Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) not only aims to strengthen its positions, which were pretty shaken in June this year during the riots against the government’s policy aimed at the Islamization of society, but also to expand its area of influence by attracting adherents from among religious and ethnic minorities. The package of reforms announced by the Prime Minister R.T. Erdoğan on September 30, 2013, sounds rather electoral than democratic, according to some Turkish and Kurdish analysts.

The presidential election was scheduled for August next year, and the JDP will probably nominate its candidate. Therefore, it is no accident that the emphasis, in R.T. Erdoğan’s speech, was placed on the liberalization of the electoral system, under which small parties (including Kurdish) would be able to take part in the elections and win seats in the parliament. Candidates for deputies were allowed to campaign in the Kurdish language during the elections. It is emphasized that the package of reforms supposedly took into account the interests of religious and ethnic minorities. However, it did not meet their expectations, as they were expecting the adoption of a new constitution and new laws that would take into account the ethnic characteristics of the population. The new constitution, in their opinion, must guarantee equal rights to all citizens of Turkey, and the full right to use their mother tongue in education and public life. In addition, the Kurds were expecting a more decentralized system of government and changes in anti-terrorism laws, as well as a decrease of the voting threshold. The Kurds wanted to see a program for solving the Kurdish question, but the “democratic package of reforms” said nothing about that, and it became subject to criticism from the Kurdish community.

The representatives of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) said that thousands political prisoners were still being kept in jails, and the “package of reforms could not solve the problems”, because it focused primarily on the implementation of the interests of JDP, not those of the people. This is not the package that can lead to democracy. They called on the JDP and the Republican People’s Party to abandon the policy of assimilation and cultural genocide, ignoring the Kurdish language, culture and history. The party National Democratic Congress called the package of reforms “short-sighted”. Kurdish Women’s movement “urged women of Kurdistan and Turkey to join forces in the fight for their rights”.

The package of reforms did not meet the expectations of the opposition of Turkish Kurds as well, who counted on a promotion of the settlement of the Kurdish question, launched in March of this year, and on settlement of relations with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (KWP) headed by A. Odzhalan. The KWP hopes to create an autonomous region in Turkish Kurdistan, but today is demanding expansion of cultural rights of the Kurds, the constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity, self-government of the Kurdish area and the use of the Kurdish language in schools. However, none of these demands was taken into account in the package of reforms, which had a limited and piecemeal character. The use of the Kurdish language is permitted only in elementary school. Villages and urban settlements are allowed to revert back to their Kurdish names, and three Kurdish letters will be introduced into the Turkish alphabet. The schools abolished the mandatory slogans: “How happy is he who calls himself a Turk”.

The Kurdish Communities Union, which is the political wing of the KWP, said in its statement that the JDP had not moved the solution of the Kurdish question from the dead point. The package of reforms is made in such a way as to delay the peace process of the Kurdish settlement, which can be initiated only when the Kurdish identity has been recognized constitutionally, and their rights and political will have been satisfied. They explained that the refusal of the JDP from democratic politics, due to fears of losing its leading position, is fraught with the collapse of its structure. The Kurdish Communities Union called on the Kurds and all democratic forces to the fight for democracy and a just solution of the Kurdish question in Turkey.

M. Karayilan, the head of the KWP, said that the peace process of the Turkish-Kurdish settlement was at a critical stage. The proposals recently put forward by A. Odzhalan involve the transition from dialogue to negotiations, and the creation of a new format of discussions between him and the state. To promote the negotiation process, in particular, laws and constitutional principles for the solution of the Kurdish question should be adopted, and the conditions of imprisonment of A. Odzhalan should be made less strict. In the event the government fails to take these steps, the situation may get worse, and the KWP assumes no responsibility for the consequences. In his opinion, Erdoğan’s “democratic package” is not aimed at solving the problem, but it shows the “mentality of government officials, who do not recognize the Kurds and their legal rights”. He said that the KWP does not intend to break the truce, but the actions of the Turkish army in Turkey’s Kurdish area are provoking clashes with Kurdish guerrillas and breaching of the cease-fire. Thus, Kurdish fighters are ready for violent resumption of hostilities.

M. Odzhalan, the brother of the KWP leader, informed the Kurdish community about A. Odzhalan’s prior opinion – who said that the “democracy package” took the Kurdish issue out of the brackets. He called for the continuation of the truce and hoped that the Government would take steps to promote the peaceful solution of the Kurdish issue initiated in March of this year. However, there are opinions that are more radical. The functionaries of the KWP, who agreed on to the truce, also criticized the package of reforms. Thus, Dzh. Baik, one of the leaders of the KWP, said that the Kurds would stop the withdrawal of their armed units from the territory of Turkey in the Kandil Mountains. The KWP also demands the release of A. Odzhalan from detention, and to exclude the party from the list of terrorist organizations.

