The political and security situation in Turkey is becoming increasingly worrying as it deteriorates behind a jumble  of acronyms that few could possibly hope to understand.  Were it not for the associated terror facing millions of Turks, Kurds and Syrians, it might seem comical.  Sadly, however, there is nothing remotely amusing about this particular alphabet soup.  

A prime example of how misleading headlines, confusing language and loosely employed acronyms was evident on August 12, 2015, when the UK Newspaper The Telegraph published the following:

“Turkey suffered one of its bloodiest days in recent weeks on Monday as Kurdish insurgents launched deadly attacks in different parts of the country, including the US consulate in Istanbul, killing nine people and leaving 11 wounded in ensuing clashes with Turkey security services.”

The fact that the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul and certain others tracks were actually carried out by a leftist group, the DHKP-C, is then outlined, but the reader is easily left with the impression that the PKK and the DHKP-C are both Kurdish separatist groups, or at least a close allies.  This is simply not the case, but most readers of this article will not realise that Kurds have very different objectives and methods of operation from the DHKP-C, and as a result, the flames of broader anti-Kurdish sentiment will be fanned.

The descent of Turkish media coverage into confusion amidst dozens of acronyms, which are doubly hard to comprehend for foreigners (since the translations do not necessarily match the original Turkish or Kurdish or English acronym) coupled with unpronounceable words and names is deliberate and no laughing matter.  The plight of the Kurds amidst all of this is a perfect example.  If we look at the terms we find in articles about the Kurds, the acronym “”PKK” immediately appears in the forefront, but its context is rarely explained.  Examining acronyms from headlines helps understand at least one key element of an equation that draws in political parties, separatist groups and the Syrian conflict: the Kurds.  It is merely the tip of the iceberg, but at least it might assist readers in comprehending the impact of poorly defined acronyms and foreign terms on the situation.

A few key terms that apply to the immediate Kurdish problem, Syria and politics in Turkey are: AKP, Erdogan, HDP,  CHP, PKK, Öcalan, DHKP/C, MHP, YPG and ISIS/ISIL.  Below is a breakdown of what they mean in today’s news.

AKP or “Justice and  Development Party”: The AKP is the Islamist party of both Turkish President Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu.  Since coming to power in 2002, it has completely changed Turkey’s role as a fervent secular NATO and Israeli ally and contender for EU membership into an openly pro-Islamic, outspoken critic of Israel that can no longer be relied upon by NATO to support the West’s agenda.  There are serious allegations that Turkey’s current AKP government has supported and continues to funnel aid to Syrian rebels linked to mass human rights atrocities.  The AKP’s leading figure, initially Prime Minister and now President Erdogan, has managed to systematically destroy the secular nature of Turkey’s government, de-fang the once formidable military guarantor of secularism, and change the Turkish constitution accordingly.   These changes have come about in an atmosphere of severe paranoia and corruption characterised by arrests and convictions of political, military and media opponents based on ludicrous evidence, ruinous fines against those not subject to imprisonment and mysterious deaths of anyone suspected of challenging Erdogan.  In spite of allegations of widespread corruption, the AKP managed to earn 49.83% of seats, an impressive win but just short of the 50% majority Erdogan was counting upon winning.   Though temporarily hamstrung by AKP’s lack of an absolute majority of seats in Parliament, President Erdogan is still bound and determined to further change Turkish constitutional law to concentrate political power in the hands of the President.    For this reason, Prime Minister Davutoglu will not act independently of Erdogan, regardless of what the media might suggest.  Therefore, focusing on Erdogan simplifies the ability to understand the Turkish political and security environment, since his word is the final word.

The HDP or “People’s Democratic Party” : The HDP is a left-leaning party, associated with Kurdish support, that  shocked everyone in June 2015 by winning 13% of the popular vote, thereby undercutting Erdogan’s plans to win a landslide victory.  Any Turkish political party that wins less than 10% of the vote loses all its votes to be divided among the parties that have won at least 10% of the vote. Erdogan did not expect non-Kurdish voters to join with Kurdish voters in HDP and create a force with which the AKP now has to contend.  Still, the HDP only won 13% of the vote, so If Erdogan can either find an excuse to outlaw the HDP party or divert just 4% of HDP voters to any other political parties, he stands a good chance of crossing the 50% majority threshold.  Erdogan is therefore determined to destroy HDP voter support so the AKP can win a clear majority in a “snap” election.  To do so, Erdogan needs to demonise Turkey’s Kurds as terrorists and HDP voters as terrorist sympathisers.

The CHP or “Republican People’s  Party”:  As the party most closely famously associated with Atatürk, the CHP is the oldest surviving party in Turkey,  but to say “the writing is on the wall” for it may be more than just a bad pun.  The CHP is secularist and represents the largest opposition party to AKP,  winning 26% of parliamentary seats in June 2015.  That 26% offers little leverage in modern Turkish politics, since it cannot exclude the AKP from government without the support of both the pro-Kurdish HDP and the rabidly nationalist, anti-Kurdish MHP (see below).  The CHP is foundering and could well be dealt a death blow if Erdogan’s AKP were to win an outright majority in a future “snap” election.  In an effort to play for time and survival, the CHP is reportedly in talks with AKP leaders over forming a coalition government to avoid a new election, but the CHP’s role in such a government would be very weak and unlikely to survive more than a a few months, let alone years.  Erdogan is allowing his party to pursue talks with the CHP for now, but most observers hold out little hope of the CHP being able to restrain Erdogan from achieving his ambition to achieve a sole majority and change the constitution and grant himself unassailable new presidential powers.

