February 28, 1972 was marked by a major event that would shape the development of global political trends for decades to come. We can still notice the impact that this event had today, but it is now viewed very differently by the major powers that were behind it some five decades ago.

The author is referring to the signing of the so-called Shanghai Communiqué by US President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai that represented the PRC. The document was but one of the three fundamental agreements that defined the development of bilateral ties between the US and China.

The other two were the joint communiqué signed on 16, 1978, which established full diplomatic relations between the US and China in two weeks’ time. (in effect since January 1, 1979), and the communiqué issued on August 17, 1982, which regulated a rather minor issue (which has now become a stumbling block of the modern bilateral ties) of US arms supplies to Taiwan. It should be noted that official relations with the island (one of the most loyal allies of the US in the region) were severed by Washington at the time of signing the second communiqué.

All of these documents have a significance, but it was the first that marked a turning point in US-China relations, putting an end to a period of confrontation to launch a phase of increasing (comprehensive, which should also be noted) cooperation. This cooperation undergoes radical changes since the second half of the 2000s, with these changes defining the nature of the current stage of the “Great Game”.

The signing of the Shanghai Communiqué was preceded by a brief period, when the parties were mapping each other’s positions on key issues in both bilateral relations and global politics, a process known as “ping-pong diplomacy”. This period was marked by Henry Kissinger’s visit to China, six months prior to the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué. The parties must have agreed on the contents of the communique in advance during Kissinger’s stay in China. Visits to China paid by top US officials at six-month intervals since the early 1970s represented the first official tie established between the two countries since the founding of the PRC, that took place in 1949.

The principal notion of the Shanghai Communiqué was an acknowledgement of the need for a complete normalization of US-China relations based on respect for individual interests of the parties. This document already maked a shift towards a radical change in the US position on the Taiwan issue, which resulted in the establishment of US-China diplomatic relations seven years later. The part of the text that reflects the US position on the issue acknowledges that all Chinese living on both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The US also announced the withdrawal of all US forces from the island, which finished by the time the diplomatic relations between the PRC and US were established.

The part when the parties opposed the establishment of a dominant force in the region was also noteworthy. Experts agree that this statement was influenced by a dramatic rise of influence that  the USSR enjoyed in the Southeast Asia as a consequence of its all-out support of Vietnam against the armed US aggression. In fact the very signing of comunique implied there were prospects of bilateral cooperation between the US and the PRC in the fight against the USSR.

This, in the author’s view, predetermined the negative outcome of the Cold War for the latter. It is important to ackonwledge, however, that no one in the US at the time could predict the exact date of the final victory over the USSR. The process of rapprochement with the PRC outlined in the Shanghai Communiqué was therefore seen as a long-term strategy that was to last for decades.

Without taking the above mentioned facts into the consideration, it is impossible to understand the current neutral-negative attitude in the US towards the document that looks like one of the country’s biggest foreign policy victories. The current US administration paid no attention to the aniversary. At the regular press conference held on February 28, this year, Department of State spokesman Ned Price clearly wasn’t looking too confident when a persistent journalist tried several times to get an explanation for such a disregard towards such a memorable date.

But at the expert level, both Kissinger (who lived to this day) and Nixon are held in contempt, with the main accusations leveled against them being: “We have nurtured our strongest enemy with our own hands.” Putting emotions aside, those accusations are not without merit, since the US provided full support to Deng Xiaoping’s rapid economic development course, leaving ideological differences aside for the moment being. Nine months after the establishment of diplomatic relations, China already gained the status of “the most preferred trade partner of the United States.”

It is not uncommon in the American expert community to see statements like “we would never have made those concessions to the PRC (particularly on the Taiwan issue) if we had known in advance that our main opponent was to crumble in late 80s, early 90s.”

But it’s easy enough to say that with the wisdom of hindsight. It is not unusual for recent allies in the fight against a common enemy to find themselves opposing each other in the next round of the Great Game. The period of World War II is an illustrative example of this, and the decades that preceded it (including World War I) as well as a significant stretch of the post-war period should also be taken into consideration.

A striking contrast to the current attitude in the US towards this anniversary date was a massive celebration organized in the PRC. There was even a concert where ‘the young represent our shared future’ (. Moreover, a videoconference was held with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Henry Kissinger as the main participants. That is, China was represented at the event by one of the top government officials, while the US representation is difficult to describe in any meaningful way. These days Henry Kissinger is almost a hundred years old and he’s no more than an exhibit in a museum of US diplomatic history.

In general, the commemorative events held by the PRC represented one of the signals from Beijing towards Washington that it wanted to restore the “spirit of the early 1970s” in the bilateral ties with the preservation, of course, of all the cornerstone positions that Beijing was able to secure at that time. This is particularly relevant to the One China Principle and the Taiwan issue. It should be noted that there are signals from US businesses, too, that the bilateral economic potential should be preserved.

As for the PRC, the report that the PRC-controlled Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is not about to go break the anti-Russian sanctions regime imposed by the collective  West is particularly noteworthy. And there’s no complaining about it, as Beijing has its own interests, and Russia’s should be the one solving its own problems. In the current configuration, the countries are standing “back-to-back”, which not the same as standing “side-by-side” (with the latter posture being desirable).

What lessons can Russia draw from the 1979 Shanghai Communiqué? It should be noted that it’s nowhere near the situation in which China found itself in the second half of the 1950s, which demanded very unorthodox and rather unexpected moves from its leadership.

It’s noteworthy in its recent history there were moments where Russia was in a similar position (specifically, in the first half of the 1920s) to the one that China manged to escape. And the present situation requires as much diplomatic prowess from its representatives, as we’re in the period of “inter-imperialist contradictions” yet again, and the divergences in the positions of the major players on virtually all issues of world politics (including the prospect of relations with Russia) are visible to the naked eye.

The current proponents of the USSR 2.0 project, however, should not lose sight of the role of the “external factor” both in getting out of the foreign policy blockade and the phenomenal process of industrialization of the USSR 1.0. The actors that played the role of the “external factor” back then were not only the US, but also its future enemy – Germany.

It cannot be ruled out that, for present-day Russia, contemporary China, its regional rival Japan, and India could all serve the role of an “external factor”. Generally speaking, this would be consistent with a process (seemingly irreversible) of shifting the focus of global political processes from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific region. However, this trend would not be contradicted by the involvement of the US. All the more so since Washington itself is increasingly positioning itself as an “Indo-Pacific power”.

These are, in brief, the history and the modern interpretation (including for the Russian Federation) of the 1972 US-China Shanghai Communiqué, one of the most remarkable political documents of the second half of the last century.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

There is a growing discourse about the striking parallels in the situations around Taiwan and Ukraine.

Proponents of geopolitics revive the basic tenet of its modern edition, which was originated by Alfred Thayer Mahan and Halford Mackinder. With certain variations, both of them had, over a hundred years ago, proposed the hypothesis of an irreducible and fundamental contradiction between the world’s “land” (the “Heartland”) and the “sea” surrounding it. However, we should note that the role of geography as a whole in global political processes has never been denied before.

In terms of geopolitics, the ever-closer rapprochement between the PRC and the Russian Federation can be imagined as another strengthening of the “Heartland”, which is a source of growing concern for the major maritime powers, like the United Kingdom and the US, which have, however, swapped places in terms of maritime importance since the early days of the basic geopolitical theory.

