It should not be assumed, that due to the extremely close economic tries between the USA and PRC, characterized by the term “Chimerica”, the Americans will be unable to bring tumult to the Middle Kingdom. The rupture of relations between Russia and the EU is also costly for Europeans, as local entrepreneurs frequently remind European officials, but this has not deterred the latter from introducing new sanctions. Of course, this has been done under intense pressure from Washington, which has long been trying to impose a planned Transatlantic free trade zone on Europe, which is clearly not consistent with the interests of both Russia and China.

It should be noted that the topic of discussion is neither a direct confrontation or a cold war between the USA and PRC. But the West will certainly try to make life difficult for the Chinese, while officially distancing itself from this process, in order to avoid accusations of meddling in the internal affairs of another state and, as a consequence, invoking a response from Beijing. The main goal is to keep China occupied with its internal problems, in order to cramp its external ambitions. In addition, the destabilization of the region will force capital out of Asian markets in search of more quiet and secure financial havens, which the Unites States intends to provide.

The West has already begun to take preventive measures to protect itself from the negative effects of the deteriorating situation in the PRC. Recently, foreign companies have been withdrawing from China. Previously the transfer of industrial capacity to the Middle Kingdom allowed the USA and Western Europe to overcome the consequences of the economic crisis of the 70s. Today European and American corporations are building plants domestically or transferring their production to countries with lower labor costs such as Vietnam, Pakistan, Indonesia, India, or Bangladesh. Obviously, there are also objective reasons – manufacturing goods in China is becoming less profitable. But much of this lies in the hands of Western, primarily American, politicians. The withdrawal of foreign companies entails a further economic decline in China, which, among other things, complicates the employment situation, and consequently increases social tension.

Problems of a social nature, which are ample in the Middle Kingdom, may be used by external powers to destabilize the country. These are the same factors that were relevant in Arab countries and in Ukraine – the gap between rich and poor, corruption, and the lack of American-style democracy. To this list should be appended the environment, the state of which is without a doubt very poor in the PRC today, and has already served as the impetus for mass demonstrations ending in riots and confrontations with the police.

The uneven economic development of coastal and continental regions of China strongly affects the income level stratification of regional populations, which leads to an exacerbation of disagreements within Chinese society. It is worth remembering that this situation was one of the key internal problems that led to the collapse of Yugoslavia.

The frequent attacks, that are typically ascribed to Uighur separatists, do not contribute to social stability. But when incidents occur in southern provinces far from Xinjiang, and the perpetrators are ethnic Han, official statements are frequently received with skepticism.

The problem of separatism is not a new one for China. It is unlikely that the West is not using inter-ethnic conflicts within the PRC to its own ends. The “Arab Spring”, according to its American ideologues (it is worth noting that not everyone in the western leadership shared this idea), should have raised the tide of controlled chaos which afflicted the Caucasus and Central Asia, and struck a blow not only in the Muslim regions of Russia, but also appeared in Chinese Xinjiang. The stumbling block in this regard was Syria, over which Moscow and Beijing both took a categorical position, knowing full well that it represented a threat to them both. To compensate for the loss on the Syrian front, the Americans managed to accelerate a similar scenario in Ukraine, which was scheduled for 2015-2016. But despite turning to plan B, the civil war in Syria is still far from over. The unrest in neighboring Turkey should also be mentioned. In general, regardless of how events develop in the Middle East, the logical next step is a worsening situation in the countries of Central Asia (especially after the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan), which, in its turn, will have an impact on China’s sensitive Xinjiang province.

Tibet is another region that is traditionally considered to be unstable, which is fighting for its rights not without the West’s support. Tibet was used to annoy Chinese leadership leading up to the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. These and other development show that the West has the capability to influence the population of Tibet through Tibetan leaders and organizations scattered throughout the world. Today the forms of protect to which Tibetans resort are demonstrations and acts of self-immolation, but they have the potential to grow into full-scale rebellion, as they did in 1959. By the way, the Arab Spring also began with a self-immolation in Tunisia.

Less well-known from the perspective of separatist sentiments is the territory of Inner Mongolia. The indigenous population to these lands is not very fond of the Han, but the problem is that due to the PRC’s policy of ongoing resettlement of this region by Chinese, the population is less than 20% Mongol. Nevertheless, during the latest spat of unrest in the Middle Kingdom, there were attempts to create and independent (or semi-independent) state in Inner Mongolia. In addition, the call for unification with Outer Mongolia, which already has independence, may be used as a guide. Now the People’s Party of Inner Mongolia is fighting for the right of self-determination for Mongols in the PRC, the headquarters of which is located in Princeton, New Jersey, USA, where the organization was founded in 1997.

Recently Taiwan has experienced calls to declare independence from mainland China. Of course, the PRC and the Republic of China do in fact exist as separate sovereign states, but both Beijing and Taipei, each in its own way, will continue to insist on the unity of the Middle Kingdom. An official declaration of Taiwanese independence will severely damage Communist China’s image and would very likely force it to take decisive action, regardless of the cost. In the East it is dangerous to “lose face”, as you could lose power along with it.

After Crimea was united with Russia, a domestic fifth column and some Western experts began to actively promote the idea that the Crimean precedent could be used by China to separate the Far East from Russia. The main purpose of this claim is to influence public opinion, both in Russia and in China, and to thereby create additional obstacles on the path to rapprochements between Moscow and Beijing. In fact, Crimea is far from the first such instance, and precedents were made in Kosovo, Comoros, and other cases. On the whole this is a Western ploy to promote its own interests, and it is doubtful that China wishes to resort to such tactics. But there is no guarantee that such a scenario would not be implemented regarding China itself. Beijing hinted at this recently when during a recent visit by Xi Jinping to Europe, he was given a map of China from 1735 printed in Germany. As it turned out, the map lacked many areas that are officially considered to be integral and inalienable parts of the Middle Kingdom. Tibet, Xinjiang, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia. It is difficult to imagine that the European higher officials and their aides did not know sensitive the Chinese are regarding ancient cartography. This was likely done deliberately in an attempt to put pressure on Chinese leadership and remind them of their own internal problems. However, on the Chinese Internet an entirely different map has been circulating, published in London in 1844, on which the Chinese state includes some lands that now belong to Russia. This naturally caused a wave of Anti-Russian sentiment in the Chinese blogosphere, which immediately drew the attention of Russian opposition, as well as foreign media.

It must be clearly understood that an alliance between Moscow and Beijing, in any form, would seriously complicated the West’s, and in particular the USA’s, task of maintaining its dominant position in the world. Therefore the destabilization of the situation around Russia and China, as well as within them, is a highly desirable and a much less expensive way to contain its geopolitical rivals, as opposed to direct confrontation or military conflict.

Roman Pogorelov, journalist, orientalist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Why is the CPC paying so much attention to a subject that is so painful to it, and is the battle with corruption really worth it?

The very notion of corruption is deeply rooted in the nation’s consciousness. The scope and prevalence of this phenomenon in Chinese culture is largely due to the traditional Confucian norms of behavior, which for many years took precedence over Chinese laws. In Imperial China, there were clear rules that governed practically every aspect of a person’s life, including their relationship with the authorities. For example, to be received by an official without bringing a gift was considered rude, and one could not expect a positive result in such a case.