The PKK or “Kurdistan Worker’s Party”: The PKK has never been allowed to hold seats in Turkey’s parliament, being classified as a terrorist organisation by many countries, including the United States. Still, all pro-Kurdish politicians in Turkey are treated as being affiliated with the PKK and thus operate under a perpetual cloak of suspicion and threat of prosecution for terrorist ties.  Over many decades, the PKK has avoided targeting U.S. personnel to deter the U.S. from supporting Turkish anti-Kurdish military operations.  The results for Turkey’s Kurds have been murky, as the US continues to classify the PKK as a terrorist organisation while calling on Turkey to refrain from military operations against the “Turkish Kurds”, in spite of all Turkish Kurds being routinely classified by the Turkish government as de facto PKK supporters.  The AKP has benefitted politically from hopeful voters seduced by government announcements of ceasefires in the Kurdish conflict, supported by public statements of former and current PKK leaders.  Unfortunately, such publicly touted ceasefires simply do not translate into reality for Turkey’s Kurdish population and violence invariably flares up into renewed conflict which is then used cynically by the AKP to justify brutal anti-terrorist crackdowns and prosecution of pro-Kurdish opposition politicians and journalists.

 Öcalan, pronounced “UHJ ah LAN”:  Abdullah Öcalan was a founder of the PKK and its recognised leader for two decades until his arrest in 1999.  He spent many years based in Syria, to the great annoyance of the Turkish government.  During this time, Öcalan reportedly learned Kurdish, a language that had been banned in Turkey, and became the face of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey.  His original death sentence in 1999 was commuted to life in prison, where he has languished on an island for 16 years.  It seems unrealistic to assume that Öcalan still commands the authority over Turkish Kurds that he once did, but Erdogan has used Öcalan repeatedly for political purposes.  Öcalan has publicly supported AKP calls for ceasefires from his prison cell, but the extent of his influence at this point is in question.  The fact that his positive response to Erdogan’s requests to call for PKK ceasefires seems tied to his personal demands for health care and eventual release is almost certainly not lost on the Kurdish public living under Turkish rule.  Öcalan remains a hero to many Turkish Kurds but he has been cut off from the actual situation on the ground for so long  that even those who respect him are not likely to follow his declarations blindly.

The DHKP/C or “Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front” :  The DHKP/C is a left-wing terrorist group that is a declared enemy of the Turkish government and all its allies.  Formerly known as “Dev Sol”, it has claimed responsibility for multiple murders and suicide bombings over the past three decades.  Although like the PKK, DHKP/C is known to receive support from Syria, it is an ideologically-based, as opposed to ethnically-based, group that does not share the same objectives as the PKK.  DHKP/C’s wanton acts of terror have raised fears among Turks and foreigners alike, and have become politically useful to Erdogan of late.  The public is prone to erroneously assuming the PKK and DHKP/C are branches of a single terrorist group based on documented Syrian government support for both DHKP/C and the PKK, as well as misreading its acronym, which is not only easily confused with the completely unrelated pro-Kurdish “DHP” but also contains a useful “K”, which falsely suggests it might mean “Kurdish”.  In the confusion following frightening terror attacks, few people bother to question false assumptions and assertions that the DHP and the Kurds are behind the acts of terror being perpetrated by the DHKP/C.  This confusion is of great use to Erdogan in both discrediting the DHP and in  convincing Western allies to turn a blind eye to Turkish government atrocities against the Kurds.

The MHP or “Nationalist Movement Party”:  The MHP is an ultra-nationalist, right-wing, anti-Kurdish party that currently holds the remaining approximately 17% of parliamentary seats.  The MHP is acting more as a spoiler for the other three parties than anything else these days, as it watches the Kurds bear the brunt of the pain resulting from the absence of an elected Turkish government, but the AKP also arguably stands to gain from MHP troublemaking.  While MHP’s views diverge sharply from the AKP’s in many areas, it is gleeful over the latest government crackdown on the Kurds in both Turkey and Syria.  On the domestic political front, MHP is also urging an AKP-CHP coalition that would be almost certainly deeply humiliating for its rival CHP and ultimately doomed to fail.

The YPG or “People’s Protection Units” and ISIS/ISIL or “Islamic State”:  The YPG is a Syrian-based Kurdish militia that has been instrumental in the effort to drive ISIS/ISIL out of Syrian areas near the Turkish border.  While one might think Erdogan would consider the YPG an ally, he has instead condemned them and complicated their anti-ISIS/ISIL operations.  Erdogan’s undermining of the Syrian YPG is being decried by many as evidence that Erdogan indeed supports ISIS/ISIL’s horrific acts of terror in both Syria and Iraq.  Even the U.S. is bewildered and    expressing tentative concerns that Erdogan is only allowing U.S. military operations out of Incirlik Air Force Base against ISIS/ISIL targets to distract attention from Erdogan’s clandestine support of ISIS/ISIL and attacks in the Kurds.  Credible reports allege that more than 90% of Turkish air strikes against ISIS/ISIL are actually aimed at Kurdish targets in Syria, complimented by robust anti-PKK ground operations inside Turkey itself.

