Russia’s cooperation with Singapore, a prosperous island city-state in Southeast Asia with a population of nearly 6 million people, neighbouring Indonesia and Malaysia and having one of the highest GDPs in the world, has been actively developing since 2009, when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev paid his first official visit to Singapore in the history of the Russian-Singaporean relations.

In 2018, the two countries celebrated the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, and in 2019, the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Russia-Singapore Business Council (RSBC).  Since then, there has been a significant increase of the trade turnover and business cooperation between the two countries, especially in the IT sphere. Cooperation in the fields of culture and education is growing at a fast pace, e.g., the Russian Film Week in Singapore, one of the brightest annual cultural events, debuted in 2019 with a full house.

At the moment, space technologies are of a particular interest in the interaction between Russia and Singapore.  In December 2021, the RSMC organised an online conference at the Science Centre in Singapore between Singaporean students and Russian cosmonauts.  The conference was addressed by Anton Shkaplerov, a test cosmonaut aboard the international space station.

Singapore’s foreign policy aims at maintaining friendly relations with all countries in the world, especially with its regional neighbours. Even back in the 1960s, Singapore established effective trade and political ties with Australia and New Zealand, which are the major players in Oceania, the largest and most significant region from the geostrategic point of view.  This has allowed Singapore to build mutually beneficial relations with 12 independent small island states and 13 dependent territories, to which it supplies petroleum products, one of its key exports (Oceania imports 90% of its fuel from Singapore).

Singapore develops most dynamic relationships in Oceania with four of the largest island nations: Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Fiji, which are located in the Melanesian subregion and have a combined total of 90% of the South Pacific’s natural resources. These states formed a trade and economic union in 1986, which was finally named the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) in 2007, and with which Singapore has been actively engaged.

The information visit to Singapore of foreign ministers from the 11 (i.e. almost all) independent small island states of Oceania in 2012 was a historic milestone. After reviewing the technical, agricultural, and other developments presented to the delegates, the participating Fiji Foreign Minister said that the MSG member states, “have a lot to learn from Singapore.”

Fiji and the Republic of Singapore established the diplomatic relations in 1971. The relationship was less official than friendly, dating back to the personal encounter between Lee Kuan Yew, the future builder of Singapore’s economic miracle, and Prime Minister and future “father of the nation” of independent Fiji, Ratu Kamisese Mara, in the 1960s. In 1986, Lee Kuan Yew visited Fiji and addressed K. Mara during an official reception, stating that “the close ties between Fiji and Singapore will grow as cooperation between ASEAN and the South Pacific expands.” No doubt his words were prophetic.

On the occasion of Lee Kuan Yew’s passing in 2015, Fiji’s Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama (also dubbed ‘father of the nation’) credited Singapore’s founder with “transforming Singapore into a country that is now the envy of the world.”

In 2016, amid growing cooperation between Fiji and Singapore, Fiji Airways launched regular direct flights between the two countries. The flight time is just over 10 hours (8,500 km).

Fiji is trying to emulate Singapore in all fields, such as agriculture, medicine, finance, housing and urban development, and even nation-building: both Singapore and Fiji’s population is ethnically mixed and its chief concern is to prevent possible conflicts between different ethnic and social groups. Singapore was the world’s best model of managing ethnic relations by avoiding the ethnic enclaves that could form among its people. One of the Fijian leaders said that Fiji would like to fully emulate Singapore’s experience. The country has managed to take steady steps in this direction with the adoption of a new constitution in 2013.

Thus, Singapore has long been a role model and a reliable partner for Fiji, a country of almost 1 million people, which since the 2010s has focused its interests on developing trade and political relations with all countries in the world, including Russia.

Relations between Fiji and the Russian Federation were considerably strengthened in 2012, when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited the island state for the first time in its history. As a result of the meeting between Frank Bainimarama and Sergei Lavrov, agreements were reached on student exchange, which a year later, in July 2013, after a visit to Moscow by Frank  Bainimarama, where he met with Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, formed the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Far Eastern Federal University and the National University of Fiji.  A visa-free regime was introduced following the signing of the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Fiji on the Mutual Waiver of Visa Requirements for Citizens of the Russian Federation and Citizens of the Republic of Fiji. An intergovernmental agreement on military-technical cooperation was also concluded, under the terms of which Russia delivered 20 containers of small arms and small arms ammunition to equip the Fijian motorised infantry battalion of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), stationed in the Golan Heights. In 2014. Moscow and Suva celebrated the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with cultural and educational events.

“Russia, just like China and the US, is a Pacific state that wants to play a constructive role in the region in general, and certainly here in Fiji. I will be the first head of Fiji to visit Russia,” said Frank  Bainimarama in an exclusive interview with ITAR-TASS First Deputy General Director Mikhail Gusman, specifically for ITAR-TASS, Rossiyskaya Gazeta and Rossiya-24 TV channel shortly before his 2013 trip to Moscow.

It should be noted that Russia’s ties with Singapore and Fiji are now facilitated by the possibilities of remote communication, as well as accelerated air travel between the three states and the absence of visa regimes, making Oceania an increasingly accessible region these days. Russia’s engagement with Fiji opens up opportunities for economic and cultural dialogue with the other three above-mentioned MSG Melanesian states. In particular, one of Fiji’s neighbouring MSG states, the Solomon Islands, is interested in cooperating with the Russian Federation, including the space and digital technology sectors, for which Russian President Vladimir Putin issued Decree No. 660, dated 18.11.2021, On the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the Solomon Islands’.

Thus, the experience of the Russian Federation in many areas can be useful to the countries of Oceania, which, as practice shows, are always open to mutually beneficial cooperation.

Sofia Pale, PhD in History, Researcher at the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Over the last decade, Russia has been successfully strengthening its influence in different parts of the world: first and foremost, in the countries of Asia and Africa.  The trade turnover with them has been growing every year, including the countries of South-East Asia, where Indonesia – the most populous state in the region (274 million people) – is one of Russia’s major trading partners, participating in several major joint investment projects (for example, Rosneft’s refinery in the East Java Province), as well as cooperation in the military and military-technical fields, suggesting a possible imminent start of a strategic partnership. The work done in this area by Ludmila Vorobieva, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to Indonesia should be particularly noted.  She has been in office since 2018 and is concurrently the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Kiribati, the Democratic Republic of East Timor and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea.

