BC stands for NEO’s Banned Classic. This article was originally published by our journal on 20.09.14. For some reason, this article is missing from Google search results. Since this article remains pretty relevant to those geopolitical events that are taking place on the geopolitical stage today, we deem it possible to present it to our readers once again. Should it go missing again, you may be confident that you will see it republished by NEO once more, should it still remain relevant by that time.

Despite Hollywood romanticizing about Bonds and Bournes, one of the most prevalent forms of modern intelligence activity is also arguably the least emphasized: economic and industrial espionage. Aimed at garnering a financial and innovation advantage for countries seeking greater influence in a highly globalized world, this activity is not just about economic policy but serves as de facto proxy military rivalry: states maneuver to outperform, outwit, and ‘outstrategize’ across all spheres of profitable activity via this lesser ‘intelligences’ activity.

The motivation to engage in soft spying and conduct economic espionage is no small matter. The end of the Cold War signaled a shift from heavy emphasis on military alliances to the focus on hyper-economic development. It was not so much the end to war and cessation of hostile activities as a switch to competition with more productive and prosperous end goals. All around the world states understood that failure to keep up in a rapidly globalizing economy could likely doom a state not just to economic hardship but expose it to dangers of the decidedly old-school realist variety: war, occupation, loss of territory, and the like.

Emphasizing economic development, however, does not magically create an industrial juggernaut overnight. As soon as developing states began to realize just how difficult steady, progressive, rational growth would be, they began finding ways to shortcut the journey. Soft spying became arguably the chief method in this new national security priority of economic development. Spy movies notwithstanding, the traditional methods of economic espionage truly read like a primer from Ian Fleming: planting moles and/or recruiting inside agents; surveillance; clandestine entry; bag drops and collections; dumpster diving; bugging and phone tapping; invasive computer programs; and drop-by spies.

The act of American businesses trying to steal secrets from other American businesses is considered a standard part of the game, if perhaps a distasteful one. It is not explicitly illegal when competitors strive to gain early access to patents, trade secrets, strategies, and the like. The domestic laws of many states, America included, do not explicitly prohibit intruding into foreign lands for the direct purpose of acquiring and collecting economic information. This might be part of the motivation behind why so many American businesses tend to avoid preaching about the elimination of soft spying and why such espionage activity is often ignored when done by traditional allies.

So while soft spying can technically be framed by some proponents of international law as a violation of sovereignty and the principles of non-intervention, the empirical problem remains that hardly any states take such claims seriously. Thus victim states more often than not find themselves arguing in the dark, as there has not been any success in establishing a global business culture that treats economic cyber espionage as the same thing as more traditional prohibited forms of force and invasion. International groups like the World Trade Organization (WTO) – a body that should have a natural alignment in seeing greater progress against soft spying – has to date shown no major prioritization or interest in this objective. This is yet another case where the structural rules governing the system hinder progress: in the WTO context, it is difficult trying to establish economic espionage as actually violating any specific or explicit WTO agreements. The WTO, just like international law, establishes guidelines for members’ operations inside their own territories. There are no established procedures for imposing punishment or enforcing such guidelines outside of those limits.

There is yet another double-dilemma in the international sphere: there are no rules currently that prevent American companies from corrupt or improper business practices overseas. The United States has attempted to self-regulate with the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, but even with this effort there is a fundamental structural problem with the global system: very few nations have enacted laws criminalizing the bribing of foreign officials in terms of economic commercial activity. This is not so much because only America cares about corruption or doesn’t ever engage in economic information collection on its own. Rather, it is a testimony to how prevalent the focus is with the rest of the world on developing at any cost.

Speaking bluntly, the position of dominance occupied by the United States in terms of technical innovation and corporate long-term strategizing makes nearly every other country in the world lesser in comparison. It is not so much about how ‘provable’ this is with data as it is about the ‘perception:’ most of the world’s countries believe it has little to offer America in terms of intellectual and industrial property worth stealing (at least in comparison to what foreign countries think is worth stealing from the United States). Paradoxically in terms of soft spying, this perception is actively encouraged on the American side, as evidenced by former CIA director James Woolsey, who infamously stated that there were only a few areas of European technology that surpassed American versions, but that those areas were ‘very, very, very small.’ As such, the concern for adopting explicit, enforceable and transparent legal rules to constrain soft spying remains infantile and largely undeveloped, even in the primary victim nation of the United States.

In totality, it is obvious that the United States accepts and understands the gravity of economic espionage and its cascade effects that go far beyond industrial profiteering. What America has not been able to do is enact effective legislation that gives governmental agencies the proper freedom and jurisdiction to intervene in or change a business culture that seeks to ‘handle its own affairs’ without any governmental intrusion. Not only does American industry at times handcuff the government and its own security organizations from properly protecting crucial assets, and often does so with an overly cavalier attitude that feigns hyper-vigilance and competence, it appears previous discussions that considered the possibility of American intelligence proactively ‘helping’ American businesses were also deterred by design. This arguably leaves the United States even further exposed and weak in comparison to other countries that have no qualms about using their own intelligence communities for such activity.

If there is general wariness between business and government, then it is hard to understate the mistrust and near derision expressed when business community leaders are asked if formal American intelligence agencies should proactively engage in economic espionage for the benefit of American industry. Direct cooperation and interaction with the American Intelligence Community is seen as something anathema to best business practices and somehow a violation of business ethics. It is not so much that the United States does not collect economic information from foreign sources. America does not deny spying on foreign firms and business interests. But it does deny that such spying goes on for a particular industrial purpose or for the advancement of specific American industries so that they may be more competitive in the global market. Whether one wishes to believe that position fully or offer exceptions to that general rule, it still results in the United States being in a surprisingly ignorant and dangerous position.

Dr. Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

BC stands for NEO’s Banned Classic. This article was originally published by our journal on 04.06.15. For some reason, this article is missing from Google search results. Since this article remains pretty relevant to those geopolitical events that are taking place on the geopolitical stage today, we deem it possible to present it to our readers once again. Should it go missing again, you may be confident that you will see it republished by NEO once more, should it still remain relevant by that time.

Here is the ultimate axiom for all aspiring diplomats and foreign policy experts to know: there is no such thing as a simple quest for peace. Before anyone goes apoplectic with disgust and disdain at such cynicism, allow me to explain. I am not saying diplomats and foreign policy analysts do not have the best of intentions when trying to broker treaties, reinvigorate relations or institute long-term cooperation. In fact, it is exactly because the road for global affairs is paved most often with nothing but the best of intentions that the axiom above rings more bitterly true: nothing is unidirectional; everything is multifaceted; and every situation is never contained by minimal players. Consequently, every initial intention is ultimately transformed and/or mutated by others into something else. You need look no further than the recent Iranian negotiations trying to conclude a new agreement about nuclear energy.

