In the entire history of China-Japan relations, the two countries had never been in such a harsh opposition and their bilateral relations had never been so strained as in the period that followed the events of September 2012. The Japanese authorities’ decision to acquire three out of the five large privately-owned Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (disputed by China, but de facto owned by Japan) into the state ownership—a step, which, in accordance with the intention of Japanese authorities, was supposed to eradicate contradictions in their relations with China, sparked in 2012 the worst crisis in the diplomatic relations established between the two countries since 1972.

Beijing did not appreciate the attempts of the Japanese leadership to prevent (through nationalization) the governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara’s initiative, which was potentially dangerous for China-Japan relations. He had planned to buy the islands outright and build a port and infrastructure there to station personnel. Under the pressure of Chinese public opinion (lacking thorough knowledge of all the details of the deal with the island), or, perhaps, even deliberately exploiting nationalistic sentiment in the circumstances of an extremely delicate process of the transfer of state power in China in 2012-2013, involving an interparty struggle among the members of CPC, the Chinese leadership decided to not curb the anti-Japanese wave that broke out in China and allowed the relations with its neighbor to worsen.

From September 2012, there was a harshening of anti-Japanese rhetoric in China on the part of the top country officials as well as in the mass media. A number of temporary regulatory measures (in particular, more rigorous customs checks of goods imported from Japan, delayed approval of work visas for Japanese, etc.) were introduced. Contacts with Japan at the ministerial and other levels were suspended on the initiative of the Chinese party. Chinese ships began to regularly patrol the sea in the area of the controversial islands. Chinese planes regularly trespassed Japanese air boundaries (at least twice a month unauthorized Chinese ships would show up in Japan’s territorial waters, while invasions of Japanese airspace occurred at least a hundred times per quarter). China has also embarked on the development of oil and gas fields near the median line of the East China Sea.

On the whole, since autumn of 2012, China-Japan relations entered an era of deep stagnation, which both Chinese and Japanese experts describe as, “It cannot get any worse.” Three issues were at the heart of the Chinese-Japanese disagreements: ownership of the Senkaku islands, the construal of historical events and the visits of Japanese high-ranking officials to the Yasukuni Shrine.

This state of affairs persisted till 2014, when it was quite clearly demonstrated that Xi Jinping’s political policy toward Japan was changing, acquiring more conciliatory undertones. The positive shift in China’s policy signaled a resumption of the dialogue between the ministers of the two countries that had been interrupted in 2012. Akihiro Ohta, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, the first Japanese minister to officially visit China since the “freezing” of formal contacts, arrived in Beijing in June 2014. The visit was followed by a whole range of ministerial meetings, and later the level of meetings propelled to presidential. Negotiations between Yang Jiechi, a member of the State Council of China and Shotaro Yachi, National Security Advisor to PM Abe that were held in Beijing on November 7, 2014, and the achievement of a “four point consensus” opened a new horizon for a private meeting of Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe during the APEC summit scheduled for November 2014.

And just six months later, in April 2015, the second meeting of the heads of the two countries took place in the course of festivities held in commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Bandung Conference. PM Abe was also invited to attend the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Victory of Chinese People’s Resistance against Japanese Aggression and World Anti-Fascist War scheduled to be held in Beijing on September 3, 2015.

Statements, which could be interpreted as the handing of an olive branch symbolizing peace to the Japanese leadership, could be clearly heard in Xi Jinping’s speeches. For example, in his speech at the events organized in commemoration of the Nanking Massacre on December 13, 2014 Xi Jinping noted that the Chinese should not harbor hostile feelings toward the entire Japanese nation for the deeds of a handful of militarists who had unleashed a war of aggression. In May 2015, in the course of a meeting with the Japanese delegation consisting of three thousand heads of local governments and large enterprises, Xi Jinping asked that his cordial greetings and best regards would be passed to all Japanese people, having noted once again that Japanese people had also fallen victims to the war. The Japanese enthusiastically accepted these two speeches of the Chinese leader and deemed them to be a signal communicating a commitment to reshaping the bilateral relations.

What made Beijing moderate its position toward Japan? First, it should be pointed out that reinstatement of formal high-level dialogue fits quite well into the customary pattern of how Chinese practice their foreign policy. When responding to adverse steps taken by a foreign state against it, Beijing temporary ceases political contacts (for a period from a year and a half to two years) with the “offender” and one and a half years later, when the expected edifying effect has been attained, it resumes high-level dialogue. For example, such was the case when there was a 14-month “freeze” of political contacts between Beijing and Great Britain, which followed a meeting of the Prime Minister David Cameron and the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama in May 2012.