At the same time, Russia explores new frontiers: along with the growing cooperation with Indonesia, it develops ties with neighbouring Papua New Guinea, the largest (9 million inhabitants) state in Oceania.  It is a region, where the Russian presence was already evident two hundred years ago. If one recalls that in the 19th century the explorers and discoverers of many South Pacific islands (along with the discovery of Antarctica by F. Bellingshausen and M. Lazarev in 1820) were Russian sailors and scientists I. Krusenstern, Yu.Lisyansky, V. Golovin, O. Kotzebou and F. Litke and when one recalls the exploration of the New Guinea island by famous ethnographer and anthropologist N. Miklouho-Maclay, then Russia’s growing influence in the South Pacific becomes historically justified. It should also be remembered that more than a hundred islands and other geographical sites in Oceania still bear Russian names, for example, the Vostok Island within the state of Kiribati, named by Bellingshausen after his ship Vostok, and the Cook Islands, the state entity associated with New Zealand, was named by Ivan F. Krusenstern in honour of English navigator James Cook.

According to renowned specialist doctor Evgeny Kanayev, Russia should “focus on resources related to intangible culture” to expand the dialogue with the South Pacific states, and the legacy of the famous Russian scientist of the late 19th century, N. Miklouho-Maclay, “an outstanding Russian, whose scientific, cultural and socio-educational activities perfectly fit the confirmation of Russia’s status as a powerful and unique civilisation” may help it. Since 2017 the Miklouho-Maclay Foundation for the Preservation of Ethno-Cultural Heritage has been working to preserve the memory of this pioneering explorer of the South Pacific and, undoubtedly, to strengthen the civilisational component of the Russian policy.  The Foundation is led by N. Miklouho-Maclay, a relative and full namesake of the great scientist.

It would take more than one page to list the successful projects of the Miklouho-Maclay Foundation to establish cultural and educational ties between Russia and Papua New Guinea, a “side effect” of which was the facilitation by the Papua New Guinean government of visa requirements for Russians. The Prime Minister of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea (PNG), James Marape, said in his speech on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the diplomatic relations between the two countries in October 2021, that “at the present stage, N. Miklouho-Maclay made a significant contribution to the development of bilateral relations. Thanks to his work, a Russian cabinet was opened at the National Library in Port Moresby, the capital of Papua New Guinea. He contributed greatly to the promotion of Papua New Guinea in the Russian Federation and organised meetings for businessmen in the Russian Federation and Papua New Guinea. We consider him our representative as his great-great-grandfather and work with him and the Russian Embassy to open the Honorary Consul representations in Moscow and St. Petersburg. We thank N. Miklouho-Maclay for his significant contribution to the friendship of the peoples of Russia and Papua New Guinea, preservation and promotion of PNG traditions and culture in the world. We hope to see Russian companies and guests from Russia in PNG in the near future”.

The diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Papua New Guinea were established in 1976, just a year after Papua New Guinea gained independence. Māori Kiki, who held the posts of the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, as well as the Minister of Defence of Papua New Guinea, paid an official visit to Moscow. He was also world-renowned for his autobiographical book “Ten Thousand Years to One Life”, published in the USSR in 1981.

During N. Miklouho-Maclay’s first visit to Papua New Guinea in 2017 as part of the work of the Miklouho-Maclay Foundation, the outstanding politician Michael Somare (1936-2021), former Prime Minister of PNG, who led the country to independence in 1975 together with M. Kiki, wished to meet him personally. In PNG, M. Somare earned love of his people and the title of “Grand Chief” or “father of the nation”.

Since then, various bilateral cultural and educational events appeared regularly in the state-run Russian and Papua New Guinean mass media. The last major project of the Miklouho-Maclay Foundation, which received wide coverage in the national press of PNG, was the creation in 2021 of a virtual “Miklouho-Maclay Online Museum”, showing dozens of traditional cultural items and everyday life of modern inhabitants of the Maclay Coast, where the Russian scientist and humanist Nikolai Miklouho-Maclay conducted his work in the late 19th century.

The work of the Miklouho-Maclay Foundation, launched in 2017, serves as the cornerstone for the development of high-level relations between the Russian Federation and PNG.  During the 2018 APEC Summit in Port Moresby, the Russian state delegation visited PNG for the first time. The delegation from the Miklouho-Maclay Foundation was also present at such a representative international forum and organised a series of cultural events for the summit participants, including photo exhibitions and films in the English language about the history of relations between Russia and PNG. These events were covered in the international press, which undoubtedly contributed to enhancing Russia’s positive image around the world.

Thus, science, education, politics, culture and international relations are intertwined in the relationship between Russia and Papua New Guinea into one canvas of history, which is created here and now.

Today, Russia actively builds ties with the other states of Oceania, such as Fiji, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, to name a few. Since Fiji’s Ambassador in Jakarta (the capital of Indonesia) is accredited in Singapore (with which Russia also successfully develops cooperation), the amazing mosaic of relationships between the states in the remote region in the South Pacific region becomes a clear and logical picture, allowing for mutually beneficial relations between the Russian Federation, Indonesia, Singapore, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and, with them, the Solomon Islands, and the other Oceania countries.

As practice shows, the cultural and educational potential of Russia during interaction with the countries of Oceania is highly appreciated and highly demanded by their leaders, which increases opportunities for the development of further trade, economic and strategic relations, helping to strengthen Russia’s positive image in the global space.

Sofia Pale, PhD in History, Researcher at the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

In recent years, the geopolitical situation in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) has been marked by extremely fast-moving development, not only in its contentious area – the South China Sea, — but also around the so-called Australian “line of defense” in the South Pacific region (SPR), where the interests of the global nuclear powers collide. Those powers are China, the US, the UK and India. Russia and North Korea, another two Pacific nuclear powers, should not be ignored either.

Tensions between Beijing and Washington were exacerbated when former US President Donald Trump took office and did not subside under Joe Biden’s administration. This rift forced the main SPR actor, Australia, that had been steering a course charted by its key strategic ally, the United States, to choose the path of ideological warfare with China while forging closer ties with Japan and India. In 2018 as Washington was ramping up its nuclear capability on Guam, the main American military base in the Pacific, to respond the Chinese efforts to establish military bases in some South Pacific states (Fiji, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea), a year later Australia signed a $66 billion contract with France to construct 12 attack-class submarines, which could have been later refitted to carry nuclear warheads.

At the same time, Canberra decided to enhance American military presence, as strong as it was at the moment, in the northern part of the country. The port of Darwin (the local capital, also dubbed “the Gateway to Asia”) is the hub of main Australian infrastructure networks with access to China which in 2015 took operational control of the port under a 99-year lease. In other words, the strengthening of American influence in this area was designed to keep the Chinese in check. Thus, exploiting Washington’s strategic interests, China’s trade aspirations and friendly ties with France, Australia has been trying hard to maintain a balance in relations with its major nuclear partners in recent years.

It is worth mentioning another nuclear power which has been seeking to establish presence in APR — the UK. In 2021, the post-Brexit UK is again poised to portray itself as an independent player on the world stage and has already built up its nuclear capabilities by 40% to support this aspiration. Australia maintains extremely close relations with its former metropolis, considering that after the UK’s withdrawal from the Pacific, Canberra inherited all British South Pacific possessions. Technically Australia is ruled by the Britain’s Queen while this country is also a part of the British Commonwealth. The UK’s rising influence in the Asia-Pacific region is not resisted by Canberra which in June 2021 announced a free trade agreement with London.