Turkish Kurds see the positive development of Iraqi Kurdistan and the success of Syrian Kurds, who control a part of Syrian Kurdistan, where an autonomous government was established. Therefore, the half-measures proposed in the “democratic package of reforms” of R.T. Erdoğan, aimed to delay the solution of the Kurdish question, can lead to increased political tensions in Turkish Kurdistan.

It is expected that A. Odzhalan will make a statement on the matter by the middle of this month, as he intends to make it public during a visit of the PDP delegation. The KWP leader regretted that, while being in detention, he was suspended from active participation in political life, and could not influence the settlement process to move it from the dead point. However, the PDP and representatives of the political wing of the KWP, in his opinion, will continue talks with Turkish leaders.

Having inclined the KWP to the ceasefire, disarmament and withdrawal of armed forces from Turkey, the Turkish Army, however, is creating tensions in the Kurdish area, by building new barracks, increasing the number of rural guards, and continuing flights by unmanned spy planes. It bothers Kurdish autonomists who seek to normalize relations and prevent the beginning of new military operations in Turkish Kurdistan.

Olga Zhigalina, Doctor of Historical Sciences, leader in the field of Kurdish studies and regional problems, chief researcher at the Center for studies of the Middle East at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine New Eastern Outlook. 

Some political analysts suggest that the threat of air strikes on Syria by the U.S. and some of its European partners, under the pretext of al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons is related to the interest of U.S. military corporations and their intent to seize control of the exploration, production and transportation of Syria’s energy resources. Recently a small exploration company from Norway discovered enormous reserves of oil and gas in Syria. There is an area rich in natural resources in a compact Kurdish Settlement in Syrian Kurdistan, where the most significant deposits in the country lie (the largest being in Rumeylan), including water. However, surgical strikes in Syria are unlikely to suddenly lead to the redrawing of the borders of the states of the Middle East and the creation of an ethnic Kurdish state in Kurdistan, which has been written about in some foreign media outlets. American politicians have repeatedly stressed that the collapse of Iraq went against the implementation of their “democratic experiment”. And the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein had not been undertaken to give more rights to the Kurds. Yet the idea of a “Greater Kurdistan”, which is actively supported by Saudi Arabia, depends on the disintegration of Iraq into three separate states (Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish). The basis of this idea came from reports from Iraqi Kurdistan, according to which some Kurdish politicians were in favour of secession, not federalism. According to some Iranian media outlets, it fits into the long-term plans of the U.S.

Saleh Muslim, head of the Democratic Unity Party (DUP), which controls part of Syrian Kurdistan, said he doubted that Assad used chemical weapons, due to the fact that the Syrian president is under scrutiny from international observers, and in the suburbs of Damascus, UN experts are investigating an alleged use of chemical weapons. However, he noted that there are forces that actively support foreign intervention in Syria with the help of the West to militarily overthrow the current Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, who is charged with using chemical weapons.

U.S. military action may weaken the Syrian regime, further exacerbating civil conflict, as well as increasing the activity of Islamic groups. In this situation, the U.S. will seek out support from the Alawites and Kurds, who intend to keep a degree of autonomy.

As in the past, American foreign policy is directed toward economic and covert military assistance to the rebels, inciting them to overthrow or undermine the current anti-American government. In this, the rebels are used as a “means to eliminate counterproductive forces to U.S. intervention.” For example, the U.S. used the Kurds as a not-state actor because they held an autonomous position in relation to the local regimes. Washington has never set itself the task of making a global solution to the Kurdish question. The Kurdish factor serves only as a means of creating conditions, whether in Iraq or Syria, to satisfy its energy needs.

Currently, the United States uses some of the Kurdish opposition in support of its regional strategic interests. For instance, it favours the National Council of Resistance (NCR), which was founded in Istanbul in 2011, bringing together not only Kurds, but also pro-Islamic forces and Arab nationalists. Supporting the policy of the West in the Syrian crisis, the political forces in the region can use the Kurds sharing the positions of the NCR and provoke them to incite a broad-based anti-government insurgency. At the same time, some politicians call on the Syrian Kurds to make a rapprochement with the West, and support the overthrow Baathist regime in order to achieve long-term autonomy. For the West and Israel it is advantageous to support the Kurds as an ethnic Kurdish state could serve as a buffer against regional threats, for instance, in containing Iran.

However, these views are not shared by the Kurds united in the Kurdish National Council (KNC), who oppose foreign intervention in Syria. This block calls for the creation of a democratic regime able to answer to Kurdish demands in the provinces of Qamishli and Afrin, where they want the right to recognize the Kurdish language as a second official language, to guarantee the rights of the Kurds in the constitution, etc.