To this day, the concept of “huanbao” is prevalent in China, a red envelope used to give money to children, people celebrating birthdays, and newlyweds, as well as partners, agents, and civil servants. The amount that is given is not as important as the gift itself, which is of particular importance in interpersonal relationships. All of this is expressed in the Chinese concept of “mai renqing”, buying a person’s feelings, and maintaining the alignment of necessary “guanxi” connections.

Of course, the state has always tried to punish officials with unclean hands. However, in China, punishment is not threatened for bribery itself, but only in cases where the official has “lost face”. That is, the official has abused authority and violated prescribed norms of conduct in his/her personal (or clan) interests, which has led to economic or, primarily, social damage, and to general discontent among the people regarding the government.

The current leadership of the PRC understands well the importance of ensuring social stability in a country with a population of almost 1.5 billion people. It is for this reason that it is so actively carrying on the battle with corruption, while simultaneously distancing itself from officials with tarnished reputations. For the same reason, the main purpose severity of the punishment is not so much to frighten officials as to satisfy the righteous anger of the ordinary Chinese.

Despite all the alarming figures of thousands of people being convicted for corruption in the PRC, in fact things are not as chaotic as they appear. For instance, according to official figures, only about 6% of those accused of corruption are eventually punished, and no more than 3% are placed in prison of sentenced to be executed.

Thus, there is no reason to assume that the state’s ruling circles have undertaken to fight corruption as a phenomenon. It is also unlikely that this is possible in general, considering the cultural and historical background, and the extent to which it permeates Chinese society. Nevertheless, the battle with corruption cannot be called fiction. China imprisons and executes not only “flies” (petty bribe-takers, lower-ranking officials), but sometimes also “tigers” (prominent party functionaries), although in these cases, corruption is an excuse, not the motivation.

Professor of the Beijing Institute of Technology, Hu Sintou, affirms that punishment is meted out only to those officials that have lost the patronage of their superiors one way or another. A similar opinion is shared by Willy Lam of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who states that there “is ample evidence indicating that officials that have been under investigation previously have generally been the victims of factional strife. These people have lost the political battle.” A striking illustration of this is the widely publicized case of Bo Xilai, who could have competed with Xi Jinping for the presidency of the PRC, but was promptly removed from the political arena on charges of corruption. At the same time, Willy Lam notes that “there is a certain network of influence in the country, and for this reason many party leaders can easily avoid being held responsible even for criminal offenses.”

In this way, the elimination of political opponents is often carried out under the guise of combating corruption. This is particularly true for the new generation of the PRC’s leaders, who recently gained power in the country after a sharp confrontation within the CPC. It was important for Xi Jinping’s team to push their competitors within the party out of the state’s management tools in order to be able to implement their declared political and economic agenda.

Corruption has another, intra-party dimension as well. Problems controlling the party may threaten both the CPC itself as well as its power within the Middle Kingdom. Bribery within the upper echelons of the communist party is not even effectively concealed. Everyone knows everything about everything. But the fact is that the formation of corrupt schemes leads to stable clans connected by mutual responsibility within the CPC. The presence of multiple groups (factions, clicks) is no secret, and experts offer different sizes and arrangements of the power structure. They are all fighting for dominance in th party and thus the opportunity to implement their own plan for the country’s future. But this battle is substantially weakening the CPC from within, and from this perspective, corruption is indeed a serious threat to national security. The stability of the entire management system depends on how the ruling clan controls the party.

The Chinese phenomenon of the “naked official” speaks beautifully on the difficulty of supervising CPC members – public servants whose family and personal possessions are located abroad. For many corrupt officials, this is a method to legitimize what they have “honestly” stolen. According to Professor of the Central Party School Lin Zhe, for the ten years between 1995 and 2005, more than 1 million children and spouses of Chinese officials were relocated abroad. As it turns out, 90% of the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the 17th convocation have close relatives that are citizens or permanent residents in the USA or EU. Also, more than 85% of the members of the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection have relatives living abroad. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, since the middle of the 90s, between 16 and 18 thousand officials of varying ranks have taken out approximately 127 billion US dollars from China.

There is an entire specialized network of underground structures toexport and launder stolen funds, as well as to relocate corrupt officials and their families out of the PRC. The key elements in this system are Hong Kong and Macau, where illegally earned capital is pre-laundered, and then invested in Western economies in various forms. All these schemes are built upon and able to function because of the Chinese diaspora throughout the world. In this way, an official makes a deal with semi-legal companies of “overseas” Chinese, and is indebted to them in the future. It may actually be considered to be an overflow of CPC elites into a competing camp of the communist party, which is mainly based abroad and has strong ties with foreign elites. This weakening of the legitimate regime could be catastrophic for the entire state through a loss of controllability.

Another aspect that should be taken into account when considering the problem of corruption is the threat to the territorial integrity of the PRC. The fact is that corruption schemes lead to the creation of not only intra-party but also regional clans, thus returning the Middle Kingdom to the dynastic era, in which the integrity of the state always depended on the cohesion of the ruling elite (often not of Chinese origin), and its ability to keep local warlords in line. In the discussion of internal separatism in the PRC, Tibet or Xinjiang is usually brought up, but in these regions in particular, the state is fully capable of keeping the situation under control using force alone. The real danger to the integrity of the state may be intra-Chinese separatism, the foundations of which lie in the uneven development of the regions, as well as language (northern and southern dialects) and mental differences (continental versus coastal). By using these differences, regional clans are fully capable of initiating the process of disintegration of the country to further their own parochial interests, especially in the context of growing social and economic turmoil. Although today it is difficult to believe such a scenario could develop, it is necessary to remember that the majority of China’s history consists of periods of civil strife.

It is also worth noting that no change in the political regime or democratic system that Western or Chinese opposition experts consider to be a cure for corruption will actually help combat corruption, but would practically guarantee a loss of controllability of the country, with all its consequences.

Roman Pogorelov, journalist, orientalist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The fact that the CNSC is a coordinating body of the Central Committee of the CPC to address and discuss issues of national security and reports directly to the Politburo and the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPC has allowed some experts to compare it with the National Security Council of various other countries such as the USA and Russia. But it is worth noting that despite the similar structure, the Committee is likely to have more authority and responsibility, while the activities of the Security Council are primarily of an auxiliary and advisory nature.

In fact, the tasks to be performed by the CNSC have been clearly laid out by Xi Jinping himself. The primary function of the Committee, as its name implies, is to protect national security, which in turn, in the words of the leader of the PRC, ensures political and social stability. To do this, the country’s leadership will need to pay particular attention, first of all, to the fight against terrorism, extremism, and separatism. These are the three areas of activity for the CNSC according to the spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Qin Gang.

The very existence of the Chinese state has always depended on two components. First – the degree to which the ruling circles provided unity and integrity of power (political security), and second – how this power nourishes relationships with the people (social security).

Problems in the social sphere are particularly painful for the PRC’s leadership due to the large population and certain national characteristics of the Chinese that manifest in noticeable impulsivity and a propensity to be socially influenced. In other words, the Chinese are quite susceptible to trends, and don’t necessarily delve into the essence of an issue. Chinese collectivism plays no small part in this.

In addition to well-known problems with the environment, corruption, and employment, a no less serious factor is the stratification of society, i.e. the widening income gap between rich and poor. One of the main indicators of income inequality is the Gini coefficient, which has not been published for China in 12 years and was only declassified in 2013. According to official statistics, in 2008 the ratio peaked at 0.49. It since declined to 0.47 in 2011 and currently remains within these limits. Nevertheless, such data are not entirely consistent with other sources. The Southwest University of Finance and Economics in Chengdu conducted its own studies in 2010. According to its results, the coefficient was 0.6 at that time. Similar figures have been given by international organizations and foreign experts regarding the current situation in China. A coefficient of 0.4 is considered to be potentially dangerous and could lead to unrest and riots.