The point of negotiations was to place formal curbs and oversight mechanisms on the Iranian government as it tries to develop a nuclear energy program. Those curbs are of course meant to make sure that only nuclear energy for domestic use can come from any Iranian effort and no possibility could emerge to transform that effort into the production of nuclear weapons of any kind. Almost immediately the American domestic audience has been passionately split: one side welcomed the opportunity to consider a new approach for actual engagement, trying to bring Iran more into the global community responsibility fold. The opposing side is convinced Iran can never be trusted and that any program involving nuclear energy is destined to be a mere ruse to secretly develop nuclear weapons and ultimately destabilize the Middle East region and beyond. The international reaction has been no less contentious: for every state that thinks engagement with Iran is the only real way to broker responsible nuclear behavior from it, there are powerful opponents (Israel and Saudi Arabia just to name two very outspoken ones) who will likely never feel any brokered deal will provide enough real oversight or enough true curbs.

In a diplomatic Utopia the next course of action would be to include all actors with a stake in the game to come together and hammer out not only consensus, but a sense of repeatable trust so that there is both the likelihood of good behavior and belief in legal redress for any violation of said behavior. But we do not live in a diplomatic Utopia, far from it. In fact, we live in a global affairs world where we speak about peace but expect war; where we declare good intentions but anticipate subterfuge; where we extend the hand of friendship while making sure the other hand is behind our backs with fingers crossed, just in case. Most say this is just cautious statesmanship, a necessary but healthy skepticism so as to not be overwhelmed if things go poorly. Sometimes, however, that cautious statesmanship seems to doom those best intentions to the trash heap of chaos. In this case, that chaos might be triggered by the barely contained secret that the United States will not only renew its defense aid agreement with Israel when it expires in 2017, but that it will likely be INCREASED significantly beyond its current three billion USD. The posturing and denial swirling around this poorly concealed secret is almost fodder for a tragic comedy: no one is willing to admit this is meant to be a ‘kiss and make-up’ defense deal to put Israel more at ease with the Americans engaging Iran. Netanyahu himself staunchly declares that even if a new deal is reached and for significantly more money that it will still not change Israel’s overall opposition to American engagement with Iran. In other words, the U.S. is going to give more money and weapons to an irritated Israel in order to keep it ‘calm’ about allowing Iran the chance to dabble with nuclear energy. Iran, of course, is not going to be blind to this development. From its side it will no doubt see its own international agreement as trying to constrain its ‘national defense sovereignty’ while then watching the Americans follow it with another with Israel that will subsequently arm it to the teeth, with an anticipation and expectation of Iranian misbehavior. Saudi Arabia will undoubtedly clamor onto Israel’s coattails to also gain new advantages and ‘cooperation.’ Keep in mind this current situation emerges from the ‘positive’ diplomacy of engaging Iran, with the intention to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons capability and making it more responsibly tied to the global community.

One man’s cooperation can indeed be another man’s conflict. So if anyone is standing by trying to read the tea leaves of future peace as it concerns the Iranian agreement, be careful with your enthusiasm: the cascade effects of the eternal Security Dilemma, innate to global affairs writ large, means this ‘new day dawning’ in American-Iranian relations could ultimately also be the cause for worsening interaction with Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, just to name a few. To recap:

• America opens discussions as it is domestically conflicted as to whether this deal with Iran is positive or negative. Regardless, negotiations and an anticipated deal is expected.
• Israel will never see it as anything but negative, leading to an increased sense of insecurity.
• Saudi Arabia will agree, on this one thing at least, with Israel.
• Turkey will hedge its bets but also look upon the agreement with concern and ‘healthy skepticism.’
• America will try to ‘soothe’ hurt feelings by giving Israel a massive increase in defense aid, likely followed by similar possibilities for Saudi Arabia and Turkey. All three will use this ‘defense’ aid in a manner that will seem decidedly ‘offensive’ in military capacity terms.
• Iran will see those actions as a direct act of ‘potential aggression’ against itself, subsequently causing internal domestic pressure to not honor the new agreement that set all of this behavior off in the first place.
• Israel, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps Turkey will see this Iranian ‘reaction’ as actually ‘action,’ the EXACT action in fact they always warned about and had been waiting for from the very first moment the Americans engaged Iran.
• America will reopen discussions domestically, perhaps even elevating to a formal legal level, to consider if this deal was not just negative or positive, but if someone somewhere somehow had done something illegal to broker it. Expect those accusations to come from whichever party is not currently holding the White House.

It is both fascinating and disconcerting to witness how fast the spinning wheel of cooperation and peace can turn into the rotating blades of mistrust and war. And always with the ‘best of intentions’ motivating everyone’s diplomats and foreign policy analysts. I hope I am wrong. I hope such possibilities do not turn into realities. I hope, for once, that ‘skeptical optimism’ can in fact turn into legitimate optimism. I hope. But I won’t hold my breath.

Dr. Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

The recent appearance of Russian President Vladimir Putin before the UN was a command performance for any Western analyst who wants a deeper and more brazen access to Russian global affairs thinking. The traditional mistake made, by Americans most certainly, is to dismiss Russian argument as nothing but crying over spilt geostrategic milk: in short, since Russia lost the Cold War and lost its beloved communist system, it cannot stop diplomatically whining about the victor. While there is no doubt that there have been over the past two and a half decades since the dissolution of the Soviet Union some examples of resentment by the Russian government over its fall from grace off of the bipolar world stage, it would be reckless and unwise to permanently paint Russian diplomacy with the bitterness brush. American political recklessness can indeed be found just as much, if not more than, examples of Russian diplomatic petulance.

Indeed, some of the more memorable quotes from Putin’s speech are in fact ideas he has spoken openly about for the past decade:

“After the end of the Cold War, a single center of domination emerged in the world, and then those who found themselves at the top of the pyramid were tempted to think they were strong and exceptional, they knew better.”

“An aggressive foreign interference has resulted in a brazen destruction of national institutions . . . Instead of the triumph of democracy and progress, we got violence, poverty and social disaster. Nobody cares a bit about human rights, including the right to life.”

“We are all different, and we should respect that. No one has to conform to a single development model that someone has once and for all recognized as the right one.”

The problem in all of this, of course, is that the United States will adamantly defend its good intentions in each and every case of foreign intervention and/or pursuit of its national interests on the global stage. Ironically, Russia has been the only country to date that accepted the American right to behave in this manner but only if that right was granted as a universal reality of global affairs and power disbalance. And that is where the United States and Russian Federation have always wildly disagreed. I have written many times before, much to the chagrin of my American colleagues, that on this one point at least logic and consistency side more heavily with Russia’s argument. Anyone who studies international relations knows well the internal philosophical dilemma between politics as they are versus politics as they ought to be. Think of it as Locke and Rousseau fighting against Hobbes and Machiavelli. Russia openly and unabashedly accepts global affairs as being the exclusive realist domain of Hobbes and Machiavelli: life is brutish, nasty, and short, and the preservation of power is not moral or immoral but rather an amoral pursuit that is simply about capability and effective strategy. Before you think that means America sits squarely on the side of Locke and Rousseau, on the side of freedom and civil liberty, think again: America has always been equally ready to recognize the nastiness of foreign affairs and the deviousness that is sometimes required to get a mission accomplished. But America is just about the only country on earth that can recognize that reality while simultaneously proclaiming itself and its own behaviors as somehow above such realist ends-justifying-the-means gamesmanship.