Another influential state – Germany — also seeks to strengthen military ties with Australia, Japan and South Korea. That is why in the summer of 2021 it planned to send a warship to the Indian and Pacific Oceans with a long-term mission to demonstrate its presence in the SPR.

Russia also tried to project its power during military exercises in June 2021 as its warships sailed at a 23-34 miles distance past the Hawaiian Islands, home to US Pacific Fleet and American missile defenses. Since the Russian warships came so close to the Hawaiian Islands, this event sent some ripples across the US media.

Thus, nuclear tensions in the Pacific are becoming one the major issues on the current global agenda.

It is not surprising that the United States, which until the early 2000s was referred to as the “Pacific sheriff”, decided to take the leading role in creating a fundamentally new power landscape in the Asia-Pacific region. In the early 2000s, this role was bestowed upon Australia itself, but in the 2010s under Barack Obama’s administration the United States was poised to become a “Pacific power” once again, an aspiration seemingly fueled by the fact that then-US leader was born in Hawaii. This plan could materialize as early as this year, given that in September 2021 upon Washington’s initiative the UK, the US and Australia have entered a military alliance AUKUS, with the Pentagon announcing another buildup of the American military presence in Australia.

This decision met a stark rebuke from France and Germany, countries that were not invited to this cozy circle while Paris even recalled its ambassadors to the United States and Australia considering that Canberra had torn up the above-mentioned multibillion-dollar agreement with France on the supply of 12 submarines for the Australian Navy. The French called this decision “a stab in the back”. According to Paris, “you do not behave this way between allies”. This is the first time Paris has ever recalled its ambassadors to the US and Australia. The more reason this step looks serious and that is why global media pay so much attention to this topic. As for explanations coming from Australia, Canberra says that it does not need “conventional” submarines considering that regional tensions are on the rise. Australia apparently needs a more powerful arsenal, which it is planning to get from the alliance with the UK and the US.

However, keep in mind that the Australian “line of defense” which rests on the major Melanesian island states (the ones where, as already mentioned above, China wanted to deploy its military bases in 2018), also includes New Caledonia – the largest French possession in the SPR, which is just 1,500 km off the Australian coast. New Caledonia is the fourth largest nickel producer and a place where a French military base is stationed. France also controls Wallis and Futuna (strategically important islands) and French Polynesia (known as Tahiti), home to a French nuclear test site that has been inactive since 1996. Thus, from Australian perspective, France is endowed with the most important geostrategic position in the SPR, and previously Canberra has always been mindful of this fact when forging friendly ties with Paris.

Until recently, Australia acted as a mediator in the difficult and contentious relations between Washington, which represents Anglophone culture, and Paris, which represents Francophonie. Both have been at odds throughout history. And the fact that Canberra has finally straightened out its priorities and taken the side of its Anglophone partners despite long-time cozy relations with France, speaks volumes about how serious the current situation in the Pacific is.

It is possible that France’s exclusion from the AUKUS alliance would undermine political ties and stymie trade with Australia, which in this case will lose its 7th largest export, 4th import, and 9th foreign direct investments partner. Paris also could ramp up its military presence in New Caledonia, a move that would aggravate the delicate geopolitical situation in SPR which is tense as it is.

To sump up, it is worth noting that the actions of Washington, London and Canberra in the Pacific could heighten global tensions, since the new force balance derives from geopolitical games of not “conventional”, but nuclear powers. The rationale behind these actions (the need to deter China) may turn out to be nothing more than a smokescreen for more expansionist designs. Realizing that such outcome is, unfortunately, inevitable, Canberra had no choice but to side with the strongest, in its opinion, actors.

Sofia Pale, PhD in History, Researcher at the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

]]> https://journal-neo.org/2021/09/24/on-france-s-feud-with-australia/feed/ 0 https://journal-neo.org/2021/05/18/is-the-western-world-losing-new-zealand/ https://journal-neo.org/2021/05/18/is-the-western-world-losing-new-zealand/#comments Tue, 18 May 2021 07:35:10 +0000 https://journal-neo.org/?p=156124

For years now, the whole world has been gripped by the Sino-American confrontation. China is actively pushing the US and other Western countries from the top positions in various spheres of world economy and politics, and the US is fiercely resisting this. Important allies of the US in the West are the main states of the Anglosphere — the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. As far back as World War II, the intelligence services of these countries began to cooperate, which led to the emergence of the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance, whose system of information collection and transmission envelops the entire Western world.

When the current period of aggravation in Sino-American relations began, the US began to actively involve all of its partners in the confrontation. Cooperation within the framework of the Five Eyes Alliance has also begun to steer in an anti-Chinese direction. Thus, in order to protect the strategic information of the alliance states from Chinese intelligence, at the instigation of the United States a process was launched of forcing Chinese telecommunications companies such as Huawei and ZTE out of the states of the Five Eyes.

However, unexpectedly for Washington, not all members of the alliance agreed to unconditionally follow its demands. New Zealand began to sabotage the American fight with China.

Recall that China is its largest trading partner, accounting for up to a third of all New Zealand exports, and that before the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019, one of the country’s main sources of foreign exchange was tourists from the PRC.

When the US demanded in 2018 that all Five Eyes members stop buying and using Chinese telecommunications equipment because of the threat of espionage, New Zealand initially obeyed and banned the use of Huawei equipment in building its 5G network in late 2018. However, in January 2019, China imposed precautionary trade sanctions against New Zealand, and the following month, the latter’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said that Huawei could participate in work on the future New Zealand 5G network after a security check of the project by the New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB).

Shortly thereafter, in April 2019, Jacinda Ardern visited Beijing, where she met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and pledged to further cherish China-New Zealand relations.

Some time later, there was another intriguing swing in New Zealand between the old partners and China.

In November 2020, members of the Five Eyes issued a joint statement calling on the PRC leadership to stop repressive measures against the democratic opposition in the Hong Kong Legislative Council. After that, the Five Eyes was regularly criticized by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Beijing claimed that members of the alliance formed a “conspiracy” against it. New Zealand soon joined in this criticism. In April 2021, New Zealand Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta said her country was uncomfortable with the Five Eyes’ outreach. According to her, New Zealand does not welcome the involvement of the Five Eyes in speaking out on issues outside the alliance’s purview. Mahuta also said that since China is New Zealand’s main trading partner, it now needs predictable diplomatic relations with that country. New Zealand reserves the right to speak out on issues in which it does not agree with Beijing, such as the situation in Hong Kong or in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), where Western countries believe ethnic and religious minorities are oppressed.

