Whether or not Putin decides to follow through with such measures, one thing is clear. Moscow’s decision to possibly deploy troops in Ukraine to resolve the crisis will have a deep and resounding effect on the European Union’s image considering its role in contributing to the crisis. Achieving such an overarching political outcome will likely have serious long-term implications not only for Ukraine’s future, but for other states in Russia’s periphery seeking to forge closer ties with the West, primarily Georgia and Moldova.

On the heels of the Sochi Winter Olympics, where post-Soviet sportsmanship was on full display, it would be naïve to think that Russia would just stand by idle while Ukraine descends into chaos, which has been punctuated by the torching of political party offices by newly empowered neo Nazi parties, the passing of laws banning the Russian language and other ant-Russian policies that seek to marginalize large segments of Ukrainian society. But despite Ukraine’s strategic importance to Russia, often described as its “soft underbelly”, Moscow is unlikely to act in a way that would damage its image and renewed international standing, one that is characterized as principled and consistent in adhering to international law.

Russia has scored a number of propaganda points over the past year at the expense of the United States, such as the Snowden affair over the US’ illegal mass surveillance program, and Russia’s diplomatic victory in defusing the Syrian chemical weapons crisis. An “invasion” of Ukraine would certainly reverse such diplomatic godsends and only feed the “blame everything on Putin” chorus. Regardless of the flak Russia will likely receive in the short term as result of any involvement in Ukraine, the crisis has already provided an opportunity for Moscow to demonstrate the EU as playing a reckless and irresponsible role in the crisis.

The crisis in Ukraine was sparked several months ago when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych spurned a much-touted trade and association agreement with the EU at a key EU integration summit last November. In an attempt to resolve the escalating unrest, on February 21 Yanukovych reached an agreement with opposition leaders during negotiations brokered by the German, Polish and French foreign ministers, along with Russia’s ombudsman. But instead of ending to the street protests, the Ukrainian Parliament fired Yanukovych without going through the required impeachment proceedings and trial, as stipulated under the constitution. Soon thereafter, the president was forced to flee the country amid death threats.

Since this coup, Russia has been able to capitalize on the apparent anarchy in Kiev by emphasizing the EU’s indifference to the failed outcome of the peace agreement, and its apparent haste in recognizing the new leadership as legitimate. In exploiting this blatant hypocrisy, and as Russian aligned regions in Ukraine rebelled against the new authorities, Russia facilitated a high-powered press conference on February 28 for the deposed Ukrainian president which generated undue media attention given its preparations – escorted by fighter aircraft, Yanukovych was flown to the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don.

At the conference, Yanukovych reiterated that still the legitimate president of Ukraine and that the EU mediators bear responsible for failing to honor the February 21 peace accord. The event provided a platform to undermine Kiev’s new leaders and their Western supporters, as it raised further questions in Ukraine and abroad as the new regime’s constitutional legitimacy, and why the EU turned a blind eye.

When the news broke that Russia would possibly take military action in Ukraine, the Western media had a field day, presenting it as an imminent invasion of the country. Such a portrayal, unsurprisingly, invoked memories of the 2008 war in Georgia in which Russia repelled Georgian military aggression against its breakaway region South Ossetia.

During and immediately following the five day war, Georgia was seen as having won the PR war, at least in the short term. Ultimately, however, this mattered little to Moscow as the immediate political outcome, and the long term political affects it would have, were far more important. The war demonstrated that Georgia could not rely on any Western military alliance and that a NATO security guarantee would not be backed up with action.

Despite all the rhetoric, NATO was unwilling to risk a third world war with Russia by intervening in the Georgian conflict, during which locals searched the sky for the American planes coming to their rescue. Such unfulfilled expectations also sent a strong message to other former Soviet republics, primarily in Eastern and Central Europe, that considered a military partnership with the US and NATO as a bulwark against a resurgent Russia. Moreover, NATO was seen as reckless, as it was the alliance’s statements prior to the war that encouraged the Georgian leadership to attempt to militarily regain its breakaway regions.