All this cannot but worry the Chinese leadership, but it is far-fetched to hope that the authorities will begin to rebuild the entire system, in order to resolve the causes of social unrest. They are more likely to engage in “putting out fires” and preventing new “fires”. The CNSC was created for these reasons (hence the increased attention to the problems of terrorism, extremism, and separatism). In general, this tactic makes sense and allows more serious threats to be avoided, especially when taking into consideration the fact that any changes to the existing order are likely to lead to a loss of control over the situation. And this is absolutely unacceptable in terms of the ongoing struggle between various clans within the CPC itself.

For today’s leaders of the PRC, one of the primary goals in creating the CNSC is to centralize power and strengthen their faction’s position in the CPC. Without control over the security forces, which traditionally have a huge impact on the internal political life of the country, accomplishing this task would be extremely difficult.

In terms of total capabilities, the CNSC surpasses even the Political and Legal Commission of the Central Committee of the CPC, which until recently played a fundamental role in maintaining public order. The Commission oversaw the courts, prisons, and security agencies, which includes a total of approximately 1.5 million employees, which is equal to half the size of the Chinese army. Until 2012 it was headed by one of the main rivals of Xi Jinping, Zhou Yongkang, who also headed the Ministry of Public Security from 2002 to 2007. He was an ally of the disgraced functionary Bo Xilai, and is considered the instigator of the intra-party struggle against the nomination of Xi Jinping to the post of General Secretary of the CPC. All this predetermined the fate of Zhou Yongkang.

Also important is the fact that in addition to maintaining internal order, the Committee will deal with issues of foreign security. This clearly indicates that the Chinese are well aware that their internal problems often have external sources.

The CNSC speaks to the authorities’ understanding that only the unity and integrity of the ruling circles of the CPC and maintaining a calm social situation in the country will be able to guarantee the security of the state. Xi Jinping himself commented on the conditions under which the new power structure of China must operate: “The tasks of the National Security Committee domestically and abroad are now more extensive than at any other time in history, the scope of security work, both in space and in time, is greater than ever before, and the problems of national security domestically and abroad are now more complex than ever before.”

Roman Pogorelov, journalist, orientalist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

As a legacy of such a turbulent history, modern China has a strongly expressed heterogeneity in terms of political, economic, social, and cultural factors. This is evident even in the administrative division of the PRC, where almost half the territory of the entire state is autonomous. This fact is not perfectly obvious until you consider that China has a multi-tier system of national autonomy. In addition to the five autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang, Guangxi, and Ningxia Hui), which are easy to find on a map of the administrative and territorial division of the PRC, there are plenty of autonomous districts, counties, and ethnic townships, included in various provinces. All these regions became part of the Chinese state at different times, and to this day the process of assimilating the indigenous population has not been completed.

The cultural core of the Middle Kingdom, ethnic Chinese, do not look much more homogeneous themselves. Just look at the distribution of Chinese dialects on a map. They largely reflect the various Chinese governments that once existed on these lands, and warred with one another. The difference in dialects is so great that many linguists consider them to be separate languages, since speakers of different dialects cannot understand one another when speaking in their native tongues.

In addition to the ethnic and cultural differences, there is the glaring issue of the unequal economic development of different regions of the PRC, which risks socially destabilizing the country. The wealthier southern and eastern coastal provinces differ from central and western China not only in income levels, but also in economic specialization and lifestyle. All this leads to the emergence of multiple relatively isolated “economies” within the country that are potentially capable of becoming the basis for separate states. Respect should be paid to the government of the Middle Kingdom, which is aware of the danger of the situation, and is attempting to address the current imbalance. However, the problem lies in in the fact that it is this inequality that was to serve as the basis for the country’s economic development, when special economic zones aimed at the export of manufactured goods were created in the coastal provinces. And if the government of the PRC wants to continue to maintain acceptable rates of GDP growth, it will have to continue to invest money primarily in these provinces.

Existing regional differences in the development of the Middle Kingdom are well explained by the theory that there are multiple Chinese civilizations. Its proponents argue that China’s worldview is divided between two civilizations: an active “oceanic” one that is capable of creation and chance, and a conservative, narrow “continental” one. The “continental” civilization refers to Central China, while the “oceanic” one refers to the southern and eastern coastal provinces. This theory allows us to identify one of the key historical and cultural contradictions of the Chinese people.

In essence, it is a reflection of the ancient Chinese concept of “Taiji” (Great Ultimate) and the well-known black and white symbol of the “Yin-Yang”. And from this point of view, it is very important how harmoniously the two opposing parts interact, since the integrity of the entire Middle Kingdom depends on it.

In most conversations about the unity of China, the majority of pundits point to the problem of Tibet or Xinjiang, seeing ethnic conflict as the main reason for a potential collapse of the PRC. But the question of the Chinese core’s integrity is much more important. To maintain its unity, Beijing is perfectly capable of using force alone to keep individual problem regions part of the Middle Kingdom. And a completely different picture emerges in the case of intra-Chinese civil strife, when a struggle for power will ensue.

Historically, only a single, centralized power has been able to keep the Chinese state from collapsing. For this reason, the leadership of the PRC is faced with the urgent issue of controlling regional Chinese clans, especially in developed regions. This that is where local elites, using a more liberal economic and political regime, have significantly greater capabilities (as well as ambitions) to convert their position and capital into real power, albeit only within their own provinces.

The confrontation between central power and regional clans is especially dangerous considering the growth of external political conflicts with the USA, which is able to use the internal conflicts of its enemy to its advantage. The proverb is worth noting that two Chinese can agree among themselves against a foreigner more easily than the latter can argue with the Chinese. Nevertheless the West does seem prepared to make some attempts in this direction. For instance, in October 2013 an interesting report was published by the political scientist William Antholis, managing director of the Brookings Institute, one of the leading think tanks in the USA, under the title “New Players on the World Stage: Chinese Provinces and Indian States”. In 2012 the author completed a tour of China and India, during which he held a series of meetings with regional leaders, studying their psychology and views on their place in the power structure of the government, as well as how they see their tole in the country’s future. According to the results of his dialogs with the Chinese, the American researcher notes that a regional official, in performing his/her direct duties, concentrates a great deal of real power in his/her hands. At the same time, the more affluent officials in south China wield more authority than their northern colleagues. In his report William Antholis recommends that the USA refrain from aligning foreign policy with India and China through their capitals. “America needs to understand the needs and dynamic interests of regional leaders in these two countries and build direct relationships with them, just as is done with individual EU countries today, for example.”

Roman Pogorelov, journalist, orientalist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

For simplicity’s sake one can essentially equate the first group of elite heading up the People’s Republic of China with the Communist Party of China. Naturally various clans and factions within the party fight for power, but in general the communist party makes up a relatively unified and integrated force. Now this force has no rivals in mainland China. The second group is more heterogeneous. Taiwanese elite and various organizations form its nucleus which unites Chinese diasporas from around the world. Despite the fact that the second China possesses dramatically less resources and manpower, it has an extensive network of contacts (both between Chinese people and people of other nationalities) connecting them with the outside world. In terms of its capabilities and quality this group of Chinese elite can go toe-to-toe with the Communist Party of China.