The main lesson from this primer is that Erdogan is cleverly capitalising on mass confusion among the public, both domestic and international, to further his own political agenda.  While ISIS/ISIL and non-PKK domestic terrorism pose the most serious threat to both the Turkish public and Turkey’s traditional allies, somehow Erdogan is succeeding in using this crisis not only to advance his own dictatorial aspirations but also to crush Kurds inside and outside Turkey with relative impunity.   Meanwhile ISIS/ISIL continue to wage violent wars in Syria and Iraq despite formidable military efforts involving Iran, Iraq, Syria, the U.S., supposedly with the full support of Turkey, which is proudly credited with having NATO’s second-largest standing military, almost 500,000 men strong.  It is difficult to understand how Turkish military efforts against ISIS/ISIL along Turkey’s own border could be so ineffectual, given Turkey’s military might, unless there is a lack of will on the part of Erdogan to attack ISIS/ISIL.  Still, Turkish active, large-scale  military operations are ongoing, suggesting that the Kurds, rather than ISIS/ISIL, may be bearing the brunt of Turkey’s military might.  Meanwhile, as average Turks and others struggle to stay afloat in this alphabet soup, even non-Kurds who dare to question, challenge or criticise Erdogan’s actions risk arrest, ruinous fines or worse.

As for the PKK, the very fact that the same term we most commonly recognise as representing Turkish Kurds is an actually internationally recognised terrorist group says it all.  How can any party or advocacy group for Kurdish rights in Turkey slip past the PKK terrorist label when even those who support the millions of non-terrorist Turkish Kurds are forced to fall back on the PKK moniker in discussing those non-terrorist Kurds?  When a pro-Kurdish party like the HDP manages to do so, it finds instantly itself in the crosshairs of Erdogan’s AKP as well as ultra-nationalist MHP troublemakers, and its leaders are threatened with prosecution and lengthy prison sentences.  As long as the stage is defined by such confusing and misleading acronyms against a backdrop of terror, corruption and politicking, chances of survival are minimal for any Turkish party that promotes any form of participatory democracy, let alone human rights for Kurds.

For the past 60 years, the West, and indeed most influential Turks themselves, quietly trusted in the secular Turkish military to step in when the political and security scene became untenable.  While everyone would publicly condemn such military intervention, the fact that it was always there as a fallback brought secret solace to supporters of modern Turkey as envisioned by Atatürk’s.  Now it appears that a military intervention is no longer an option to restore traditional order if the situation deteriorates further.  Instead, President Erdogan stands ready to change the constitution and establish a Turkey very different from anything we have seen in our lifetimes.  Given what we are seeing right now in terms of government corruption, disregard for human rights and elimination of all dissent, the prospect of this new Turkish political landscape, devoid of all but the AKP acronym, justifiably strikes fear into the hearts of many Turks and non-Turks alike.

Gwenyth Todd a former Adviser to President Clinton and an expert in international security policy with a M.A from Georgetown University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

In the run-up to last week’s elections, there were two major schools of thought predicting a massive AKP victory.  One was composed of those convinced that Erdogan would intervene behind the scenes and rig the elections in AKP’s favor.  The other was composed of people, many of whom are paid by President Erdogan’s corrupt party machine, to believe and spread the word internationally that Erdogan’s Turkey is a fantastically modern, democratic, free society on a path towards economic super-stardom.

The shocking game-changer for AKP fortunes came in the form of a spike in votes for a primarily Kurdish political party called HDP (“Peoples’ Democratic Party)  mostly located in Turkey’s Southeastern region.  The HDP picked up enough new seats to pass the minimum 10% threshold for any political party in Turkey to be included in government.

The fact that a predominantly Kurdish party could get this far was something of a shock to all.  Many people are unaware that President Erdogan’s forces have never really stopped oppressing the Kurds in Turkey’s Southeast.  This is largely because they only hear good news concerning President Erdogan’s reasonably amicable relations with Iraqi Kurds, as well as meaningless announcements that President Erdogan has negotiated an tentative ceasefire with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’Party or PKK through an agreement with its incarcerated former leader.  Few have actually paid attention to the never-ceasing military and law-enforcement operations against Turkey’s Kurds.  After all, those who report bad news in Turkey risk losing their livelihood or even their lives in President Erdogan’s Turkey.

For those who do not have time to read the lengthy background outlined below, Erdogan is  unlikely to accept this defeat for his AK Party without a fight.  He does not want to draw too much international criticism and is thus likely to look for a simple democratic solution.  The simplest thing he can do in the short term is to reduce the numbers of HDP members to below 10% by charging enough HDP members with the crime of supporting Kurdish separatism, or even banning the HDP party outright.  During the past few days, Erdogan has begun decrying Kurdish terrorist activity in Syria and in Turkey.  This could well be “preparation for surgery” in excising the HDP from Parliament.  Such a move would be unlikely to elicit intense Western criticism or even hold the public’s attention via CNN for more than ten days.  New elections would be called and this time President Erdogan would pay much closer attention to securing his desired results.

Even if President Erdogan does not remove the HDP obstacle, he is almost certainly ready to stop at nothing to maintain his iron grip on Turkey.  He has fought hard, stopping at nothing to attain his powerful position and it is almost inconceivable that he would accept defeat now, when he has come so far.  Few people want to acknowledge just how far Turkey has drifted from its once crucial role as a critical Western ally in a dangerous neighborhood,  Turkey has gone from being NATO’s arguably most strategically positioned member during the Cold War to being,
at best, a bridge between the West and the Muslim World and to being, at worst, a corrupt troublemaker run by a megalomaniac who has publicly called on his followers to start a possibly nuclear war in the region by rising up and marching to wrest Jerusalem from Israeli control.  How could this dire change have occurred without anyone stepping in earlier?