The leaders of the geopolitical “sea”” are attempting to create an “anaconda ring” as they grapple with the strengthening “land”. AUKUS can be considered its founding. The “sea” leaders are starting to “surround” their opponents with the said “ring” in the most sensitive places for the latter, which are Taiwan for the PRC and Ukraine for the Russian Federation.

The geopolitical picture looks logical at this point. But the author of this article likes another hypothesis about the nature of large-scale international conflicts, going back to Thucydides, who linked the main cause of the Peloponnesian Wars (which had disastrous consequences for the peoples at the time) with the growing role that Athens played. The latter was perceived by the then regional hegemon Sparta as a rising challenger threatning its vital interests.

Within this vision of the nature of conflict, “sea” and “land” (and geography in general) are important but concomitant factors. The continuing validity of Thucydides’ hypothesis was recently demonstrated by the American political scientist Graham Allison, using the wars of the last few centuries (including the no less catastrophic World War I) as examples. He also showed the relevance of the “Thucydides trap” to the central conflict of the entire 21st century, with the US and the PRC as the main actors.

Within Allison’s interpretation of Thucydides’ hypothesis, the main opponents and sources of threat to global peace are not the abstract “sea” and “land”, but rather the very specific two major world powers. There is no geographical mysticism in their growing confrontation. Instead, the rapid economic development factor of the incumbent world hegemon’s competitor is evident (as it was at the beginning of the last century). The hegemon is still at the top of the global political hierarchy that developed with the end of the Cold War.

But the US already has nothing to counter its main opponent (the PRC) with, which is rapidly spreading influence in the world through the Belt and Road Initiative, a key political-economic project. Apart from vociferous declarations and beautiful acronyms for their own (alternative to the BRI) projects, neither the US nor the EU have so far demonstrated anything more or less effective.

The only thing left to do is to step on the geopolitical “calluses” of the main opponents, with the most painful of them being the Taiwan issue. NEO has been following the chronicle of related events of any significance on a fairly regular basis. Of the latter, the visits to the island by two very high-profile individuals deserve special attention (and quite expected assessments) from the PRC. These are Mike Mullen, who was Chief of Joint Chiefs of the US Armed Forces from 2007 to 2011, and Mike Pompeo, who until recently headed the Department of State. Each of them (seemingly independently of each other and a day apart) arrived in Taiwan in early March and they were received by President Tsai Ing-wen in turn.

The arrival on the island of the former US military chief was meant to demonstrate Washington’s readiness to provide the necessary assistance to Taiwan, should the PRC do something similar to what Russia did in Ukraine with regard to the island. Incidentally, the same “Ukrainian” factor (among others) can also be seen in the demonstration passage of a US missile destroyer through the Taiwan Strait on February 26.

As for the level of importance for the US of what is happening around Taiwan and Ukraine, the speech of Kurt Campbell, one of the architects of US policy in the Indo-Pacific region and current White House adviser on emerging issues in the region, on February 28 drew the attention of experts. He questioned in particular the validity in the present context of the decade-old doctrine of the US being able to fight two (subsequently modified into one and a half) wars at the same time. This included a reference to the need to focus US efforts in the IPR “despite the Ukrainian crisis.” Incidentally, the illustration to the Global Times article commenting on the above speech delivered by Campbell is noteworthy.

It should be noted that Taiwan today has one of the world’s most advanced economies, with the world economy relying on its succes to a certain extent, whereas Ukraine is a parasitic, festering abscess on the body of Europe, whose representatives seem preoccupied with one problem, namely that of finding places whose owners are bad at keeping their own money safe.

The current Ukraine is a territory with two (essentially interrelated) strategic objectives. The first boils down to the role of a quagmire in which the Russian Federation has to get bogged down so that it will have no time to strengthen relations with China, and to fulfil a badly needed “eastward shift.” At the same time, Ukraine should be a major element of the wall designed to prevent the formation of a no less mutually beneficial system of relations between Russia and the Old World. Generally speaking, the latter goal has been a traditional British preoccupation for the last few centuries. The said wall is being built out of the political rubble that was formed after the collapse of the USSR.

Until recently, the author believed that the ideological successors of Mazepa who seized power in Kiev and traded on the global political market in the strategic importance of the territory they controlled should be left to the natural course of events, with major powers cutting off all relations with them completely.

But the Russian leadership, which undoubtedly has incomparably better intel, seems to have decided that it cannot tolerate this rotting wound any longer without performing a radical surgery. The act of said surgery should only be welcomed by the same Old World, for the abscess that is being removed has long been poisoning all aspects of its life above all.

However, the author has never been fond of the not infrequent maxims about “Europe and Japan suppressed by Washington.” Those are some dodgers who rode comfortably throughout the post-war period on other people’s security guarantees.

And their current stance on the crisis in Ukraine is a deliberate and voluntary choice. There is no need to have any illusions about this, which seem to persist among some supporters of the project of embedding post-Soviet Russia into Europe, “freed from its unnecessary territorial fringes.” By the way, those fringes played the role of a bomb that blew up the USSR.

But it seems that the scale of such illusions is much larger among the Ukrainian population, something that is being successfully exploited by its current thieving puppet leadership.

Against the background of the general shift in the focus of the “Great Political Game” to the Indo-Pacific region, the assessment of the Ukrainian events by the three leading Asian powers, i.e. the PRC, India and Japan, deserves special attention. But that is a subject for a separate commentary.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Located fifty kilometers from Hindustan (i.e. from what is now one of the largest states, the “Republic of India”), the island country of Sri Lanka has never suffered from a lack of attention from the world’s leading players. This is due to the island’s critical strategic position in the Indian Ocean. Such a position always and for all such countries contains both positive and potentially dangerous aspects.

It all depends on the state of affairs in the system of relations between the main players at a given moment in history. If said players are not too suspicious of each other, quite a lot of benefits can be derived from the interest of each in influencing countries of Sri Lanka’s caliber. If the contradictions between the main players take a particularly acute form, it is possible for the smaller country, as they say, to “get heavy beating.” Most likely, from both sides. This is not “out of spite,” but simply because the “strategic environment” may require so. Something similar happened to Sri Lanka during World War II.

However, it was then a colony of the British Empire called “Ceylon.” The Imperial Japanese Navy Command decided in the spring of 1942 to destroy the British Eastern Fleet based in the main port of Ceylon, Colombo. British commanders became aware of this and began withdrawing ships to other bases. But Japan’s aircraft carrier forces still took a heavy toll, both on the British and (“in passing”) on the port and inhabitants of Colombo.

Nothing as bad is threatening the present Sri Lanka yet. On the contrary, there is a peak of “attention” to the country by the major players, which today include China, India and the US. Japan, for example, is increasingly asserting its presence in the Indian Ocean region.

It is fundamentally important to note that in the struggle for influence over the so-called “Third World countries” (i.e. the vast majority of humanity) the economic component of the “National Power” available to the main players is increasingly effective. This is most clearly demonstrated by the new world power represented by the People’s Republic of China. The global Beijing Belt and Road Initiative project already involves, in varying degrees, some 150 countries.

Accustomed to swinging a military club (or, for the Japanese, a katana) in said struggle, the former Western colonizers suddenly discovered that it was much more productive to follow the cowboy principle: “Why steal a pretty girl! She could just be persuaded!” It should be added that, more often than not, Beijing does not have to bother itself much with persuasion, because the differently colored “pretty girls” (of Asia, Africa, Latin America) are ready to accept much needed assistance in the development of transport and industrial infrastructure, agricultural facilities, education and healthcare, in the fight against chronic epidemics.