In 1949, when the government of the Republic of China fled to Taiwan, the whole network of organizations (including secret ones) created in various areas around the world for putting up resistance against the Manchurian Qin dynasty wound up being cut off from mainland China. The Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party), which established its home base in Taiwan, had close ties with Chinese diasporas from the day it was founded. In 1894 Sun Yat-sen founded the Revive China society in Honolulu which became the first Chinese revolutionary organization. A branch of the Revive China society, called the Chinese Alliance, was formed in Japan in 1905, while in 1912 the Kuomintang came into being due to the Chinese Alliance teaming up with other political organizations. It should come as no surprise that the party managed to maintain constant contact with Chinese people living abroad who eventually wound up facilitating trade with the People’s Republic of China, as well as helping Taiwan become one of Asia’s tigers.

Thus, in 1949 the Middle Kingdom split in half (de-facto) kicking off the first stage of the relationship between Beijing and Taipei. This stage, which lasted until 1978, was primarily characterized by mutual rejection and sharp confrontation as well as the elite practically isolating themselves from each other. Each country decided to go its own way, while formally declaring that one unified state existed.

During this period, Taiwan, using all of its connections, as well as the geopolitical confrontation between these two major world hegemonies, managed to industrialize and bring its economy to a new level, passing many of its neighbors in terms of development. Meanwhile, as a result of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution China was on the brink of disaster. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, which envisaged opening up part of mainland China for joint use, enabled China to avoid collapse. So-called special economic zones, capitalist enclaves controlled by the communist party of China, were established in coastal provinces. The laws of the market economy were in place, which allowed China to attract foreign investment (primarily capital from ‘overseas’ Chinese). From this point on the elite of the People’s Republic of China begin to convert their economy into state capitalism with a leading role being given to the Communist Party of China. For mainland China the invaluable experience accrued by the Taiwanese and Huaqiao on conducting international business, as well as their communication channels around the world to create their own corporations, was particularly important.

So, after proclaiming the policy of reform and openness a new page was written in their relationship (between the two groups of Chinese elite). Beijing and Taipei gradually built a political dialogue while establishing and expanding economic ties. It should be noted that the actual share of Taiwanese investment in mainland China is not great, but official statistics on China-Taiwan economic and trade relations are unlikely to reflect the real situation. The problem is that capital is often invested in mainland special economic zones through third countries, primarily through the Virgin Islands, Singapore and especially Hong Kong, which plays a unique role in the economic relations between China and Taiwan. Also, many companies involved in trade are based in Taiwan and other Southeast Asian countries, therefore in the official records their investment funds appear to be Huaqiao.

While mainland China received investments and access to technology, while also using Taiwanese know-how, Taiwan built up its own export-oriented economy by moving powerful heavy machinery onto the continent and switching over to high-tech products. In fact, the People’s Republic of China directly contributed to the development and modernization of the island’s economy. The “foreign” Chinese elite was able to gain a foothold on the mainland and renew lost ties with the coastal provinces, where many clans of that group came from.

Now it is appropriate to mention another aspect of separation between the Chinese elites. Civilization differences. There is a theory developed by Japanese scientists, according to which China in terms of its worldview is divided into two civilizations: an active, oceanic one capable of creation and change and a conservative and stagnant one, the continental part. Geographically, the continental civilization includes central and western provinces of China, in turn, the oceanic one takes up almost all the maritime coastal provinces of China and Taiwan. Of course, the Japanese use this framework for their own interest, emphasizing the similarities of Japanese and Chinese oceanic civilization, thus justifying the need for increased co-operation in this part of China. But in general, this theory seems quite reasonable and helps to explain the many historical and cultural contradictions of the Chinese people.

According to this approach, the communist party of China more so embodies continental Chinese civilization, while “overseas” and Taiwanese elites are oceanic. In terms of territory this is all the east coast of mainland China which is now a shared zone between the two Chinas. This explains the great interest the “ocean” elite has in spreading its influence in the region.

To date, a substantial portion of the clans in both groups of Chinese elite are in favor of uniting both Chinas, but each of the groups is hoping to take control politically of the new Great China. And each side has quite legitimate grounds for making such a claim. But the fear of losing existing power makes the elite take great caution in this matter. For example, a reunion may have irreparable consequences for the communist party of China. It’s very risky business to join the fight for power with such an experienced opponent like the Taiwanese elite especially when the struggle between existing clans in the communist party of China is heated. It looks like this is well understood in the Communist Party itself, so China is trying to impose the same model for Taiwan that has been set up for Hong Kong and Macao—one country, two systems. While the local rulers are afforded unique privileges and they are able to use their resources, Beijing has full control of their involvement in the government. Of course, this subservient option does not suit the Taiwanese elite, as they will be politically isolated and not get any real power. However, as an intermediate step on the way to recreating Great China, such developments are quite possible.

In Taiwan itself the issue at hand is the elite’s obvious split into two camps. While the blue coalition led by the Kuomintang seeks to reunite China, the green coalition led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is in favor of a formal declaration of independence of the island. Kuomintang, which under the one-party system once single-handedly ruled the island and is an implacable enemy of the communist party of China, in recent decades has done much for rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei. This is the part of the Taiwanese elite that is ready to fight for power throughout the Middle Kingdom as it has historical justification for doing so. But judging by recent events in Taiwan, where the DPP could bring more than 100,000 people to the streets of the capital to protest against the ratification of the economic agreement with mainland China and block the work of parliament, this group is capable and determined.

One should note that foreign forces interested in containing the communist party of China also oppose the unification of China. The fact of the matter is that Great China with its enormous resources and human capital on the one hand and extensive connections worldwide on the other is a much more serious geopolitical opponent. It’s highly unlikely that the USA would like this, as it claims to be the world’s sole leader.

If one analyzes the situation as a whole, we can say that the two Chinas, albeit slowly, are constantly moving towards each other. Sooner or later they will have to become united, but at the moment it is not completely clear on what foundation this process will occur. In the spirit of the Chinese, as they are born merchants, the Taiwanese model with its market economy is more familiar (this is more for the residents of the coastal provinces most of whom belong to the oceanic civilization, which today drives China’s economy), but a strong, centralized state with a united and strong government is essential to preserving the unity of China. You have to understand that Western-style democracy for China means almost one hundred percent death by disintegration of the state. Historically, only monolithic authoritarian leadership managed to unite and keep the country intact after a long string of civil wars and internecine.

Today, only the communist party of China can assume such leadership, even given all its internal troubles. For reunification of Great China and keeping it from decay the “continental” elite has to decide a daunting task: it has to successfully perform liberal reforms in favor of trade (domestic and foreign), while preventing the collapse of the state and remaining in power without losing to its opponents, who are now non-existent, but who will appear as “ocean” elites when combining China.

Time will tell how attainable this is, and whether it’s worth the hassle.

Roman Pogorelov, journalist, Asian studies scholar, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The main such instrument is soft power as a form of political influence, which makes it possible to accomplish the desired goals through voluntary participation, sympathy and appeal. The author of this concept, American political scientist Joseph Nye, emphasises that a country’s language and culture are its soft power, which plays a key role in international relations through affecting, directly or indirectly, world politics. It is obvious that a state seeking to play the role of the global leader or at least of one of the world’s poles is bound to be a subject and not an object of the use of soft power.