The world has been very slow to notice the dangerous erosion of Turkey’s role as a Western ally since the AKP came to power in 2002.  Erdogan was hailed as the best hope for Turkey to be admitted to the European Union, because he was willing to undercut the Turkish military’s role as guarantor of a secular Turkish state.  No one stopped to consider that Erdogan’s touting of “religious freedom” might be a ruse to destroy the Western-allied, secular Turkish state created by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.  In hindsight, while politically incorrect to say so, it was always absurd to think that the European Union would allow a truly Muslim state into its club.  Anti-Islamic sentiment runs too high in various European Union countries.  A secular Turkey would have been the only acceptable Turkey for the EU and even then, the Greeks and Cypriots would never have agreed. Yet over the past decade, the U.S. and Europe cheered on Erdogan as the best hope for Turkush EU membership even as secular, military, political, media and business figures were steadily but quietly incarcerated and/or served with ruinous fines to force them into submission.  If those tactics did not work, critics of Erdogan have died under mysterious circumstances, been ruined financially, been driven into exile or silenced through blackmail and threats.

Meanwhile, during the past decade, Turkey has increased its popularity as a tourist destination and investment opportunity and few visitors ever scratch below the shiny AKP gilded image of Turkey to see the unprecedented corruption of President Erdogan and his cronies.  Certainly it was clear that there were popular protests: we all heard about them on the news, but they seemed to be about trivial things like shopping malls and were thus easily ignored.  More women were wearing headscarves, but it was politically incorrect to question that since it seemed to be a personal religious or fashion choice. Billboards of Erdogan were popping up everywhere and some observers commented that they were replacing images of Atatürk, but again, it did not seem that important.  For many, it was not until President Erdogan unveiled his 1,150 room Presidential Palace in 2014 that they started to look more closely at President Erdogan’s agenda.

During this time of tourism, economic boom and public glitz, Erdogan had presented himself as the only credible regional champion of Palestinian rights while also advertising himself as a friend to Turkey’s fractious Kurdish population.  As far as the Kurds were concerned, Erdogan managed to focus international attention on an apparent peace deal he had reached with Adullah Ôcalan, the long-imprisoned former leader of the terrorist Kurdish PKK organization.  Few people questioned whether Öcalan, after almost 20 years in prison, actually still wielded sufficient power among Turkey’s Kurdish population to be able to influence events.  People wanted to believe in Erdogan and those who questioned him frequently found themselves in grave danger.

As for the Palestinians, in 2010 Erdogan tried a doomed-to-fail publicity stunt and sent a flotilla of ships, purportedly carrying humanitarian relief supplies but also heavily packed with international journalists, to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza.  Nine Turkish activists were killed in the Israeli operation to block the flotilla.  Erdogan’s image as a defender of the Palestinians received a huge boost, even though he accomplished nothing that actually helped the Palestinians.  When the flotilla incident publicity died down. Erdogan apparently decided that the best way to harass the Israelis was to wield power over the government of a country bordering Israel.  In 2011, Erdogan held high hopes that Egypt, under the new leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, would help him lead the effort to pressure Israel.  Simultaneously, Erdogan was quietly stirring up tensions in neighboring Syria by arming disenfranchised Sunni Muslims and encouraging them to overthrow the Syrian Ba’athist government led by President Bashar Al-Assad, himself a member of the Shi’a Alawite sect.  Erdogan stressed the sectarian Sunni vs. Shi’a aspect of Syrian society and managed to unleash complete chaos inside Syria by training and arming disenfranchised Syrian Sunnis.  Still, however, Bashar Al-Assad retained control in Syria and furthermore, in a serious blow to Erdogan’s strategy, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was overthrown with support from the U.S., Europe and Israel.

In spite of disappointment over losing Egypt, Erdogan was full of hope that he would gain Western military support in overthrowing Syrian President Assad if he could just stage a false-flag chemical weapons attack.  He appears to have done so in Aleppo, Syria and in Rehanli, Turkey, although he vigorously denies having done so. Still, as Seymour Hersh noted correctly, forensic studies of the chemicals used in these attacks did not come from weapons in Syria’s military arsenal.  U.S. President Obama, fortunately, was advised quietly at the last minute in August 2012 that he was being advised to bomb Damascus based on false information about supposed use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime against the Syrian people.  President Obama also realized that even some of his closest advisors, many of whom were being lobbied by former US officials on Erdogan’s payroll, were feeding him Erdogan’s lies about Assad.  A number of prominent Obama administration foreign policy advisors were subsequently replaced in 2012 and 2013, albeit under the guise of unrelated reasons, from sexual misconduct to normal turnover of cabinet members following a Residential election.

Meanwhile, President Erdogan ensured Turkey became the undeclared gateway for any terrorist wishing to fight with the radical, brutal Sunni An-Nusrah rebel brigades in Syria.  An-Nusrah was not strong enough to unseat Assad however.  What the world next witnessed was the formation of the even more brutal Islamic State in Syria or ISIS, which was made up largely of exiled Iraqi Sunnis who had fled to Syria and were prepared to fight to the death to drive the Iranian-backed Shi’a militias out Iraq.  The weapons used by An-Nusrah and later ISIS were and are frequently NATO weapons, further implicating Edogan and Turkey.  Apologists for Erdogan claim that the NATO weapons have been seized came from the camps of Western-armed Iraqi Army forces crushed by ISIS but it is highly likely that Turkey is responsible for providing many sophisticated Western weapons to ISIS.  Erdogan also likes to turn a profit, so thanks for Turkish materiel and other support must also be given for the financial support for ISIS by Gulf Arab states wishing to offset Turkey’s role as the primary supporter of this radical Sunni movement.  It is a classic case of rivals exploiting each other unthinkingly, but with devastating consequences.