The process is not without its costs (“debt traps” sometimes arise), but so far nothing particularly dangerous for Beijing’s partners has arisen. Rumors of Uganda losing control of the only international airport Entebbe have not been confirmed. The new world power is engaged in far bigger games to have its image spoiled by all sorts of “trivialities.”

Too late to realize the real cause and source of threats to positions in the former colonies, the former metropolises rushed to compose their BRI, “but better.” On December 1, 2021, the European Commission, i.e. the de facto EU government, announced the launch of its own project called Global Gateway (GG), through which smart, transparent and secure connections with the outside world will be organized. This was a kind of European contribution to the global project of a generalized West, Build Back Better World (B3W), announced in June 2021 during a regular G7 summit in Cornwall, the United Kingdom.

Exclusively for the Indo-Pacific region, where the focus of the current stage of the “Great Game” is shifting, and consequently key US foreign policy interests, US President Joe Biden initiated the so-called “Economic Strategy Framework” at the end of October 2021 (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, IPEC).

In general, the generalized West has produced many words and beautiful acronyms in the direction of the “Third World” in recent months. So far, however, they have not led to any concrete results. Results similar to what Beijing can demonstrate, including in Sri Lanka. Because today the strategic importance of this country is determined by the fact that it is located on one of the world’s most important trade routes, acting as an intermediate hub on it. It is as important as Singapore.

But in order to fulfil this role properly, the available port facilities need to be state-of-the-art. And the upgrading of the same port of Colombo is being carried out by Chinese companies. Moreover, a new hub, Hambantota, is being built on the southern tip of the island, which was previously completely deserted. Western propaganda links the fact that Chinese companies received an order to build this port to Sri Lanka’s financial debts to the PRC.

These do exist, but they are not clearly linked to the fact that Beijing was given the right to build Hambantota and the subsequent 99-year lease on the port. Moreover, an undertaking has been obtained from China not to use Hambantota for military purposes. Beijing says it does not need to, as the Pakistani port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, which incidentally is the terminus of Pakistan’s (one of the most important) BRI land route, is sufficient for such purposes. The same role will not be ruled out for Hambantota as a crucial trans-shipment point for the BRI maritime portion.

Again, it is not surprising that the main geopolitical opponents of the PRC, above all the US, are paying close attention to Sri Lanka. In particular, the country was one of the points of visit for Mike Pompeo during his last (late 2020) trip abroad as US Secretary of State. Negotiations with the leadership of Sri Lanka and several other countries visited (above all Vietnam) have been exploratory as to the possibility of expanding the newly formed Quad configuration comprising the US, Japan, India and Australia. In Colombo, Pompeo made a number of amusing remarks, stating in particular the “partnership” nature of the US coming to a country, as opposed to the “predatory” policies of the CCP in the same countries.

But the main destination of Pompeo’s said tour was India, which is also the main opponent of China’s in the struggle for influence in Sri Lanka. It was the problems in Chinese-Indian relations that once again came to light during the struggle to win the order for the construction of the Hambantota port.

Unfortunately, the competition between the two Asian giants for influence in Sri Lanka and other crucial island states in the Indian Ocean (Maldives, Mauritius) has not abated since then. The visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Sri Lanka in early January this year during his traditional annual tour of a number of countries in Africa and Indian Ocean island states was met with suspicion in New Delhi.

It is important to bear in mind the complexity of the situation in which the latter find themselves, as they have to maneuver in the field of tensions that are being shaped in the region by the world’s leading players. Each of them has its own interests to uphold. The main purpose of the visit to India in early February this year by Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Gamini Lakshman Peiris seems to have been to reassure New Delhi that the bilateral relationship was not threatened.

In a demonstration that India is always ready to help its southern neighbor in an emergency, India concluded an agreement in mid-February to supply Sri Lanka with 40,000 cubic meters of diesel and petrol, which proved to be an extremely timely step in the context of the growing energy crisis on the island.

However, once again, the situation around Sri Lanka is an important indication that the state of Chinese-Indian relations is becoming one of the major factors shaping developments not only in the Indian Ocean region, but also in the entire Indo-Pacific region.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

NEO has already had reasons to complain about the rapidly changing agenda on both the local and global levels as the “Great Game” unfolds. Which, by the way, is a sure sign that at the current stage of its development it is mired in crisis. In this context, it is necessary to make some remarks.

Thus, recall that at a press conference after the meeting in Hawaii of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea, the head of the State Department, Antony Blinken, devoted almost half of the time allotted to him to the topic of the Ukrainian crisis. Although this meeting itself was held on an immeasurably more important occasion, due to Washington’s long-standing headache caused by unsuccessful (twenty-year) attempts to form a trilateral military and political union in the region. The reasons for the failures of which have been discussed more than once by NEO.

The reason for the recent trilateral meeting was provided (as always) by the DPRK, which made a series of new missile launches into the Sea of Japan the day before. What would regional political tricksters do without the North Korean “Kims”? They should have a monument raised in their honor instead of being publicly cursed.

Naturally, both the ROK and Japan could not care less about the problems of the “Space of Wild Ukies” located somewhere with their children’s fairy tales about “the thousand-year history of Ukraine, during which it has continuously repelled Russian aggression protecting the civilized world.”

During the aforementioned press conference, the Head of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs limited himself to a couple of meaningless phrases regarding the “Ukrainian” topic, while his Japanese colleague Yoshimasa Hayashi completely passed it over in silence. The latter probably caught not only NEO’s eye. And here some explanations will be needed regarding the “price of the issue” for Japan when its “big brother” has been trying (for a long time) to show it the “importance of the Ukrainian issues.”

The abovementioned “price of the issue” is determined by the word “Russia”, more precisely, the possibility and level of influence on it in competition not only with Japan’s geopolitical opponent in the person of the PRC, but also with the “big brother.” It should be stressed that this is not so much about the notorious “problem of the Northern Territories”, but, again, about the possibility of influencing the Russian Federation as a whole.

NEO at one time had to listen to the same question from Japanese experts more than once: “When will this damned Ukrainian nonsense finally end so that we could focus on important things?”. It seems, it should never be the case since Japan’s “big brother” once acquired an overly effective foreign policy tool. It is namely suitable for “bossing around” Tokyo, so that the increase of Japan’s role in the world proceeds in the “right direction.”

For almost two years since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, the government of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been “dragging its feet” with joining the anti-Russian sanctions that Washington has begun to impose. During this time, articles appeared in some serious American media outlets (also written) by (a sort of) experts who reflected whether Article V of the Japan-US “Security Treaty of 1960” applies to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. But as soon as by the spring of 2016 Shinzo Abe declared solidarity with Japan’s main ally in the Ukrainian issue, the then US President Barack Obama, who had been silent on this topic for two years “like a partisan under interrogation,” personally said approximately the following words about the applicability of the mentioned article to the situation around the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands: “Well, of course, yes. Were there any doubts? It can’t be.”

And today, when “America returns,” the Ukrainian master key in the capable hands of Washington turns out to be very useful, since the discipline in the Euro-Atlantic ranks during the administration of Donald Trump has become by no means harsh.  The thing is the Japanese and Europeans seem not to care that the heroic Ukrainian people has been shedding blood by the bucketful “for our and your democracy” in the fight against one of the main autocratic regimes.

