Twenty one civilians were killed after Taliban militants attacked a popular Lebanese restaurant in the Afghanistan capital of Kabul on January 19. The unprecedented magnitude of the tragedy, which included the deaths of an IMF official and four UN workers, prompted strong condemnation by the international community and generated substantial media speculation as to the causes and motives of the attack, ranging from local corruption, to false flags operations to foreign conspiracies. But these often self-comforting and self-fulfilling narratives amid a sea of conflicting details fail to grasp the more underlying processes at work. The attack should be understood within the context of strained US-Afghan talks over a continued US military commitment to the South Asian country beyond 2014. Any failure to reach a strategic security agreement and forge a long-term partnership will give the Taliban a serious advantage in a post-US Afghanistan.

The attack began when an insurgent blew himself up outside the “Taverna du Liban” restaurant’s entrance, killing several security guards. Two gunmen then proceeded inside and opened fire on patrons until additional security personnel were able to respond and kill the attackers. The MO of the raid was unusual in that it occurred in the early evening hours, a time when security personnel are usually on high alert, making it more difficult for militants to operate.

There is a tendency among many Afghans to buy into to conspiracy theories, especially following surges in violence and other negative developments, such as reports about thriving opium production and widespread corruption, etc. Often it comes down to finding some deeper meaning behind the inability of the powerful United Sates to quell the ever-intensifying Taliban insurgency or solve other domestic social and economic problems.

It is easy to understand the frustrations over unmet expectations. Afghanistan has been wracked by conflict for over three decades and is currently witnessing not the first, but a second world superpower retreat after 12 years of fighting. Often too much is involved for most locals and foreigners to fully grasp the complexity of the problem. It is not surprising then that some Afghans have even alleged a US role in the recent terrorist attack in Kabul as a means to apply pressure on Karzai into signing the bilateral security agreement (BSA) with the US which would allow the US to maintain military footprint in the country beyond 2014. Aside from the apparent absurdity of such reasoning, it does reflect the collective anxiety among many Afghans over the future of their country if a security pact is not signed.

Other reports have emerged alleging that the recent tragedy was the result of the restaurant’s owner failing to pay-off local security services, which indirectly purchase “security guarantees” to keep such locales off a supposed Taliban “hit list”. In supporting this view, attention is drawn to massive delays in payment to Afghan security personnel, as reported in the New York Times on Jan. 12, even though payments were back on schedule weeks before the attack. And while most restaurants and hotels in the country function under some sort of security umbrella, the idea that such a sophisticated attack involving high profile targets was the result of a missed bribe comes off as far-fetched. The fact that the restaurant owner was himself killed while attempting to defend against the attackers weakens such speculation.

The attack has already had a seriously impact on the social landscape in Kabul. The vast majority of expats still residing in the city have been put under “lockdown” because of the security threat. Even those who still have limited freedoms are refraining from venturing out to the plethora of restaurants, which have sprouted up over the last decade to cater to Kabul’s burgeoning community of foreign workers. Many consider the killings as the first major volley by the Taliban aimed at forcing foreigners out of the country in mass, with the ultimately aim to shutter ongoing development projects. While this view seems plausible since any substantial drawdown in foreign aid workers would negatively impact the heavily subsidized and bloated Afghan economy, and in turn destabilize the government, it is important to understand that most expats will be pulled out of the country anyway as the bulk of coalition forces are withdrawn by the end of 2014.

A residual US presence of possibly 10,000 troops, as the BSA may provide, is expected to focus primarily on combating terrorism in order to prevent the country from reverting back to an Al-Qaeda safe haven, one of Washington’s most repeated fears, and consistent justifications back home to continue prosecuting the so-called “war of necessity”. Such a force structure would be insufficient to ensure the stability required by a large expat community, even with accompanying private security contractors who themselves have been substantially curtailed in recent years. And while many foreign aid workers remain strongly committed to improving Afghan lives, their continued work is ultimately tied to the decisions of major international donors whose policies are dictated by Washington’s overarching strategic goals.