Erdogan took his continued support even further.  According to credible reports, when three trucks belonging to the Turkish Intelligence Service were stopped at the Turkish border with Syria, they informed the border guards that they were carrying humanitarian aid.  The border guards managed to open one van and reportedly found it full of weapons.  When the border guards tried to seize the trucks, an armed stand-off ensued and the trucks passed into Syria.  The Customs Service complained and Turkish judges ruled the actions of the truck drivers illegal.  Erdogan’s response to the judicial finding against his own weapons smugglers operating government trucks epitomizes tErdogan’s illegal tactics: he charged the judges with treason for daring to support any challenge to his National Intelligence Service operations.

Being able to act without any lasting negative consequences may help explain why President Erdogan lost track of political reality somewhere along the way, as he successfully silenced all opponents and critics inside Turkey.  Most observers believed that Erdogan would rig these latest elections to ensure AKP a two-thirds majority in Parliament. It seems, however, that Erdogan has been riding so high on the crest of his wave of corruption that he convinced himself he no longer needed to worry about internal political opposition.  He looked as stunned as everyone around him when, instead of gaining seats in Parliament, the AKP lost a significant number of seats and with it, the AKP majority.

It is clear that Erdogan is leading Turkey down a dangerous path.  He operates behind a cloak of normalcy and it is only once a new onerous policy has been implemented that anyone takes notice.  Even then, in this world of 24 hour news coverage, the world audience quickly turns their attention away from significant events inside Turkey.  As long as the archaeology, the beaches, the hotels and the friendly tour guides continue to be accessible, outsiders will ignore  even the most egregious violations of acceptable democratic practices.

It is now up to the Turkish people who said “No” to Erdogan in these recent elections to follow through and stop the AKP from regaining its previous levels of power.  Political parties like the HDP will have a tough time standing up to AKP pressure and harassment, but they and their sympathizers are Turkey’s only hope of stopping Erdogan from turning Turkey into a truly destructive force in the region.  The outside world has shown that they will not intervene, regardless of how distressing it may be to witness Erdogan’s destruction of modern Turkey as we know it.

Gwenyth Todd a former Adviser to President Clinton and an expert in international security policy with a M.A from Georgetown University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

In no way do I wish to minimize the tragedy of the ongoing slaughter of thousands of innocents in Gaza. I would, however, like to suggest that even as the death toll rises in Gaza, it is extremely important to remain vigilant regarding events in the much larger West Bank, where settlement building and ongoing, widespread human rights abuses continue unabated and unaddressed. Additionally, people should consider that the size and resources of the West Bank could one day provide overcrowded Gaza with tremendous relief from its population pressure, thus reducing the desperation and poverty that help fuel Gazan terrorist activity. This is why it is important that people realize how and why they are manipulated into focusing solely on the devastating problems in Gaza instead of on the potential solutions in the West Bank.

It is difficult not to be cynical about the Gaza drama. It was not an altruistic or benevolent act on Israel’s part when the late Prime Minister Ariel Sharon withdrew the last protesting Israeli settlers from Gaza in August 2005. The Israeli withdrawal irelieved Israel of the significant burden of protecting Israelis in a cramped, dangerous, resource-poor environment. Uprooted settlers were generously compensated and relocated, with added bonus payments for relocating within certain areas of Israel proper. The withdrawal further helped Israel’s international image by being portrayed as a major concession by Israel in terms of the Peace Process. The gesture was designed to “take the heat off” Israel at a time when Israel had already begun building the infamous Wall between Israel and the West Bank, a wall supposedly designed to protect Israel from incursions and attacks, a hideous, looming structure reminiscent of the darkest days in Berlin.

It is much easier for the world to focus on the situation in Gaza than in the West Bank. There are about 1.5 million Palestinians living in the West Bank, and they are spread over 5640 square kilometres. Interspersed among them are up to 500,000 Jewish settlers, a number which is steadily increasing. Contrast that with about 8500 Jewish settlers relocated from Gaza into Israel in August 2005 and the differences between the situations in the West Bank and Gaza become even more stark. Simply put, it was easy and convenient in 2005 for Israel to withdraw from Gaza since it covered only a tiny area, housed only a small number of Jewish settlers, had no significant resources needed by Israel and was generally recognized as an overcrowded Palestinian slum.

I reserve the harshest criticism for those who sanctimoniously announced in 2005 that Gaza had a chance to become a real democracy. Any politician, historian, sociologist or even casual observer could have foretold that fundamentalist Muslims, most likely with ties to known terrorists, would be the only group sufficiently organized to win a general election. Since independent Gaza’s fate still remained in the iron grip of the Israelis, the moment Hamas was elected provided an opportunity for Israel to set up a blockade to isolate, punish and direct international focus onto this tiny, overcrowded slice of land. In doing so, the stage was set for a permanent spotlight on Gaza to deflect outside observers’ attention from the situation in the West Bank.