The effectiveness of this master key was tested, again, on Japan. That is why the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs remained silent on the Ukrainian issue in Hawaii but his rebellion did not go any further. It is necessary to know when enough is enough, and Hayashi, of course, knows it well. He demonstrated it during his visit to Germany at the end of the second decade of February on the occasion of a number of events held there.

However, he expressed his solidarity with his allies on this issue in fairly cautious terms (“if there is an invasion, then, generally speaking, economic sanctions will be considered together with other G7 participants”). Using equally interpret-as-you-wish wording, Japanese news agencies have been transmitting the content of Hayashi’s conversation on this topic with the current NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and a number of European colleagues. Thus, the Romanian interlocutor of the Japanese minister promised to help evacuate Japanese citizens from the territory of Ukraine (“just in case”).

But, of course, all these “adjustments” regarding the Japanese stance on Ukrainian issues were not initiated by Japan’s foreign minister. At the same time, there was a half an hour long conversation between Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, during which the parties expressed their intention to “persistently continue diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the conflict.” Fumio Kishida also promised to allocate an emergency loan to Ukraine for USD 100 million. The same problem of Japanese citizens staying on the territory of Ukraine was not forgotten.

The Japanese parliament, which adopted a special resolution demanding that the government promote “the rapid introduction of peace to the region,” did not remain idle either. However, even without parliamentary urging, the government has been working in this direction, as they say, “by the sweat of its brow.”

In particular, it decided to share parts from imported liquid gas with the Europeans in order for them not be frozen too much in the process of self-restrictions aimed at deterring “Russian aggression” in Ukraine.  Although the head of the German Foreign Ministry bravely states: “We will be patient.” As a matter of curiosity, who these “we” are and what relation does a trampoline-jumping champion have with the formation of one of the world’s leading economies?

Finally, it should be noted that the “Ukrainian project” was part of a more global endeavor aimed at the collapse of the USSR as a result of which all the peoples of the once great country suffered, and the Ukrainians practically most of all.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

On February 11, Melbourne hosted the fourth meeting of foreign ministers of the countries participating in the Quad, which consists of the United States, Japan, India and Australia. Since the creation of this alliance in 2019, Washington (together with Tokyo and Canberra) attempted, firstly, to expand the scope of activity beyond the framework of an “interest club” (mainly humanitarian), and, secondly, to tightly involve Delhi in the entire “expanded” range of Quad’s activities.

Such expectations could be seen, in particular, in an article published the day before by the hostess of the upcoming event, that is, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, Marise Payne. And, judging by the final “Joint Statement”, these expectations were not unfounded.

The key message of the entire paper is expression by the event’s participants of their “commitment to supporting Indo Pacific countries’ efforts to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific – a region which is inclusive and resilient, and in which states strive to protect the interests of their people, free from coercion.”

This has been a well-established mantra in recent years, incorporating a very topical political content, which de facto is in the focus of the escalating struggle between the United States and the duo of its now main geopolitical opponents, that is, China and Russia. Incidentally, a week before the event under discussion, the leaders of these two signed a “Joint Statement,” quite significant in modern world politics. The very fact of its appearance, undoubtedly, cast its shadow on the course and results of the work of the Quad foreign ministers in Melbourne.

Although the text of the document they adopted does not explicitly mention China and Russia as sources of threats to the “freedom and openness” of the ITR, nor does it mention any cases of “coercion”, both of these powers are easily recognized from its very content. In addition, they were directly pointed out by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at the final press conference.

Naturally, Western commentators of the Melbourne meeting do not hesitate to point fingers at Beijing and Moscow. In this context, Taiwan, Ukraine, Lithuania and Australia are most often mentioned as the latest examples of “victims” of the Chinese-Russian “coercion.” The appeal by the EU leadership to the WTO with a complaint against China, which took some “painful steps towards Lithuania in the field of trade” (due to the latter’s reckless intervention in the Taiwan problem, an extremely sensitive issue for Beijing), was supported by the so-called “G7.”

As for the euphemisms used by the participants of the Melbourne meeting in their Joint Statement, even Tokyo – for now – avoids directly singling out China (or Russia) as the main source of its foreign policy problems. Naturally, so does Delhi. This is especially peculiar, given that without first involving India in its sphere of influence, Washington would not have ventured to even initiate the so-called Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, IPEC.

Meanwhile, its development was announced in late October 2021 at some regional event by US President Joe Biden. IPEC is undoubtedly supposed to play the role of an American alternative to China’s key global project, the Belt and Road Initiative, which is the main instrument for spreading China’s political influence in the world. But so far, the only thing known about IPEC is that this project is still under development, even though from time to time there appear information leaks regarding its supposed content.

To reiterate, Washington assigns a key role to involving India in the general process of shifting its foreign policy focus towards the IPR, as well as the implementation of the (future) IPEC project. Therefore, it would be extremely imprudent on the part of the US leadership to embarrass Delhi in its already difficult relations with Beijing.

The reason for a new hiccup in said relations was the opening ceremony of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. The flag of Team China was carried by the former commander of the group of Chinese border guards who directly took part in the clashes with Indian border guards in the summer of 2020, in the Galwan river valley in Ladakh. Although (seemingly) no shot was fired, there still were casualties on both sides. The numbers are still not entirely clarified, and in India this issue remains one of the topics of internal political struggle. Some of the players outside of this conflict are providing their own data on the losses on both sides of the Galwan conflict of two years ago. Indeed, why not pour salt on other people’s wounds that have not healed so far?

How painful they remain is evidenced by the demarche of the Indian Ambassador to China, caused by the fact that the flag of the host country of the Olympics (an event whose main slogan is O Sport, You Are Peace!) was carried by the commander of those same Chinese border guards. He simply fulfilled his military duty to his Motherland two years ago, which resulted – as is almost always the case in such conflicts – in death of people. Again, on both sides.

It is not for the author to judge the correctness or fallacy of the decision of the PRC leadership to select him as the national flag bearer during an international sporting event, at whose opening (amidst a “diplomatic boycott” by Beijing’s geopolitical opponents) the Indian ambassador nevertheless appeared. However, he soon left the guest podium. This new unpleasant incident in relations between the two Asian giants occurred, again, exactly one week before the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting, which clearly had an anti-Chinese orientation. It is hardly in the interests of Beijing to accelerate the drift of Delhi towards Washington, China’s main geopolitical opponent.

Among other noteworthy theses of the “Joint Statement” adopted at the end of the meeting in Melbourne, were the support of the claims of the ASEAN member countries for the central role of this Association in all aspects of the situation in the Southeast Asia, the condemnation of the military coup a year ago in Myanmar, as well as Pyongyang’s more frequent testing of the latest types of missile weapons in recent months. Moreover, according to Western commentators, the North is demonstrating achievements in the field of hypersonic missiles, the fight against which raises the entire problem of missile defense to a whole new level of complexity.

From Melbourne, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, after an intermediate stop in Fiji (countering the spread of China’s influence in the Pacific is also becoming one of Washington’s main foreign policy concerns), went to Hawaii, where the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral ministerial meeting took place.

This event turned out to be yet another attempt to turn this configuration into a full-fledged tripartite military-political alliance. These attempts have been made over the past twenty years with almost no results. For the sole reason of (hardly fixable) problems in relations between Washington’s two main regional allies, Tokyo and Seoul.