Welcome to what drives the Russian diplomat absolutely insane with incredulous frustration. Russia (and to a lesser extent China) has always dismissed this inconsistency. In fact, some might argue Russia has been somewhat gleeful in pointing this hypocrisy out. This was exactly what was happening this past week at the UN with Putin’s speech. The Russian President basically stood back from the podium, symbolically spread his arms out wide, and with a Cheshire cat grin, declared to the world watching: So, America, are you happy now? Are we ready to get serious about cleaning up these messes now? While most of America has been critiquing the Russian presence in Syria as just a cheaply-veiled attempt to keep Assad in power while supposedly trying to do damage to DAESH, Russia looks on bemusedly and says, ‘ah, yeah, exactly. What’s your point???’ After all, it was over three years ago that Russia publicly said the removal of Assad from Damascus might not be all that America was cracking it up to be: the ‘rebel alliance’ seemed to be a fractured and disorganized band of miscreants. While some were true rebels aiming to topple a decrepit regime with the democratic experiment that had been washing over the Middle East in general with the Arab Spring, there were plenty of others who were crossing secretly over the border from Turkey looking to help radical Islamists fill what could be an expected power vacuum. Russia will always be worried about radical Islamists on its southern flank. The fact that this happened to be taking place in a country whose leader was politically-aligned with Moscow just made the decision-making calculus simpler. Thus, when America lobs an accusation that Russia isn’t fighting DAESH but supporting Assad, Russia with complete sincerity responds that it is openly and unashamedly doing BOTH. The only country in the world more afraid of or against the spread of radical Islam than the United States is Russia. It also does not have a problem with countries determining and preserving whatever system of power central authority can maintain (see quote above). No, Russia does not believe this principle results in the most free, most open, and most democratic societies emerging. But it does believe this principle keeps the global stage far more stable. American contradictory experiments in tampering (where it believes that it is exceptional to all other countries but that its exceptional system and beliefs should be exported everywhere else) is what rocks global equilibrium to Russia. China has always believed in this reality as well. But it is Russia that has taken on the unique responsibility to call the United States out for it. Again and again and again.

What some might think is that this is a diatribe against American arrogance, or that American ‘moral imperialism’ has to be met with resistance from countries like Russia. I think this is an overstatement. I don’t believe Russia worries about such things. It may state things to that effect for the mere drama and ‘media sexiness’ of calling America out. But the real reason Russia stands against the posturing of American de facto exceptionalism is that it sincerely believes it leaves nothing but a mess behind. The worry is not that America is taking over the world (anyone who looks at Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Syria understands that American intervention doesn’t result in any immediate and positive American interests), even if Russia thinks America might want to take over the world, fantasy-style. No. The problem is that America never truly actively commits, but rather ‘half-commits’ to its interests. This is what results in the chaos. Russia entering Syria and actively conducting air raids on various DAESH and rebel positions is simply Putin saying ‘THIS is our priority and so we will act. Because we have the power to do so and therefore it is our right.” It believes this same right was acted upon by America with all of its adventures overseas. What’s good for the American goose will always be seen as also just fine for the Russian gander. At the very least, there is something refreshing about a country stating where it stands and then acting exactly in accordance with that position, rightly or wrongly. And anyone who knows Russia and Russian history, this aspect, of charging forward whether it is undeniably proper and correct or irrefutably brash and impatient, is wonderfully consistent of the Russian foreign policy character.

Dr. Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

While the debate over the wisdom of concluding the Iran nuclear deal continues, this article takes a slightly more involved intellectual approach to explain why an alternative to the long-standing sanctions was likely inevitable.

This is especially the case if there is a sincere desire to see Iran incorporated long-term into the global community and not simply continue to punish it as a pariah into political perpetuity. Several conceptual and theoretical explanations have been used to highlight key indicators that counteract the effectiveness of sanctions within the Middle East and how the spread of certain ideologies and social practices have impacted the success of international mediations. This microcosm analysis of the various social variables, mostly stemming from historical and political events, supports the need to judge more harshly the long-term efficacy of sanctions. It provides an analysis concerning weapons proliferation within Iran and will question the overall potential success of sanctions against such targeted states.

In an effort to provide a clearer scope of imposing sanctions against independent states, it is required to assess the overall political stratagem. According to many political theorists, the application of sanctions against various states has become the most popular alternative to military force that may otherwise lead to war. Past war efforts, however, have provided a misguided concept of the efficacy of sanctions, implying that a one-size fits all approach will produce identical results. “Sanctions — either bilateral, in conjunction with informal coalitions of like-minded countries, or through international organizations like the UN — have long been a staple of U.S. foreign policy.   Their appeal is obvious: sanctions provide an intermediate step, between normal negotiations and outright hostilities, in our attempts to a) alter the behavior of foreign states or even b) force the removal of their governments. There is a voluminous and disputatious literature on the effectiveness of sanctions.” (Baker) Put another way, the over-popularity of sanctions as a policy refuge demonstrates a lack of awareness within the international political spectrum, implying that all political arenas are the same and general applications can bring about similar change. This is simply false.

Unfortunately, it was not until the recent failures of multiple Western-imposed sanctioning projects that security theorists began to see key variables that have contributed to the lack of effectiveness within such measures. Such factors have included: considering the targeted state’s form of government; levels of state patriotism; and unilateral control. To begin with, assessing the form of government of the subjected state has proven crucial in generating success of applying sanctions. “Because of different institutional incentives, economically punishing sanctions are less likely to succeed against a nondemocratic target than against a democratic target. Sanctions increase rents. This benefits nondemocratic leaders more than democratic ones. Also, nondemocratic leaders have smaller winning coalitions, so their core constituents suffer less from sanctions than democratic leaders.” (Souva) This certainly was the case with Iran, and other targeted states with authoritarian-led regimes, in that democratic societies are human rights driven and tend to focus on the overall well-being of their societies. Democratic states in general maintain multiple parties. Majority-led parties can then petition their views by vote which can in turn push sanction compliance. On the other hand, authoritarian-led regimes like Iran lack this outlet, resulting in the authority of the government being the only and final determination of sanction negotiations, regardless of differing views, isolation, or general populace suffering.

In terms of considering state nationalism and the successful outcomes of sanctions, research has proven that applying sanctions to countries with strong nationalist perspectives will most likely fail. This mitigating context is widely seen throughout countries with strong anti-Western perspectives and can definitely be applied to the case of Iran. “Nationalism is as strong among Iranians as it is among Americans. And it is easy to imagine a similar ‘rally round the flag’ effect were the United States to face foreign pressure aimed at altering our policies. It is one of the curiosities of our foreign policy that Americans often assume that foreigners will act in ways that we ourselves never would.” (Baker) As seen with Iran, the original premise of institutionalizing sanctions was to negatively impact the country’s economy, hoping to turn the people against its own government. The reality is that the Iranian state, along with many other authoritarian countries, maintains strong anti-Western perspectives that often engender a counter-reaction to sanctioning efforts. Such countries often effectively lay blame on Western leaders for increasing levels of poverty that then contribute to the growth of stronger nationalist perspectives and thus increase the long-term resistance against Western sanctions.