It is now clear that the combination of both hard and “soft power” applied by the US and its allies has failed to create a stable and well-governed country, one able to provide its own security needs. Some would argue that Washington’s ever-changing policies towards the country, ranging from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency, etc, along with the West’s flawed and ineffective distribution of development assistance has contributed to a more perilous situation than what existed prior to post 9-11 US involvement in Afghanistan.

By the mere act of surviving, the Taliban have not only become a more effective and battle-hardened fighting force. The militant jihadist movement has also gained unheard-of political legitimacy on the international level through the US pursuit of a political accommodation involving the central government. This delicate act of face- saving can be viewed as an attempt to withdraw with a semblance of dignity rather than get sucked into a deeper quagmire. This is a compromise that the American public has long been ready to make, as reflected in recent polls. The latest terrorist attack must be understood within the wider context of this exit strategy.

As with most terrorist attacks, the restaurant raid was carried out to achieve a political objective. In claiming responsibility, the Taliban openly announced that the attack was in response to local Afghan civilian deaths at the hands of NATO forces, a sensitive issue that has for years been a serious cause of tension between US government and the Karzai administration.

The Afghan government has already attempted to place constraints on US military operations to curtail such deaths. These include a ban on night raids by Special Forces and the need to obtain permission before conducting airstrikes. Karzai has sought to place additional limits on coalition forces within the framework of the BSA, including a provision depriving legal immunity to any remaining US troops in the country, something the US is strongly against. By targeting civilians in response to Afghan civilian deaths, the Taliban attack further exploits this rift and puts the signing of the BSA in jeopardy.

In what may seem on the surface as nothing more than a deplorable “tit-for-tat” attack on a popular Kabul soft target, the Taliban are using the existing momentum behind deteriorating Kabul-Washington relations in order to sow further discord and frustrate US plans for a post 2014 foreign military presence in the country. This falls within classic guerrilla tactics aimed at winning without openly fighting a superior force.

Any immediate impact on the behavior or decisions of foreign workers in Afghanistan should be viewed within this larger and more strategic objective of shaping a post 2014 reality, one that will provide the Taliban with a significant security and political advantage. That said, more attacks of this nature will likely follow.

Ian Carver, communications specialist and freelance journalist, that has worked extensively in the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

The last week of 2013 saw Uzbekistan – the most populous Central Asian nation – become the latest country to join the CIS free trade zone, a bloc encompassing former Soviet states Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The decision furthers Moscow’s efforts at economic integration in a region marred by ethnic divisions and political disputes over borders and scare resources. In light of these realities, Uzbekistan’s inclusion in the trade bloc could also pave the way for cooperation with Russia in the area of security. This would mark a U-turn for Tashkent in its relations with Moscow and would come at a time when Central Asia is bracing for the anticipated fallout from the US military drawdown in neighboring Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

The Commonwealth for Independent States was created at the end of 1991 as part of an effort to hold together the remnants of the Soviet Union. The former Soviet space has since experienced extensive economic transformation and political realignment both towards and away and from existing Moscow backed integration projects. The Baltic States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania immediately opted for closer ties with Western political and economic structures, facilitated in part based on their proximity, while the Republic of Georgia dropped out of the CIS following the 2008 Russian-Georgian crisis that culminated in a war over the tiny breakaway region of South Ossetia.

In an attempt to bolster integration among this loose association of states, in 1994 leaders of the CIS agreed to establish a free trade zone, which would eliminate import and export duties on a wide range of products among other preferential trade terms. After years of unsuccessful negotiations over the terms of the trade zone, the CIS Free Trade Agreement finally came into force in 2011 when eight of the eleven remaining CIS states signed the agreement. At the time, only CIS members Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had held back from signing the trade agreement.

Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s decision to ratify the agreement on December 28, 2013 marks a reversal for the bloc, which has long struggled with internal cohesion among member states. More importantly, this occurred in a country that has historically been wary of Russian-backed integration frameworks. The CIS free trade area is just one of many instruments that Moscow has utilized in the past to retain/expand influence in its “near abroad”. More recently-established trade blocs such as the Eurasia Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan have received far more attention in recent months, especially in Ukraine.