The stated reason for holding the Hawaiian meeting was the aforementioned North Korean missile tests. However, in the speech of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at the final press conference equal attention was paid to the situation in Ukraine. Blinken repeated the same accusations Washington has leveled against Moscow in recent months, as the Ukrainian crisis has escalated.

It is worthy noting, however, that this topic was only briefly and in neutral terms touched upon in the speech of the South Korean foreign minister and was completely left out from the speech of his Japanese counterpart. The topic of Ukraine is also nowhere to be found in the Associated Press editorial on the results of the tripartite ministerial meeting in Hawaii.

Overall, this last meeting, as well as the previous event in Melbourne in the Quad format, are another evidence of Washington’s ongoing attempts to build something similar to an anti-Chinese front comprising its closest allies and partners in the region.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The previous chapter of this Chronicle discussed perhaps the most relevant question of all – how strong the position of the Democratic Progressive Party ruling since 2016 (its second consecutive term) and led by Tsai Ing-wen, the current president of Taiwan, is among the Taiwanese. The answer to this question will largely determine the answer to another question (one of the most critical in contemporary world politics, at that): How will Beijing restore sovereignty over Taiwan, which it owns?

It should be recalled that in 2005, the Chinese parliament passed a law granting the country’s leadership the authority to solve its main foreign policy problem by any means necessary, including through force.

However, back in 1979, when Washington, guided by the realities of the Cold War, established diplomatic relations with Beijing, thus de facto depriving one of its most loyal allies in Asia of its international status, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which provided, among other things, for the US to “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” It should be noted, however, that the TRA-1979, as well as the subsequent so-called “Six Assurances to Taiwan by President Reagan” are not acts of international law and are therefore ignored by Beijing.

This does not obviate the very problem of possible (let us stress it) intervention by the US in the Taiwan Strait if Beijing resorts to “military surgery” in order to finally remove the current most painful splinter from its own body of statehood. And the stronger the DPP’s position on the island (Tsai Ing-wen will not be able to run for president for a third time in early 2024), the more remote the prospect that the PRC will refuse to continue its policy towards Taiwan “by other means.”

Beijing itself is most certainly not happy about such a prospect. For a variety of reasons, including the need to use an inevitably highly sophisticated, almost jewelry-grade “technique,” which has almost nothing to do with the incomparable ratio of “absolute” military capabilities of the Mainland and Taiwan. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff have so far been rather skeptical about the availability of such tools in the current People’s Liberation Army (PLA). But, of course, everything in the world is changing and this is especially true of the quality of the PLA in general, and its technical equipment in particular.

Naturally, taking back control over a part of the territory that is still uncontrolled is a very important task in and of itself. But not at any cost, that is without devastating the island. Moreover, getting one of the world’s most advanced urban, transport, industrial and rural infrastructures in one piece, which all 23 million Taiwanese will continue to use, is equally important.

To give just one example, TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.) is a unique phenomenon in today’s global economy, accounting for some 56% of the global market for the manufacture and sale of advanced semiconductor devices. TSMC employs around 60,000 people (apparently including overseas subsidiaries), has a market capitalization of over $600bn and annual net profit of around $20bn.

The world’s leading powers (USA, Japan, Germany) are signing contracts with TSMC to build similar production facilities on their territories. At one time, President Trump approved paying TSMC $12bn to build such a facility in Arizona. What TSMC means for today’s global economy was shown by the forced restrictions (due to the Covid-19 pandemic) in the raw material and component supply chains. The world’s auto manufacturing giants were the first to feel the negative effects.

It is clear that TSMC as well as other important economic facilities in Taiwan and their employees should not be affected in any meaningful way in a future “jewelry operation.” The task is extremely difficult, even if the US refuses to militarily intervene directly (again, it is not obliged to do so) in a future armed conflict.

Especially since Taiwan itself has well-equipped and compact armed forces that are designed to repel amphibious landing attempts and fight paratroopers, should they happen to be on the island. Modernization of its armed forces has been the focus of the island’s leadership in recent years. Ms Tsai herself takes great pleasure in being photographed with her officers on the bridge of a frigate, in the cockpit of a modern fighter jet (standing, of course, on the ground) and at the missile and artillery positions. At first glance, this is no more than a common female weakness, encouraged, however, by the military. After all, they would not mind the island’s leadership paying attention to their problems.

But perhaps most importantly, a large proportion of Taiwanese not only disagree with the “non-peaceful” way of “returning to the motherland,” but also express their willingness to resist it with weapons. Note, however, that any poll on such a risky topic rarely has anything to do with real life since “everyone likes to believe they are a hero … ” Still, the Taiwanese are clearly not showing a willingness to roll out the carpets in front of Mainland paratroopers.

This brings us back to the original question of how likely it is that the current “separatist” regime on the island will be replaced by one that is more acceptable to Beijing. This would obviously spare the latter the necessity of resorting to the above “jewelry surgery,” since a much less risky “political therapy” will do. The main contender for the role of such “therapist” is the good old Kuomintang party. How realistic the prospect is for the Kuomintang to lead Taiwan’s parliament and government in two years can be judged by the current acts of democracy where the island’s leadership asks its people to voice their views on particular issues. There have been two such acts recently, whose outcome has largely confirmed the continuing split in Taiwanese society over preferences between the DPP and the Kuomintang, but with a steady trend of the former leaving the latter further behind.

The confidence of the party led by Tsai Ing-wen was demonstrated when she opened a library in honor of Taiwan’s former president (from 1978 to 1988), Chiang Ching-kuo (son of Chiang Kai-shek). Commentators have already drawn noted that not only did she dare appearing in the “den of political opponents,” but she also gave a speech during the event where she contrasted the former “anti-communist” leadership of the Kuomintang with the current one “ready to agree with the CCP.” ANd that despite the fact that all the relevant current leaders of the Kuomintang were in the meeting room.

It was a strong PR move that is sure to boost the already increasingly visible popularity of DPP among the Taiwanese. The latest opinion poll shows that the DPP’s support rating is already at 46.3%, compared to 23.7% for the Kuomintang. But even worse for the latter, its anti-rating level has exceeded 63%.

However, Tsai Ing-wen’s political charisma is only one factor contributing to the DPP’s popularity. The main thing seems to be the increasing level of support for the party and its leader from the US and some Washington allies. Among the latter, Japan and a number of European countries are becoming particularly prominent. While the activity of Eastern European “Tabaquis” in this respect is understandable (they trade what little they have), what the United Kingdom, France and even Germany are trying to find on the other side of the globe remains a mystery to the author. Unless, of course, they admit that they are simply following the instructions from Washington.

But in the end, that’s their problem. More importantly, the recent internal and external developments on the Taiwan issue make the prospect of a peaceful resolution increasingly vague.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The NEO has already raised the issue of the optimal positioning of the Central Asian countries in the field of power that is being shaped by the world’s leading players, who have in varying degrees been involved in the processes that have developed in recent years in the sub-region.

The change of power in Afghanistan, as well as the changing nature of the presence of the world’s leading power, the United States, in the country brought a major novelty to these processes. It should be stressed that a military withdrawal does not mean a complete loss of Washington’s leverage in Afghanistan. First, there must be some “secret protocols” to the public agreements with the Taliban. Second, US banks hold significant financial reserves created by the previous Afghan government, access to which is becoming increasingly urgent for the new Kabul authorities. Third, the US retains diplomatic leverage in the region, which was recently exercised by Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, during her trip to India, Pakistan and also Uzbekistan.