Multilateralism, also explained as the concept of international control, has been identified as a contributing variable to the overall effectiveness of state-centered sanctions. Due to many economic interdictions often involving the international cooperation of surrounding states, individual compliance by other countries is required. “Multilateralism, according to Ruggie’s definition and quoted by Martin, ‘requires that states sacrifice substantial levels of flexibility in decision-making and resist short-term personal temptations in favor of long-term universal benefits.’ Effectively, international cooperation is often described as a product of national self-interest in an increasingly interdependent world.” (Golliard) Thus, multilateralism holds that independent states must not only be aware of their individual contributions but also that they sacrifice the possible individual benefits of pursuing their own interests. This is quite indicative of one of the ways the Iranian case went wrong, as some nations contributed to Iran’s resistance simply by not dismissing their own international personal benefits in order to ensure sanctioning success.

Thus, the form of government, levels of nationalism, and multilateralism are all factors to be considered when looking at the potential success (or lack thereof) of sanctions as a general phenomenon. The presence of these elements, as well as their intertwining relationships, can often undermine the overall efficacy of employing sanctions to coerce change within a subjected state like Iran. In “Thinking Strategically about Sanctions,” the author Olivier Schmitt discussed the onset of factors in deciding to introduce sanctions against a country. This especially considered the overall environment of the subjected state and how that might produce primal behaviors that would ultimately lead to future violent conflict. “And once the process is launched, studies of potential radicalization of the actors are needed. I am not here talking about a ‘path-dependency’ phenomenon. Rather, using the ‘rise to the extremes’ theory, I suggest that the beginning of sanctions imposition can have a radicalizing effect on the targeted country.” (Schmitt) Therefore prior to enforcing sanctions on such poorly-positioned states like Iran, someone should have acknowledged these negative characteristics independently and how they can lead to negative results and further disastrous outcomes.

After reviewing the conceptual shortcomings of instituting sanctions and assessing theoretical flaws, it is clear for many reasons that UN-led sanctions were arguably always going to fail majorly in pushing Iran to cease its nuclear enrichment program or soften its general anti-Western stances. In spite of multiple efforts at coercion by the U.S. and facing heavy declines in Iran’s economy, the nuclear enrichment program not only continued to exist, but the authority of the theocratic regime was able to fairly easily handle the largest public resistance against it back in 2009 with the Green Revolution. Therefore it was arguably always imperative to the future of international security that policymakers and diplomats alike began to consider alternative approaches to the subject of deterring Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities. This alternative would have to be something not exclusively based on punishment and isolation but rather inclusiveness and mutual accountability and responsibility. For these reasons the new Iranian deal, even with misgivings and far from perfect, is a step of progress compared to the old long-standing sanction regime.

Dr. Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University and Dianne Valdez who just completed her Master’s degree in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The word on the street in Afghanistan is that the United States created ISIS to be a problem for Russia, China, and Iran. While it would not be the first time the US funded, trained, or invented militarized extremism in the name of great power politics, the whole truth of this statement is far-fetched.

What it suggests is that sometime prior to the US invasion of Iraq a few individuals planned a series of intricate political and geostrategic moves that would create conditions hospitable for a group that was brutal and effective, whose geographic ambitions were oriented toward challenging America on the world stage. While I reject this narrative there is a small nugget of truth in this conspiracy: ISIS is a bigger problem for Russia, China, and Iran and the US is strategically aware of it.

First, take US political will in the fight against ISIS. The US is politically exhausted after more than a decade of war. Domestically, we have rising racial tension, an uneasy economic outlook, and the coming marathon of an 18-month election campaign. Internationally, we face an irritated Russia, an ascendant China, and the ongoing drama of the Iranian nuclear deal. Without an attack on US soil, ISIS is quite frankly off the local ballot and a footnote on the US National Security Council’s agenda.

This perspective sheds light on many apparent political faux pas in recent months – namely the no complete strategy and public bewilderment of US Generals. In these moments where the veil seems to be pulled off, and a very human face is put on the most powerful military and intelligence community in the world, one is forced to surmise whether this is not some part of a deeper strategy within old-school great power politics. Instead of getting lost in the noise of poor US leadership, our attention should be focused on why the decisions are being made, because these decisions form the front lines of a new geopolitical battleground: Khorasan.

Khorasan is a region that encompasses much of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. To ISIS, Khorasan represents the first battleground of its end-of-days scenario. To regional powers, Khorasan represents the future of energy.

The recent history of the region has seen an increase in economic brinksmanship as energy sources, namely oil and natural gas, have been uncovered. Russia and Iran, due to their history of control and geographic proximity, have had relative carte blanche access, what with their largest competitors being each other. The past decade has seen this bipolarity shaken as Chinese, European, and American ambitions have sought to develop their own share of a quickly-increasing resource pie. While China has been able to develop their own transnational energy infrastructure with little regional backlash, Western development has come at both high fiscal and political costs. The conditions in recent months are a Europe that is still significantly dependent upon Russian energy, an Iranian economy that has basically withstood US sanctions, and a China that is growing more confident in its energy outlook. One way to counteract this reality is to flood the market with new energy resources. Another way is to destabilize the region.

To turn again to US strategy, I offer three thought experiments. First, under the auspices of a Russia that has shown increasing willingness to flex its military and subversive might in pursuit of its economic interests, the US faces two dialectical choices on the posture or submit scale. Either the US can try to constrain NATO expansion in order to give Russia space on its periphery and look to balance European trade and energy dependence between the two nations or the US can try to increase NATO presence through security commitments and public displays of force, seeking to undermine the Russian regional energy hegemony. We have already seen the public march of NATO throughout Europe. We are in the midst of developing a simultaneously overt and covert strategy of economic and energy subversion. It seems likely such a strategy would seek to align military and economic power rather than detach them.

Second, consider Iranian negotiations: Iran has largely been in the driving seat, particularly as sanctions have fallen far short of crippling its economy. The scales seemed to have shifted as the US has shown increasing willingness to walk away from negotiations in order to secure a better deal. While the recent agreement is far from complete, I argue its timing is more a product of Iran’s desire for expediency. Because as the threat of ISIS grows in the region, Iranian economic stability and its own national security will at least be perceived at the local level to decrease. Therefore Iran has much more to risk in continued negotiations. This concern is also evident in Iran’s continued support for the Assad regime. As ISIS celebrates its one-year anniversary, Iranian support for Assad is less about power projection and more about power protection.