The surgical strike capability of American missiles on government targets in Syria is unlikely to radically change this side of the ethno-political map of the Middle East. Indeed, they will only reinforce the chaos that the country is engulfed in and exacerbate the plight of the Syrian people, including the Kurds. Thousands of Syrian Kurds are crossing the Syrian-Iraqi border in order to seek refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan, causing problems for the Iraqi Kurds to support them. Supporting the aggressive plans of the U.S. and its European partners, Turkey, a NATO member, will try by all means necessary to prevent the rise of a movement on the part of Turkish Kurds. The Turkish government rejects the existence of a “Turkish Kurdistan”, recently banning the use of the word “Kurdistan” in the name of a youth organization and viewing support of the Kurdistan Workers Party, led by Abdullah Öcalan, which began in March of this year a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey, as unlawful. Turkish leaders are concerned about the preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of their country. In this, it pursues the same objectives as Iran.

In these complicated circumstances, the Kurds of Syria and Iraq will make every effort to preserve their gains. The plight of Syrian Kurds is provoking Iraqi and Turkish Kurds to use their armed forces to protect them. However they refuse to do this so as not to involve ethnic Kurdistan (and the entire region of West Asia) in a large-scale armed conflict. Iraqi Kurds, in particular, do not plan a military invasion of Syria, as the Syrian Kurds, in their opinion, are capable of defending themselves. However, they are willing to provide them with other forms of assistance, like taking refugees, the flow of which will only increase if the tension does not subside.

The Kurds of ethnic Kurdistan still restrain themselves in order to prevent the initiation of ethnic and religious slaughter, which could lead to their destruction as an ethnic group. They are in favour of easing international tension and holding a conference on Syria in Geneva.

Kurds doubt the Kurdish question will be solved by the European community, and even less so by the United States. They remember how Henry Kissinger, acting under the administration of R. Nixon and G. Ford, incited the 1974 Kurdish revolt, and then stopped providing assistance when it was no longer beneficial to the Americans. As a result, the Kurds suffered a severe defeat. This reinforces the distrust Kurds have of the United States and its European partners. But talk of the formation of an anti-American Kurdish underground is unfounded. Although many Kurdish organizations oppose U.S. intervention, they are interested in establishing democratic regimes that are capable of answering the demands of the Kurdish population. For example, the leaders of the organization of Iranian Kurdish Komala (the Revolutionary Workers’ Party of Kurdistan) stated they would not support a war between the West and Iran, but if war did break out, the Kurdish organizations would oppose support of the ruling regime.

In general, the attacks on Syria will not benefit the Kurds, but could plunge them into a more severe and bitter struggle against Islamists.

Olga Zhigalina, Doctor of Historical Sciences, leader in the field of Kurdish studies and regional problems, chief researcher at the Centre for the study of the Middle East at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Source: Flickr

Most of the opposition political parties of the Iranian Kurds that are in an irregular situation in relation to the Iranian political process boycotted the last presidential elections, which took place 14 June 2013. This can be explained by the fact that none of the candidates in the running for president seriously dealt with the issue of the rights of national minorities, though H. Rouhani, the moderate Shiite cleric elected president of Iran, did bring up the question of the ethnic minorities during his presidential campaign. Nevertheless, the opinions of Iranian Kurds as to whether H. Rouhani will change the Kurdish stance in relation to the government are divided. Therefore, the organizations of the Iranian Kurdish opposition united under the banner of the Kurdish United Front (KUF), founded in 2005 by B. Adab, are inclined to make a compromise with the new president, hoping to revitalize their organisation after its structural renovation taking into account current political realities. B. Adab, as we know, was not only a member of the Iranian parliament, but also organizer of the Kurdish factions within it. KUF intends to discuss international and regional issues among its members in order to gradually develop a joint platform for action. Hamanzif Qadiri, a member of the Politburo of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) said that although the Iranian government does not recognize the rights of Kurds, the KUF will make an effort to find ways for the Iranian Kurdish political parties to interact with the government. But this issue should be resolved first by the Iranian Kurdish political parties. KUF is operational in a number of cities in Iran (Urmia, Ilam, Kermanshah, Hamedan, Tehran, Seine).