Secondly, from 2013, when China faced a possibility of having to deal with a powerful anti-Chinese coalition with the participation of its neighbors—the parties disputing territories in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, it embarked on the implementation of the “neighboring” diplomacy which, among other things, implied harmonization of relations with its most powerful neighbor—Japan.

Thirdly, the scale of deterioration of China-Japan relations had become alarming: two incidents occurred in the spring of 2014 (in May and June): standoffs between Chinese and Japanese aircrafts, which potentially could have resulted in a crash and the subsequent diplomatic scandal. Since neither Japan, nor China were looking to engage in military actions, which could be triggered by human error during one of the standoffs between aircrafts or ships, there was a real need to ease the tension in the China-Japan relations.

Fourthly, the fact that political disagreements had started adversely affecting the trade and economic relations of the two countries could have also contributed to the change in the Chinese policy toward Japan. At that time the goods turnover was dropping, the volume of operations of Japanese business in China was shrinking, and there had emerged a stable trend of reduced Japanese direct investment in China. In December of 2013, the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation published a report informing that China had been moved down from the first to fourth position on the list of countries receiving Japanese investment. From January to October 2014 Japanese direct investment in the Chinese economy decreased by 42.9% in comparison with the same period of the preceding year. The flow of Japanese tourists traveling to China had significantly reduced: In April-September 2013, the sales of package tours to China dropped by 75.2% in comparison with the same period of 2012.

And fifthly, by 2014 Xi Jinping had already concentrated all the power in his hands and there was no real need to employ nationalism as a means of consolidating power. China could afford to somewhat reduce its pressure on Japan and disregard nationalist public sentiment.

However, there are not so many reasons for optimism as far as the possibilities of full-fledged normalization of China-Japan relations are concerned even in light of the relative moderation of Xi Jinping’s policy toward Japan. All the problems inherent in the bilateral relations remain unresolved and there is little chance they could be effectively settled in the foreseeable future. It is also highly unlikely that one of the parties involved in the disputes will be willing to make concessions to the other party on the issues in question. Nevertheless, the observed improvement in the political dialogue in the present situation is evidence that significant progress in China-Japan relations has already been made.

Yana Leksyutina, Ph.D. in Political Sciences, Lecturer at St. Petersburg State University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

The growing concern about the deterioration of the situation in China’s immediate surroundings manifested itself in October 2013 when Beijing held a central meeting on work in the field of its foreign policy activity, especially dedicated to the issues related to cooperation with its neighbouring countries. What was extraordinary about this event was that the previous central meeting on work in the field of foreign policy activity was held solely in 2006 and it concerned foreign policy activity in general and there were no specialized meetings on the policy of Beijing’s neighbourly relations. It is also significant that of the 22 countries that Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang paid an official visit to in their first year in top government posts, 12 were China’s neighbours.

The appearance of an alarmist article by the authoritative Chinese-foreign researcher Yan Xuetong in China Daily in January 2015 is telling. It raises the question of what is more important for China: developing relations with the US or with its neighbours. Citing a number of weighty arguments, Yan Xuetong clearly asserts the priority of relations with neighbours.

Yan Xuetong’s framing of the question is not accidental. Since the end of the 1990s, the development of relations with neighbouring countries has not been a priority for the Chinese leadership, who aimed to present China as a world power, which was interested in improving relations primarily with leading world states (and, in particular, with the United States.) Since 2002, in the Chinese President’s summary reports given every 5 years at the CPC Congresses, the strict hierarchy of Chinese priorities has remained unchanged: developed, neighbouring and finally, developing countries (although up until 1997, the order looked radically different: neighbouring states, third world countries and developed states.)

However, the deterioration of relations between China and a number of Asian neighbours which has become apparent since the end of the 2010s, has forced the Chinese leadership to look at the arrangement of its foreign policy priorities in the area of increasing the role of the development of relations with neighbouring countries in a new way.

Starting in 2013, the concept of “neighbouring diplomacy” has become a keystone in China’s official discourse.
This concept can be understood in both a narrow and broad sense:
the first involves China implementing its task of harmonizing its relations with its neighbouring countries against the backdrop of the deepening territorial disputes between them, and dispel the “Chinese threat” theory. The second has a deeper dimension, in this sense, China’s “neighbouring diplomacy” aims at strengthening its role as a regional leader by way of managing regional integration processes in line with China’s own vision.