Third, as China expands its strategic reach, it becomes increasingly aware of its future resource needs. In an act of foresight, and arguably to some extent anticipatory fear, China is developing resources around the world from food to metals to energy. A piece in their South-South development strategy is Caspian energy. In acts that can be described as a calculated risk, the Chinese have spent billions on developing energy infrastructure across what is increasingly becoming one of the most dangerous and unstable regions of the world. Whether this venture is designed to enhance China’s strategic depth or to be a bulwark against economic contraction, the US has a geopolitical interest in acting as at least a partial impediment.

War is not just politics but economics by another means. The Caspian region, or Khorasan, is now playing host to a Gordian knot of great power politics and economics. ISIS is a dialectical challenge for the United States, existing both as a US foreign policy failure in the present and presenting a unique strategic opportunity in the near future. While drone strikes will undoubtedly continue, the current strategic landscape will have to change for a serious Western-led intervention to occur. I expect that as ISIS looks to Khorasan the US will look the other way. Only time will tell whether this turn-the-other-geopolitical-cheek strategy ends up harmless or causing great harm.

Dr. Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University and Evan Thomsen: a graduate of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE and is currently a Master’s student at the world-renown Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University,  exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The recently signed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and China was barely completed and announced to the world when debates about its impact began. As can be expected, much of the conversation since the announcement has been focused on Iran’s nuclear program and whether this plan can prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon in the future. Formally speaking, the JCPOA leaves Iran enough capacity to still attain a nuclear weapon in the future should it decide to pull out of the agreement. But the question that must be asked, that we must keep in mind when discussing JCPOA, is this: What does Iran gain by signing the JCPOA?

When one considers that Iran has expended a great deal of resources over previous decades on building up its nuclear program, there has to be a serious reason for it to give up its nuclear aspirations now. Iran has spent billions of dollars on building infrastructure: nuclear reactors, centrifuges, and facilities; attaining nuclear materials; and thousands of man-hours expended on uranium enrichment. So why after all that material, time, and man-power investment does Iran reverse course and agree to curb its nuclear aspirations?

The most obvious gain to the Iranian government and its partners in the JCPOA is the economic and geopolitical cascade effects of full Iranian reintegration into the global economy. Iran’s economy has taken hits related to drops in the price of crude oil the last couple of years from over $100.00 a barrel to just above $50.00, as well as chronic strains on economic output because of sanctions imposed by the UN, the EU and the US. Prior to the imposition of sanctions, Iran was OPEC’s second largest oil producer with the fourth largest oil reserves and second largest natural gas reserves. Indeed, 80% of Iran’s economy was based on its petroleum industry. Iran’s economy was growing before the sanctions and it enjoyed a relatively low unemployment rate. As intended, these sanctions have had a devastating effect on the Iranian people over the last decade since their imposition. Iran’s unemployment rates now hover in the low teens and 20% of its population lives below the poverty line. Iran would greatly benefit by a return to its pre-sanction economic output. For the European Union, Iran’s return to the global market would offer it a welcome alternative to obtaining its natural gas supplies from someone other than Russia. Russia has used threats to shut off natural gas supplies to Europe to gain leverage in negotiations on the situation in the Ukraine. While much of Western Europe isn’t 100% dependent on Russia for its natural gas supplies, it nevertheless must be very attractive to remove that threat leverage from future negotiations with Russia. So on this level the JCPOA has very little to do with joining or being prevented from joining the global nuclear club and much more about a return to what must be seen in Iran as its proper economic birthright on the global market and in the EU as a wonderful chip to work against the Russian Federation as concerns its own energy needs.

But as we continue to ponder the question of what Iran gains by signing the JCPOA, we must begin to look also at a less obvious and, at least in our opinion, more compelling reason for its sudden agreement to capitulate on a nuclear program now. It is Iran’s demographics and the potential for political unrest related to its large youth population that can no longer be simply dismissed by the governing authority. Since the Ayatollah’s revolution Iran’s population has doubled and nearly 50% of the population is now under 35 years old. Unlike previous generations, this youth population is well-educated, since earning a college degree was highly encouraged by the Iranian government since the revolution. Despite their education levels, the brute force and displacement of the economic fall-out caused by sanctions has fallen squarely on this young and talented generation. Youth unemployment remains at nearly 25%, double the rate of other generations. The last time Iran had youth unemployment rates this high was in the decade prior to the revolution. The current regime is largely dominated by leaders who were youth members of that revolution. We find it hard to believe they themselves fail to recognize the strange similarities between the current situation and the 1970s, especially if they continue to ignore youth dissatisfaction. The Iranian Islamic Revolution was largely born within a restive youth population suffering from high unemployment rates that then partnered with other marginalized groups to overthrow the Shah and his US-backed government, which almost all sides had come to view as corrupt and ineffectual. While the current youth dissatisfaction has no religious underpinning or charismatic single leader to powerfully unite them all, it is not illogical to think current progressive thinkers within Iranian authority see concern with all this displaced anger and wasted young talent. For recognizing that danger and trying to counteract it through the JCPOA, Iran has proven itself to be diplomatically cunning and adept.

Keep in mind Iran had already experienced civil unrest from this demographic group. Following the 2009 presidential elections the Green Movement, which supported reform politicians in the elections, organized and led some of the largest protests seen in Iran since the revolution itself. Hundreds of thousands of Iran’s youth were in the streets protesting for political reform in the weeks following President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s reelection. While the government ultimately quelled the protestors, the sentiments expressed by the movement did not just melt away. On the contrary, the Green Movement has always been working below the surface of Iran’s political scene, pushing for democratic and social reform. As the 2011 Arab Spring spread through neighboring nations, Iran’s leaders had to notice the similarities to the Green Movement protests of 2009. They might have even worried that the base source for the Arab Spring may have been its own quashed Green Revolution. There had to be concern that the Arab Spring could create a ‘full circle’ effect, bringing revolution back to the place it all almost started three years before.

In addition, the countries that had the largest protests and ultimately largest reforms were the countries that had similar demographics to Iran: high youth populations and high youth unemployment rates. During the Arab spring, leaders of the Green Movement organized street demonstrations that had nearly a million protesters on the streets of Tehran. The candidates selected by the Guardian Council in the 2013 election cycle also show that while the Green Movement is not as openly active they are still clearly on the minds of the ruling class: the eventual winner, while a conservative leader, has shown more willingness to enact reforms and engage the broader population across the country.

The ultimate goal for Iran to join the JCPOA is rebuilding economic opportunities for its large youth population and hopefully redirecting it energies into building careers, raising families, and achieving stability and prosperity. Prior to the JCPOA, with sanctions still firmly in place, those goals had to seem largely out of reach for many of the young members of Iran’s society. Again, the true diplomatic talent with the nuclear accord is in Iran recognizing what could be a boiling point for political dissent and with one deft stroke has attempted to turn that energy into an economic aspiration for the entire country. Once it gains economic prosperity for its youth population, while still trying to ensure political stability for its ruling class no doubt, it will be interesting to see if Iran will continue to follow the mandates set out for it under the agreement. Or will it choose to pull out of the agreement (as it has a right to do let’s not forget) and return to its quest for a nuclear weapon, only now with the stability and prosperity and LEVERAGE of being a fully integrated and quite possibly valuable piece of the global energy economic puzzle for the Western world.