Within the security realm, Moscow has been fostering regional cooperation within the CIS community through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a modern counterweight to NATO, but with less ambitious objectives. In 2012, Uzbekistan suspended its membership with CSTO due to disagreements over the alliance’s plans to strengthen military cooperation among member states and strategic designs for Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has long been one of the most independent of the former Soviet states within Central Asia, and the move clearly indicated the Tashkent’s intention to remain open to closer security ties with other outside powers, such as China and the United States. This was reflected in a March 2013 visit by Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov to the United States amid reported rumors that Uzbekistan was seeking to bring its military in line with NATO standards.

Balancing foreign relations among global powers is a strategy pursued by other former Soviet republics, such as Ukraine and Azerbaijan. But such a policy has had mixed results, and will be increasingly difficult for Uzbekistan considering Russia’s existing influence in the country along with Moscow’s growing ties with other countries in the region.

Although less integrated with Russia compared with other Central Asian states (with the exception of Turkmenistan), Uzbekistan still relies on the Russian market for much of its agricultural output and natural gas exports, with overall economic turnover between the countries in 2012 exceeding $7 billion. Moreover, nearly 8 percent of Uzbekistan’s population (2.52 million) works in Russia, sending home upwards of $5.7 billion in remittances annually (equal to about 11 percent of the country’s gross domestic product). Maintaining access to this market will be increasingly important for Uzbekistan given its rapidly growing population and dearth in domestic employment opportunities.

Currently estimated around 30 million, Uzbekistan’s population is most densely concentrated in the eastern Fergana Valley, a relatively small but highly fertile and productive region shared with neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (by Soviet design to maximize interdependence). Scare resources, especially water, and border disputes have contributed to near constant tension along the borders, often including deadly clashes amid alleged border incursions and land grabs. Hostilities in the Kyrgyz city of Osh between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks following a 2010 revolution in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek further strained relations between the two countries. Disputes over the supply of Uzbek gas to Tajikistan have also been common in recent years.

Russia has since augmented its military presence in Kyrgyzstan and has established outposts in Tajikistan along the country’s porous 1,300 kilometer long border with Afghanistan to curtail the flow of drugs out of Afghanistan which is at record levels. In terms of bilateral trade, both countries have announced their intention to join the Eurasia Customs Union, considered a precursor to the Eurasia Union. Modeled partly on the European Union, the Eurasia Union project represents the most advanced attempt at integration within the region since the establishment of the Soviet Union. Beyond harmonizing tariff and customs controls, the union is expected to form a single market for agricultural goods, industrial cooperation, enable a single transport and communication system and provide a visa free regime among citizens of member states, among other benefits. As a key pillar within this developing union, the CIS free trade zone will provide Uzbekistan access to cheaper goods and investments, leading to increased productivity and local jobs.

On the regional level, Tashkent’s decision to join the CIS free trade zone will not only provide a framework for the country to resolve long-standing disputes with its neighbors. It could provide an opening for increased regional cooperation in combating the flow of terrorists, narcotics and weapons from Afghanistan. While Uzbekistan is unlikely to rejoin the Russian-led CTSO in the nearest future, the need for such cooperation with Russia and its regional partners will be all the more apparent as the inherently unstable Central Asia region prepares for a potential spillover of violence in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.  

Ian Carver, communications specialist and freelance journalist, that has worked extensively in the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

A wave of discontent is sweeping Ukraine following Kiev’s decision not to forge closer ties with the European Union during the Eastern Partnership summit in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius on November 28-29. While progress was made with Georgia and Moldova, Ukraine’s decision will likely lead to increased EU skepticism in Georgia, as its citizens weigh the perceived benefits of further integration against a range of economic, political and cultural considerations.