In essence, China’s “neighbouring diplomacy” is a combination of traditional diplomacy, economic and public diplomacy in relation to its neighbours. Economic diplomacy is aimed at deepening its neighbouring countries’ economic dependence on China by promoting trade links (for example, by introducing special preferential treatment in trade with these countries), increasing the use of the Chinese currency for inter-regional payments, increasing investment and assisting in the development of neighbouring countries, which includes collaborating with them in the implementation of major infrastructure projects. Public diplomacy is aimed at fostering a positive image of China among its neighbours, and includes measures to expand the presence of the Chinese media in neighbouring countries, attract a growing number of foreign students from neighbouring countries to study in China, and increase the number and presence of Confucius Institutes, among others, throughout the region.

Against the background of deepening conflicts in territorial disputes with its neighbours, the new Chinese leadership has employed a series of measures aimed at strengthening neighbourhood relations, expanding its influence and restoring China’s image in the region since 2013, by embarking on a second wave of a so-called “charm offensive” (the first wave occurred approximately 1997-2007.)Over the course of 2013, with the aim of improving relations with its neighbours, Beijing intensified its diplomatic activity, strengthened its economic diplomacy and offered countries in the region a number of attractive large-scale economic projects.

For example, in early September 2013 a Chinese mega-project in the Eurasian space entitled the “Silk Road Economic Belt” was widely announced. Its specific role is to deepen cooperation between China and its Central Asian neighbours and Russia. In October 2013 during meetings with the leaders of APEC and the East Asia Summit, the Chinese party put forward a series of initiatives in the field of trade and infrastructural development of the region.
Xi Jinping proposed establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and outlined China’s intention to increase trade with ASEAN from the then level of $400 billion to $1 trillion by 2020. In Xi Jinping’s unprecedented speech before the parliaments of Thailand and Indonesia, Beijing presented its strategic concept of Community with a Common Destiny, China-ASEAN, and the blueprint for a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, which involves the construction of ports and the development of China’s maritime links with the countries of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.
In 2014, a number of sub-regional initiatives were put forward, such as the creation of the Bangladesh-China-India-Burma economic corridor and the establishment of a mechanism of dialogue and cooperation between countries of the Lancang-Mekong River Basin.

China has also intensified its efforts to establish a vast free trade area, which would link the economies of China with the whole of East Asia and even the Asia-Pacific Region. This idea gained momentum in the form of two options, which Beijing is actively promoting: the establishment of an integrated regional economic partnership and a free trade area in the Asia-Pacific region.

Over time, China’s “neighbouring diplomacy” has begun to take on scope, scale and a multi-vectored nature. This is demonstrated by the development of events and how the initiatives proposed by Beijing are systematically coming to fruition.

Not limiting itself to the task of expanding its diplomatic and economic presence in its near surroundings, Beijing has started putting together its conceptual vision of its special place in the region, which are addressed to its neighbouring countries. Beijing is trying to convince its neighbours of the idea that the “Chinese dream” and the other nations’ interests and dreams of national revival are dependent on one another and inter-linked. The establishment of good neighbourly relations is not only seen in the suggestion of the strategic concept of a Community with a Common Destiny, China-ASEAN, in the autumn of 2013, but also in Xi Jinping’s public mention in September 2014 of Deng Xiaoping’s concept of the “Asian century”, which will come to be only under the right conditions for achieving the development of China, India and several other neighbouring countries to China. At the APEC summit in November 2014, Beijing the general idea of a common “Asia-Pacific dream” for all countries in the region was aired, which encapsulates the desire for prosperity and security, creates the conditions for this, as well as having the aim of ensuring that the region remains at the forefront of world development and makes a significant contribution to the prosperity of humanity Later, China began to actively promote the idea of a common destiny of the Asian community. Underlying all of these concepts is the over-arching idea of inter-connection between the countries in the region, the need for their solidarity in order to achieve prosperity and security (this means solidarity under the auspices of China). The task, which Beijing is leading by pushing forward similar concepts – dispelling of the fear that was aggravated in its closest neighbours from 2007-2008 about the “Chinese threat”, convincing its neighbours that the rise of China brings prosperity to the whole region, that the desires and dreams of the region of national economic development can only be fully brought about by way of close cooperation with China.