Other organizations have irreconcilable positions in relation to the government, focusing on the experience of the Iraqi Kurds. The National Democratic Movement of Iranian Kurds is a conglomerate of political organizations, which is nevertheless supportive of the conduction of the Kurdish National Conference, as it is important for the Kurds of ethnic Kurdistan to strengthen the trend toward consolidation of Iranian Kurdish opposition forces. Thus, the three groups of “Komala” immediately joined together to obtain a mandate for participation in the conference. 9 Iranian Kurdish parties based in Iraqi Kurdistan got an offer to appoint five delegates to the Kurdish National Convention. With the exception of the Independence Party of Kurdistan, all organizations of Iranian Kurds got the right to participate. When Komala and KDP determined the composition of the delegation, the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) announced its desire to send a representative to the conference with a delegation of Iranian Kurds. Iranian Kurdish organization does not recognize the Iranian PJAK party. DPIK also does not recognize the legitimacy of the KDP fraction that appeared in 2006. Yet within the framework of the preparation for the Conference, this did not stop the KDP from participating in the Conference as an independent party. The main purpose of this Conference is to provide a basis for political solidarity between Kurds in ethnic Kurdistan for implementing the aims of ethnic Kurds in the Kurdish areas in their countries of residence (Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iraq) as well as the global aim of creating a future independent Kurdish state. N. Barzani, Prime Minister of the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq, for instance, said that “our brothers everywhere deserve a better life and a guaranteed plan for success, as our people have already suffered, and deserve a change for the better”.

After N. Barzani’s trip to Iran, V. Vilatbegi, Director of the Kurdish Institute in Tehran, took the initiative to send an official delegation to the Kurdish National Conference, which is scheduled in the middle of September of this year, sending a letter to this effect with the help of two members of parliament to the address of the new president H. Rouhani, who subsequently promised to meet them. But the date of the Conference coincides with the transfer of work to H. Rouhani’s cabinet, which hasn’t yet formulated its political program. V. Vilatbegi believes that the Iranian Kurdish delegation is not representative of all Iranian Kurds. He believes that two delegations should be sent to the Conference: one consisting of prominent Iranian figures, and the other consisting of Kurdish students, lawyers, civil servants, and members of Shiite religious communities. He believes that the congress will pave the way for dialogue between the Kurds and the Iranian government on the one hand, and put the Iranian Kurdish question at a higher level under President H. Rouhani. Nevertheless, the question of an independent Kurdish state will not make ties closer between the Iranian leadership and the Kurdish opposition.

It is important to note that Kurdish opposition groups do not have a strong position within all of Iranian Kurdistan. They are relatively weak in the provinces of Kermanshah, Ilam and West Luristane. The Kurdish population is about one and a half million people and are mostly Shiite and largely integrated into Iranian society. At the same time, Feili Kurds in Iraq have been denied Iranian citizenship, despite the fact that they have historical roots in the provinces of Kermanshah and Ilam. These and other issues are on President H. Rouhani’s cabinet’s agenda. However, it is also worth noting that Anwar Hossein Panahi, a Kurdish human rights activist, was recently freed from Sanandaj Prison, where he spent six years.

However, the situation in Iranian Kurdistan remains relatively tense. For example, there is a serious threat from Islamist groups – the Ansar al-Islam, an umbrella group of Iraqi Sunni Arab Jihadists, upon the new president of Iran H.Rouhani’s entry into power, urged Iranian Sunnis to join the jihad against their Shiite government. The organization said that all the Sunnis of Iran should “unite under a single banner and start a jihad” in order to force Iran to be “a single nation, the nation of the Koran and the sword”. The leaders of Ansar al-Islam said that Iranian Shiites were too interested in money and power and therefore ceased to represent the Islamic nation. They expressed concern about the growing influence of Shiite policy, noting that their aim is to discredit so-called “Sunni nationalism”.

The Iranian leadership is making efforts to get the Kurds to protect their territory from the Islamists. In the summer of 2013, Tehran announced its intention to deploy a new unit of its national security force in the western region of the country, especially in Iranian Kurdistan. It will be called “Razim” and it intends to recruit Kurds. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, initiated this project, which will have the full backing of the government. Its task is to maintain stability and security in the region. However, representatives of Kurdish militant groups express a differing view: they believe that these units will also fight against the Kurdish opposition in Iranian Kurdistan. Although the Kurdish opposition has not conducted military operations against the Iranian government since 1996, the government is still very concerned about the political processes underway in the Kurdish territories of Turkey and Iraq. According to some Kurdish observers, Iran fears the rise of Kurdish nationalism in Iranian Kurdistan, one of the most impoverished areas of Iran, where Kurds are victims of ethnic and religious discrimination. Along the Kurdish Region of Iraq, Iran (or rather the IRGC) has deployed armed units, tanks as well as armoured personnel carriers. Military bases and other military facilities have also been constructed in the region.