The tragic reality of the neverending Peace Process is that no Israeli government will ever be able to allow the West Bank to become an independent Palestinian state. While Israel cites security concerns, pointing to the rockets fired from Gaza and pointing out how much worse things would be if the West Bank, more than 15 times the area of Gaza, were an independent state, they might as well be comparing apples and oranges

Many observers accept Israel’s security justification, but the reality is more complex. The first issue is resource-based. Israel counts on unfettered access to the huge fresh-water aquifer under the West Bank to keep Israel green and luxuriant. Israel rejoiced when it gained control of the aquifer in 1967 and will never allow the Palestinians to control that aquifer without access to large amounts of water from another source. No such alternate water source is on the horizon. The second issue is political. With somewhere around 500,000 Israeli settlers established throughout the West Bank, no Israeli government in recent decades has had the luxury of ignoring the West Bank settler votes. This is not likely to change either, thus there is nothing to be gained by Israeli leaders from peace talks related to creating a truly independent Palestinian state in the West Bank.

The housing market in Jewish settlements in the West Bank backs the assertion that the Israeli government has no intention of ever turning over full sovereignty of the West Bank to the Palestinians. Israel’s news outlet Ha’aretz recently detailed skyrocketing house prices in the largest “settlements” in the West Bank, with settlement cities like Ariel and Betar Ilit seeing price increases of 104% and 77% respectively (see Ha’aretz, “Forget Tel Aviv, Israel’s Real House Price Boom Is In Ariel” by Hagai Amit, July 25, 2014). Such significant increases in housing prices, affecting hundreds of thousands of Jewish settlers, indicate great settler confidence in assured permanent residency.

The prospects of any Israeli government being strong enough to survive opposition from the settler communities in the West Bank are virtually nil. Therefore the West Bank will never be allowed to become a fully independent Palestinian state. Such harsh truths do not sit well with the international community, thus Israel is desperate to keep stringing along the international community while it completes its slow but steady annexation of the West Bank. In order to do so, Israel must create the illusion of supporting the idea of a two-state solution until it can prove that such a solution is simply not possible due to insurmountable, constant threats to Israel’s security from the Palestinians as a whole.

Enter Gaza from Left Stage straight into the spotlight. By allowing an independent state to be created in a tiny, overcrowded, poverty-stricken, economically unviable, isolated strip of land called Gaza, the Israelis have been able to extrapolate and establish a syllogistic argument demonstrating why they must continue to occupy and annex the West Bank. The glaring differences between Gaza and the West Bank are not understood by most nations and observers are happy to assume ignorantly that Gaza is a merely a microcosm of the West Bank.

As intended by the Israelis when they agreed and assisted in setting up the doomed experiment in Palestinian statehood, we find ourselves yet again staring at the spotlight illuminating the horrifying, but thoroughly predictable violence in the artificially created vortex of destruction that is the Gaza Strip. It sucks in all the energy and attention of the media, human rights groups and Muslim nations along with the United States and much of Europe. That there is no viable solution for peace in Gaza under a democratically elected government is tragic but obvious to anyone who wishes to see the truth. What is even more tragic is that the pull of Gaza seems to be so strong that no one appears able to tear their attention away long enough to recognize that the slow, yet still possibly preventable destruction of over 1.5 million Palestinians is underway, under our noses, less than half a day’s drive from Gaza in the West Bank.

The world today is facing ongoing civil wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya Ukraine, Nigeria, The Democratic Republic of Congo, and many other “hot spots”. The Palestinian-Israeli battle has become part of the international security landscape for most international observers, and only the most spectacular fireworks seem able to motivate the world to take yet another stab at serious peace talks. Even then, those organizing them are jaded to the point that no negotiators seem to believe success is possible,

During my years working for the US Government, I spent many hours in daily meetings with the key US figures associated with the Peace Process. The meetings were pointless, lacking in substance and highly politically charged in favour of Israel. it was, and still is, far more palatable politically to be able to see, admonish, gasp at and try to negotiate over the terrifying, man-made spectacle in the Gaza spotlight rather than to attempt seeing past Gaza to the much larger West Bank, where the the stakes are much higher, the political risks astronomical, and the logistical challenge greater. Yet the possibility of a lasting solution outcome in the West Bank could be possible if the Israeli Government were willing to contemplate seriously a true two-state solution.

Over the past month, at least three new settler outposts have been established in the West Bank. Those who built the settlements claim that it is in response to the mysterious and tragic death of three Israeli teenagers. Such an inflammatory response was highly predictable, given the settlers propensity to use any excuse to expand their presence. Meanwhile, during the same period, hundreds of protesting Palestinians in the West Bank have been seriously injured, sometimes leading to fatalities. While I do not have a special ability to predict the future, I would be prepared to state with absolute certainty that there will be more injury and death to come in the West Bank while all eyes remain fixed on Gaza.

The global community may not be able to stop the violence in Gaza, but it could band together to force Israel to give Gazan civilians the choice of living peacefully in less crowded conditions by enforcing international laws against Israeli settlements since 2004 in the West Bank. Unfortunately, Israel has too much to lose by ceding control of the West Bank and will thus likely turn the spotlight beam up a notch or two if it means keeping the world blinded by the horrors of Gaza while Israel continues its steady annexation of the West Bank.

Gwenyth Todd a former Adviser to President Clinton, expert in international security policy, she hold M.A from Georgetown University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The ISIS crisis has thrown the Near East into a new tailspin.  Everyone interested is casting about for a solution and every option appears to be on the table.  Unfortunately, one option seems to factor into almost every in-depth news story on the subject, and that is Mr. Ahmad Chalabi, the personification of the proverbial bad penny.