After these statements by the head of the New Zealand Foreign Ministry, many media began to write that there was a split in the Five Eyes Alliance and that New Zealand was preparing to leave the Western world and yield to the authority of China. These reports may be overly exaggerated, but given the volume of Sino-New Zealand trade and the vivid displays of deference to Beijing by the New Zealand leadership, the emergence of such views does not seem surprising.

On May 3, 2021, the 7th China Business Summit was held in Auckland, where the PRC and New Zealand traditionally discuss economic cooperation. The event was attended by such dignitaries as Jacinda Ardern, New Zealand Secretary of Commerce Damien O’Connor, and PRC Ambassador to New Zealand Wu Xi. Among the issues discussed at the event were the development of bilateral trade and the economic crisis associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. However, a number of issues went beyond trade and economic relations.

Consequently, Jacinda Ardern said that as the PRC’s role in the world has increased, it has become increasingly difficult to resolve differences with that state, and that there are issues on which China and New Zealand disagree and will never be able to agree. In the words of the leader of New Zealand, there are several conflicts between the Chinese and New Zealand systems and interests and values that define those systems, and these conflicts are only increasing as Chinese influence grows. Ardern also said this is a challenge not only for New Zealand, but for many other countries in the Indo-Pacific region, Europe and elsewhere. However, she toned down her speech, adding that the mentioned controversies should not play a defining role in Sino-New Zealand relations.

As for Chinese Ambassador Wu Xi, she did not soften anything, firmly reminding the audience, as is the Chinese custom, that whatever happens in Hong Kong or XUAR is an internal matter of the PRC.

The day after the business summit, the New Zealand Parliament met to discuss the situation in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the PRC. It is known that separatist sentiments are strong among the Muslim Uighurs who inhabit it, and some of them have a tendency toward radical Islamism. In this regard, the Chinese authorities are taking harsh measures, which many experts consider excessive. A small group of New Zealand parliamentarians has proposed that the actions of the Chinese authorities against the Uighurs be recognized as genocide. Incidentally, this is how the three representatives of the Five Eyes characterized the situation: US, UK, and Canada. The decision reached was that the New Zealand government was concerned about human rights violations in XUAR, but did not recognize the actions of the Chinese authorities as genocide.

The statements of the New Zealand prime minister and the actions of New Zealand show that this country has not yet decided on the choice between the PRC and the West, and for now is trying to please both sides. However, small and militarily undeveloped states (which New Zealand is compared to China and the United States) do not always have a choice, and New Zealand’s future depends on which side wins in the confrontation between China and the West in the South Pacific. In the meantime, it is worth noting that throughout its history, the state of New Zealand has been an integral part of the Western English-speaking world. And its very geographic location between Australia and the US promotes cooperation with the West. So the very fact that New Zealand now faces a choice between the West and China speaks to the unprecedented power that Beijing has achieved and the beginnings of great change in the existing world order.

Sofia Pale, PhD in History, Researcher at the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

After 47 years in the 28-nation European Union, Britain decided that the alliance was no longer beneficial to it and left the EU, giving the world a new term in the process: “Brexit”. So now, starting January 1, 2021, the UK is no longer allowed to trade with partners outside the European Union under trade agreements previously concluded within the EU. Consequently, in the next couple of years, London will have to individually re-negotiate 759 trade and economic agreements with 168 countries around the world in accordance with WTO rules. This is especially true of former British colonial possessions, many of which are in the South Pacific.

Although the total population of the South Pacific is small, at only about 43 million people (of which 25 million live in Australia, 9 million in Papua New Guinea, 5 million in New Zealand, 0.9 million in Fiji and 0.1-0.5 million each in the other island nations and territories), it is still a good market for Britain with a population of about 67 million.

In the South Pacific region, London is strategically and economically important to the two most financially successful states – Australia and New Zealand, with whom the UK has been actively negotiating a free trade zone since June 2020. Then there are Papua New Guinea and Fiji, the largest island nations, with whom London entered into a “UK-Pacific economic partnership agreement (EPA)” in mid-March 2019, effective January 1, 2021. The EPA is a type of free trade agreement with developing countries, under which all tariffs on goods imported from Fiji and Papua New Guinea are completely eliminated and about 80% of tariffs on UK exports to those countries will gradually be lifted. According to the estimates, the trade turnover will amount to £369 million a year, especially since trade links have long been established: cane sugar is traditionally sent from Fiji to the UK, and vegetable oils (particularly palm oil) are sent from Papua New Guinea to the UK. Samoa and the Solomon Islands are in line to sign the agreement, and Vanuatu and Tonga may follow. Given that all island nations are rich in fish resources (such as tuna, for instance), these products are also on the list of exports to Great Britain. The former metropole, for its part, sells machinery, medicine and services to South Pacific countries, the latter accounting for the bulk of British exports. To expedite the signing of EPA agreements with island countries in perpetual search of means of support, London emphasizes the desire to increase Official Development Assistance (ODA) to them, and promises large profits from trade

Interestingly, in early March 2019, the EU blacklisted Fiji, Samoa and Vanuatu as tax havens, but that didn’t stop London from signing the aforementioned EPA trade agreement just days later. Also in March 2019, London announced the Pacific Uplift strategy, under which the UK opened offices in Samoa, Vanuatu and Tonga. With British diplomatic representations already in place in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands, the United Kingdom currently has more influence in the region than France, Germany, Taiwan, India, and others. Only Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the United States and China have more offices in the South Pacific island countries and territories.

It should be mentioned that the South Pacific region is the largest on the planet, with 12 independent island states and 13 dependent territories belonging to Australia, New Zealand, France and the United States. The UK, too, owns a tiny overseas territory in the middle of the Pacific Ocean called the Pitcairn Islands, where only about 50 people live. Nevertheless, Britain has the right to send its warships to the Pacific Ocean. However, it exercised this right for the last time in 2001, transferring authority to patrol the waters of Pitcairn to New Zealand and France, which consider such interaction to be very beneficial for strengthening relations between the three countries.

As for the defense strategies of the major players, i.e. Australia, France, and the United States, in the Pacific, Australia plays the biggest role in the region. As early as January 1944, Australia and New Zealand signed the Canberra Pact, which established a “regional defense zone” covering Australia, New Zealand, and all of the South Pacific islands of Melanesia, a subregion northeast of the Australian continent. Recall that Melanesia is home to the states with which the UK has or is about to enter into EPA trade agreements: Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Tonga.

Looking back two years ago, one can remember how China had already tried to start negotiations with Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Vanuatu on the possible deployment of its military bases in parallel with the implementation of the Chinese trade and economic project “Belt and Road Initiative”, but these attempts were suppressed by the efforts of Australian diplomacy. Moreover, Canberra managed to negotiate with Papua New Guinea and Fiji to strengthen its military presence in their territories. Australia is now more interested than ever in maintaining its influence in the Melanesian “defense zone,” for which British assistance will not be superfluous. Australia has already ordered 12 submarines from France in February 2019, and it is likely not the last of its major defense purchases. Britain, too, has a chance to get involved in strengthening Australian defense. It should be recalled that the UK is increasing its arms exports year on year: in 2019, sales peaked, allowing it to leave behind competitors such as France and Russia and rank second in the world after the United States on the list of leading arms trading countries.