If the war in 2008 damaged NATO’s image and derailed realistic chances for Georgia’s membership in the military bloc, the outcome of the current crisis in Ukraine will likely be a significant weakening of the EU’s image, as well as its main integration instrument, the Eastern Partnership program. Even if Russia considers further action in Ukraine unnecessary, the EU will have proven itself to be not only an untrustworthy partner in mediating pressing political negotiations; it will be seen as having played a direct role in creating a much larger crisis, one which till now, has forced Russia to respond with possible military force. Regardless of how the Ukrainian crisis unfolds and the extent of Russia’s involvement in stabilizing the country, Western leaders may be wise to rethink their integration policies towards Ukraine and other former Soviet republics given their reckless nature and the serious risks that are now ever so clear.

Martin Harris, a freelance journalist and analyst based in the Eurasia region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

On the twenty fifth anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban have likened the success of the holy war fought against the Soviets to the “jihad” now forcing the United States and its allies out of Afghanistan. While it remains unclear how post US involvement in Afghanistan will compare to what followed the Soviet occupation in 1989, there are important parallels that can be drawn from the experience of both former Cold War rivals as they sought to cut their losses and withdraw from the so-called “graveyard of empires”.

On December 27, 1979, after repeated calls for assistance by Kabul, the USSR entered Afghanistan in order to stabilize the country’s fledgling communist government. Supported by an estimated 80,000 troops, the operation was completed in just two days and marked the Soviet Union’s largest foreign military intervention since the Second World War.

But within just the first year, the Soviets recognized that the situation was not going well. Babrak Karmal, the Afghan president who Moscow installed following the invasion, had proved ineffective. Desertions within the Afghan National Army were rampant and the Soviets found themselves engaging a growing constellation of rebel groups amid rising causalities.

The arrival of Soviet Primer Mikhail Gorbachev in the Kremlin coincided with a growing stalemate on the ground, and one of his first orders of business was to steer the war in a new direction. Thousands of more troops were sent in and tactics were shifted to include heavier use of Special Forces and helicopter gunships. Moscow also replaced president Karmal with the more able Dr. Mohammad Najibullah, a former head of the Afghan secret police. Najibullah began implementing a policy of national reconciliation and had improved the effectiveness of the Afghan army. But despite the augmented troop presence, which peaked at around 120,000, and the new military tactics and political approach, by 1986, it was clear that Moscow was already looking for a way out. In many respects, these changes were central to the broader exit strategy.

A decade later, on the pretext of responding the September 11, 2001 attacks in NYC, the US invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban regime due to its failure to hand over Osama bin Laden. In accomplishing its mission, the US used heavy airpower coordinated by Special Forces on the ground; these units also worked with local militias, which were fiercely opposed to the Taliban and had been fighting the Islamist movement since it came to power in 1996.

As with the initial stages of the Soviet intervention , the US’s invasion was swift and faced weak or limited resistance. Upon securing the capital and other major population centers, Washington launched a campaign of “nation building” with Hamid Karzai as the new leader and face of Afghanistan’s democracy. US troops meanwhile scoured the countryside for known or suspected members of Al Qaeda. But to ensure security throughout the country, the US increasing relied on former mujahedeen commanders who, following Afghanistan’s civil war in the early 90s, had effectively carved out personal fiefdoms in various parts of the country. Though anti-Taliban, these “warlords” were often despised by the local population. Indeed, their corrupt and chaotic rule was a main reason the Taliban came into existence in the first place.

This seemingly contradictory policy of “spreading democracy” while empowering warlords, combined with the near immediate US shift its focus to regime change in Iraq after dislodging the Taliban, would later come back to haunt the US. Just months into the operation, Washington had already diverted substantial military and intelligence resources to the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, the Taliban – far from defeated – had simply melted away only to fight another day.

As with the arrival of Gorbachev five years into the Soviet Afghan war, the election of Barak Obama in 2008 severed as the catalyst for policy change towards Afghanistan. Though troop levels had been steadily rising even under the last year of out-going President Bush, in 2009 the US “surged” its troop presence in Afghanistan by 30,000, bringing the total foreign count to over 150,000. The appointment of new military leadership also saw strategy shift from counter-terrorism to counter-insurgency. This was buttressed by expanded use of development assistance to pacify key areas of the country.