While transforming its economic gains into greater political weight, the Celestial Empire began giving attention to such foreign policy instruments as soft power.The 4th Plenum of the 16th CPC Central Committee, which was held in September 2004, set a task of spreading Chinese culture outwards in order to strengthen the overall power of China, promote Chinese culture and increase its international influence. One of the elements of the practical implementation of this programme was setting up worldwide centres called the Confucius Institutes to promote the Chinese language and culture, as well as holding the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing. However, despite the country’s obvious economic successes and its victories in international politics, which are more controversial, the PRC’s position remains rather weak when it comes to promoting its culture and vision of the world order.

The problem is that, at this stage, China’s ideological arsenal does not contain so-called ‘universal values’ that it could offer the world. Without questioning the ancientness, distinctiveness and richness of Chinese culture, it should be noted that, historically, the Chinese philosophical thought has always been directed inwards, at the Chinese themselves, and not outwards. For this reason, a universal, generally accepted world-view system could not emerge, but it is very difficult to talk of global dominance when such an important component is missing. When the Chinese announced building socialism with Chinese specific characteristics, they even managed to confine to their country such international ideas as communism and socialism, which could have potentially promoted the PRC’s interests in other countries.

Many of those who disagree with the policy of the United States as the main voice expressing Western values are trying to find an alternative to them, and, as an option, they often propose China, with its “five principles of peaceful coexistence” and “Beijing Consensus”. But, interestingly, all neighbouring nations, who have first-hand knowledge of the Chinese and Chinese values, do not particularly like them and, therefore, display rather a hostile attitude to Beijing’s foreign policy in the region. And the PRC’s increasing power makes this hostility grow. Of great importance here is the fact that for centuries the Chinese have viewed their state as the centre of the world and the neighbouring countries – as vassals and, as a result, the uncompromising and rather aggressive foreign policy. While Joseph Nye claims that China’s soft power is in the Chinese dream, prominent Singaporean scholar Simon Tay argues: “No one in Asia wants to live in a Chinese-dominated world. There is no Chinese dream to which people aspire.”

Chinese culture is virtually non-adaptive for other peoples. It can be adopted only by the assimilated Chinese like it happened in the case of the Manchu and the Vietnamese, 60% of whose vocabulary today account for Chinese words. Some cultural influence and borrowing of certain elements, such as the writing system, can be observed, for example, among the Japanese and the Koreans despite their deep-rooted mutual hostility. But this is probably due to the unique ability of these peoples, like the Chinese as well, to adopt everything advanced and embed it into their own culture in a harmonious manner, without being afraid to lose their own cultural identity. Besides, the Japanese and the Koreans had no alternative anyway since their communication with the outside world had always been through the Celestial Empire and experienced a Chinese impact. This was the case, for example, with Japanese Zen Buddhism, which stems from Chinese Ch’an Buddhism formed under the influence of Taoist life philosophy.

But as for the peoples of South-Eastern Asia, there was an alternative available to them and they used it willingly. The Thais, the Khmer and the Malays have always experienced the cultural influence of India despite their close relationship with China. In the countries of South-Eastern Asia, the ethnic Chinese often account for nearly a quarter of the population, for example like in the case of Malaysia, so they often have full control over the economy of these countries and play a significant role in it. At the same time, Chinese culture has no effect on the indigenous population at all and remains the domain only of the Chinese themselves, who are in this sense a pretty closed community. In Indonesia, for example, the ethnic Chinese virtually live in a parallel world, which is very different in terms of living standards. They have their own schools and universities which enrol only those who come from Chinese families. The ethnic Chinese have their own shops and entertainment centres where you won’t see many Indonesians. There are mosques which were built specifically for Chinese Muslims. And all of the above does not prevent them from having control over the entire business in the country, from small shops to large companies.

It is obvious that in Eastern and South-Eastern Asia China should use its soft power most effectively because here the influence of Chinese culture is the highest. Besides, these regions have the largest proportion of Chinese Huaqiao immigrants – carriers of original culture. However, the PRC cannot use these advantages to influence the neighbouring states’ policies. It is rather the other way round: all of this plays against the Chinese leading to the rejection of both culture and policies pursued by Beijing.

The problems of the image in Asia can be justified by the historic imperial ambitions of the Celestial Empire and the neighbouring peoples’ fear to be conquered and assimilated by the Chinese, which cannot be said about Africa, where China arrived quite recently, at the beginning of the 21st century, at the height of its popularity.

Interested, in the first place, in African resources and the sales market for its products, the PRC made investments in mining and infrastructure projects and did not impose political conditions on local governments, unlike the Americans and the Europeans. The Chinese focused on cultural ties by allowing the Africans to study in the Celestial Empire on a number of training programmes at the expense of the PRC government. Besides, the Chinese opened educational institutions to train specialists, mainly in technical fields, in Africa itself. All of this was, obviously, received very positively by the governments of the “black” continent. But soon it became clear that, in the pursuit of resources, China has reduced Africa to a raw material appendage and is no different in this respect from the West, whilst the influx of cheap Chinese imports does not allow these countries to develop their own industry. Chinese investments are not coming through the local governments. They are allocated directly to the Chinese companies operating in Africa. It is being done this way supposedly to combat corruption in the field, but in fact China simply lends to its own companies. Considerable damage is caused to the PRC’s image by the influx of Chinese migrants, including illegal immigrants. The Africans are not happy that a large number of specialists are brought in from the Celestial Empire, whilst local sellers are being squeezed out by Chinese street vendors. The situation is exacerbated by the traditional desire of the Chinese to live in isolation, without maintaining close contact with the indigenous population.

Thus, having failed to offer the African states anything new and having just played the role of yet another neocoloniser, China’s popularity in Africa is dropping, and its capabilities to influence the global processes are reducing as well. Of course, no one is going to stop cooperation with Beijing, even more so because China’s terms are often more attractive than those of Europe or the US, but in the eyes of the Africans the Celestial Empire ceases to be an alternative to the West and is gradually becoming just another partner. Given the shortage of soft power, China increasingly resorts to the use of hard power to protect its interests in Africa. So far it has been done under the guise of peacekeeping missions, Beijing’s participation in which has increased substantially in recent years.

The prospects for the PRC’s use of its soft power in other regions of the world seem to be even more obscure. There is an interest in China as an investor and a trading partner in different parts of the world, but there are not many of those who are willing to emulate it, change their own identity or align their foreign policy with Beijing. In Russia, the US and Europe, they obviously know how to “separate the wheat from the chaff”, hence while developing cultural, economic and political cooperation with China, at the same time they successfully compete with it in all fields. Thus, the Celestial Empire’s cultural influence on such subjects of international relations is not really noteworthy.

Another serious obstacle to the cultural expansion and strengthening of China as a world leader is the Chinese language itself. It is unlikely that it will be able to become a language of international communication, like European languages. For example, the Chinese language is quite rarely used at regional and international conferences despite the fact that it is one of the six official languages of the UN. The presence of four tones as well as a whole range of sounds which most foreigners would find difficult to tell apart hinders learning spoken Chinese. In turn, the Chinese writing system requires of you to memorise a few thousand hieroglyphs, and that takes a lot of time. Moreover, unlike the alphabet, hieroglyphs can be soon forgotten, which has been confirmed by the Chinese themselves. All of this turns mastering Chinese into a long and laborious process. Opening the Confucius Institutes around the world and attracting international students to learn the language in China will undoubtedly increase the number of translators and sinologists but will hardly change the situation fundamentally. Today’s fascination with the Chinese language is largely a fashionable trend which is going to diminish in the future, particularly taking into consideration the pace of learning English by the Chinese themselves. In other words, the world community will not start speaking Chinese even in a remote perspective.