Considering that London is threatening all of Europe with plans to copy the “Singapore miracle” and turn into the so-called “Singapore-on-Thames” by creating an offshore zone, the South Pacific countries have the prospect of building not only trade but also political and even military relations with a complex and rather unpredictable player pursuing its own interests in the region.

Sofia Pale, PhD in History, Researcher at the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

By early 2021, Britain had finally settled all economic, political, and other issues about leaving the European Union, while actively strengthening trade and economic relations around the world, especially with countries that have historical and cultural significance. First of all, with the countries of Oceania, which only a century ago were part of the British Empire, namely, Australia and New Zealand, with which London has been negotiating a free trade agreement since June 2020. The signing of free trade agreements (FTAs) between Australia, New Zealand and the UK is a priority of British economic policy, which foresees that by 2023 the established FTAs around the world will account for more than 80% of the UK’s foreign trade turnover.

The unification of the Australian and New Zealand markets with the United Kingdom is a mutually beneficial goal that all three parties to the deal seek, especially since there is a high degree of openness and trust between them that has persisted since ancient times. Until the mid-20th century, Britain was a major trading partner for Australia and New Zealand, but by the 1970s trade and economic cooperation began to wane because of Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC). This led to the abolition of preferential access of Australian and New Zealand products to the British market. In response, Australia and New Zealand began to look to Asia-Pacific countries as new trading partners, and by 2021 China and ASEAN countries have pushed the European Union down to the third place in trade with Australia and New Zealand.

When Britain joined the EEC in 1973, Australia and New Zealand also began integrating their markets, starting with the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangements (TTTA), which introduced a special visa regime and freedom of movement between Australia and New Zealand. Under the TTTA, New Zealanders and Australians were given the right to live and work freely in the two countries. Ten years later, in 1983, Canberra and Wellington signed the Australia‑New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA or CER), which proved to be one of the most successful free trade agreements in the world.

Since 2009, Australia and New Zealand are committed to the Single Economic Market (SEM), a program designed to create the most transparent business environment between the two countries. SEM is based on the CER agreement and aims to take innovative measures to reduce costs arising from conflicting or overlapping regulations in either country. The SEM program has already brought significant economic benefits by reducing the cost and simplifying the way companies do business in both states.

It is clear that the integration of the Australian and New Zealand markets with Great Britain will lay on an already fertile ground and bear great fruit.

Nevertheless, the United Kingdom faces certain difficulties due to the fact that London’s trade and economic ties with Canberra and Wellington have nevertheless been significantly weakened over the past 60 years. In recent years, about 70% of Australia’s trade and 60% of New Zealand’s trade was with Asia, of which China, of course, was the priority partner. And Britain’s share of trade with Australia and New Zealand was only 2-3%. Consequently, the British side will have to work hard to achieve the planned increase in trade with its Oceanian partners by 10-14%.

It should be noted that at present the main exports from Australia to the UK are gold (30%), wine (9%), and lead (8%). It is interesting to recall that in 2016, about 99% of Australian gold exports to the EU went to the UK. This was due to fears that Brexit could lead to a depreciation of the British pound and a slowdown of the UK economy. Australia also benefits from an FTA with the UK because some Australian agricultural products, for which China applies customs duties, can be redirected to the British market.

As for New Zealand exports to the UK, the bulk of it is agricultural products: meat (30%), wine (27%), fruit (5%). One should not forget that New Zealand is one of the world’s leading exporters of agricultural products, especially dairy products, of which the United Kingdom is one of the world’s largest importers.

At the same time, all three parties are equally successful in exporting services to each other, which accounted for about 50% of their trade turnover in 2019.

In turn, Britain will increase the supply of goods produced in such industries as automotive, engineering (passenger transport), textiles and pharmaceuticals (medicines) to the markets of Australia and New Zealand.

Yet in addition to the benefits of an FTA between the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, there are challenges for the Oceanian countries that they will have to address. Thus, prior to leaving the EU, Britain served as an auxiliary link between Australia, New Zealand, and the European countries. But from 2021 onward, Canberra and Wellington are faced with the task of strengthening and increasing their ties with such leading EU countries as Germany and France, with which Australia and New Zealand already have a respectable trade turnover.

Australia’s and New Zealand’s closer relations with France, neighboring with them in Oceania (it owns huge island territories in New Caledonia and French Polynesia), and Germany’s desire to strengthen the European presence in the so-called Indo-Pacific region (which implies the South China Sea) promise further expansion of cooperation, including in the military sphere, for the foreseeable future.

But such a turn of events could have a negative impact on relations with China, which in recent years has been actively promoting its own trade and economic “Belt and Road Initiative” in the South Pacific region, not to mention its position on the issue of the South China Sea. The presence of the United States in this complex arrangement should not be disregarded either. All in all, the Oceanian leaders — Australia and New Zealand, the European leaders — Great Britain, Germany and France, the Asian leader — China, along with the “major hegemon” — the United States — will have to build a very careful and balanced policy in the Pacific, which will, the author would like to hope, be based on the principles of mutual respect dictated by too many nuclear powers gathered in too small a space.

Sofia Pale, PhD in History, Researcher at the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

France is a major player in Oceania, a place where Australia, which has a leading position in this vast region of the South Pacific, has historically developed solid, neighborly relations. From the middle of the XVIII century to the present, France has owned New Caledonia (with the world’s fourth largest nickel reserves and a French military base), Wallis and Futuna (which has a strategic location), and French Polynesia (known as Tahiti), with a French nuclear testing site that has lain dormant since 1996.

The foundation of bilateral diplomatic relations between France and Australia was laid back in 1842, and they have became stronger over the years that have passed since WWI and WWII.

In the XXI century close interaction has evolved between Canberra and Paris on all significant issues, including regional security and environmental protection.

France keeps striving to maintain its presence in Oceania for a variety of reasons, one of which is to prevent the emergence of a monopolar, Anglophone world by promoting Francophone cultural influence wherever that is possible. Since the French believe that the concept of “culture” encompasses political culture, economic culture, etc., the objective set by Paris in the Pacific Ocean is to curb the expansion of Anglo-Saxon countries – the USA, Australia and New Zealand – not to mention Asian states like China and India. As a consequence, France is ready to sponsor its South Pacific possessions, sometimes even to the detriment of its own budget.