Who says global affairs isn’t full of irony in the modern day? The Iran accord proves this cynicism false.

Dr. Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University, and Paula Malott is a 2012 graduate with a Bachelor of Science degree from Bellevue University’s International Security and Intelligence Studies program. She is currently employed as a Department of Defense contractor (Booz Allen) instructing Intelligence Analysts for the U.S. Air Force, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Although the Caspian Sea states haven’t officially come to terms on their respective maritime claims, Iran currently firmly controls about 12% of the Caspian Sea. The current Iranian holdings are very difficult from an economic perspective as they are resource rich but also much deeper than the rest of the Caspian Sea, which makes extracting these resources far more difficult. This is a major contributing factor to the Iranian claim to fully 20% of the Caspian Sea, which conflicts with other states’ claims. There are essentially two threats to Iran in the Caspian Sea over these territorial claims: Russia and Azerbaijan.

During the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union the Caspian Sea was primarily under Moscow’s control. Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has consistently sought to be the major power in the Caspian Sea. This is reflected in three ways. The first way is that the Russian Navy maintains the largest fleet in the Caspian Sea. The second way is through gearing the other Caspian states against Iran, being Russia’s main regional competitor, through soft power moves such as joint military exercises and trade agreements. The third way is through overtly blocking Iranian attempts to build up its navy in the Caspian Sea, such as when Russia denied Iran the use of its rivers to transport a warship from the Gulf to the Caspian Sea. Being that Russia is the major military power in the Caspian Sea, an asymmetric defense similar to Iranian strategy in the Gulf would translate well.

The second threat to Iranian claims in the Caspian comes from Azerbaijan. Although not a large military threat, Iranian claims in the Caspian Sea overlap mostly with the Azeri claims. This is primarily due to the contested areas having prime depth for resource exploitation. In particular the proposed Western-backed pipeline, which Iran opposes, would traverse this area and head through Azerbaijan towards the West. Iran has tested these waters with an incursion by an oil platform which was virtually unopposed by the lackluster Azeri Navy. With this type of incursion Iran has shown it is ready to engage in its preferred naval strategy of area-denial to enforce new acquisitions.

Even the mighty US Navy, the world’s strongest and a sign of global American power, is frustrated by the Iranian Navy. The Strait of Hormuz is able to be blocked off by Iran due to its leveraging of asymmetric tactics to conduct area denial. Although this scenario hasn’t been tested in actual combat it has shown to be worrisome to the US with the adoption of doctrines such as AirSea Battle which focus on countering anti access/area denial capabilities. Therefore it is logical that this Iranian strategy would be employed in the Caspian Sea to enforce its claims against local neighbors.

The Iranian chain of command is decentralized in that small unit commanders have enough autonomy to carry out the overarching strategy even with infrequent communication between itself and central command, which creates capacity to absorb attempts to decapitate the command structure from its constituent units. The Iranian military copies this strategy with all of its serving units beyond the navy, meaning its entire military could operate in this manner within a Caspian Sea conflict.

To supplement the decentralization of the Iranian military command structure is a culture of sacrifice within the Iranian military. This is in reference to the motivation for service-martyrdom that is highly emphasized within the Iranian military. To get the most out of its asymmetric strategy it is important that the Iranian military is able to rely on their personnel to put everything on the line to be able to accomplish their mission even if they are cut off from their command structure. This is also rumored to involve the planned usage of suicide attacks as part of Iran’s military strategy. Regardless of the use of suicide attacks or not, the Iranian military has plenty of tools at its disposal to secure its claims in the Caspian Sea.

Iranian surface ships are capable of extensive mine-laying operations which deny an area to their enemy and serve as a deterrent to any other waters that the Iranian Navy operates. Iranian submarines also serve this purpose in that their existence is a deterrent to enemy naval movements. Closer to the coastlines, small attack boats have the capacity to ambush naval ships from concealed positions in suicide or hit-and-run attacks. Further inland Iran still has land-based missiles and aircraft which are able to be deployed to secure and deny their claims against enemies. Finally, Iran has the ability to deploy Special Forces to conduct sabotage, hit-and-run, and suicide attacks against enemy military facilities. Therefore, the Iranian military has the ability to at least significantly frustrate the ability of an aggressor to encroach upon Iranian claims within the Caspian Sea, similarly to their strategy in the Gulf, even when faced by a supposedly superior military rival like the United States or Russia.

The growing geostrategic importance of the Caspian Sea has been reflected in the growing Iranian military emphasis on it. Whether it is the threats of the powerful Russian Caspian Flotilla wanting to retain power over the Caspian or Azerbaijan’s overlapping claims with Western backing, Iran feels backed into a corner. Thus having a doctrine of being able to operate with ‘the command head cut off’, pushing a martyr morale throughout their military, and emphasizing tools to conduct area-denial operations makes the Iranian military a formidable opponent. It is potentially the hydra lurking beneath the surface of the Caspian’s contested waters, making an impact far beyond the immediate region.

Dr. Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University, and Taylor S. Morse, a Master’s graduate student in the ISIS Program at Bellevue University, studying under Dr. Crosston, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

The fear aspect comes from worrying about ‘freeing’ Iran from crippling sanctions. While those who view Iran from a more hawkish perspective lament how much influence the Shiite republic has managed to obtain across the Middle East while ‘weakened,’ they are nearly apoplectic with the possibility of removing sanctions and actually letting Iran enter the world market and start to develop global economic stability. The fear logic dictates that a prosperous Iran would not be newly responsible but only more bullish and disruptive across the region. The fantasy aspect, however, decries that the West is making too much out of Iranian desires to be a regional military hegemon. This dismissal relies on materiel statistics that judge Iranian war-making capability as not just obsolete and behind most of the possible regional rivals it might challenge, but as possibly decrepit. Indeed, Saudi Arabia and Israel both massively outspend and out-invest Iran in terms of defense and military capacity and their current standing in terms of direct comparison is considered laughable: simply put, Saudi Arabia and Israel are modern 21st century militaries while Iran is a mid-20th century military at best. All of this back-and-forth, however, misses one very key aspect: it plays exactly into the geopolitically manipulative interests of Saudi Arabia and Israel as it concerns holding Iran down.