But lacking the long-term commitment necessary to succeed, this strategy would prove overambitious. It was further stymied by Obama’s desire to set a timetable for withdrawal as more and more Americans began questioning the war’s rising costs and strategic purpose amid diminishing perceptions of the terrorist threat posed by Al Qaeda, the original rational for the war. Later, public support all but dropped off when on May 2, 2011, the US announced it had killed Osama Bin Laden in his Pakistani hideout, making it all the more difficult for Washington to justify a war largely perceived to be a fight against Pashtun tribes in the mountains of the Hindu Kush. The sudden spike in insider attacks on American troops by their Afghan counterparts throughout 2012-2013 was perhaps the tipping point for the US public. Despite what appeared to be widespread Taliban infiltration, this “Vietnamization” policy, i.e., shifting the burden on local forces to do the fighting has remained central to the US exit strategy.

Similarly, starting in the mid 1980s, the Soviets had also expended huge resources in building up the Afghan Army in order to leave behind a regime capable of fending for itself. With Soviet troops gone by 1989, the Afghan communist regime led by Najibullah which to the surprise of many US strategists at the time, would survive another three years, collapsing in early 1992 only after Soviet aid ceased with the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Unlike the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the US occupation enjoyed broad international backing by US allies and international donors. But unlike the Soviet efforts to build up the capacity of the local Afghan government to stand on its own, both the military tactics and international donor support under the US-led occupation has been inconsistent and undermined by a lack of coordination.

With local presidential elections scheduled for April, it remains unclear how Afghanistan will fare following the departure of US and NATO forces. Weather the new leadership in Kabul agrees to allow the US to retain a limited military footprint in the country or not, it is hoped that, as with the end of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in 1989, the departure of the bulk of foreign troops by the end of 2014 will help stem the on-going violence in the country.

Martin Harris, a freelance journalist and analyst based in the Eurasia region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

Yanukovych’s latest political concession to the opposition follows over two months of unrest, which on February 18 exploded into bitter gun battles between anti-government protesters and riot police, leaving at least 80 people dead, including 16 police officers. As part of the deal, new presidential elections will be held sometime before December and the Ukrainian constitution will be reverted back to its 2004 form, which relinquishes presidential powers and favors increased parliamentary authority. The agreement to end the unrest also calls for the formation of a transitional government within 10 days.

Critical will be the reaction from protesters who remain camped out on Kiev’s Independent Square (Maidan). The more radical elements, such as the Right Sector, have been left out of the negotiations. They remain skeptical of the recent compromise between Yanukovych and the moderate opposition leaders and have vowed to continue their struggle until the president resigns. Emboldened by their much fought-for victory in forcing the president to the negotiation table, the group will likely fall under increased pressure from the moderate opposition which now must uphold their part of the deal to end street protests and allow the political process to move forward.

It is unclear how these concessions will be worked out, and recent rumors, such as Yanukovych fleeing the capital, indicate the process will be anything but smooth. But while a more dangerous security situation in Kiev appears to have been averted, the crisis has generated a new set of challenges whose dangerous trajectory may now be irreversible. The crisis has not only resulted in more severe financial problems for the country; it has underscored and deepened longstanding cultural, linguistic and religious divisions, mainly between the eastern and western halves of the country.

Ukraine’s mounting economic troubles have formed the backdrop of the recent crisis. With rapidly decreasing currency reserves and a $13 billion debt payment scheduled this year, Yanukovych opted in November last year for a $15 billion loan from Russia and cheaper natural gas prices after reconsidering the perceived economic benefits against immediate consequences of an EU association agreement and trade deal. The apparent U-turn in EU integration efforts sparked weeks of protests that have only aggravated the country’s existing financial difficulties. Ukraine’s currency has sharply devaluated in recent weeks and Moscow has now postponed a decision to purchase $2 billion worth Eurobonds from Ukraine until the political situation in Kiev becomes clearer.