After gaining independence from Great Britain in 1942, Australia’s foreign policy objectives have included maintaining mutually beneficial relations with France in Oceania in general, and in particular in Melanesia, which is part of Australia’s line of defense but where in New Caledonia – located only 1,500 kilometers from the coast of Australia – French military forces are stationed. Taking this circumstance into account, Australia and France need to build a thoughtful, harmonious relationship that is based on building trust and fostering cooperation. For example, the presence of French military forces in Oceania allows regular joint exercises between French and Australian naval forces, both to protect maritime borders and to provide assistance during emergencies, for example if natural disasters like typhoons and floods arise, which are not uncommon for the tropical climate. French warships often call on Australian ports.

The importance of having a defense relationship between the Australian and French sides in the Pacific was highlighted in Australia’s 2016 Defense White Paper. That same year, Australia and France signed an agreement regarding the exchange and reciprocal protection of classified information, which marked a milestone in the development of the strategic partnership between these countries, and formed the cornerstone for a cooperation agreement on the Future Submarine Program (FSP), something that is important for Australia’s defense and entered into force in 2017. In addition, in 2019, the two countries entered into another agreement concerning a strategic partnership for the French side to build Attack-class submarines for the Australian Navy.

At the present stage, the relationship between Australia and France in the field of defense can be described as very strong. It is founded on the Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French Republic Regarding the Provision of Mutual Logistics Support Between the Australian Defense Force and the French Armed Forces, which was signed in Sydney in 2018.

In 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron went on a business trip to Australia, during which he and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull signed a Vision Statement on the Australia-France Relationship, in which the leaders agreed to launch the Australia-France initiative (AFiniti ), aimed at strengthening bilateral relations across all areas.

France has charted a course to bolster its position in Oceania since the early 2000s. Despite the fact that Australia strives for absolute leadership in the region, Canberra does not place any restrictions on the aspirations of the French side: cooperating with France – the sixth-largest economy in the world and one of EU’s leading countries – allows Australia to gain access to 25 integrated European markets that have a single Euro currency and a total population of 450 million. Specifically, in 2018 Australia and the European Union began negotiations on setting up a free trade zone.

Bilateral relations in the field of humanitarian cooperation – education and tourism – are evolving energetically. The cultural sector does not lag far behind: the Cultural Diplomacy Grants Program from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade helps bolster cooperation between the two countries in this area. In particular, the first French Festival took place in Adelaide, Australia’s “cultural capital”, in January 2018. Australia has also made a significant contribution to the collections at the French Quai Branly Museum (Musée du Quai Branly), part of which is devoted to the art and culture of Australia’s Aborigines.

Of course, sometimes disagreements have arisen between France and Australia, chiefly due to France conducting nuclear tests in French Polynesia from the 1960s to 1996 – something towards which Australia has taken a sharply negative attitude. However, this problem was resolved in 1999, after Paris ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The second aspect inherent in this controversy is related to the fact that Australian foreign policy, in many ways, combines itself with US policy. For example, US military action in Iraq in 2002 became a polemical issue, and something that Australia supported by sending its troop units there, while France criticized these actions. At the same time, France does not put any restrictions on Australia’s defense strategy in Oceania: being one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, France supported deploying an international peacekeeping force under Australia’s leadership in East Timor (formerly an Indonesian province) back in 1999-2000, and took the same position in June 2006 regarding another Australian intervention in the domestic affairs of the now independent state of Timor-Leste. Moreover, French President Jacques Chirac endorsed Australia’s intervention in the Solomon Islands in 2003.

This means that the conclusion can be drawn that a strong relationship exists, and will continue to exist, between France and Australia for a long time – something which should be taken into account when considering the balance of power in the Pacific Ocean.

Sofia Pale, PhD in History, Researcher at the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Even after gaining independence, the countries in Oceania are facing pressure from more powerful regional players that want to keep them in their spheres of influence, and secure strategically important positions in the Pacific Ocean for themselves. At the same time, the expression of national volition is becoming common in the South Pacific, and is leading to fragmentation across the region, which could end up being a win-win situation for some major powers but a losing one for others.

Just recently New Caledonia, a French overseas territory where the second referendum on independence has already taken place, managed to attract the attention of the world community.

During the first referendum in November 2018, 57% of New Caledonians expressed the desire to remain part of France, while 43% of voters opposed it. It would seem that the subsequent victory in elections to the local congress for those who support keeping the French authorities should have consolidated the results following the first referendum, but in reality everything turned out quite differently.

During the referendum on independence in October 2020, more than half the voters (53.26%) still supported the idea of staying part of France, but along with that those who support independence garnered 46.74% of the vote, which is 3% more than during the previous referendum. This attests to the increasing degree of polarization in New Caledonian society, where indigenous people – the Kanaks, who have been actively advocating independence since the 1980s – comprise 25% of the population, while 40% are emigrants from France and descendants of French settlers, who do not want to lose the patronage of their historical homeland.  Furthermore, voter turnout in 2020 was 86%, which is still the maximum number since referendums have started being held in New Caledonia.

Now the French territory in the South Pacific still has to hold the third referendum, as stipulated in the Nouméa Accord signed between those who support independence – the Kanaks – and the French government in 1998. However, whatever the outcome of the vote, and even if there is another defeat for those who support independence, this strong polarization across society will most likely spark the search for a new compromise on New Caledonia’s future status.

Meanwhile, France is adhering to a policy of neutrality regarding the future status of New Caledonia: French President Emmanuel Macron is treading cautiously when he speaks about independence for the overseas territory, but also actively speaks out about the role of France in the Indo-Pacific. Yet at this time New Caledonia remains an autonomy that depends upon France economically and for its defense, albeit a free one.

Given the fact that France actively supports the conceptual foundation of the Indo-Pacific, and is establishing contacts with India and Australia, the loss of New Caledonia could attenuate the position of this European power in Oceania, and call into question its future role in the region, where a rivalry between the world’s major world powers is mushrooming.

As far as the economic and political sides of this issue are concerned, if New Caledonia gains independence, then France will lose one of the world’s largest nickel deposits, a 200-mile exclusive economic zone through Oceanian territory, and most likely its naval base. Moreover, independence for New Caledonia could set an example for other French possessions in Oceania, especially for French Polynesia, which, generally speaking, copies the steps taken by New Caledonia in terms of its relations with France.

It is likely that New Caledonia could have been influenced by the precedent set by the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, which is part of the largest island state in Oceania, Papua New Guinea (PNG). In December 2019, Bougainville also held a referendum on independence, in which the majority of residents (97.7%) voted to secede from PNG. The referendum in the Papua New Guinean autonomous region gave rise to a lot of speculation, including about the influence China has had on Bougainville and the emergence of a new nation on the world map. It should be noted that the Bougainvillean referendum is non-binding rather than mandatory, and the PNG parliament will decide whether or not to ratify it, presumably at the end of 2020.