The start of a constructive dialogue with the opposition of Iranian Kurds advocating an armed solution of the Kurdish question could become a major event in the history of the Kurdish problem in Iran. This would alleviate the tension that exists in their relationship with the Iranian government and open up new opportunities for the socioeconomic development of the region. However, the participation of the Kurds in the Kurdish National Conference, leaves little hope for the positive development of these relations.

Zhigalina Olga, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Leader in the sphere of Kurdish Studies and Regional Problems, chief researcher at the Centre for Middle East Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

 On 22 July 2013 Barzani hosted a meeting of representatives from 39 Kurdish parties and organizations from all four parts of Kurdistan in Erbil. From this a committee of 21 members was created: 6 from Turkish Kurdistan, 5 from Iraqi Kurdistan, 5 from Iranian Kurdistan, 4 from Syrian Kurdistan, and 1 from the National Council of Kurdistan, an umbrella organization composed of the European diaspora, founded by exiled Kurdish politicians, lawyers and public figures. The aim of the Kurdish Conference, scheduled for 15-17 September 2013, includes the establishment of a Kurdish League (following the model of the Arab League), led by the President. Its main task will be to coordinate the development of the political process in all four parts of Kurdistan, enabling a joint effort for the achievement of a global solution to the Kurdish question. Presumably the participants will accept the Charter, which calls on Kurds to cease all quarrels and feuds, as well as a statement about the political unification of the Kurds of ethnic Kurdistan. Two entreaties have been planned as well – one to the peoples of the region and the world, and the other to the Kurdish government.

Such aims have been taken somewhat ambivalently by the various ethnic Kurdish organizations of Kurdistan, between which a rivalry for leadership is taking place. For example, between the DPK of Iraq and the PPK of Turkish Kurdistan, who along with the Syrian Kurds are pushing for an open Syrian-Iraqi border. Organizations of Iranian Kurds, who generally don’t cooperate well with each other, may adopt recommendations for a program for gaining rights in Shiite Iran.

Meanwhile, the Party of a Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), guided by the ideology of Abdullah Öcalan, has announced its readiness to send soldiers to Syrian Kurdistan to protect Kurds from attacks from Islamists. Its functionaries believe that the Kurds must unite in order to fight in the different parts of Kurdistan. They argue that the Syrian Kurds already have their moral and political support. According to them, PJAK fighters are representatives of the National Revolutionary Army, and are prepared to defend national interests.

The Union of Muslim Scholars of Kurdistan condemned the activities of a group of young people, far from Islam, which under jihadist pretences shed innocent Kurdish blood. The leader of the Union stated that these “criminal acts” have nothing in common with the principles of Islamic law. They are nothing more than, “the attempts of those who use religion to create chaos and try to discredit the image of Islam.” The organization called on all Muslim clergy members to conduct work with young people in order to prevent fratricidal war.

Barzani also believes that Iraqi Kurds could deploy their Peshmerga in order to protect Syrian Kurds from Islamic groups. However, these initiatives are not supported by some influential Kurdish politicians. For example, M. Otman, an independent member of the Kurdish Alliance, believes that the protection of Syrian Kurds is the responsibility of Russia and the United States.

As we approach the date of the conference, the various differences between the Kurdish political parties and organizations still linger. At first the organization of the Kurdish opposition in Iraqi Kurdistan refused to participate in the conference, arguing that they do not agree with many of the issues up for discussion. They believe that the dates of the conference, which coincide with elections in the Kurdish Parliament (scheduled for 21 September), were unfairly chosen, benefitting the KDP and the PUK, which also have differing opinions about when the conference should take place. The KDP believes that the conference should always be held in Erbil, chaired by a permanent president of the Kurdish League. The PUK has a different opinion, believing the conference should be held in different cities and its leadership rotated. Some Turkish Kurds believe that Barzani wants to lead the conference in order to diminish the role of the PKK. At the same time, the leader of the Party of the Democratic Unity of Syrian Kurds D. Hanan expressed the controversial opinion that the opening of the Syrian-Iraqi border would eliminate the contradictions between the parties and contribute to the success of the conference.

A July 22nd press release from the organizing committee of the conference stated that its main theme would be the question of Kurdish rights to self-determination. The conference will bring together 600 delegates and 300 guests. The quotas for participation were distributed according to the following scheme: 10% – youth organizations, 10% – personalia, 35% – non-governmental organizations, 45 % political parties. Women are to make up 40% of all participants. A representative of the organizing committee said that the conference is aimed at developing a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in the four parts of ethnic Kurdistan and would not contribute to the outbreak of conflict and war. It was also stressed that Feylis, Yazidis and Alawites are Kurds and will participate in the conference within the delegations from political parties, associations, organizations, or in person. The Kurds of Israel also expressed their desire to participate in the conference, whose numbers there are 500 thousand, adhering to their national traditions. Turkey and Iran followed the preparation of the conference, fearing the adoption of incorrect decisions.