Therefore, the list of countries that create the “field of power” mentioned at the beginning undoubtedly includes the United States, along with China, Russia, India and Pakistan. Meanwhile, Iran bordering the sub-region, Turkey with its claim to be the center of the “Great Turan” (a project that is unlikely to go beyond the conceptual framework) and, judging by certain signs, the United Kingdom shouldn’t be counted out. Germany and Japan have every chance of joining the significant actors as well.

The optimum strategy for countries lacking their own agency (that is, virtually all Central Asian countries), which have found themselves in such a “field,” has always been to perform a balancing act, with slight preference given at times, for one reason or another, to one of the creators of the “field.” In the case of non-threatening misunderstandings between said creators, such a strategy (with some skill) can be very profitable. An example of its quite successful implementation is the behavior of countries in another critically important sub-region, i.e. Southeast Asia, which is constantly monitored by the NEO.

A directly opposite strategy is being pursued by some Eastern European limitrophe states, which, for the dubious pleasure of sticking their tongue out at their former overlord, are unconditionally choosing one side of the escalating political confrontation in Europe. A questionable strategy, to put it bluntly, and one fraught with serious consequences at that. Who knows what can happen in our highly volatile world? With NATO, for example.

But Central Asia is home to people of a much older culture who do not allow themselves this kind of nonsense. An example of their most recent behavior was the (video) conferences the presidents of the five Central Asian countries held with the leaders of one of the major actors (China) first and the other (India) two days later. Even though the relationship between the latter two countries is still, as they say, not really working out.

However, the author was surprised to read at the last moment that the meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was preceded, first, by a video conference with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and, second, that it (the meeting with Modi) was also held in an online format. Just a month earlier it was reported that the leaders of all the five Central Asian countries were scheduled to travel to India as guests of honor on the country’s main holiday, Republic Day, which is celebrated annually on January 26. The agreement to arrange this trip turned out to be the main outcome of the so-called Delhi Dialogue between the foreign ministers of all the six countries, which took place on December 18-19, 2021, in an offline (let’s stress it) format.

The author believes that at a later point some of the Central Asian participants in the upcoming summit may have realized that the planned summit in New Delhi would be regarded as an act of disrespect or even a challenge by their crucial neighbor, China – something the Central Asian Five do not need at all, neither as a group nor individually.

It was the good old COVID-19, whose contagion curve in India has skyrocketed for the third time since the end of December, that helped to break the ambiguity. A perfect excuse for Central Asians to a) not go to New Delhi; b) use the one-month pause to arrange a similar event with Beijing; c) hold them all in the same online format; d) keep the “right” hierarchy in the order of the two events.

However, New Delhi is hardly upset, since there is nothing offensive about Beijing’s current immeasurably greater all-round presence in the Central Asian sub-region. For instance, China’s trade volume with Central Asian countries alone is an order of magnitude higher than that of India. In addition, the task of improving India’s relations with China is becoming increasingly urgent. The need to reduce turbulence across the whole of Central Asia, which is only possible by aligning the efforts of all leading actors, provides an excellent opportunity If the practical follow-up is in line with what was said at both summits, things could turn out very positively for the Central Asian partners of Beijing and New Delhi.

That is truly some mastery many independent Eastern European limitrophes could learn from. While they still have the time, that is – as the poor example of Lithuania has shown, which in its zealous – and not particularly smart – affection for Taiwan clearly overdid it.

A good excuse for Central Asian countries to hold summits with each of the two Asian giants was the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations with both of them. In his speech, the Chinese leader developed the main points of China’s policy towards Central Asia, which he had already announced three weeks earlier in a spoken address to Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev in connection with the notorious events of early January. This time they were presented in the form of five theses, most notably, once again, the fierce opposition expressed by Xi Jinping towards attempts by external forces to provoke “color revolutions” in the region and interfere in internal affairs under the pretext of “protecting human rights.” In addition, the promise from the previous “address” to provide “feasible assistance” in the areas of health and training in various fields of activity of Central Asian countries has taken concrete shape.

The editorial of the Chinese Global Times also drew attention to a number of points. In particular, the US strategy of containing China and Russia “simultaneously” in the sub-region, and the refusal to invite them both and all five Central Asian countries to the just-ended Forum for Democracy.

Again, just two days later (and this is highlighted in the Indian media), a similar event was held in the same format with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the leaders of the five Central Asian countries. From what can be understood, the Indian side has focused its interlocutors’ attention just on the problem of dramatically increasing trade and economic relations, an area in which it still lags far behind China.

As for Russia’s role in the Indo-Pacific region as a whole (and in its individual sub-regions), it is seen as a kind of political damper designed to reduce problems between all the countries in the region, but primarily between the leading countries, which in addition to China and India also include Japan.

The years-long process of chewing Euro-Atlantic “cud” (in which the “Ukrainian” part has an absolutely unjustified place) should also be stopped and from now on, all the attention should be focused on the region, where the fate of humanity will be decided.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

At the end of December last year, the National Security Council of Pakistan, chaired by the Prime Minister, adopted the National Security Policy of Pakistan 2022-2026 (or NSP), apparently the first such document in the country’s history.

However, its originality was immediately questioned by representatives of highly influential army circles in Pakistan who say that a similar report is issued by experts from the National Defense University on an annual basis. But the civilian leadership of any country tends to interpret the concept of national security much more broadly than the military, and commentators on the document under discussion have already drawn attention to the fact that it focuses primarily on Pakistan’s economic development.

The “published” version of the NSP, which is most likely redacted, with parts of the text remaining classified, is an extensive (62-page) document with eight chapters. The text is preceded by a brief introduction by Prime Minister Imran Khan and his National Security Adviser Moeed Yusuf.

Perhaps the content of both the document as a whole and the introductory articles can best be understood in the context of the upcoming general elections, scheduled for October 2023. Imran Khan and his Movement for Justice Party will then be faced with the challenge of repeating the success which they achieved in the summer of 2018, when they brought about what experts described as the “second democratic transfer of power” in the country’s history. Naturally, this description of the event is an exaggeration (to put it mildly), especially in view of the way that the military (which remains the main manager of “democratic processes” in the country) treated Nawaz Sharif, a member of one of Pakistan’s most powerful political clans. But still, it did not involve any shooting, attempted assassinations of political rivals or resounding court hearings.

And although Pakistan’s domestic politics are never free from a certain amount of turbulence, hopes remain high that the next electoral campaign will stay within the bounds of acceptable democratic procedure.

The Prime Minister’s comments in the preface to the NSP are clearly aimed at voters in next year’s elections: “… the security of Pakistan rests in the security of its citizens. Such a citizen-centric approach to national security prioritizes national cohesion and the prosperity of people… Realizing the symbiotic relationship between economic, human, and traditional security is now imperative for Pakistan’s long-term development.”

These introductory statements from the Prime Minister were further developed by his national security adviser in the latter’s comments on the “archaic guns versus butter debate.” “Our national security thinking seeks to identify means ….such that Pakistan can simultaneously strengthen its traditional and non-traditional security.”

It should be noted that experts have always been aware that the concept of national security is highly complex and cannot be reduced to a “basic” formula (such as the “traditional” security element). In recent decades, the catastrophic collapse of the USSR provided an impetus for rethinking the concept of national security: the collapse was the kind of event that could not have been prevented by the “main” component in a traditional security system, such as a nuclear missile shield. The shield remained untouched and in full effect, but the nation it was designed to protect just disappeared. That, of course, does not in any way detract from the importance to a state of having (or not having) nuclear weapons in its arsenal. This factor is reflected in the document under discussion.