Concerns about various spheres of influence in Oceania cannot help but affect the United States, which closely kept tabs on the elections held in the Marshall Islands in November 2019. This Micronesian state continues to diplomatically recognize Taiwan, not the PRC. Furthermore, the Marshall Islands are in a compact of free association with the United States, which allows the citizens in this Oceanian republic to live and work on the “mainland” in exchange for giving Washington’s military exclusive access to its strategically important territorial waters. The US also has a testing and staging ground on Kwajalein Atoll run by the US Army.

But things have not been going so smoothly in recent years. For example, in the 2019 elections President of the Marshall Islands Hilda Heine, who actively supported both the pro-Taiwanese and pro-American policy thrust, was defeated. Quite a few experts conjectured that the new president of the Marshall Islands, David Kabua – who is the son of the first president of the island state – could reorient the country toward the PRC, but that never happened. No matter how you look at it, statements are still being made in the Marshall Islands about the need to cooperate with the PRC, and not with Taiwan. For example, in 2018, James Matayoshi, the mayor of Rongelap Atoll, called for making the atoll into another Hong Kong – a special administrative division – and doing that with help from Chinese investments.

Currently, 10 out of the 14 states in Oceania diplomatically recognize the PRC, while the rest (the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, and Tuvalu) maintain relations with Taiwan. It is likely that major players in the Pacific will continue to try to leverage economic incentives to win over Oceanian states.

In the era of the so-called “coronacrisis”, when many countries in Oceania are incurring heavy losses due to a drop in tourism and decreases in the demand for raw materials, each island state is searching for more and more opportunities to earn money. There is the likelihood that if key donors are also unable to provide the scope of assistance that they need, countries in Oceania could turn to the PRC for support.

Before our very eyes, Oceania is becoming one of the regions where a rivalry is playing out among the major world powers: the United States, France, Australia, and the PRC. Furthermore, the ongoing processes of fragmentation among the island states across the South Pacific open up new opportunities for the major players involved to use their economic leverage to build relations with the small players. At the same time, the idea of independence, or expanding the scope of autonomy, is a phenomenon that is rather contagious – and one that we will hear about again repeatedly.

Sofia Pale, PhD in History, Researcher at the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

]]> https://journal-neo.org/2020/10/28/the-domino-effect-in-oceania-and-competition-among-world-powers/feed/ 0 https://journal-neo.org/2020/10/20/singapore-and-fiji-the-strongest-relationship-in-oceania/ https://journal-neo.org/2020/10/20/singapore-and-fiji-the-strongest-relationship-in-oceania/#comments Tue, 20 Oct 2020 05:59:12 +0000 https://journal-neo.org/?p=144513

Singapore is a thriving island city-state located in Southeast Asia next to Indonesia and Malaysia. A bit fewer than 6 million people live in the country, which is small in terms of area but the size of its GDP is comparable to prosperous European countries like Belgium or Switzerland. Singapore has always maintained friendly trade and economic ties with its neighbors in the region, and over the past decade its foreign policy has been aimed at forging close ties with the small island countries across the South Pacific that lie in the largest region of the world, which has been dubbed Oceania.

In Oceania, Singapore cooperates the most intensively with Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Fiji, and is becoming the chief fuel exporter for them. These four island states are located in a subregion called Melanesia and, unlike other countries in Oceania, they have mineral resources. Back in 1986, they created an intergovernmental organization that is called the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) nowadays. More intensive interaction between Singapore and MSG countries began in August 2012 when, at the invitation of Singapore’s Foreign Ministry, foreign ministers from 11 countries in Oceania arrived in the country for a study visit (the Singapore-Pacific Ministerial Study Visit 2012). The purpose of the event was to show what the best practices in Singapore are in the areas of economic development, land development, water resource management, healthcare, education, etc. During the event, the heads of Oceania’s foreign ministries talked with the Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, with whom they discussed the current situation in Oceania and the possibilities for further cooperation between them.

The next meeting was held in a similar format in Singapore in 2017, but with participation on the part of 14 heads of foreign ministries of small island states across Oceania.

Fiji expressed a direct interest in developing relations with Singapore. This state, the largest out of all the small-sized island states in Oceania with a population of about 900,000 people, was looking to expand economic ties with all the world’s countries in the 2010s, and Singapore’s proposal for cooperation across many areas, including on the issue of global warming, elicited a positive response from Fijian leadership.

Both Fiji and Singapore belong to the Alliance of Small Island States, AOSIS, which started to operate in 1990; AOSIS is an intergovernmental organization of low-lying coastal and small island states, whose primary purpose is to unite the voices of small island developing countries in their fight against global warming. Fiji and Singapore have always followed the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and then its add-on treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in 2005.

Diplomatic relations between Fiji and the Republic of Singapore were established on November 30th, 1971, and since then the two island states have maintained friendly relations at all levels. The Ambassador of Fiji to Indonesia was accredited in Singapore.

Even back in the 1960s, the two countries’ rulers developed personal relationships marked by trust. Lee Kuan Yew, the founder of Singapore and the creator of the so-called Singaporean “economic miracle”, visited Fiji in 1986 and delivered commitments of friendship when addressing Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, the “founding father” of the independent state of Fiji who was the country’s prime minister and then became its president.

Given the long tradition of strong ties between the two island states, Fiji and Singapore rapidly expanded their bilateral cooperation in the 2010s.

One landmark event was in April 2016, when Fiji Airways, the country’s flag carrier, opened up direct flights on a regular basis between Fiji and Singapore. Making a direct flight over a distance of 8,500 kilometers (this is 1,000 kilometers more than between New York and Moscow), one which takes just over ten hours, turned out to be three hours shorter than the previous route involving a layover in Australia and, of course, much more convenient. Improved transportation services facilitated the increase in trade flows and tourism in both directions, and by the end of 2016 the number of tourists visiting from Singapore grew by 120%. As an aside, tourism brings in more than 30% of the tax revenue for the Fijian budget each year.

At the same time, from 2010-2015 Fiji managed to attract 12 investment projects backed by Singapore valued at 250 million Fijian dollars (about 116 million USD at the exchange rate for September 2020).

Bilateral trade has also developed rapidly: since the mid-2010s Fiji has purchased 90% of its fuel each year from Singapore, which has become a major import partner that way, while Fiji exports precious metals and mineral water to Singapore.

It is interesting to note that the Fijian government sees Singapore as an example to emulate.  For example, the Housing Authority of Fiji is structured around the Housing and Development Board of Singapore (HDB); and in 2012, Singaporean consultants were involved in reforming Fiji’s National Reserve Fund, modeling it after Singapore’s Central Reserve Fund.

