry it over Japanese territory. No one in Pyongyang plans to launch a nuclear warhead rather than a satellite, especially since there is no evidence that one is being developed. North Korea’s improvement of its ballistic missiles is troubling, but it does not represent a real threat to surrounding countries. Like nuclear weapons, North Korea needs missiles only for defensive purposes. They guarantee that no one will overthrow the regime in Pyongyang by force.

Thus, the world perceives North Korea’s space program much the way it looks upon Tehran’s similar program: The international community sees it only has cover for development of its national missile program. North Korea has every right to space exploration of course, but that does not mean Pyongyang should violate UN Security Council resolutions demanding that it halt its missile program and reinstate the moratorium on launches of ballistic missiles.

North Korea is continuing to develop two-and three-stage Taepodong-2 class ballistic missiles under the cover of a space program. Depending on payload, their maximum range may be as much as 6000 kilometers with a circular error probability of 3.7-3.8 kilometers.

 Vladimir Yevseyev is a New Eastern Outlook columnist.

Wikileaks says that Azerbaijan’s close ties with Israel have given it access to a new level of arms for developing its army. This equipment cannot be obtained from the United States or Europe due to various legal restrictions, or from former Soviet suppliers in Belarus and Ukraine.

Azerbaijan’s leaders had every right to enter into the contract. However, many military experts felt that Russia was only informed about the deal after it was concluded, even though Russia, as co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, has avoided supplying modern weapons to its ally, Armenia. The fact that its army uses Chinese arms supports that contention.

The large purchase of Israeli arms is not only leading to an arms race in the South Caucasus, it encourages influential forces in Baku to try and resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue by force. But victory would not come easy despite Azerbaijan’s personnel superiority and its larger inventory of armored vehicles and aircraft. The result would most likely be a protracted conflict that would inevitably reach beyond Nagorno-Karabakh.

Russia, which is obligated to defend Armenian territory, would be drawn into the conflict, and Turkey, which has similar obligations to Azerbaijan, would find itself in a difficult position. Nor could Tehran avoid becoming involved in the conflict, especially if Georgia closes its border with Armenia. It is vital for Tehran that the Iranian transport corridor remain open. Therefore, an armed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh would become regional in scope, something Baku tries to ignore.

There is also a possibility that a worse scenario could develop — Azerbaijani involvement in a large scale military operation between the United States and Iran like the Iraq war (2003), with massive missile and aviation strikes and troops on Iranian soil. The objective is to destroy Iran’s economy, armed forces and government and, ultimately, topple its regime in order to irreversibly destroy its nuclear program and end its status as a significant power in the region.

Russia’s reaction to this development, which would threaten security in the South Caucasus, would be severe. Its reaction would not be limited to convening an extraordinary meeting of the UN Security Council and holding bilateral and multilateral consultations. Russia would likely undertake political and military-technical steps that would make it extremely difficult for Azerbaijan to regain Nagorno-Karabakh by force if a total blockade is imposed on Armenia.

That scenario would have the most serious consequences for the entire region. Moscow probably could not prevent it from happening. It could only mitigate the adverse consequences, including the refugee problem. Of course, large numbers of refugees are not inevitable. It did not happen during the difficult period of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war despite Baghdad’s use of chemical weapons. However, the US military would find it necessary to destroy the country’s transportation infrastructure in its effort to weaken Iran’s resistance. That would result in shortages of food and other essential items and displace large numbers of people, primarily ethnic Azeris relocating to Armenia and Azerbaijan.

However, their ultimate goal would be Russia, because those countries’ capabilities are limited. Currently, 9.5 million people live in Azerbaijan, and about 1 million work in the Russian Federation. As the tragic events of the first half of the 1990s when 700,000-800,000 refugees fled to Azerbaijan demonstrated, that would be critical for the country’s social infrastructure. We should remember that at least 25 million ethnic Azeris live in Iran.

A large-scale conflict between the United States and Iran obviously would not happen overnight. It would have to be preceded by a brief period (2-5 days) of large-scale Israeli missile and aviation strikes on critical nuclear infrastructure nodes, as well as a number of military facilities that must be destroyed in order to effectively neutralize the nuclear targets. In this scenario, or independently of it, the United States could carry out missile and aviation strikes of gradually increasing intensity against a broad range of targets over several weeks or even months (similarly to the war in Yugoslavia). A coalition consisting of a limited number of countries could be formed to execute these actions.

Prior to a large-scale operation, Russia could significantly boost its forces in both the North and the South Caucasus. That would primarily affect the military base in Gyumri (Armenia). Its geographic location requires that arms and materiel, fuel and lubricants, provisions, and much more needed for combat operations be built up in a timely manner before a total embargo on transportation lines. Depending on how the situation evolves, Russia could both build up its ground forces and deploy Iskander operational tactical missile systems in Armenia.

Another problem that exacerbates the mutual misunderstanding involves the lease on the Gabala radar station. The cost of the lease on this military facility was suddenly increased from $7 to $300 million, i.e., by a factor of 42. That fee is obviously excessive. To see that, we need only compare the leasing fee for the Transit Center at the airport in Manas: $60 million, i.e., 5 times less than the amount Azerbaijan is demanding from Russia. These two facilities are simply not of comparable value.

Russia’s leaders anticipated that things may play out like this. That is why construction of a second prefabricated Voronezh radar is underway near Armavir. It will operate in the meter wavelength range in same sector as the Gabala radar. The new radar will detect targets at a comparable range (about 5000 km) but will be capable of more accurately determining their position and trajectory parameters. Also, its operating costs are somewhat lower.

Thus the misunderstanding between Moscow and Baku is growing, and it has already resulted in the closure of Russia’s only military facility in Azerbaijan — the Gabala radar station. That had almost no impact on Russia’s defensive capability, but it dealt a serious blow to relations with Azerbaijan in a sensitive area of military cooperation. The consequences for our two countries have yet to be determined.

Vladimir Valeryevich Yevseyev is the Director of the Center for Social and Political Studies. This article was written expressly for New Eastern Outlook.