However, the “neighbouring diplomacy” of China, which seemed to demonstrate positive trends the development of Beijing’s contacts with its neighbours in 2013, began to falter in the case of countries with which China has territorial disputes (a number of countries in South-East Asia and Japan.) Another round of escalation of the situation in the South China and East China Seas, which started in May 2014 and continues to this day, largely because of China’s assertive behaviour, was evidence of the failure of the second wave of the “charm offensive”: China’s image continues to fall in a number of countries in the region, and the fear of the increasingly powerful East Asian neighbour is on the rise. Some East Asian countries are showing a growing concern about their increasing economic dependence on China. Among the expert community of South-East Asia, in particular,
opinions on the urgent need to diversify trade partners and artificially reduce the economic dependence on China are increasingly heard. Often such characteristic foreign policy conduct of contemporary China, provided by politicians and experts in Asian countries as an example of the significant discrepancy between the grand words and promises of Chinese dignitaries to its neighbours and Beijing’s real foreign policy steps and actions towards them.

Thus, at this stage, when there is a combination of “neighbouring diplomacy” and a contradictory approach to the development of relations with neighbouring countries, which involves putting pressure on its neighbours in territorial disputes (as well as in other matters where the parties’ positions are diametrically opposed), “neighbouring diplomacy” does not bring about the desired results of China’s harmonisation of relations with the countries concerned, and does not lead to the provision of a favourable neighbouring environment, and in a broad sense, to the approval of China as a regional leader.

Yana Leksyutina, Ph.D. in Political Sciences, Lecturer at St. Petersburg State University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

The US leader’s reluctance to pay tribute to China and the Chinese people should not be seen as accidental or unexpected and is consistent with Washington’s ambivalent and ambiguous policy towards Beijing. Despite the long-standing calls from the highest representatives of the USA for Beijing to develop trustworthy relations and a partnership, and continued US assurances of their desire to build “a new type of relationship between great powers” with China, Washington continues to demonstrate an unwillingness to respect “fundamental” Chinese interests, and build relations on an equal basis without constantly regulating various aspects of the Chinese leadership’s international and domestic activities.

China often draws attention to the US policy of “double standards”, which is manifested in fundamentally different requirements, criteria and standards of conduct imposed on China by Washington on the one hand, and those imposed on the US and its allies or close partners, on the other. China is often the object of harsh criticism from Washington for actions that in other circumstances, if committed by the United States or its allies instead of China, would not be viewed in a negative light and would be deemed fully justified in terms of fulfilling state national interests.

One of the areas where Washington’s double standards towards China can be traced most clearly, is to China developing its military capabilities. Beijing is systematically subjected to severe criticism of the increase in their military spending, the lack of transparency in military modernization, the strengthening of their military capabilities, which according to Washington stimulates the arms race in East Asia and, as a consequence, the growth of regional instability.

Primarily, Washington focuses on to the long-term, steady growth of China’s defense budget. From 2004 to 2013, the annual increase in China’s official defense budget averaged 9.4%. China currently ranks second in the world in defense spending, coming second only to the United States, but significantly exceeding its neighbors. What’s more, gross figures of China’s military spending show that it increased faster than that of the other Asian countries: from 2010 to 2014 China’s share in the overall volume of military spending in Asia grew from 28% to 38%.

Citing the high increase rate in the defense budget and an increase in the absolute figures of defense spending when evaluating Chinese defense spending, as a rule, Washington ignores other important indicators such as the share of defense spending as part of GDP and per capita defense spending. After all, these figures give a completely different picture of China’s military spending. Thus, the share of defense spending as part China’s GDP is very modest: in 2013 it was only 2%, which is lower than that of the majority of the top ten military spending countries: USA (3.8%), Russia (4.1%), Saudi Arabia (9.3%), France (2.2%), the UK (2.3%), India (2.5%) and South Korea (2.8%). The share of defense spending as part of China’s GDP has remained almost unchanged since the start of the 21st Century. From 2000 to 2013, it fluctuated between 1.9 and 2.2%. This indicates that the growth of China’s defense spending is not due to increasing the share of defense expenditure as part of GDP, but down to the growth in GDP and China’s maintaining a consistent percentage of allocations for military needs.