This is not necessarily a criticism of either Saudi Arabia or Israel aiming to accomplish this goal. Geopolitical competition is always about advantage and disadvantage and most view that game still as zero-sum. This has been especially so in the Middle East. In the world of Intelligence Studies, however, what matters most is gaining insight from information. And while that is possible when the information is impartial, it becomes nearly impossible when the information is flawed or misleading. This is what will happen in the aftermath of the nuclear deal with Iran, as anyone who reads it will notice almost immediately that it is much more a temporary postponement rather than a permanent solution. What I find so distasteful is not how the interested parties are all now trying to cater and ‘manage’ the information to their own national agendas. To me, that is a basic definition of foreign affairs, albeit a somewhat callous and blunt one. No, what is distasteful is how the United States often fails to see itself being played by ‘allies’ while being adamantly watchful against such possibilities with ‘adversaries.’ The problem, of course, is that whether you are played by friend or foe you are still, in the end, simply PLAYED. And being played doesn’t usually end up in your own favor. A recent piece from Foreign Policy perfectly illustrates how this can be both openly evident and inexplicably not noticed:

“The Russian and Iranian position is that the Security Council resolutions rested on the understanding that the arms embargo would be lifted once concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program were resolved. Provided that a deal is reached on Iran’s nuclear program, Russia and Iran thus argue, the arms embargo loses its legal justification. The current U.S. position, however, may be less interested in maintaining coherence with past policy than it is with ensuring that it mitigates regional allies’ concern as much as possible as part of a nuclear deal with Iran. Understandably, U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration fears that undoing the arms embargo on Iran would be a step too far for some of the United States’ key regional allies, all of which — but particularly Saudi Arabia — threaten to undermine the administration’s case for a nuclear deal should they perceive their interests to dictate in favor of doing so.” (The Myth of the Iranian Military Giant, Foreign Policy, July 10, 2015)

The line emphasized in bold and italics is a nod to Israeli and Saudi concerns about Iran as a legitimate regional presence. It is not so much about military conquest or even regional defense hegemony, which is what the original Foreign Policy piece was trying to dismiss from the discussion table. Rather, it is acknowledgement of a very serious but more implicit reason: namely, Saudi Arabia and Israel never want to see a Middle East that has a globally-embraced or even slowly-integrating Iran. In Israel’s case, it is an obvious reference to Iran’s so-called foreign policy goal to wipe the Jewish state off the map. No matter what changes happen within Iran, no matter what reforms or constraints or inroads made against the Guardian Council, Israel will never see Iran other than the Holocaust-denying, anti-Semitic, radical Shiite republic incapable of ever truly altering the political course set in 1979 by the Ayatollah (Prime Minister Netanyahu’s comments today only bear witness to this).

In Saudi Arabia’s case, it is the sometimes shrill Wahhabist concern over Shiite encroachment in the Gulf and any perceived challenge, no matter how remote, that Iran might make against the Ummah, the transnational Muslim community writ large. It is easy to forget the radical cleric community within Wahhabism is not exactly tame and docile compared to the radical cleric community within Shia Islam. We are, in essence, witnessing the battle between Gulf radical Islam versus Persian radical Islam for the ‘religious conscience’ of the region. This is not, of course, the official diplomatic line given from the Saudi royal family in terms of its priorities or agendas. But it is, without question, a matter of ‘soul importance’ to the religious community within Saudi Arabia. And the fact of the matter is that Saudi religious zealots do not take a back seat to Iranian religious zealots as it concerns zealotry. America just chooses to not draw its attention to that fact and the nuclear deal is not going to lessen this intense rivalry in the least.

And thus, back to the original quote above. What that piece fails to observe or conclude is just how long-term damaging such a position is to the diplomatic and foreign policy credibility of the United States. Put another, more blunt, way: it is stating that America honors or betrays its own policies not because of coherence or rationality or justice. But rather it arbitrarily alters course dependent upon present-day allegiances and the needs of those duly initiated into the ‘inner American circle.’ What mitigating allies’ concerns truly means in this case is America may ultimately betray its promises and principles on stage today for other promises made to friends tomorrow. It just depends on how important the friends are. And Israel and Saudi Arabia are banking on always being very good friends. This is the true Great Game of the Middle East that no one likes to talk about. It is a game of strategic doubletalk. What is potentially the most frustrating in this particular context is how the Great Game might in the end actually backfire on the long-term security of not just the Middle East region or the United States national security agenda but of the actual nuclear deal concluded today.

Truly turning Iran, long-term, into a functioning member of the global community, not just with its benefits but with its responsibilities and obligations, might be the only real plan that allows the Iranian people, long-studied and long-documented as perhaps the most democratically-knowledgeable and democratically-aspiring people within the Muslim world, to finally reconstruct its own society in a manner that fundamentally changes the nature and the dynamic of the region. That possibility has only an inkling of a chance if the present deal is not actively undermined, if the powers on the stage that crafted it work in the coming years to turn what was initially a temporary band-aid into a full-on permanent brace. And that, quite frankly, won’t happen if the two most important countries that did not have their flags on the dais today in front of the cameras work hard to ensure this temporary solution becomes simply a confirmation of everyone’s worst assumptions about Iran. Perhaps, in the end, that is exactly what Israel and Saudi Arabia want the most. They don’t want change. They want affirmation. Sometimes status quo has its seduction.

Dr. Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

First consideration goes to the Western Europe – Western China International Transit Corridor, which is a massive construction endeavor aiming to reinvigorate what is basically a modern ‘Silk Road,’ only with all the amenities of modern highway construction. The 7.5 billion USD infrastructure investment will basically connect Western Europe with an efficient superhighway to Western China (and subsequently through China’s highway system all the way, theoretically, to the Pacific Ocean) through Kazakhstan. The 2,840 km transit system has approximately 2/3 of the cost coming from the World Bank, ADB, EBRD, and IDB. Kazakhstan for its part highlights the importance of this corridor not just in its economic reports but in its foreign policy and national security briefings, with its ultimate goal to decrease the delivery of goods from China to Europe from the current road travel time of 45 days down all the way to just 10. This new Silk Road ostensibly rests on Kazakhstan for being the crucial ‘middle passage’ that makes the Europe to Asia connection possible. In its own policy briefings Kazakhstan emphasizes this need not just as a better conduit for improving business and trade but literally connecting the world via roadway in a peaceful and open endeavor. It is somewhat surprising much of the Western world has not capitalized on this massive human geopolitical transportation project more heavily.

Kazakhstan also intends to improve its national rail system, hoping to increase its operating efficiency and reach by being the main connector of the Caspian Sea to the Pacific Ocean and the chief conduit for China to reach Central Asia and beyond to Western Europe. Many fine scholars and analysts in the past have made note of Kazakhstan’s irrefutable central location as the connection point between Europe and Asia. While history has often made reference to Istanbul (nee Constantinople) as the ‘Gateway to the East,’ that is largely a contextual reference based on a history that is now past. The true ‘gateway’ with proper infrastructural development, both economically and politically, could be Kazakhstan. It finally seems fully aware of this potential, given the new emphasis within its budget, foreign policy, and national security policies. More interesting still will be to see, if this comes to fruition, how much there will be a cascade or copy-cat effect on the rest of the Central Asian ‘Stans. Kazakhstan perhaps more than any other Central Asian country has focused on open trade, transnational communication, participation within the global economy, and the rejection of radicalization and extremism. Perhaps most importantly, it has done this with a much less heavy-handed approach when compared to its immediate neighbors in the region.