In spite of numerous past problems, political analysis in the Western media appears to be tilting in favour of Ahmad Chalabi as a prime contender to replace Nuri Al-Maliki as Prime Minister of Iraq.  Such a development should send shivers down the spine of anyone with any knowledge of Mr. Chalabi’s “rap sheet”, a term used in the United States referring to a person’s official criminal dossier.  Mr. Chalabi’s rap sheet holds enough charges and conviction of criminal activity to fill a book.  So why are Iraq’s neighbours, along with the United States Government, either staying silent or expressing support as Mr. Chalabi’s name once again pops up?  After all, this man has been repeatedly shown to be a crook and a “con artist” and is arguably lucky to even be alive and out of prison, let alone parading in front of cameras, positioning himself to replace Prime Minister Maliki.

Understanding Mr. Chalabi’s background and his unique relationship with international power brokers is critical to unravelling the mystery of why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003.  In 2003, the neoconservative architects of the Iraq invasion planned for Mr. Chalabi, as the head of the largest group of Iraqi exiles, the Iraqi National Congress (INC), to become Iraq’s new President or Prime Minister.  The US Department of Defense even provided air transport to fly Mr. Chalabi and his supporters into southern Iraq while the battle for Baghdad was still ongoing.  Mr. Chalabi had the advantage over all other contenders for the Iraqi leadership from the moment his feet touched Iraqi soil in 2003.  Yet he has never managed to attain the top political post in Iraq.

I witnessed and even participated in many of the events leading up to Mr. Chalabi’s return to Iraq.  Given his support from powerful neoconservatives, as well as my former colleagues at the Pentagon and White House, it is a real testament to  the enduring strength of the Iraqi people that Chalabi has thus far failed to attain the post of Prime Minister.  He appears politically indestructible, however, as he seems to be proving yet again, and there is a real risk that he might succeed this time.

Who is Ahmad Chalabi?

For those interested in the details of Mr. Chalabi’s life and career, there are endless accounts available elsewhere.  For layman’s purposes, it should be enough to know that Mr. Chalabi comes from one of the wealthiest families of pre-1958 Iraq.  He is Shi’a in name but puts himself forward as non-sectarian.  His family fled Iraq in 1958 to Lebanon and Mr. Chalabi spent much of his life living in the West.  He attended school in the United Kingdom and university in the United States   He received advanced degrees in Math from prestigious universities. His powerful family had sufficient funds to ensure that the Chalabis rubbed shoulders with the best and brightest in the West and in friendly Arab countries.  In short, he is a polished polyglot with a keen intellect who also happens to be an excellent social companion and salesman.  In Mr. Chalabi’s case, these traits have been used repeated for personal gain at the expense of others.

Financial Dealings, Charges and Criminal Conviction

In the 1970’s, Chalabi helped found the Petra Bank, a financial institution that crossed borders and was even granted permits to operate in the Israeli Occupied Territories.  The rise and fall of Petra Bank is again a tale that has been told and retold widely, but suffice it to say that in 1989, Petra Bank collapsed, uncovering corruption on a scale that could have destroyed Jordan’s entire domestic banking system, and Mr. Chalabi barely managed to escape from Jordan, reportedly aided by the brother of Jordan’s King Hussein and carrying tens of millions of dollars.

My Experience With Chalabi And His Supporters

I first became aware of Mr. Chalabi’s existence two months after joining the US Government Civil Service in August 1990.  The Petra Bank collapse had led to criminal charges against Mr. Chalabi in June 1990, and Interpol subsequently issued a warrant for his arrest on behalf of the Jordanian government.  In October 1990, I saw a TV interview with Mr. Chalabi.  Although the focus of the interview was on the missing money from Petra Bank, discussion of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was also addressed.  Mr. Chalabi made clear that he supported all efforts to remove Saddam Hussein from power.  At the time, I did not realize that the interview was part of a carefully orchestrated effort by US neoconservatives to market Mr. Chalabi as a future leader of Iraq.  After all, who would promote a future Iraqi leader whom Jordan, a close US ally, was actively seeking to extradite for serious financial crimes?  The last thing Iraq needed was a convicted con artist to replace Saddam Hussein.  But it turned out that Mr. Chalabi was indeed the man chosen by the neoconservatives to lead a new Iraq.

For me, it was not until 1992 that Mr. Chalabi suddenly resurfaced.  I was working on Iraq policy for Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney at the Pentagon.  In sorting through my daily pile of messages, I noticed that Interpol had issued a warrant for a man named Ahmad Chalabi, but the name did not ring any alarm bells in my memory.  Coincidentally, that afternoon I received a telephone call from Paul Wolfowitz’s secretary asking me to join a meeting  regarding Iraq.  I was perplexed, since I had not set up any such meeting, but I went straight over and entered the meeting in progress.  There were seven people in the room, including me, and the man speaking to Paul Wolfowitz seemed oddly familiar.  As I listened to him describing the recent Iraqi National Congress (INC) summit in Vienna, I suddenly realized that this was the Petra Bank leader for whom Interpol had issued a warrant.

With the Interpol warrant still fresh in my mind, I was stunned that Mr. Chalabi was in the Pentagon, let alone meeting in secret with Under Secretary Wolfowitz.  Even more disturbing were the assurances of US support for Mr. Chalabi’s INC being proffered by Wolfowitz.   I waited until the end of the meeting and then approached the man who had set up the meeting. I asked him why Chalabi, who was wanted by Interpol, was in the Pentagon E-ring.  The reply was casual and chilling: I was told that “Ahmad” was going to be put in to replace Saddam and that the Interpol warrant was meaningless.  Richard Perle and Professor Bernard Lewis had chosen Mr. Chalabi to be Saddam’s successor and this was just the beginning of a partnership between Washington and Mr. Chalabi.  Mr. Chalabi would also be meeting with Special Assistant Dennis Ross at the the Department of State.  The case was closed.