However, the realization that national security depends, to put it broadly, on “everything”, that is, on all aspects of the functioning of a country, dramatically complicates the task of developing a national security policy that can be used by the government when drawing up plans for any given time period. The available resources are always limited, and thus the inevitable question arises – if “everything” is important, then what should be prioritized? It is not even easy to imagine (and express in a concise form) what this “everything” might consist of. In the words of the NSP, “Pakistan faces innumerable internal and external factors that impact its security.”

It is therefore no surprise that, according to the document itself, it has been under development since 2014, with input from all major state institutions and hundreds of specialists. Moreover, it appears that its authors do not consider it to be a final version, and it may therefore be updated to take into account new circumstances, both internal and external, that may arise.

And yet the authors still needed to define their own vision of the problematic concept of national security, which lies at the very hear of the document. Otherwise, all their hard work over many years would be effectively pointless. So, in the National Security Framework section, they define their terms of reference as follows: “Pakistan’s vital national security interests are best served by placing economic security as the core element of national security.” It is this element that can ensure “national cohesion, territorial integrity, internal security, and citizen welfare.”

However, the document has a whole section dedicated to the problem of “National Unity”. Among the various security challenges related to this issue, that of “socio-economic inequalities” is particularly significant. Based on the principle of “unity through diversity”, the Policy emphasizes the importance of strengthening the federal structure of the nation.

Challenges to national security from abroad are also considered in detail. These include threats both from Pakistan’s neighbors and from further afield. Important aspects of Pakistan’s relations with such leading world powers as China, the USA, Russia, and India are considered.

In the words of the Policy, “Pakistan’s deep-rooted historic ties with China are driven by shared interests … mutual understanding … and strategic convergence”. It also describes the continuation of the long-term China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” project as being of exceptional importance for Pakistan’s development. That statement seems particularly significant in view of the increasing propaganda attacks from Western countries against China’s vast Belt and Road Initiative generally, and specifically in the a–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which forms an important link in that project.

The Policy also describes relations with the United States fairly cautiously. Readiness is expressed to develop these relations in the areas of “trade, investment, connectivity, energy, counter-terrorism, security, and intelligence cooperation.”

Relations with Russia are described in positive terms. Russia’s role in the Central Asian region in general and especially in Afghanistan is emphasized. Recent developments in this region have been of particular concern to Islamabad.

Naturally, however, the views of Pakistan’s leadership on the general state of the country’s relations with India are of particular interest. Their ongoing tensions between these two neighbors remains the main challenge to maintaining strategic stability in the entire South Asian region. Without ignoring the existing problems in bilateral relations, especially the situation in Kashmir, which has its roots in the partition of that former Principality back in the 1940s, the authors of the Policy express the hope that they will be resolved peacefully.

In India, of course, Pakistan’s publication of the NSP has been the subject of considerable comment, and its content has been closely studied. There, assessments of the Policy’s implications for the future of bilateral relations range from cautious optimism to “nothing fundamentally new.”

But this brief commentary is unable to do full justice to such a wide-ranging document as Pakistan’s National Security Policy, which deals in depth with a wide range of ideas and is the fruit of many years of work by a large number of specialists. There is insufficient space here to focus on all the important points made in the Policy, and readers are recommended to seek out the original. Anyone with an interest in modern international politics today will find that the time they spend reading this document is amply rewarded.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

On January 10 the Supreme Court of India agreed to urgently consider a petition on “hate speech” against the country’s Moslem communities, with reference to specific incidents, most notoriously an incident in December 2021 in Haridwar – a city venerated in the Himalayan foothills on the banks of the River Ganges. Both the city and river are regarded as holy by Hindus.

Back in December, during a private three-day event held in Haridwar, a Hindu religious leader Yati Narsinghan made a speech which (assuming the transcripts published in the Indian press are accurate) it would be hard to describe as anything less than a call for Indian Muslims to be violently expelled from their country. But he went even further – after an investigation was launched into his conduct he lashed out at all India’s main state institutions. Among others, he was outspoken in his tirades against the Supreme Court, General Prosecutor, Army, Police and even the Constitution. The outspoken orator was promptly arrested.

Although one might think that his first speech alone – in which he praised India’s neighbor Myanmar for its policy towards Muslims – would have been enough to justify arresting him. Readers will remember that back in autumn 2017 the Myanmar military led a “counter-terrorist operation” in the border state of Rakhine, forcing most of the Muslim Rohingya people in the region to flee to Bangladesh. The refugees are still living across border from their former homes in Myanmar, stuck in a country which, to but it mildly, is far from prosperous.

Since then the Rohingya people’s plight had been the subject of considerable international attention, especially after the coup led by generals in the Myanmar army on February 1, 2021. The international attention has taken various forms, ranging from entirely well-meaning support to thinly-disguised propaganda attacks from the US and its close allies against a country that has been under the influence of the US’s main geopolitical rival, China, since long before the recent coup that returned the generals to power.

As for the anti-Muslim hate speech from a high-profile Hindu leader, it is worth looking in a little more detail at just what was said. Firstly, this is far from the first time that Yati Narsinghan has spoken out in this way. And while in the past he has been able to get away with his attacks, this time even the radical Hinduist Bharatiya Janata Party, which has been in government since 2014 and tends to share his views, has had enough.

But this clear provocation of the Muslim community, both in India and in neighboring countries, was too much for the BJP and its leader, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Although the problem of inter-faith relations is a universal one, in India the sheer size of the population gives these issues a special importance. If in Myanmar the Rohingya number just over a million (about 2% of the country’s population), India’s Muslim population numbers some 200 million, or 15% of all Muslims in the world.

It is clear that if only a small proportion of India’s Muslims are provoked by the excesses of certain adherents of the majority religion, then turbulent times lie ahead for the country. And, as the author has noted before any serious conflicts between India’s Muslims and Hindus could cause the opening of a dangerous rift in India – although it is by far from the only such fault line. And that could result in the fragmentation both of Indian society and of the country itself.

It is important not to forget the mass protests by farmers against (long overdue) laws passed in 2020 to reform the agricultural sector, which lasted more than a year, and the ongoing situation in Kashmir, which is still challenging, and which the fiery rhetoric of Yati Narsinghan risks further inflaming.

But the problem is by no means limited to Kashmir – in the second half of last year other states in India saw an increase in the number and seriousness of outbreaks of violence between Hindus and Muslims (for example the many ways in which Hindus sought to obstruct Muslims from performing namaz – ritual prayer- in the open air). The triumphant seizure of power in Afghanistan by the Taliban (a group prohibited in the Russian Federation) has clearly had an impact, albeit indirect, on the activities of radical Muslim groups.

It is important to note that in India the tensions between Hindus and Muslims are superimposed onto other domestic conflicts. There is for example the religiously-motivated Sikh separatist movement, as well as the more secular Tamil separatist movement. It was Sikh separatists who assassinated the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 – earlier in that year she had ordered the security forces to storm the Golden Temple in Amritsar, which is sacred to Sikhs. And, seven years later, her son Rajiv, also serving as Prime Minister, was killed by members of the Tamil movement.