Even more fascinating has been the launch of a completely new project called the ‘Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran’ (KTI) railway. In the past decade this project could have run afoul of the United States, what with its adamant stance on keeping Iran limited and constrained in terms of economic development as long as it was still under suspicion with its nuclear energy/weapons program. Recent improvements in Iranian-American relations, or at least the prospect of those relations warming up and becoming more tenable, could prove to be of tremendous benefit to Kazakhstan and especially the KTI railway. Most in the West have viewed the softening of relations between Iran and the West strictly from the much larger perspective of global geopolitics and conflict. Much less time and attention has been paid to the numerous payoff effects such a thaw may have on the immediate region. Kazakhstan clearly has not missed this relevance and is deftly trying to position itself to capitalize on potentialities.

Kazakhstan is not without its problems. Any country that has been ruled by the same leader, and his commensurate favorites, uninterrupted since 1991 cannot be absent the typical corruption, nepotism, waste, and bureaucratic inefficiency notorious with any government so dominant and assured of its place and future. But time and accomplishment has clearly shown Kazakhstan to be a fairly ‘dull’ country. And in this case, ‘dull’ is quite positive: it means it is relatively stable, reliable, and absent the turbulence that has been seen more than once in several of its neighbors: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Iran just to name several. Kazakhstan may not be the most open or the most perfectly democratic of systems. But it clearly values calm stability and economic progress, not in the sycophantic and somewhat irrational way that Turkmenistan does, but in a way that sees its future as an active member of the global economic system and wanting to be considered a valued partner in the larger global community of politics. Until recently, only Azerbaijan in the Caspian region could consistently lay claim to that goal. Kazakhstan seems intent on making that club now a twosome. As the saying goes – once could be an accident, but twice would be a trend. If Kazakhstan continues to play out this new role as Central Asia’s stable giant, as the Caspian’s reliable ‘Stan, then it may just end up finding itself in a much more important geopolitical role: the conduit from West to East, the solidifier of a new Silk Road, and the foundation upon which a new era of communication, trade, and transportation develops between the two dominant civilizations in human history. Not bad for a strategy that basically started with a desire to just fix a few potholes.

Dr. Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

The point of negotiations was to place formal curbs and oversight mechanisms on the Iranian government as it tries to develop a nuclear energy program. Those curbs are of course meant to make sure that only nuclear energy for domestic use can come from any Iranian effort and no possibility could emerge to transform that effort into the production of nuclear weapons of any kind. Almost immediately the American domestic audience has been passionately split: one side welcomed the opportunity to consider a new approach for actual engagement, trying to bring Iran more into the global community responsibility fold. The opposing side is convinced Iran can never be trusted and that any program involving nuclear energy is destined to be a mere ruse to secretly develop nuclear weapons and ultimately destabilize the Middle East region and beyond. The international reaction has been no less contentious: for every state that thinks engagement with Iran is the only real way to broker responsible nuclear behavior from it, there are powerful opponents (Israel and Saudi Arabia just to name two very outspoken ones) who will likely never feel any brokered deal will provide enough real oversight or enough true curbs.

In a diplomatic Utopia the next course of action would be to include all actors with a stake in the game to come together and hammer out not only consensus, but a sense of repeatable trust so that there is both the likelihood of good behavior and belief in legal redress for any violation of said behavior. But we do not live in a diplomatic Utopia, far from it. In fact, we live in a global affairs world where we speak about peace but expect war; where we declare good intentions but anticipate subterfuge; where we extend the hand of friendship while making sure the other hand is behind our backs with fingers crossed, just in case. Most say this is just cautious statesmanship, a necessary but healthy skepticism so as to not be overwhelmed if things go poorly. Sometimes, however, that cautious statesmanship seems to doom those best intentions to the trash heap of chaos. In this case, that chaos might be triggered by the barely contained secret that the United States will not only renew its defense aid agreement with Israel when it expires in 2017, but that it will likely be INCREASED significantly beyond its current three billion USD. The posturing and denial swirling around this poorly concealed secret is almost fodder for a tragic comedy: no one is willing to admit this is meant to be a ‘kiss and make-up’ defense deal to put Israel more at ease with the Americans engaging Iran. Netanyahu himself staunchly declares that even if a new deal is reached and for significantly more money that it will still not change Israel’s overall opposition to American engagement with Iran. In other words, the U.S. is going to give more money and weapons to an irritated Israel in order to keep it ‘calm’ about allowing Iran the chance to dabble with nuclear energy. Iran, of course, is not going to be blind to this development. From its side it will no doubt see its own international agreement as trying to constrain its ‘national defense sovereignty’ while then watching the Americans follow it with another with Israel that will subsequently arm it to the teeth, with an anticipation and expectation of Iranian misbehavior. Saudi Arabia will undoubtedly clamor onto Israel’s coattails to also gain new advantages and ‘cooperation.’ Keep in mind this current situation emerges from the ‘positive’ diplomacy of engaging Iran, with the intention to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons capability and making it more responsibly tied to the global community.

One man’s cooperation can indeed be another man’s conflict. So if anyone is standing by trying to read the tea leaves of future peace as it concerns the Iranian agreement, be careful with your enthusiasm: the cascade effects of the eternal Security Dilemma, innate to global affairs writ large, means this ‘new day dawning’ in American-Iranian relations could ultimately also be the cause for worsening interaction with Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, just to name a few. To recap:

• America opens discussions as it is domestically conflicted as to whether this deal with Iran is positive or negative. Regardless, negotiations and an anticipated deal is expected.
• Israel will never see it as anything but negative, leading to an increased sense of insecurity.
• Saudi Arabia will agree, on this one thing at least, with Israel.
• Turkey will hedge its bets but also look upon the agreement with concern and ‘healthy skepticism.’
• America will try to ‘soothe’ hurt feelings by giving Israel a massive increase in defense aid, likely followed by similar possibilities for Saudi Arabia and Turkey. All three will use this ‘defense’ aid in a manner that will seem decidedly ‘offensive’ in military capacity terms.
• Iran will see those actions as a direct act of ‘potential aggression’ against itself, subsequently causing internal domestic pressure to not honor the new agreement that set all of this behavior off in the first place.
• Israel, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps Turkey will see this Iranian ‘reaction’ as actually ‘action,’ the EXACT action in fact they always warned about and had been waiting for from the very first moment the Americans engaged Iran.
• America will reopen discussions domestically, perhaps even elevating to a formal legal level, to consider if this deal was not just negative or positive, but if someone somewhere somehow had done something illegal to broker it. Expect those accusations to come from whichever party is not currently holding the White House.

It is both fascinating and disconcerting to witness how fast the spinning wheel of cooperation and peace can turn into the rotating blades of mistrust and war. And always with the ‘best of intentions’ motivating everyone’s diplomats and foreign policy analysts. I hope I am wrong. I hope such possibilities do not turn into realities. I hope, for once, that ‘skeptical optimism’ can in fact turn into legitimate optimism. I hope. But I won’t hold my breath.

Dr. Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”