Of course, there is no point in denying the fact that in recent years the interest in China, its culture and language has increased around the world, including the West, but this should not be classed as an achievement of Beijing’s cultural policy. This popularity is more likely due to the PRC’s economic success, the desire to attract Chinese investors, as well as due to the hopes placed in it by many of those who got disappointed in the West and are looking for ways out of the current crisis. However, the Celestial Empire hardly has anything to offer. Because of its complex language and peculiar culture, that can be carried only by the Chinese themselves and that is rejected by other peoples, China is restricted in the use of soft power, in its socio-cultural aspect, and therefore it virtually loses a very important mechanism for influencing international policies, which greatly undermines its claims to world leadership.

Roman Pogorelov, journalist, orientalist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

To understand the logic of Chinese intentions, it is first necessary to consider the format in which Beijing will build its relations with the major geopolitical players: the EU, U.S. and Russia. Obviously, each of the parties will seek to enlist the support of China. Nevertheless, the question is – what China itself wants at the moment?

One cannot overestimate the importance of the European tour that Xi Jinping is making these days. The interest of both parties in establishing trade and economic relations is very high, especially given the fact that China remains the second largest trading partner of the EU. Above all, Europeans are trying to attract Chinese investments to stimulate their economies, which are in recession. China, as always, needs markets for its products (despite the stated refocusing on domestic demand, foreign markets are its targets, so far), and advanced Western technologies to ensure transition to an innovative model of economic development, as a pledge of the future welfare of China. Another important issue for China is to increase the role of the Yuan in international transactions, which, in the long term, will lead to its free convertibility. Now, this is mainly done through bilateral currency swap agreements, but the UK’s stand on this issue could significantly change the situation in favor of Beijing. According to the British Finance Minister George Osborne, London is going to become a global center for trade and investment in the Chinese currency. Work in this direction is very active, as evidenced by the results of visits to China Cameron and Osborne in the autumn and winter of 2013.

In general, the whole line of China’s European long-term policy aims at the creation of a Sino-European free trade area, which will become the foundation for joint development and mutual stimulation. A key role in this process is assigned to the UK.

In this context, it is particularly worth mentioning the Chinese projects – the Maritime Silk Road and Silk Road of the 21st century, which have things in common with European plans to establish a free trade zone stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, announced in March 2014 by Stefan Fule, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy. Wang Ivey, professor at the Institute of International Relations of the People’s University of China, Deputy Director of the Research Center of the EU, believes: “If there is an opportunity to combine efforts, then Sino-European cooperation will bring Eurasian integration, and will give a new meaning to globalization.”

It is unlikely that Eurasian integration in this format will serve the interests of Russia, for which this direction of foreign policy is paramount. An alternative project, linking together the East and West, given the huge potential of China and the EU could leave Russia out of the picture.

Americans decided to approach the issue of building their relationship with China from another angle. They are actively using “soft” diplomacy, playing on Chinese pride, and this factor should not be underestimated. By sending on a tour of China, the entire female half of Obama’s family, the U.S. is pursuing a clear goal – to enlist the sympathy of the Chinese people. The USA is trying to use all the available means to win over the PRC to their side, given that there are many more problems in the relations between China and the United States. Beijing and Washington consider each other as the main rivals. Americans fear that China will challenge them in the struggle for world leadership, while the Chinese, in their turn, accuse the U.S. of pursuing a containment policy aimed against China. That is the way the U.S. position on the priority of their interests in the Asia Pacific Region is regarded. China is extremely concerned about the intensification of Washington’s activities, primarily in Southeast Asia, as this region is the “throat” through which China imports and exports its products. The U.S., unlike Britain, does not welcome the strengthening of the role of the Yuan in international trade, rightly seeing it as a threat to the dollar. Despite the close relationship of the two leading economies of the world, the U.S. is jealously protecting its advanced technologies, which are one of its main advantages in the modern world. This, in particular, is reflected in the establishment of trade barriers and export restrictions on high-tech products to China. The confrontation with Washington on all the key issues for Beijing, from the territorial conflict with Japan to the situation in Tibet (this February, Obama had a meeting with the Dalai Lama, and in this connection, China expressed an official protest), clearly does not contribute to the convergence of foreign policy positions of the two countries.

Another blow to US-China relations was made before the meeting of Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, held on March 24, 2014, during the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague. The media revealed information that the U.S. National Security Agency had spied on the Chinese telecom giant Huawei, on the former leaders, including Hu Jintao, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, as well as on the banks. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei immediately demanded an explanation from the United States on this issue. Due to this story the American president, who hoped to enlist the support of the PRC on the Ukrainian question, was placed in an awkward situation. As a result, Xi Jinping has only confirmed the immutability of the “fair and objective” position of his country on the issue of Ukraine, which is – “advocating a political solution to the crisis”.

This formulation rather plays into the hands of Russia than into those of the West, which expected to hear from Beijing a condemnation of Russian actions in Crimea. China also abstained during the vote on the Ukrainian issue in the UN Security Council. Moscow has blocked the adoption of this resolution, using its veto, but given the fact that all the other 13 member states of the Council voted “for”, China’s position may be well regarded as a support of the Russian Federation, albeit indirect. Of course, China could not openly support Russia, as it did in the case of Syria, in view of its own problematic territories, such as Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as the unresolved Taiwan issue.

If the West has already begun actively to persuade China to move to its side, Russia is saving its trump cards until May of this year, when we will see what its opponents have been actually able to achieve. Putin’s visit to China is scheduled for May 2014. Undoubtedly, this event is of great importance for the development of bilateral relations, but it is especially worth noting that during this visit, they are expected to sign a contract for the supply of Russian gas to China. They have been negotiating the deal for a long time, but the main stumbling block was the price of the fuel. Minister-Counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow Zhang Di pointed out that “the signing of the contract during the visit of Russian President to China in May is quite possible.” With all the caution and careful approaches, this agreement is equally beneficial to both parties. China, of course, is interested in reliable energy supplies for its giant economy. In addition, it will be much easier to ensure the security of such supplies from the continent. For Russia, attracting a reliable consumer of its hydrocarbons, in this case China, is more than topical, especially after Obama’s statements on the possibility of providing Europe with American gas. And although, as experts say, for purely technical reasons, the West will not be able to fully realize these promises earlier than in 2020, Russia today needs to think of new partners in the energy sector, which it could rely on in case of further deterioration of relations with the EU.

It is worth noting that the West, especially given its position on the Ukrainian issue, has done much to accelerate convergence between Russia and China, whose relations had been dynamically and positively developing before this. Russia was the first country visited by Xi Jinping as head of the PRC, which in diplomatic language speaks about the priority of this direction in Beijing’s policy. However, few experts paid attention to another visit of China’s leader. It is very important that Xi Jinping arrived for the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in Sochi, at the moment when China itself was celebrating the Chinese New Year. It must be remembered that at this time of the year, the Chinese visit only relatives and their closest friends, and in China, they attach great importance to this.