China’s defense spending looks even more modest, if you evaluate the per capita spending. Thus, China’s defense spending per capita is 1/22 of the equivalent US figures, 1/9 of that of the UK and 1/5 of Japan. In the world ranking of defense spending per capita, China only ranks 76th, while the United States is in fifth place.

While questioning China’s right to increase its defense budget, Washington has a huge defense budget, which reaches an amount equivalent to the total figure of the defense budgets of the remaining nine countries of the top ten military spending countries combined (including China). China’s defense budget in 2015 is less than one third of the USA’s projected defense budget. Meanwhile, from 2003 to 2013 China’s share of defense spending as part of GDP ranged from 2.0 to 2.2%, and the US share fluctuated in the range of 3.6 to 4.7%. US defense spending continues to remain at a high level, reaching, in real terms, its previous historical peak of the late 1980s.

Confident in their indisputable right to have the largest defense budget and most powerful army in the world, Washington consistently draws the world’s attention to China’s increasing defense budget, to China’s strengthening of its various aspects of its military capabilities, and questions the need for such growth and its peaceful intentions. The natural need to strengthen the defense capabilities of a rapidly developing power (of which China is one) is often dressed up by Washington as evidence of a growing “Chinese threat”. Meanwhile, the United States posits the strengthening of its military potential, which has long been far superior to the military capabilities of any other great power, as justifiable and reasonable measures taken by the world’s leading power that bears the heavy burden of responsibility for ensuring global and regional security.

Moreover, while directing a barrage of criticism at Beijing in connection with it strengthening its armed forces, Washington ignores the fact that certain US allies and partners in Asia are increasing their defense spending and in some cases even assists them in strengthening their military capabilities. From 2009 to 2013. the most rapidly growing defense budget in East Asia was not only China’s (though only China lends itself to Washington’s condemnation), but also Indonesia’s (which increased by 93% from 2009, while China’s grew by only 33%), the Philippines’ (which increased by 27%) and Vietnam’s (24%).

Washington’s clear double standards in this regard are manifested in relation to countries who participate in territorial disputes in the South China and East China Seas: China is categorically condemned for increasing its defense budget, but the increased military spending by other participants in territorial disputes is deemed justifiable measures to improve their defense capabilities in the face of the “Chinese threat.”

For example, since 2009 there has been a steady increase in military spending and a boost to the modernization of the military in the Philippines, which is one of five US allies in the region. Defense spending has increased from $2billion in 2009 to $3.5billion in 2013. According to the 5-year program of modernization of the armed forces, approved by President of the Philippines B. Aquino in 2013, Manila plans to spend $1.73billion from 2013 to 2017 on the purchase of warships, helicopters and other types of weapons to strengthen its defense capability.
The trend of increasing defense spending can be traced to another US ally – Japan. In 2013, there was an increase in the Japanese defense budget for the first time in the previous 11 years: by $1.15billion or 0.8%. Japan’s defense budget increased by 2.8% in 2014 on the 2013 level, and in 2015 it will be increased by a further 2%, to $42billion.

Impressive rates of increase in defense spending are typical for Vietnam, with whom Washington seeks to develop military and political cooperation. In the ten year span from 2003 to 2013, Vietnam’s military spending increased 4 times from $842million to $3.4billion. In order to assist Vietnam in reinforcing its maritime security, Washington approved granting Hanoi aid worth $18million in 2013, which provides for, among other things, the delivery of five modern patrol boats on an annual basis over the next five years.

While it criticizes Beijing for accumulating their military power and for expanding the scope of projecting its military power in East Asia, of which China is an integral part, Washington has been building up its military and political presence in the region. However, from a geographical point of view, the United States does not belong in East Asia. In its day, Washington proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine, which gave the US exclusive rights within the Western Hemisphere and considered any attempts by foreign nations to exert their influence there as acts of aggression against the US, and now does not want to acknowledge China’s exclusive rights within East Asia and rejects modern China’s expanding influence in the region, which logic would dictate should be attributed to China’s natural sphere of influence.

It is noteworthy that while Beijing holds back from developing military contacts and deepening strategic cooperation with the countries of Latin America even now, when the Monroe Doctrine is no longer a part of the US foreign policy strategy, in order to avoid dissatisfaction from Washington, the USA, on the other hand, clearly demonstrates to China its commitment to maintain its status as a regional leader in Eastern Asia, and plays an active role in the establishment of military-political cooperation and strengthening allied relations with the countries of the region.