In 2019, Fiji once again turned to Singapore for its experience, but this time in the field of urban planning; specialists from the Singaporean government-run agency Singapore Cooperation Enterprise, which was established in 2006 to exchange experiences with foreign countries about urban planning, developed a master planning project for three Fijian cities – the capital of Suva, Nadi, and Lautoka – designed for 50 years into the future, providing for their further conglomeration. It is expected that by 2075 more than 1 million people will be living on Fiji, and that almost all of them will be city dwellers. “We would like to fully imitate the experience that Singapore has,” the Fijian side once admitted.

In terms of their foreign policy, Fiji and Singapore are also following a common path. For example, in February 2020 they became the first countries in the world to ratify the Singapore Convention on Mediation, which will enter into force 6 months after it is ratified by any third country. Since the time it was opened for signature in August 2019, 52 countries have already signed the Singapore Mediation Convention. This UN convention proposes using mediation (i.e., the services of an intermediary) in international trade and investment, and will facilitate dispute resolution without the need to go through official, and often lengthy and expensive, legal procedures.

In conclusion, I would like to note that the strengthening of friendly ties and productive cooperation between Fiji and Singapore clearly show how the joint efforts of just two small states can provide a significant contribution to sustainable development not only on a regional scale, but throughout the world.

Sofia Pale, PhD in History, Researcher at the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

]]> https://journal-neo.org/2020/10/20/singapore-and-fiji-the-strongest-relationship-in-oceania/feed/ 0 https://journal-neo.org/2020/10/15/will-2020-be-the-year-bougainville-gains-independence/ https://journal-neo.org/2020/10/15/will-2020-be-the-year-bougainville-gains-independence/#comments Thu, 15 Oct 2020 12:59:34 +0000 https://journal-neo.org/?p=144108

Bougainville Island (which is slightly larger than Cyprus in terms of area) and the smaller Buka Island that is adjacent to it, and that has the capital which bears the same name, is located in the northern part of the Solomon Islands archipelago in the southern Pacific, and is part of Papua New Guinea (PNG), the largest state in Oceania. About 300,000 people inhabit Bougainville, while almost 9 million people live in Papua New Guinea. Bougainville enjoys a special status as the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, which was earned through tremendous efforts and a civil war that lasted an entire decade, from 1988 to 1998, and killed at least 15,000 people.

Starting in the 2000s, Bougainvilleans continued to fight for independence using peaceful methods, and finally in 2019 the island held a referendum on whether Bougainville should secede from Papua New Guinea. Following the voting, 97.7% of its residents voted in favor of independence. And, from August-September 2020, elections were held to elect a president for the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, which attracted attention worldwide.

This attention stemmed from the fact that Bougainville has one of the largest copper deposits in the world: according to experts, the Panguna Mine (which has lain idle since the civil war) contains approximately 5.3 million tons of copper and 19.3 million ounces of gold, with a total value of 60 billion USD.

At the same time, in the 21st century the situation around the world requires a colossal amount of vigilance on the part of small countries in terms of choosing their “protégés” in the form of major powers, without which modern international politics could not be accomplished.

Not only Papua New Guinea, but also Australia, that ruled PNG until 1975, and China, upon whose financial decisions almost all countries of the world already depend to one degree or another, and primarily the neighboring countries, including PNG and Australia, claim to play the role of Bougainville’s “patrons” or “friends”.

And the next foreign policy steps taken by Ishmael Toroama, the new President of Bougainville and a 51-year-old ex-commander of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army that fought for independence, will determine the island’s future fate. One extremely important question is who is going to participate in helping develop the Panguna Mine. Starting in the 1970s, and before developing the field was suspended, that was done by the organization Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL) under the control of the Australian company Rio Tinto, and profits were directed both to the Australian economy and to Papua New Guinea’s federal government budget (which owned 20% of the shares in BCL) – but none of it reached the Bougainville people themselves. Moreover, loopholes in legislation and environmental problems strongly pitted the Bougainvilleans against the Australians. Consequently, I. Toroama’s task will be to ensure that extracting the huge reserves of copper will benefit all the stakeholders concerned, both within the country and abroad, provided that the proper balance of power can be maintained.

As far as the position taken by Papua New Guinea is concerned, the country’s Prime Minister James Marape, who came to power in 2019, clearly expressed his point of view, saying that he would willingly discuss with measures with I. Toroama to gradually grant independence to Bougainville.

Australia, forced to maneuver between the interests held by PNG and its own interests in Bougainville, has remained silent for a long time since the island’s independence referendum results were disclosed in 2019. Canberra is interested in keeping Bougainville in its sphere of strategic influence within the framework of its defense policy, and is ready to use the usual levers, such as financial assistance, that can influence the foreign policy taken by small island states around the South Pacific Ocean. Finally, only just recently Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced that Australia supports the process initiated after the Bougainville referendum, and will encourage PNG and the government in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville to cooperate in helping Bougainville secure its independence.

China, in turn, cautiously let it be known that it is ready to give support to the new Bougainvillean government. It became known that Beijing is able to offer the Bougainvillean economy about 1 billion USD in investments, and thereby contribute to the transition process of gaining political independence. It is anticipated that Chinese investments will be made to help develop mining, tourism, and agriculture. At the same time, information came to light about the Chinese side building a new port in the western part of Bougainville Island, despite the fact that two busy ports are already present there. There has never been any doubt that after Bougainville gains independence, China will immediately establish diplomatic relations with it.

The secession of Bougainville from the PNG that could take place soon cannot be perceived dispassionately by Indonesia, which is watching what is happening with alarm. The thing is that if Bougainville turns into an independent state then a precedent will come into existence that separatist forces can draw from who are speaking out for the Indonesian provinces of West Papua and Papua, both of which are located in the western part of the island of New Guinea. Residents in these provinces in 2019 submitted an application to the UN to hold their own independence referendums.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that the issue of Bougainville’s independence will be resolved gradually, and the results of the 2019 referendum have yet to be reviewed by the National Parliament of Papua New Guinea; that will presumably take place in the coming months. At the same time, the new government in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville will have to become involved in domestic political affairs that are aimed toward developing the island’s economy; the core of this will be the profit generated from resuming work at the Panguna gold and copper mine. It should be kept in mind that, despite how attractive what was once one of the largest deposits in the world is, the political uncertainty associated with it still keeps major global companies from investing, and a significant amount of that will go to upgrade the mine’s primary equipment.

As mentioned above, the Autonomous Region of Bougainville will also have to deal with China, which in the past decade has shown an interest in the South Pacific not only from a commercial point of view, but also from a strategic one. This distresses Australia, which is trying to maintain its dominant position in the region, keeping other players out of its shores, and this may lead to it intensifying its focus on Bougainville.

In any event, the process for Bougainville to gain independence, and the recent election of its new president, have caused experts to pay steady attention to it; they are watching one of the most exciting political events of this year with interest.

Sofia Pale, PhD in History, Researcher at the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

]]> https://journal-neo.org/2020/10/15/will-2020-be-the-year-bougainville-gains-independence/feed/ 0