At the moment, China, which openly supports a multipolar world, is interested in strengthening Russian positions, which will significantly undermine Washington’s leadership on the world stage. Nevertheless, Beijing would not dare to make an open alliance with Moscow against the West. First of all, China is not going to risk its economic relations with the EU and U.S., which are likely to worsen substantially. The second reason for the denial of such a position is not so obvious, but it is much more important for the whole world. The thing is that by adhering to any of the parties involved in the present confrontation, China would effectively form the basis for a military and political alliance – China-Russia against the U.S.-EU, or China-U.S.-EU against Russia, which would move all the geopolitical balance of forces towards pre-war conditions. And at this stage, China does not need a war, or any international sanctions. Such a development would not suit the CPC’s announced goal of pursuing a path towards the construction of a moderately prosperous society (Xiaokang) by 2020. Moreover, China is now entering a period of reforms, and international stability is extremely important to it at this time. Therefore, Beijing is insisting on a peaceful political settlement of the conflict over Ukraine and Crimea. At the same time, it is not so important for China in whose favor this dispute will be resolved – the main thing is to prevent military actions and to minimize the penalties that would make trade and economic ties more complicated.

Today, globalization, primarily economic, is profitable for China, even more than for the West, which promoted it to their advantage. Based on this, we can assume that China will further develop mutually beneficial trade with all the international players, supporting the existing geopolitical balance of power, but directing its efforts to gradually reduce the role of the United States and strengthen the role of Russia and the EU.

Roman Pogorelov, journalist, orientalist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

Chinese diasporas are among the most numerous and well organized diasporas in the world. There is a special term “Huaqiao” (overseas Chinese) to indicate the ethnic Chinese living outside of China. There are about 50 million overseas Chinese all over the world and about 75% of them are concentrated in South-East Asia.

The Chinese themselves were not actively engaged in the colonization of the neighboring countries. The growth in the numbers of the overseas Chinese began with the arrival of Europeans in the region. The main wave of Chinese migration occurred in the 19th century, when the future overseas Chinese moved in search of a better life to the countries of their current residence, as Coolie workers for European colonies and metropolises. Usually it was the Chinese triads that supplied the cheap labor force (and controlled it later on) mainly from the coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, and that is why the current overseas Chinese speak various southern dialects of the Chinese language: Cantonese, Hakka or South Manchuria dialects.

Gradually, thanks to their innate thirst for business activities and a well-established system of mutual assistance, the Chinese began to carry on successful businesses, which gave them an opportunity to improve their wealth and social status significantly. Today, the overseas Chinese are considered the most educated part of the population in some countries and, in addition, they own most of the businesses, remaining an entirely isolated national minority at the same time. Even partially assimilated ethnic Chinese can be clearly distinguished from the local community thanks to the system of ties (guangxi), family structure and business organization.

All these facts make many researchers consider the Chinese diaspora as potential conductors of China’s foreign policy, a kind of the fifth column having huge opportunities to influence the policy of the countries that gave shelter to them. Sometimes they even express a view that China has a de facto control over some countries through their economies, which are in the hands of the overseas Chinese. Primarily this may especially apply to the Southeast Asia region, where the positions of the overseas Chinese are stronger than most other places.

In order to understand to what extent the Heavenly Empire can use the ethnic Chinese to promote its interests in other states, we should consider two important questions. First, what are the relations between China and the overseas Chinese? And second, how can the overseas Chinese actually influence the policies of their residence countries?

It would be fundamentally wrong to deny completely the existence of ties between Beijing and the Chinese diasporas around the world. However, these ties are very specific. Initially, the Communist Party of China (CPC) considered overseas Chinese as accomplices of the capitalists, and the attitude towards them was appropriate. However, after Deng Xiaoping proclaimed “the policy of reforms and openness” in the 1970s, the Heavenly Empire faced the problem of attracting investments. Under these conditions, it was the overseas Chinese, or rather their money, that played a very important role in the rise of China. Today, China pays careful attention to establishing relationships with the overseas Chinese in its foreign policy.

This direction is supervised by the Zhigongdang of China (Zhongguo Zhigongdang), one of the eight legally recognized political parties in China, which has long established ties with the Chinese diasporas. The party was founded in 1925 in San Francisco and is a direct heir to one of the branches of the Society of Heaven and Earth (Tiandihui) – a Chinese anti-Manchu secret organization that was one of the key forces supporting Sun Yat-sen and seeking to overthrow the Qing Dynasty.

Another branch of this organization is the Three Harmonies Society (Sanhehui), better known as the Triad. Initially being a patriotic anti-Qing organization, the Triad became a common name for all secret societies and underground structures operating in the British colonies (especially in Hong Kong), and later it became a synonym for Chinese organized crime. It should be noted that it is really very difficult, sometimes even impossible, to separate the legal and criminal components in the activities of such organizations, however, not all secret societies were or are exclusively criminal organizations. Some of them became the basis of several Chinese political parties, including the Kuomintang and the already mentioned Zhigongdang. It were societies like the Tiandihui, delivering Chinese migrants from mainland China to European colonies that played a key role in spreading the overseas Chinese, organizing them into communities, Chinatowns, tongs and triads, as well as maintaining ties between them. Today, these organizations maintain the clan system of society in the Chinese diasporas, which was traditional in the pre-communist China (Liang Qichao, one of the founders of the concept of a single Chinese nation that guided Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek, pointed out the clan consciousness of the Chinese back in the early twentieth century). And while the PRC actively fought against the clan system in creating a single Chinese nation, the overseas Chimes have maintain this structure until the present.

And it is perhaps the main contradiction between the current Chinese government in terms of the CPC and the Chinese diasporas that, thanks to the self-isolation, these societies are well-organized inside and have close ties with each other and with Taiwan (Taipei has never lost its ties with diasporas and even provided places in the parliament of the Republic of China for them). The overseas Chinese actually are in the opposition to the PRC, as they always supported nationalist and democratic parties rather than the communists.

The Zhigongdang of China is the link between the Communist Party and the overseas Chinese. Probably it is no mere coincidence that Wan Gang, the head of this party, heads the Ministry of Science and Technology of China now, being the first non-member of the CPC as a minister since the 1950s. At this stage, China needs advanced innovative technologies, the development of which could take decades, but the access to which may be provided by former compatriots living abroad. And it is not simply a desire of the overseas Chinese to help their historic homeland. The thing is that these high-tech projects will be implemented primarily in special economic zones, and first of all it will be the overseas Chinese who will benefit from them, because they were first to invest into these capitalist enclaves. Best of all, this situation was described by Li Lanqing – the first Vice-Premier of the State Council of the PRC in 1998-2003, one of the initiators of the policy of reforms and openness, who worked at the State Foreign Investment Administrative Commission at that time. In his book entitled “Breakthrough. The Early Opening of the Door”, he quoted a senior official responsible for attracting foreign Chinese into special economic zones, who noted that “there is no need to appeal to their patriotism, just let them smell money”.

Often the fact that the overseas Chinese control much of the economies in Southeast Asian countries is misleading to many experts, who believe that this way the Chinese can influence the foreign policy in their countries of residence and Beijing could potentially use it to its advantage. However, the truth is that even in those countries where the Chinese are represented in the politics by their parties or individuals, their activities are limited solely to the protection of their own interests (primarily business), since they are a minority, and the tolerance of the local population often leaves much to be desired.