The logic of Washington’s conduct in relation to China is that the United States reserves the right to have full freedom of action in the implementation of its national interests, while limiting Beijing’s freedom of action with a strict framework of regulation within which Washington allows China to operate. Going beyond these limits is treated as a manifestation of China’s “assertiveness” or even its “aggressiveness”, confirming the “China threat” theory, as well as China’s reluctance to play a role of a responsible power in the international arena.

It is of fundamental importance that the fact that these double standards are not a reflection of specific, individual cases of inadequate assessment of the various aspects of the Chinese leadership’s domestic and foreign policy, but a manifestation of the USA’s generally cautious approach to China as an inexorably growing rival power, alien to Washington in its political and economic model, ideology and values.

Yana Leksyutina, Ph.D. in Political Sciences, Lecturer at St. Petersburg State University, exlusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.“

The West’s concerns about development of military capability in China are understandable. China’s defence budget has demonstrated continuous and steady growth over many years. In the period from 2004 to 2013, the annual increase in the official defence budget of China averaged 9.4%. According to Chinese official figures (which, according to Western sources, are greatly underestimated in comparison with the real values), in 2013 it increased by 10.7% compared with the previous year, amounting to 114.3 billion USD. In 2014, defence spending increased by 12.2% compared with the level of 2013, reaching 132 billion USD, and in 2015 it will increase by 10.1% and amount to 142 billion USD.

Now China ranks second in the world in defence spending, coming second only to the United States. According to the calculations of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China’s share in global defence spending in 2013 was about 11%.

Several Western countries, including the United States in particular, constantly focus on China’s increasing defence budget, on strengthening certain components of the military potential of China, questioning the need for such a strengthening and its peaceful orientation. The natural need to strengthen the defence capabilities of a rapidly developing power is often represented as an evidence of a growing “Chinese threat”.

Such an approach to China actualizes the need to develop a system of transparency and publicity of various aspects of China’s military policy. The first steps in this direction were taken by the Chinese leadership as early as in the late 1990s, when since 1998 on a regular basis (every two years) the White Papers “China’s National Defence” have been published, which reflected issues such as the assessment of the military and political situation in the world and in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the basics of the defence policy and development of military capabilities in China. Over time, these White Papers became more and more informative. The White Paper “China’s Military Strategy” released a few days ago was the ninth document in the military field.

Since August 2009, in a test mode, and two years later on a formal basis the site of the Defence Ministry of China became operational. On Monday, May 25, 2015 the launch of the official microblog and an account by the Defence Ministry of China using Weibo platform was announced.

The reasons that prompted Beijing to make information relating to the military sector more public and accessible was the desire to dispel fears distributed in some countries about the existence of the “China threat”. In this regard, Beijing is constantly emphasizing the peaceful nature of the modernization of its armed forces, the defensive nature of its military policy, its commitment to peaceful development, and the desire to build a “harmonious world”.

The White Paper of 2015 has affirmed China’s commitment to its long-voiced strategic concept of “active defence” involving refusal to initiate or participate in wars of aggression, but allowing participation in a war in the event of the need to protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The document places particular emphasis on this concept, and three components at the present stage: unity of strategic defence and readiness for a tactical attack; commitment to the strategy of defence, self-defence and counter-attack against the enemy; commitment to the position “We will not attack until we are attacked, but we will certainly give a rebuff in case of attack.” The main focus of preparations for military action has been cited as victory in local wars under conditions of informatization.

The White Paper contains a description of the current military and political situation in the world and the Asia-Pacific region. In assessing the international situation, a number of profound historical changes in the balance of forces, the structure of global governance, and the geostrategic landscape of the Asia-Pacific region are noted. It also states the international competition in the economic, scientific, technological and military fields. Among the most serious threats to be noted are hegemonism, position-of-strength policy and neo-interventionalism; intensification of international competition for the redistribution of power; terrorist activities; ethnic, religious, territorial and border disputes; small-scale wars, conflicts and crises.

Among the key factors that have a negative impact on security and stability in the so-called “near environment” of China (Asia-Pacific region) listed in the White Paper are the US strategy of “rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region”, the military policy of Japan, provocation by some neighbours of China in respect of the disputed islands, interference of external forces in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea (quite clear allusion to Washington), and instability on the Korean peninsula.