Such conferences are expected to be conducted regularly. The first conference is to be chaired by Barzani, the most authoritative and popular politician, holding a pro-Western political orientation. According to some Turkish media outlets, a statement about the future borders of a Kurdish state is being prepared, making up part of divided ethnic Kurdistan, and corresponding to the American plan for the Greater Middle East. This information appeared during the conduction of the peace processes in Turkey between the PKK and the Turkish leadership. According to some analysts, including Russian ones, NATO with the help of the Kurds is committed to putting pressure on Turkey in order to make its management more amenable.

Today, the Kurds of ethnic Kurdistan are an emerging nation. Currently, they are unable to overcome many of the ideological and political contradictions at the local and global level. Their prolonged stay in different sociocultural, economic and political conditions and their related systems, connected with the specific division of the ethnic Kurdish state, as well as the uniqueness of the Kurdish national democratic movement in its different parts, are part of the political process associated with trying to achieve national and political cohesion. However, today’s Kurdish elites are seeking to unite the Kurds of ethnic Kurdistan and inspire them to find a worthy place in a globalized world through political and spiritual guidance. Yet the unresolved contradictions between the Kurdish parties in the different parts of ethnic Kurdistan, as well as the complexity of the Kurdish movement in the different parts of ethnic Kurdistan, do not allow one to optimistically consider the prospects of their stated aims.

Zhigalina Olga, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Leader in the sphere of Kurdish Studies and Regional Problems, chief researcher at the Centre for Middle East Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

 In the run-up to the next presidential election, the idea of a Constitution for the Kurdistan region was once again on the agenda. The project, consisting of 122 articles was created by representatives of the ruling political coalition (KDP and PUK) in 2009.

Iraqi Kurdistan is defined in the current draft as “an autonomous federated state” which recognizes more than one identity, since its art. 15 recognizes the multi-ethnics of the region, art. 35 offers national, cultural and administrative rights to all non Kurdish nationalities. Art. 36 provides for freedom of religion, especially for Christian and Yazidi communities.

Kurdistan Constitution recognizes the right of all national languages of the people of Iraqi Kurdistan in the education system (from school to University), and their right to participate in local or regional governance and self-determination in areas under their national dominance.

Among Iraqi Kurdish the draft Constitution was controversial. The Kurdish community in and outside the region, opposed the haste of making such an important document that requires comprehensive analysis and discussion, while M. Barzani, the KDP leader, is interested in the rapid adoption of the Constitution in order to ensure future power and control.

The opposition declaims against the referendum, pointing out that the draft Constitution should be referred back to Parliament for amendment, since the approval of its current form will return Kurdistan to authoritarianism. Today, according to opposition, the President of the Kurdistan region has absolute power. “Goran” proposes to establish a Special Commission to amend. Opposition demands changes of the political system from a presidential to a parliamentary, administrative decentralization and guarantees of the rights of all citizens in the Kurdistan region.

KDP and PUK do not consider legitimate a return of the text back to the Parliamentary Commission. Yet a meeting of M. Barzani with opposition leaders – N. Mustafa (Goran), Mohamed Faraj (Secretary General of the Islamic Union of Kurdistan) and Ali Baber, Emir of the Islamic Group on their own initiative in Erbil, January, 17. They discussed the need for a mechanism to overcome the differences on the issue of reform of the power system on the text of a draft Constitution of Kurdistan.

Adoption of Iraqi Kurdistan Constitution is considered by Kurdish authorities as an important step of promoting the independence of the region. KDP proposed to ratify the draft Constitution of the Kurdistan region, according to which M. Barzani would be able to run for President for a third term. He believes that this issue can be resolved through a referendum. M. Barzani has already taken up his post two terms, the first time he had been appointed by Parliament, and the second time by popularly election.

The opposition criticizes the policy of M. Barzani, arguing that it needs to be updated. M. Barzani and his family’s alleged corruption and nepotism. Some time ago daily demonstrations and protests in Suleymaniyah were dispersed by the police. Most of the demonstrators were opposed to the reign of M. Barzani and his KDP party. In clashes with Kurdish security forces, several people were killed, hundreds injured and arrested.

Today the opposition says that if there is no national consensus on the text of a draft Constitution for the Kurdistan region, it will lead the people to the streets again to protest. However, these measures obviously do not lead to resolution of the problem.

Some Kurdish political activists suggest to set up a new draft Constitution, if a majority of the Kurdish population vote against the current draft. Others believe that KDP would conclude strategic agreement with the “Goran” for the management in the region. So far, however, neither the opposition nor the public associations have not nominated their candidates to compete with M. Barzani.