However, as stated above, the population figures are a major factor: India has far more Muslim citizens that Sikhs or Tamils, and therefore the potential for a major conflict between Muslims and Hindus represents a far more serious risk for the country. To give an idea of the scale of the problem, it is enough to cite two examples – the consequences of the demolition of the Babri Masjid mosque in Ayodhya at the end of 1992, and the Gujarat riots of 2002. Each of these incidents resulted in the deaths of some 2000 people. Significantly, the Haridwar hate speech incident took place on the 29th anniversary of the demolition of the Babri Masjid mosque – a fact which attracted a great deal of comment in India.

And relatively recently, in February 2020, major riots in which a number of people were killed took place in several districts of the Indian capital. The immediate trigger for these riots was the passing by the Indian Parliament of amendments to the law on citizenship which Muslims saw as discriminatory. Some 50 people were killed in the riots.

However, as often happens in such cases, the investigation identified a number of different and seemingly unrelated causes for the riots. And a year ago, on January 26, 2021, this trend was confirmed by another serious incident of rioting – this time fortunately without any victims – during the Republic Day celebrations. The disorder was largely provoked by Sikh separatists among the protesting farmers who had been permitted to organize a tractor procession through the streets of the city.

In fact, in as complex a country as modern India, with its many different domestic problems, any internal disorder is inevitably the result of many different factors. Any excuse is enough.

It is important to remember that Muslims form an integral part of Indian society. They have always served in government at all levels, including at the very top, and it is hard to overestimate their contribution to the nation’s scientific and cultural achievements. It is enough to cite the Taj Mahal (an achievement that tends to be ignored by Hindu zealots).

But the difficult relations between India’s two main religious groups also has serious foreign policy implications, especially in view of the fact that India’s neighbors include the important Muslim nations of Bangladesh and Pakistan. And while the anti-Muslim hate speech incident risks inflaming relations with the friendly nation of Bangladesh, it also risks derailing the regular bilateral attempts to improve the generally poor relations between India and Pakistan, both of which are de facto nuclear powers.

Imran Khan, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, who is under pressure from radical Muslim movements in his own country, was naturally unable to ignore an inflammatory speech made by a senior Hindu priest. Yati Narsinghan’s speech was also noted in China, which expressed doubt as to whether the West, with its high-profile campaign against different manifestations of extremism, would take any notice of such a blatant example in pro-Western India.

In general, this latest outspoken anti-Muslim tirade by a senior representative of what is practically India’s state religion has been extremely inconvenient for the country’s government.

And many centuries of human experience have proved what the ancient texts tell us: that there are almost no circumstances in which hate speech is appropriate.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The regular US-Japan meeting (2+2) (officially called the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee) in January this year, involving the foreign and defense ministers of both countries, is noteworthy for a number of reasons.

First of all, it should once again be emphasized that the very existence of the 2+2 format in a pair of states is almost a necessary sign (with a few exceptions, such as in the RF-Japan pair) of a high level of trust in the relations between them. Necessary, but certainly not sufficient.

In the case of the US-Japan nexus, this necessary attribute is complemented by others, among which the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the most important. The confirmation of the “cornerstone” importance of the bilateral military and political alliance in the whole system of US-Japanese relations is the central thesis of the outcome document of each successive 2+2 meeting.

The motivation for holding another 2+2 meeting does not, of course, end with the fixation of allegiance to this “creed” in this relationship. Each such event audits the full range of defense and security issues, both bilaterally and in the Indo-Pacific region as a whole.

The latter is subject to high dynamics, but still not to the extent that the Joint Statement, which is adopted by the parties at the end of the next 2+2 meeting, is completely different from the previous one. A major aspect of the US and Japanese concerns about the regional situation was identified long ago. It is driven by the factor of the PRC’s emergence as one of the world’s leading powers. Everything to do with it has been in the spotlight lately in Washington and Tokyo, encouraging them to meet more frequently in the 2+2 format.

Since 2020, they have been held annually, with a gap of just nine months between the last and penultimate one (held on March 16, 2021). The reasons for this seem to be the sudden change of the Japanese cabinet in November 2021 and the further straining of relations between Washington and Tokyo on the one hand, and Beijing on the other.

With regard to the PRC, the Joint Statement 2022 mainly uses already established negative connotations, such as: “Ongoing efforts by China to undermine the rules-based order present political, economic, military, and technological challenges to the region and the world.” The concern is expressed, first, about the situation in the entire maritime belt adjacent to the PRC (at least 4,000 km long) and, second, about the intention to jointly confront the challenges that both members of the US-Japanese alliance see here. In particular, the US confirms the extension of Article V of the alliance to the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu in China).

Both sides once again advocated a “peaceful settlement” of the situation in the Taiwan Strait and rejected China’s claims to the waters and island archipelagos in the South China Sea. The second case refers to a ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in the summer of 2016.

An opportunity has not been missed to meddle once again in the internal affairs of the PRC with regard to the situations in XUAR and Hong Kong.

At the same time, the text of the Joint Statement 2022 reflects the military and political innovations that have emerged in the region since the penultimate 2+2 meeting. In particular, the ministers endorsed the signing (discussed in the NEO) of the so-called Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), a detailed set of rules under which military units of both countries can be stationed on each other’s territories.

The formation of the trilateral AUKUS configuration (comprising Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States), as well as the increasing military and political activity in the region by leading European countries, have been equally welcomed.

Participants in the last US-Japan 2+2 meeting expressed their intention to promote cooperation in the development of advanced military-applied technologies, as well as to strengthen controls on the possibility of any information about the results being leaked and falling into the hands of the PRC.

In this regard, the Joint Statement first mentions “hypersonic systems” in the part that deals with this kind of development by regional opponents. Apparently, this does not only refer to PCR’s announced test of its hypersonic missile. The DPRK is suspected of something similar.

It was therefore noteworthy that a report that appeared the day before the 2+2 meeting was held that the Japanese Defense Ministry was funding the development of a railgun with an electromagnetic projectile acceleration system. It is supposed to be used in air defense systems to intercept hypersonic missiles. Apparently, these studies will be taken as a basis for joint work on such systems, which, among others, were mentioned by Secretary of State Antony Blinken during his speech at the event.

The NEO has repeatedly noted a long-standing trend towards a levelling of the roles of the participants in the US-Japan alliance. Japan is gradually shifting from being a “consumer” of defense and security services provided by its overseas “big brother” to being a significant “supplier” of them. This has been fully understood by all recent US administrations, especially the penultimate president. In this regard, it is notable that the Joint Statement says that “Japan reiterated its resolve to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities… The United States welcomed Japan’s resolve…”

At the same time, the US restated its “unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan” (in particular, as noted above regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands) in accordance with the provisions of the bilateral military and political alliance.

Of course, the Covid-19 pandemic factor could not but affect the agenda of the event under discussion, which, however, continues to be present in all global processes while the political and medical nature of this factor remains unclear.

It is understandable the interest with which the passing of another US-Japanese 2+2 meeting was watched in the main “object” of its targeting, the PRC. Here, on the one hand, they called everything that the sides have been saying lately about the situation in the sea lanes adjacent to the Chinese coast as well as in China itself well-established “anti-China clichés”. But at the same time they took the event quite seriously. This is especially true of the Taiwan issue.

Overall, however, the very fact, as well as the outcome of another US-Japanese 2+2 meeting shows a thickening of the shadows in the overall picture of the Indo-Pacific region.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.