The third Eastern Partnership summit was for months touted to be a highly-historic event. This was based on the assumption that Ukraine, the second largest of the six Eastern Partnership countries after Russia, would continue to strengthen relations with the EU by signing the Association Agreement, a framework which would bring Ukraine into the EU’s free trade zone as part of a preliminary step towards possible EU membership, among other perceived benefits. The Ukrainian leadership’s apparent U-turn just less than two weeks prior to summit shocked EU leaders and was largely viewed as the result of lobbying from Moscow and economic realities. This can be explained in part by the Kiev’s acceptance that any drift towards the EU would come at a price, especially in terms of bilateral trade with Russia.

It came as no surprise that thousands of pro-EU Ukrainians have hit the streets of Kiev and other cities in recent days, with some even calling for snap presidential and parliamentary elections. As protesters vent their emotions, the disappointment in their country’s leadership has the potential, at least partially, to spill over into outright disillusionment with the EU, providing a greater opening for Russia.

A pivotal point for Ukraine

The EU’s current setback in Ukraine comes as Moscow is working to expand its Eurasian Customs Union, an economic alliance, which already unites Russia with Belarus and Kazakhstan and is expected to include other former Soviet states in the coming years as well. Against this tense backdrop, Ukraine is being presented in the Western media as a key battleground between Brussels and Moscow, both vying for influence in their backyards and one of the former Soviet Union’s most strategic republics.

Russian and EU officials have made it clear to Kiev that membership in one bloc is incompatible with the other, and that Ukraine could not continue its balancing act in straddling between the two indefinitely. In raising the stakes, Moscow aims to establish a Eurasian Union by 2015, based partly on the EU model, with the Eurasian Customs Union serving as a key component.

Ukraine’s decision not to sign the deal was a psychological blow to the few countries that remain within the crosshairs of the Eastern Partnership program. In the others, Belarus, Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Eastern Partnership program has received either no interest or only negligible success. This was perhaps most evident in Armenia, which, despite making significant progress in EU reforms, decided on Sept 3, 2013 to instead maneuver towards Customs Union membership, largely due to immediate economic considerations. Georgia and Moldova did initial the EU Association Agreements and other documents during the summit as expected, but as the Ukrainian example has demonstrated, initialing the agreement does not mean a definite follow-through with signing.

Georgian and EU integration – Economic considerations

In the lead up to the summit, Moscow did not present the same disincentives to Georgia as it had to Ukraine and Moldova; these included a new customs regime to test border controls in the event of a future signing of the EU Association Agreement. While Georgia’s leadership has pledged to follow through with signing the agreement at the Eastern Partnership’s next summit (scheduled for February or March 2014), a serious reaction from Moscow to Georgia’s policy course ahead of the Vilnius Summit would have been counterproductive. Georgia and Russia have been improving relations in recent months, particularly in the trade sphere, and the Georgian leadership will need to consider how such links could be threatened by moving ahead with more enhanced Georgian-EU trade ties.

Ukraine’s experience in recent months makes it clear to Georgian officials that signing the agreement may produce some benefits, but will also come with real economic and ramifications since a free trade regime with the EU will not be compatible with Russia’s customs regime, including quality control standards. Considering the sluggish state of Georgia’s economy, the country’s leadership will likely not risk taking steps that could lead to even a temporary closure of the much-needed Russian market, which after six years of embargo was only recently reopened to Georgian mineral water, wine and other agricultural products.

Geopolitical realities

Moreover, Georgia’s willingness to improve ties with Russia in spite of Moscow’s recognition of the country’s breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independence states following the Russian-Georgian War in 2008 creates a strategic impasse that can’t be immediately resolved by closer integration with the EU.

Georgian citizens will likely become increasingly aware of the contradiction of integrating with Western structures while lacking territorial integrity. Although Georgian officials may tout the theoretical long term benefits of an Association Agreement, it would block immediate possibilities for restoring limited cross border trade with the breakaway regions. They will likely also come to understand that signing the EU Association Agreement doesn’t automatically confer many benefits, such as a visa free regime, or complete access to the European market or even eventual EU membership. Meanwhile, shared values between Russia and Georgia and political realities within Georgia will influence the country’s actions at the next Eastern Partnership summit.