At a recent rally in Erbil, M. Barzani stated that the draft Constitution had already been approved by a majority of votes in Parliament in 2009. He stressed that those who protest against the existing power system, poorly studied the draft Constitution, the first paragraph of which specifies that “the system of the Government in Kurdistan is parliamentary”. He also called on the Kurdish parties to think about its people and its future, and not to deprive the Kurdish people of the right of freedom of expression on the draft Constitution.

Meanwhile, the Kurdish parties and public associations are ready to put forward candidates for the post of the President of the Kurdistan region, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the independent High Electoral Commission has already started preparations for the holding of elections in a number of localities in the local municipal councils. It endorsed the presidential and parliamentary electoral system. But the opposition has heart set against nomination of M.Barzani for the Presidency for the third time, despite the variety of opinions on the legality of his nomination. KDP and PUK have reaffirmed the legitimate right of M. Barzani to take part in the elections, though, according to some analysts, the PUK has not yet agreed because of the illness of its leader J.Talabani.

 In the run-up to the elections the fight between supporters and opponents of the existing system of power is likely to worsen. The opposition has agreed not to nominate an alternative candidate. Meanwhile Barzani clan holds a very strong position not only in the power structures of the region, but also controls the significant commercial and economic programmes, which income accounts several billion u.s. dollars.

Olga Zhigalina, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Head of Kurd Studies and Regional Problems Sector, Chief Scientist at the Center for Study of the Middle East Countries, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

В ХХI в. в этническом Курдистане начались заметные сдвиги в курдском национально-демократическом движении. Свержение режима С. Хусейна в Ираке и его оккупация коалиционными силами, возглавляемыми США, активизировали партикулярный национализм иракских курдов. Начавшийся в стране политический процесс способствовал признанию статуса автономии Иракского Курдистана в конституции 2005 г. нового федеративного государства. Курдская национальная элита согласилась на федерализм постсаддамовского Ирака, и выдвинула новую националистическую версию полунезависимости своего региона. В Сирии курды в 2012 г. захватили часть Сирийского Курдистана и создали самоуправляющийся курдский район. Иранское руководство обратилось к курдской оппозиции с предложением начать переговоры. Обозначились новые тенденции, способные продвинуть решение курдского вопроса в Турции мирными средствами.

Заинтересованность Р.Т. Эрдогана, премьер-министра Турции, в сохранении власти Партии справедливости и развития (ПСР) и его претензии на пост президента Турции способствовали некоторому смягчению его жесткой линии в отношении курдов: он как будто бы стал выражать склонность к внесению поправок в конституцию и политическую систему страны. Эскалация сирийского кризиса и обострение ситуации на турецко-сирийской границе (протяженность которой составляет 500 км, где проживают преимущественно курды) требовало от Эрдогана принятия более решительных мер. Неожиданно он осознал, что турецкая политика в отношении Сирии и поддержка Турцией сирийской оппозиции, в особенности, идет на руку турецким курдам и, в частности, РПК, являясь «источником ее поддержки и демографического, политического и военного укрепления». Это означало, что втягивание Турции в широкомасштабные международные и региональные действия с целью ограничения иранского влияния на Дамаск могло осложнить турецко-российские отношения и усилить вооруженную конфронтацию с РПК. Поэтому опасаясь обострения курдского вопроса в Турции и создания курдского самоуправления на части территории Сирийского Курдистана, турецкое руководство было вынуждено сдерживать свои экспансионистские намерения в отношении Сирии, а также выступить с беспрецедентной инициативой начала переговоров с А. Оджаланом, несмотря на сопротивление турецких националистов и армии.

В ходе переговоров, начатых курдским парламентским блоком с участием представителей турецких спецслужб, было достигнуто соглашение между А. Оджаланом, руководителем РПК, объявленной турецким руководством террористической и находящейся в Турции на нелегальном положении.

Хотя болезненный процесс достижения договоренностей продолжается, можно отметить, что он содержит положения, направленные на сдерживание националистических устремлений курдов. Среди курдской политической элиты реакция на сближение А. Оджалана с турецкими властями было неоднозначным, поскольку появилось немало его оппонентов, заявивших, что чаяния курдов могут быть реализованы только в процессе «дезинтеграции» других наций, в частности, Сирии и Ирака. Они настороженно восприняли решение Оджалана согласиться с разоружением и выводом курдских бойцов за пределы Турецкой Республики. Другие считают, что, напротив, прекращение огня будет способствовать расширению курдского движения и предоставит курдам более широкие возможности для претворения своих требований в рамках существующей государственной структуры.