With Yanukovych and his Party of Regions now weakened, there are rising concerns over the country’s future within the more prosperous eastern and southern regions, whose heavily industrialized economies are closely integrated with Russia. In the lead-up to the peace accord, a number of officials from eastern Ukraine floated the idea of the country adopting a federalist model. Such a reformed political structure would provide greater fiscal autonomy to the regions and substantially benefit the eastern regions, where per capita GDP is already estimated at over three times of that found even in more richer areas of western Ukraine. Russia has openly supported this notion, as any added authority in these regions could provide valuable leverage over what would then likely be an economically weakened western Ukrainian.

Perhaps most concerning is the coastal region of Crimea, where the idea of all out separatism is beginning to take deeper root, especially among the region’s majority ethnic Russian population. Home to a Russian naval fleet, this strategic peninsula on the Black Sea was part of Russia until it was incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in 1954. Such sentiment goes back years in Crimea but was reignited by events in pro-European western Ukraine, where in the region of Lviv, the regional council’s executive committee, also known as the People’s Rada, declared independence from the central government during the height of the crisis.

Speaking to Russian news agency Interfax, the speaker of the Crimea parliament, Volodymyr Konstantinov, suggested that his region might secede from Ukraine if the country breaks apart in the event of a civil war. Meanwhile, The Financial Times quoted an unnamed Russian official as saying that under such hypothetical circumstances, the Russian-majority Crimea would be “the first to go” and Russia would “go in to protect it, just as we did in Georgia”, referring to the 2008 war Russia fought with Georgia over its breakaway region of South Ossetia.

Ukraine’s future leadership, whatever its exact political makeup, will not easily overcome these structural challenges. The intern government that is expected to soon take shape will not only have to convince hard line protestors of the need to adhere to a tentative peace plan; it will have to contend with mounting economic troubles and the possibility that much-needed economic aid, currently being provided by Russia, will no longer be readily available if an exclusively European policy course is pursued. The ability to manage such realities will be complicated by what is now more clearly a deeply divided nation, whose entrenched divisions cannot be allayed by mere cosmetic measures such as political concessions. Such a reality will likely portend further political turmoil. The worst may be yet to come.

Martin Harris, a freelance journalist and analyst based in the Eurasia region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

]]> https://journal-neo.org/2014/02/23/ukrainian-truce-calm-before-the-storm/feed/ 0 https://journal-neo.org/2014/02/13/ukrainian-opposition-suffers-setback-amid-diplomatic-flap-and-rising-concerns/ https://journal-neo.org/2014/02/13/ukrainian-opposition-suffers-setback-amid-diplomatic-flap-and-rising-concerns/#comments Thu, 13 Feb 2014 00:29:30 +0000 http://journal-neo.org/?p=7900 The recently leaked diplomatic exchange between United States Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasia Affairs Victoria Nuland and US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyat is more than just another embarrassing revelation of how Washington values democracy or conducts its foreign policy. The bugged phone conversation, uploaded in the form of a video on Youtube under the name “Maidan Puppets” (referring to epicenter of the opposition movement) bluntly demonstrates the lack of any unified approach by the West in finding a viable solution to Ukraine’s political crisis (not to mention mounting economic problems) which could help to offset the country’s growing dependence on Russia.

The apparently stark divergence in interests was best made clear when Nuland was recorded saying “f**k the EU” while speaking with the American Ambassador. The two diplomats further discussed how key opposition leader Vitaly Klitschko, who was offered the position of deputy prime minister by Yanukovych, has no place in a potential new government.

Aside from making clear the US’s overall position on the EU’s role in Ukraine as a political entity, the conversation reflects secondary intentions of the US to undermine Germany’s influence within the Ukrainian opposition. Among EU member states, Germany has perhaps the strongest ties with the Ukrainian opposition. Channeling funding through the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Berlin has built up substantial ties with the German-educated Klitschko, whose Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform party’s main goal is to integrate Ukraine closer to Western structures.

Regardless of US intentions, Yanukovych continues to hold his ground, giving the timing of the leak added significance. The Ukrainian crisis has already undergone a substantial transformation, most importantly in terms of outside perception. The leak can thus be seen as an attempt to build off of the opposition’s currently weak position by sowing discord between the opposition leaders and their Western partners who now appear at odds with each other over how best to resolve, if even approach, the increasingly divisive crisis.