Cultural constraints

Already there have been indications that Georgia’s European commitment is not quite what it appears to be in the eyes of the West. Earlier this year, on May 17, a large and concerted effort was made to violently disrupt a rally held by those marking International Day against Homophobia. In its apparent failure to protect the collection of gay supporters and related Western-backed NGOs, the Georgian state demonstrated its inability to reconcile its stated Western orientation with domestic realities. Western diplomat’s sharp reactions to the clashes prompted many Georgians to even believe that the concept of exercising tolerance towards homosexuality was being imposed on them from abroad.

On a strategic level, the outcome of the event revealed a reinvigorated sense of fraternity among Georgians and their Christian Orthodox northern neighbors. In the days following the clashes, a series of rallies were held in the Georgian capital where participants called on their government to pass legislation similar to Russia’s own laws aiming to counter “the spread of homosexual propaganda”. Although these rallies were small, they helped raise questions about the actual purpose of many foreign NGOs in Georgia which support Georgia’s gay community. The result is that many Georgians who are otherwise uninterested in the affairs of “sexual minorities” have since become skeptical of what it means to adhere to European values as a whole.

With the help of the media, the sensitive issue of homosexuality will likely be reactivated in the weeks leading up to the 2014 Winter Olympics in the southern Russia city of Sochi. Rallies directed against Russian views on promoting homosexuality and counter protests combined with statements by the world’s key religious leaders will help spur more discussion about the topic in Georgia, providing an avenue to impede Georgian society’s interest in the West and the EU integration process as a whole.

Political concerns

Aside from these cultural considerations, there is also a fear that former Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili could follow in the footsteps of Yulia Tymoshenko, Ukraine’s ill-fated Orange Revolution-era Prime Minister who was imprisoned for abuse of power after losing a run for president to Viktor Yanukovych in 2010. Saakashvili’s imprisonment, as Tymoshenko’s had, would ring “selective justice” in Brussels, and would most certainly hamper EU-Georgian relations, especially within the frames of the Eastern Partnership initiative. Again, as with Tymoshenko, the result would likely be that the EU would make any further integration with Georgia dependent on his release.

In underlining this concern, Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski told journalists on the sidelines of the Vilnius Summit that EU leaders’ message to Georgia is that the Georgian government has had its “Caucasian vendetta with the previous administration, but enough is enough.” However, this statement’s real intent may have more to do with Poland’s geopolitical interest, and less to do with the justice process in Georgia. The current Georgian authorities will likely continue to accommodate a segment of society that is keen on seeing Saakashvili join other former officials behind bars for various abuses of power and real crimes.

Moving forward

It remains unclear just how the EU will further proceed with its Eastern Partnership initiative, but among the participating member states, the uncertainty of the policy course based on Ukraine’s example, combined with increased internal skepticism of EU effectiveness in the face of Russia’s resurgence, will likely contribute to a growing trend of setbacks and diminishing expectations.

The standoff over Ukraine further demonstrated that Russia is willing to go to great lengths in discouraging its neighbors from moving any further towards the EU. The unsatisfactory outcome of the Vilnius Summit not only buys time for Moscow to expand its Customs Union; it also frees up energy and resources for Russia to devote to improving its relations with Georgia. As Russian President Vladimir Putin announced during a visit to the Armenian capital Yerevan on December 2, Russia intends to “strengthen its positions in the South Caucasus”.

Ian Carver, communications specialist and freelance journalist, that has worked extensively in the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

As the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi approach, the issue of security is increasingly in the spotlight. Already there has been an increase in cooperation between Russia and its Western partners to better secure the Games. On the regional level, however, it remains unclear to what extent, if any, Russia will cooperate with neighboring Georgia, a country that it has long accused of covertly contributing to insecurity and violence in the turbulent Northern Caucasus region.