Переговорный процесс позитивно оценивают страны ЕС, США и иракские курды. Вашингтон заявил, что будет поддерживать народ Турции в его усилиях разрешить проблему. ЕС призвал все партии объединиться для достижения мира и пообещал всяческую поддержку для развития мирного процесса. Представители иракских курдов также выразили свое удовлетворение тем, что турецкие курды сделали шаги в правильном направлении, хотя оценивать это событие еще рано.

Между тем, в Турции сохраняется напряженность между сторонниками и противниками согласительной политики по курдскому вопросу. Некоторая часть курдов считает, что эта политика может привести к расколу РПК и ее постепенной ликвидации, в чем заинтересованы турецкие власти и Запад.

Попытки турецкого правительства достичь договоренностей с РПК имеет позитивные и негативные стороны. Впервые турецкое правительство признало, что А. Оджалан является политическим лидером турецких курдов, а не террористом; оно сочло возможным начать переговоры с ним по курдскому вопросу. Оба политика как бы отказались обсуждать его с позиций национализма. Они полагают, что следует вернуться к состоянию турецко-курдских отношений, характерных для докемалистского периода истории Османской империи, когда Курдистан имел особый статус. Эрдоган даже намекнул, что в дальнейшем возможно обсуждение создания федеративной структуры.

Однако все это не означает, что курды продвинулись к своей конечной цели по реализации общенационального курдского идеала – созданию курдского государства. Правда, А. Оджалан, лидер Рабочей партии Курдистана (РПК) турецких курдов в своем послании (март 2013 г.), заявил, что прекращение вооруженной конфронтации курдских бойцов с турецкой армией означает начало нового этапа развития курдского движения – активизацию демократической борьбы и расширение рамок курдского движения. Можно предположить, что соглашаясь на конституционные гарантии прав курдов, они берут передышку для начала нового этапа борьбы.

Между тем, в создании курдского государства не заинтересованы ни Турция (как и другие региональные лидеры), ни Соединенные Штаты, всегда охотно способствовавшие «постоянству» курдского вопроса, используя который им удавалось поддерживать необходимый для них баланс сил в регионе.

Потеря Турцией Курдистана, действительно, существенно ослабит ее геополитическое значение в Западной Азии, и будет препятствовать осуществлению ее стратегических планов в отношении Центральной Азии, Кавказа и России. Объединенное курдское государство (состоящее из курдских районов Турции и Ирака) будет доминировать в юго-восточных и восточных районах Турецкой Республики и преградит ей доступ к Азербайджану, к Кавказу, и тюркским республикам Средней Азии. Соперником Турции за влияние в государствах Закавказья и Центральной Азии становятся Соединенные Штаты, уже обеспечившие себе неплохие позиции в Азербайджане. Если будет построен газопровод, соединяющий азербайджанское месторождение Шах-Дениз с турецким городом Эрзерумом (через который уже проходит газопровод, связывающий Турцию и Иран), Соединенные Штаты, обеспечив себе поддержку турецких курдов, смогут контролировать поставки энергоносителей из Центральной Азии в Турцию.

Перехватив у США инициативу в сфере политики замирения турецких курдов, турецкое руководство стремится не допустить использование США и Израилем курдского фактора как барьера в осуществлении турецких интересов на Кавказе и в Прикаспии. Кроме того, оно игнорирует и замечания США по поводу заключения прямых нефтяных контрактов с Курдистанским регионом Ирака в обход Багдада. Турция продолжает укреплять свои торгово-экономические контакты с иракскими курдами, невзирая на опасения администрации Б. Обамы, что они вызовут дестабилизацию в Ираке. В телефонном разговоре с М.Барзани, президентом Курдистанского региона, Дж.Керри, госсекретарь США, настаивал, чтобы иракские курды не заключали договоров по поставкам сырой нефти в Турцию в обход Багдада, аргументируя тем, что такая позиция может привести к распаду страны. Желая оставаться единственным региональным арбитром, США, таким образом, пытаются блокировать и ослабить позиции Турции в Иракском и Турецком Курдистане, где она стала претендовать на новую, более значимую роль.

Миротворческий процесс в Турецком Курдистане, спровоцированный событиями в Сирии, играет в пользу Р.Т. Эрдогана, желающего баллотироваться на пост президента страны, а также части турецкой политической элиты, стремящейся к расширению своих политических и экономических проектов в государствах Закавказья и Центральной Азии. Но его значение для турецких курдов оценивать пока еще рано.

Жигалина Ольга Ивановна, доктор исторических наук, заведующая сектором курдоведения и региональных проблем, главный научный сотрудник Центра изучения стран Ближнего и Среднего Востока Института востоковедения РАН, специально для Интернет-журнала «Новое восточное обозрение».