In the White Paper, Beijing has frankly stated that some riparian countries, China’s neighbours, resort to provocations and strengthen their military presence on reefs and islands owned by China. As early as at the end of April 2015, PRC’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei accused the Philippines and Vietnam, saying that over the years these states have engaged in creation of artificial islands, large-scale construction of airfields and other facilities, as well as deployment of missiles on disputed islands in the South China Sea. In particular, Beijing accused the Philippines of building on the islands disputed by China an airport, a wharf, and tourism facilities, of strengthening the warship stranded near the Zhenay Reef, and Vietnam of building numerous artificial islands in the vicinity of the Spratly archipelago, as well as of building on the disputed islands runways, helipads, missile installations, administrative buildings, barracks, lighthouses, hotels and other infrastructure facilities. Protecting maritime rights and interests is referred to in the White Paper as a long-term objective of China.

In addition to the repetition of themes voiced in previous White Papers on national defence and in the speeches of Chinese high-ranking officials concerning China’s military strategy and development of the Chinese armed forces, the White Paper “China’s Military Strategy” contains a number of new provisions and focuses:

- increase of international position and influence of China, the expansion of China’s strategic interests, the need for the Chinese armed forces to seize the strategic initiative in military rivalry is declared;

- strengthening China’s military forces was called an integral part of the Chinese dream of national revival of the Chinese nation;

- several times in different variations the document repeats the idea that the armed forces of China must unconditionally adhere to the principle of the absolute leadership of the Communist Party of China and obey the authorities of the CPC;

- In the White Paper, four key areas, in which China needs to improve the capacity of its armed forces, are specified: sea, space, cyberspace and the nuclear sphere. In the development of the course for establishing China as a strong maritime power stated by Beijing as early as in 2012, the White Paper points to the need to abandon traditional assumptions that land space is more important than the sea. It emphasizes the need for a greater importance of the protection of maritime rights and interests of China. Moreover, a transition from protection of coastal territories only to a mixed defence protection, both in coastal areas and on the high seas is announced;

- A part of the White Paper, which reveals the intentions of China to develop military cooperation with the world countries, attracts quite much interest. In the first place, its intention to continue military exchanges and cooperation with Russia is stated. And only secondarily, its willingness to develop a new model of military relations with the United States is indicated. It subsequently refers to plans to develop military cooperation with neighbouring countries, its European, African, Latin American and South Pacific partners.

In general, the content of the White Paper on military strategy suggests the high importance that the Chinese government places, on the one hand, on military modernization and the creation of a highly effective and strong army, and on the other hand – on clarifying for the international community its motives and the main directions of its development of military capabilities.

Yana Leksyutina, Ph.D. in Political Sciences, Lecturer at St. Petersburg State University, exlusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.“

Contrary to official eloquence of the US and China senior officials, and their public claptrap on strengthening of bilateral cooperation and possible development of ‘relations of a new type between the Great Powers’, in reality there is an increase of rivalry and contradictions in the American-Chinese relations. If at the beginning of XXI century the ‘negative’ agenda included the Taiwan issue, human rights discourse (Tibetan and Uighur issues, the problem of Chinese dissidents, freedom of speech, etc.) and a range of economic problems, then in the last few years in record-breaking time this list of contradictions was supplemented by a range of problems related to the South China and the East China Seas, cyber security issues, freedom of Internet in China, the situation in Hong Kong, and also intensifying rivalry between the two countries in the APR, as well as at other regional venues (the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, etc.).

Widening of the spheres of contradictions between the USA and China lends evidence for the thesis on the inevitability of rivalry between a firmly established state – global leader and a potential super-power rapidly expanding its might, both of which drastically differ in ideology, value system, political and economic model.

In this relation the augmentation of the American-Chinese contradictions in security sphere in the APR is extremely indicative. The both states which since the beginning of XXI century have boosted their involvement in this region’s affairs give each other a handle for grounded concern and building up of distrust.

Beijing’s growing discontent and deep concern is related to the US intervention since summer 2010 into territorial disputes in the South China and the East China Seas, to strengthening by Washington of the military alliances and formation of new partner relations in the APR (in particular, Washington’s ‘drawing over to its side’ of such key Asian countries as Vietnam and Myanmar), to the American policy for China demonization, to the intensification of the US joint exercises in this region, to the US continuing intelligence-gathering activities in close vicinity to China’s territory. Behind the events in Hong Kong, Beijing also sees the US’ purposeful activities in accordance with the proven scheme of triggering ‘colored’ revolutions, aimed in this case at destabilization of the situation in China and erosion of the CPC legitimacy. Beijing often interprets the majority of critical situations which China currently faces in its internal and external policy, as a result of measures implemented by Washington to deter China.