With the Games less than three months away, Britain’s MI6 announced on November 7 its intention to share the experience it gained from the 2012 Summer Olympics in London with Russia. Such a decision is in the spirit of maintaining positive relations ahead of major international sporting competitions and is part of a growing trend within the international community in combating terrorism. Georgia certainly does not have the experience of hosting such a massive event, but its security and intelligence forces could nevertheless influence the conduct and outcome of the Games. There are even some pundits who predict that some in the current or former Georgian government may even try to use the occasion of the Winter Olympics as a forum for political debate by staging a range of destabilizing events.

The difficult neighborhood, and in the aftermath of the brief Georgian-Russian war in 2008 makes such cooperation all the more important. Sochi is located on the western edge of the Northern Caucasus region, Russia’s southernmost border. The region takes its name from a formidable mountain range that separates the former Soviet republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia to the south. Sochi’s pick as the host of the games on July 4, 2007 immediately raised eyebrows among many security experts due to the city’s proximity to this region of the Russian Federation, which for over the past two decades has seen bloody secessionist movements that have created long lasting security implications. Two major wars erupted in Chechnya in the 1990s leading into the mid 2000s, resulting in the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism, especially in Chechnya and neighboring Dagestan, and ensuing low level violence and crime that continue to plague the region, inter alia. Though not officially located in the Northern Caucasus region, and with a relatively small Muslim population, Krasnodar Krai with its capital Sochi, fall within the so-called Caucasus Emirate, a virtual state proclaimed by its “Emir”, Chechen militant and alleged terrorist mastermind Dokka Umarov in 2007.

Georgia and Chechen rebels: What is the nexus?

As Russian security forces were struggling to deal with pockets of resistance and acts of terrorism in or emanating from the region, Moscow continued to link Georgia to its security troubles at home. This was partly due to Georgia’s track record as a weapons and drugs smuggling corridor, but also because the country provided a safe haven for Chechen rebels in its Pankisi Gorge during the height of renewed Russian-Chechen hostilities.

Nearly ten years into the second Chechen War, in 2010, Aleksander Bastrykin, head of Russia’s Investigative Committee would describe the situation in the Northern Caucasus as equivalent to an all-out war, explaining that militants were killing between five and six Russian Interior Ministry troops per day. In late 2009, Aleksander Bortnikov, the director of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) said that he was in possession of audio evidence seized from insurgents that showed that they had close contact with representatives of Georgian special services along with “emissaries of Al-Qaeda”.

The FSB chief alleged that through these links, Georgia “participated in training of terrorists and facilitating their movement to Chechnya”. In October 2010, Ramzan Kadyrov, Moscow’s strongman in Chechnya, told Russian news stations that Georgia played an exclusive role in fueling the insurgency, claiming that entire rebel contingents received financial and material support via Georgian territory.

Keep in mind that Sochi, a seaside resort, is also located just north of Abkhazia, a Georgian breakaway region, which along with South Ossetia, was recognized as an independent state by Moscow following the 2008 Georgia-Russia War. Relations between Tbilisi and Moscow had already been steadily deteriorating since the pro-Western Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili came to power and hastily sought to integrate his country into Western economic and military structures. These policies were implemented at the expense of relations with Russia, and likewise, delicate peace prospects with the breakaway regions were further set back, especially given the influence Moscow enjoyed in these separatist regions since gaining de-facto independence from Georgia in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse.

A cheap ploy: Georgia recognizes the Circassian Genocide

Against huge odds, the Georgian government found itself still in power after its country’s defeat in the 2008 war (perhaps based on the Saddam Hussein model circa the First Persian Gulf War), and soon began to step up its anti-Russian rhetoric, likely believing that if it had survived a Russian counterattack, it could now get away with just about anything. As part of this often reckless subterfuge, Tbilisi jumped on an opportunity to discredit Russia for hosting the 2014 Winter Olympics. On May 20, 2011, the Georgian Parliament unanimously recognized the controversial Circassian Genocide, the mid-nineteenth century massacres and expulsion of ethnic Circassians (native to the Sochi area) following Imperial Russia’s conquest of the Caucasus after nearly a century of war.