For example, in Malaysia, where the Chinese Association of Malaysia, one of the three main political forces in the country, was established with the support of the Kuomintang in 1949, the overseas Chinese just try to protect the rights and welfare of the Chinese population, whose share is being reduced, but they do not sympathize with China. Any attempts to influence the foreign policy of the country of residence are likely to result in increased anti-Chinese sentiment, which could lead to pogroms, ethnic cleansing and force the Chinese to move to other countries. Just as it happened in 1965-66 in Indonesia, where the fight against the Communists acquired a distinct ethnic component, since most overseas Chinese were considered accomplices or members of the Communist Party of Indonesia that stood for rapprochement with China. All these facts determined the nature of anti-Chinese policies of the Republic of Indonesia for three decades. In 1998, many Chinese were forced to flee to neighboring countries of Southeast Asia, primarily to Singapore, because of pogroms, taking about 80 billion U.S. dollars with them.

Thus, we should not overestimate the role of the overseas Chinese in China’s policies. The overseas Chinese have never sought to control the policy of the countries they live in. They live such an isolated life that we can speak of a state within a state in a way. This internal Chinese “state” has its own structure, hierarchy of authority, distribution of spheres of influence, and it also maintains relations with the Chinese diasporas in other countries. This policy of self-isolation, on the one hand, allows the overseas Chinese to preserve their identity, but on the other hand, it makes them an inefficient tool to influence other countries. At the same time, the relations between China and the overseas Chinese are based on business cooperation and actually have no political component. The CPC heading the Heavenly Empire now and the societies controlling Chinese diasporas were and still are political antagonists.

However, politics has never prevented the Chinese from doing business.

Roman Pogorelov, journalist, orientalist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

In the era of globalization there’s hardly a State that is not influenced by another cultures. Modern China has not escaped this fate as well. At this point proliferation of western values in Chinese society should be mentioned. Apparently, liberal reforms of Deng Xiaoping were not in vain, because today’s China is now far from those communist ideals introduced into the public consciousness by Mao Dzedun and his companions. It goes without saying that, every society strives to improve its well-being during development process. As the saying goes, there’s no law against living a good life. And a good life in the Celestial Empire now is as seen in American movies, despite the limited and fairly rigid censorship. So, until recently no more than 20 foreign films a year has been in China, but in 2012 the number was increased to 34. The interest of the Chinese audience to Hollywood movies is very high, that makes trouble to the local cinema. It looks like an “American dream” appeals to the Chinese public. It is remarkable that the literal translation of the Chinese name of the United States “mèjguo” is “beautiful country.”

There is no wonder that America is a role model for China today. For example, world classics are presented mostly by European writers in the Chinese book market, but in regard for the whole mass of modern literature, Chinese prefer to translate and publish mostly American authors. Although foreign literature is not so much presented that the Chinese one, it appeals greatly. The most popular are works on economics, management and business.

Popularity of European and American festivals has been increasing in China in recent years. Costumed parties for Halloween are arranged by young people, and talks about American Thanksgiving Day are held in kindergartens. Under the influence of Hollywood movies the best part of Chinese society has become to make a Christmas tree and make gifts to beloved ones for Valentine’s day.

Foreign culture fascination has resulted in mass teaching of English in China and the business that turned around in this area. Chinese parents, irrespective of their wealth, do not spare money for English courses or even a tutor for their often the only child. The teacher must have European appearance and, preferably, come from America; pedagogical skills and education play a secondary role. People with dark skin, like African-Americans or Indians are less preferable, but still more than any Asian, even if he is a native English speaker. A foreign teacher automatically raises the status of a University, school or kindergarten that will allow increasing tuition fees.

At the same time, Chinese officials do not often send their children to study in prestigious universities in Europe and America, where the latest knowledge is instilled along with a Western perception, values and attitude towards life. Still they are little confused by the fact that many Chinese are dissappointed, because high ideals and love for the motherland are not the core of such reactions, but rather the financial side of the issue and political restrictions. That is the Chinese students would flood the Western institutions, whether their parents are the same political and material possibilities as the elite. And these possibilities are gradually increasing. In the school year 2011-2012 194 thousand students went from the PRC to the United States. Thus, China ranked the first place by the number of foreign students studying in American universities.

Foreign language expansion is one of the negative consequences of the English language culture widespread. Similar trends have taken place in the 18-19 century in those parts of China where European influence took place. Thus pidgin-English-Chinese-English hybrid language was popular among the merchants of Guangdong Province, where the English modified language is combined with Chinese grammar. Pidgin was later eliminated as a legacy of Western colonization. However, Chinese linguists point out an active inflow of new words that do not fall under influence of Chinese language. For example, such words as “sûèpin” — shopping, “coo”- from the English “cool” and others. Still some English words, such as “OK”, “hello”, “bye bye”, actively push their Chinese counterparts and are becoming quite common in a spoken language. Experts say that if such trends continue, it could lead to the formation of a new pidgin.

In this regard, the Government began to take measures to protect the Chinese language from foreign influence. New regulations prohibit the use of foreign words during television and radio air time. Similarly, under Chinese law, foreign words, if any, in any publication, must have explanations in Chinese. However, this is actually not the case, because even official publications use English abbreviations and words without comments.

It should be mentioned that the sources of Western influences on Chinese society vary. Such countries as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong S.A.R. who had time to adopt and adapt Western values under the Eastern worldview, and now pass them to China as well, are prominent. For example, despite the dislike for the Japanese, the Chinese, especially the youths, often copy the Japanese. This is most apparent in all kinds of fashion trends. Modern Chinese canons of beauty, hairstyles, dressing style and stuff is often copied from the closest neighbors, where they have been developed under the influence of the West and differ greatly from those traditional.

Well-known Chinese ability of adopting also contributes to the process of Westernization. So, Yan Junqi Deputy Chairman of the NPCSC during the opening ceremony of the Beijing Forum – 2012 called “Harmony and Shared Prosperity of Civilizations”, noted that “although today’s China has achieved tremendous progress, it still needs to borrow those remarkable cultural achievements from foreign countries, to expand cultural exchanges with foreign countries in various forms and at different levels.” It is appropriate to ask the question: whether a State, which needs replication and borrowing for development, can generate its own ideas and values, pretending to be universal?

While the obsolete Western values are predicted to be replaced soon with the Eastern alternative that will allow to overcome the existing crisis of the modern world, placing China as an example, the Middle Kingdom increasingly discusses the problems in this area. Delegates from the 18-th Congress of the CPC, representing the organizations of culture and arts, drew attention to the fact that “culture and art workers should focus on forming the values of contemporary Chinese society”. It seems that the Chinese themselves are well aware of the magnitude of the cultural influence from outside and its threats. Chen Yan, one of the delegates of the 18th Congress, said: “we need to learn from the experience of our ancestors, in view of the traditional Chinese culture, but not the foreign one.”

Time will tell whether China is be able to develop an alternative way, other than the western one. Meanwhile China is along the way of copying and imitation. Of course, any borrowing, coupled to the local reality, becomes some kind of identity, in this case, more known as the Chinese specificity, creating the appearance of something new. Such unique Chinese “features” are numerous, but with no fundamental differences. The core of the problem is still in perverse ideas and values that lead mankind to stagnating. China as an object of cultural impact follows the system of values imposed from the outside and is not able to offer his own worldview. China is trying to challenge the leadership in an existing system without makin any changes. That is why the Celestial Empire will inevitably face the same problems as the West, and while these problems are bound to be wearing the infamous Chinese specifics, the overall picture is unlikely to change.

So whether the Chinese can offer something new to the others while looking at the world through the eyes of strangers?

Roman Pogorelov, journalist, orientalist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.