For Washington there are also more and more issues for concern in relation to the current situation in the security sphere in the APR. Now it is hard to deny the fact that China becomes a new centre of power and influence in the APR. Chinese defense budget demonstrates sustainable growth in absolute terms (in 2015 defense expenditures will grow by 10.1% compared to 2014 and will amount to USD 142 bn), China’s war potential is considerably consolidating, operating capabilities of its armed forces keep growing, China’s push in implementation of its national interests also increases.

Incidents with the Chinese and American marine vessels and aircraft standoffs in the water areas around China and aerial domains over them have long become common occurrence. China, upholding the principle of absolute ban for foreign war ships’ navigation within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone of a coastal state, disturbs the American ships’ navigation in its exclusive economic zone and sometimes outside it. Yet another incident took place in August 2014, when a Chinese fighter aircraft Su-27 impeded the navigation of an American maritime patrol aircraft P-8 flying at the distance of 145 miles from the Chinese Hainan Island. By contrast with the similar incident which ended up in the plane collision and the death of the Chinese pilot, the August incident was without losses and resulted only in protests on the American part.

A peculiar response to the continuing intelligence operations by the American Navy and Air Force in the Chinese exclusive economic zone was introduction by China since 2012 of the practice of conducting military maneuvers within the limits of the US exclusive economic zone, in particular in the area of Guam and Hawaii islands in the Pacific Ocean. Such maneuvers became possible due to enhancement of Chinese armed forces’ operational capabilities. Increased capabilities of the China’s fleet to overpass ‘the first island chain’ and enter the Pacific Ocean unhindered were demonstrated in July 2013, when for the first time in history Chinese ships sailed through the La Perouse Strait located between the Sakhalin and Hokkaido islands. At the end of March 2015 another showcase incident took place: for the first time the Chinese Air Force crossed ‘the first island chain’ and held maneuvers in the Western part of the Pacific Ocean. Prospectively, one can predict further expansion of military exercise level and the increase of the number of China’s maneuvers in the Western part of the Pacific Ocean near the American territory with all that it implies.

Rapid strengthening of China’s military power is accompanied by Beijing’s attempts to spread its control over navigable and air routes in the APR. The creation by China of the air defense identification zone in the East China Sea in November 2013 was the first signal, which caused a massive outcry in the region and an extremely negative response on the part of the USA. The second signal followed at the end of March 2015, when China, without relevant coordination with the interested parties, officially opened a new air route M503, only 8 km away from the West of the Taiwan Strait water parting line. Such proximity of the new air route to transportation corridors of Taiwan, the US long-standing partner in the region, can obstruct both civil and military operations for Taiwan, in particular, affect communication between Taiwan and Taiwan-controlled islands of Kinmen and Matsu.

Washington also shows deep concern in view of Beijing’s spinning-up activities in vindicating its claims for disputed islands and water zones of the South China Sea. In 2014, Beijing designated its new tactics in materialization of territorial claims: China undertakes extraordinary in scale and unprecedented in speed works on the creation of artificial islands in the South China Sea. Over the past year China constructed through sluicing at least five artificial islands. In mid-November 2013, Jane’s Defense Weekly made public satellite images of the construction of the Jongshu Island that was even then larger, in terms of area, than Taiwan-controlled Itu Aba – the largest natural island of the Spratly Islands. In February 2015, the world community’s attention was drawn to sluicing by China of the Yunsidao Island – the largest in the group of the Paracel Islands. Compared to 2013, the island area almost doubled. The construction of new islands and the enlargement of those already existing can considerably strengthen China’s positions in the South China Sea, which is certainly in conflict with the US interests.

And finally, contradictions between the USA and China can reach their pinnacle in relation to the actively promoted by China idea of creating a new regional security system in the APR, that should replace the currently functioning system based primarily on the bilateral allied relations between the USA and the five countries of the region. On the basis of statements from Chinese high officials, heard throughout the last year, Washington has come to the conclusion that Beijing intends to bolster the creation of the new system of regional security without the US’ participation under the principle ‘Asia for Asians’.

Yana Leksyutina, Dr. Sc., Associate Professor at Saint-Petersburg State University, exlusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.“