Despite its official backing by the Georgian authorities, who called the Circassians their brothers, the recognition received a largely negative response. Many prominent Circassians and local organizations viewed the decision as less than wholehearted, and as a cheap ploy to score political points by playing into sensitive ethno-historical issues.

Nevertheless, under Saakashvili’s presidency, the Georgian authorities continued to portray Russia as a villain at nearly every opportunity. The hosting of the Winter Olympics on the site of historical atrocities seemed to conveniently fit into this policy even in spite of the limited fanfare among key stakeholders. Meanwhile, many Georgians were encouraged to believe that their team’s participation in the Games would be tantamount to betraying their country given Russia’s support to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Boycotting the Olympics

For Georgia, there would be little to gain in boycotting the Olympics. Lacking the umbrella of a coordinated multinational boycott, such as the US-backed decision not to participate in the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Tbilisi’s decision would come off as rooted in its sourness over its lose in the 2008 war. Moreover, the move could invite retaliation from Russia, likely in its most subtle form, such as a reactivation of Moscow’s PR campaign to tie Georgia to the insurgency in Chechnya and elsewhere (renewed allegations of such a nexus would be especially damaging in the event of a terrorist attack at the Games).

Russia could just as easily choose to further showcase and augment its relations with neighboring Abkhazia, it protectorate. It could take the opportunity to portray itself as the nation which protected Abkhazia from “Georgian aggression” and which subsequently took the lead in recognizing a people’s right to self-determination. Under the Games’ international spotlight, a boycott or even a refusal to cooperate with Russian security or intelligence services in contributing to the Games’ security would be to the detriment of Georgia’s image. Moreover, it could significantly hamper Tbilisi’s efforts at home to continue justifying the need to improve ties with Moscow.

But with the change of Georgia’s government in the October 2012 Parliamentary elections, which saw Saakashviili’s United National Movement lose to Bidzina Ivanisvhili’s Georgian Dream coalition, Tbilisi has since successfully worked with Moscow to restore trade ties, albeit on a limited scale, and restore links in humanitarian and cultural spheres.

Still, the controversy over Georgia’s participation in the Winter Olympics resurfaced when a Russian air force pilot who ran combat sorties over Georgia during the 2008 war was chosen to take part in the Olympic torch bearing relay around the Kremlin. However, the election of Georgian Dream candidate Giorgi Margvelashvili in Georgia’s recent October 27 Presidential Elections put an end to the need to accommodate/cohabitate with Georgia’s remaining anti-Russian hardliners, thereby helping to shift the discussion from whether Georgia’s national team should participate in the Games to whether the Georgian president should attend the event.

“A good start”

In a interview with Russia’ First Channel on November 11, the incoming president said that the issue of his attendance is being considered by his team, adding that the Olympic Games represent “a good start” in avoiding political tensions and could help to foster “new relationships.” Ideally, Moscow would like to see the Georgian-Russian relationship expand beyond the trade and cultural links to collaboration in the security and intelligence realm, with the Sochi Games serving as the perfect platform.

The months leading up to the Sochi Winter Olympics will be a litmus test for gauging the ability of Russia and Georgia to further build on existing progress in restoring bilateral relations. In the context of the Games, the timely change in Georgia’s leadership signifies the neutralization of Georgia’s anti-Russian rhetoric in one of the most sensitive areas, while also provides Moscow an opportunity to make a hard-to-resist “request” to Tbilisi to cooperate in the security area, which can be seen as part of a broader effort to make further inroads into Georgia’s security and intelligence apparatus and ensure continuity during Georgia’s political transition.

Given the security challenges in the Northern Caucasus and during a time of heightened geopolitical tensions over Georgia and other post-Soviet states involving competing trade blocs touted by the European Union and Russia, it is especially important for Moscow to use the Olympics as a venue for improving trade, political relations and anti-terrorism cooperation.

Ian Carver, communications specialist and freelance journalist, that has worked extensively in the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.