Taking a step back, it is hard to imagine that Yanukovych did not fully anticipate a strong reaction after the Ukrainian Parliament passed highly controversial anti-protest laws on January 16, especially from the more radical elements. But in doing so, the focus of the protests, which began when Yanukovych failed to sign landmark cooperation agreements with the EU during the third Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius late last year, has shifted from the more strategic issue of the country’s foreign policy course to issues more concerned with domestic policy. Already many Ukrainians, whether active protesters or those supporting from the sidelines, have conceded the issue of EU integration, claiming the protests are instead purely driven by general disconnect with their government’s performance at home.

Nonetheless, the Western media’s narrative of the situation has remained largely unchanged. Following every stone and stick thrown, the West remains ready to condemn the government at every opportunity while presenting the “regime” as tinkering on the verge of collapse amid persistent unrest, which, so the story goes, Yanukovych is solely responsible for. It is thus clear that any use of force, however limited or justified, will be immediately condemned by the West and depending on the scale, would lead to calls for sanctions against the Ukrainian government. Such actions would only further drive the government closer into the arms of the Russians.

Upon closer inspection, we observe a government that has been remarkably restrained in dealing the protestors, even engaging in negotiations with opposition leaders and offering serious political concessions. Under such conditions it would have been seriously unwise for Yanukovych to help strengthen the opposition’s “dictator” narrative by violently cracking down. The use of heavy handed tactics in response to the protesters, even if rioting and breaking into government buildings, would potentially exasperate the situation and play into the opposition’s hands. Such restraint should be seen as part of a larger strategy of buying time while the opposition fractures and runs out of steam; the public grows tired of the general unrest, and finally, as Western support unravels.

Rejecting Yanukovych’s political concessions, opposition leaders meanwhile remain resolute in their demands for total leadership change. Relying on the momentum of the protesters can hardly be viewed as strong strategy and the opposition leaders clearly lack a clear vision as how to deal with the wide ranging ramifications their country would likely experience upon taking power.As negotiations continue, the concessions achieved thus far, such the revision of the notorious anti-protest laws and the resignation of Prime Minister Nikolay Azarov and other cabinet members will likely be viewed as a victory by the part of the opposition most willing to peacefully resolve the crisis. Even so, the acceptance of these concessions would ultimately fall short of the original reasons behind the demonstrations: the government’s decision to turn its back on closer ties with the EU and instead opt for a Russian economic bailout, which included substantially discounted natural gas imports.

This shift change, brought about by the government’s actions, also comes against the backdrop of rising challenges within the EU. With the economic crisis in Europe deepening, EU is in clearly in no position to expand in membership (which by many accounts is already over extended). Such a reality weakens the overall efficacy of the EU’s preliminary integration projects such as the Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP). This, in turn, generates a false sense of hope, often with dangerous consequences, within aspiring member states. Even under more ideal economic conditions, any future discussion of EU membership status for Ukraine would come up against intense internal and external opposition.

Perhaps the most significant element in the Ukrainian crisis has been the participation of ultra-nationalist and far-right groups. While clearly playing a central role in challenging Yanukovych, their involvement has at the same time raised eyebrows in Western capitals, as it underscores the EU’s dilemma in remaining open to new nations even as the Union experiences a steady increase in support for far-right parties and a rise of intolerance and anti-integration sentiment as a result of skyrocketing unemployment and other internal socio-economic factors. Where Brussels and Berlin were previously able to pay lip service to pro-EU protesters in Ukraine late last year, many now see the EU project’s worst nightmare potentially manifesting on its doorstep.

In recognizing the apparent recklessness of the EaP, especially in terms of Germany’s economic and energy ties with Russian, many questions are now being raised. Such strategic considerations were perhaps best summed up when barely a day in his new job, Gernot Erler, Germany’s new chief of relations with Russia and countries of the Eastern Neighborhood told journalists in Berlin on January 30 that the EU was wrong not to have analyzed possible conflicts with Russia before offering the so-called Eastern Partnership to countries like Ukraine.

Martin Harris, a freelance journalist and analyst based in the Eurasia region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.