This was my introduction to the neoconservative modus operandum and I found it deeply disturbing.  After all, the Chalabi family was so hated in Iraq that when Ahmad Chalabi’s uncle died, those who worked for him reportedly celebrated for three days.  The Chalabis did not leave Iraq willingly in 1958: they were driven out of Iraq by a populace that despised them.  I could imagine no circumstance where the Iraqi people would have welcomed any returning Chalabi family member, let alone one as publicly corrupt as Ahmad Chalabi.

I was relieved when President Clinton was elected in 1992 because it slowed down Mr. Chalabi’s momentum.  Paul Wolfowitz was gone from the Pentagon and Richard Perle’s shadowy civil service organizer in the Pentagon was removed from any post of influence regarding Near Eastern matters.  Still, neoconservatives and others who were uninterested in Mr. Chalabi’s financial misdeeds continued to support him and the INC.  Mr. Chalabi did go into Northern Iraq to help build organized opposition to Saddam, but any success he had was due more to US support and a marriage of convenience with the Kurds rather than popularity or ethics.  Still, his mere presence in Northern Iraq and the accompanying risks helped lionize him back in Washington DC with some of the Clinton Administration officials,

I asked Richard Perle’s man in the Pentagon in 1992 why Mr. Chalabi had been chosen by the US to lead Iraq.  I was told that Mr. Chalabi, being a secularist Shi’a with huge name recognition in Iraq, could win over the majority of Iraqis. When I protested that no sane person could trust a man like Mr. Chalabi, I was told that he and Iraq were merely pawns in an effort to set up a base from which to foment unrest in Iran. No neoconservative cared about Iraq for any reason other than using it to harass Iran.  Even access to Iraqi oil was not raised as a factor:  the primary objective was to set up a Western-friendly government in Iraq from which the US and Israel could conduct operations against Iran. Mr. Chalabi seemed pleased with that arrangement, as long as he could restore his family’s territory and exploit Iraq’s wealth potential.

By 1999, Mr. Chalabi had lobbied the US Congress to such a degree that millions of US taxpayer dollars were appropriated to support INC operations.  To this day, it is unclear where all that money went.  Iraq policy in Washington had become so politicized and irrational that I wanted no part of it.  I was relieved when a new, openly pro-Chalabi Iraq Director took my place at the White House as I quit government service.  Witnessing the madness and being unable to influence it was simply not a productive use of my time.

In January 2001, at an inaugural dinner for George W. Bush, I was approached by the neoconservative “poster boy”, Richard Perle.  When I told him I had quit the US Government in 1999, he gave me his card and urged me to come and work for Paul Wolfowitz at the Pentagon.  He said that Wolfowitz was setting up a special projects office to fulfill his commitment to Mr. Chalabi and that he needed people like me who shared the neoconservative philosophy for the region.  I thanked him politely, went home and called friends in the US media.  I tried to explain that war with Iraq was going to happen under George W. Bush, with the goal of setting up a base from which to conduct anti-Iranian operations.   Not surprisingly, no one believed me.  It was too difficult to imagine that a mere handful of powerful men and women could convince the US public, not to mention the Europeans and Arabs, that Iraq should be invaded and Saddam Hussein replaced by a crook like Ahmad Chalabi.

The ensuing strategy to mislead the US public into supporting an unjustified invasion of Iraq very carefully danced around the choice of Chalabi.  Instead, the apparently imminent nuclear threat from Saddam, horrific images of human rights abuses and false claims of ties to Al Qaeda were used to convince the American people that Saddam had to be removed immediately.  This was not based on serious intelligence, but in large part on a source known as “Curveball”, who turned out to be a creation of none other than Mr. Ahmad Chalabi.  In fact, the CIA Near Eastern office told me in 2002 that their intelligence assessments saying that Saddam posed no imminent threat to the West were barred from the being reported “up the chain”.  I was told that Wolfowitz in particular was parsing incoming intelligence assessments to exaggerate the threat posed by Saddam Hussein to the West.   There were many frustrated intelligence analysts but little, if anything, could be done to bypass Wolfowitz and his Special Projects team.

The Bad Penny Returns To Iraq

What happened to Chalabi after the fall of Baghdad is a matter of public record, but it is fair to say that it did not go as the neoconservatives had planned.  Within a year of returning to Iraq, Mr. Chalabi found himself under suspicion of passing sensitive intelligence to the Iranians, had his compound raided and an arrest warrant issued alleging Mr. Chalabi’s role in counterfeiting Iraqi dinars.  Although he was not arrested, he was publicly disgraced.  At the time, in August 2004, I met with one of the Bahraini Crown Prince’s key advisers, astonishingly a Shi’ite, who told me that there was no possible way Chalabi could ever return to politics.  I suggested that this was an overly optimistic view. Sure enough, by 2005, Mr. Chalabi was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and interim oil minister, proving the “bad penny” theory once again.  And ironically in 2012, Bahrain itself felt the effects of Mr. Chalabi’s unsinkability directly thanks to his alleged support for the Shi’ite opposition that threatens the power of the Bahraini Royal Family.

The reason why “bad pennies” are a problem is that while, under normal circumstances, most people know to quickly throw them out, in a crisis, they may present themselves as the only known solution.  Name recognition is also a powerful thing, especially when combined with huge personal wealth and die-hard international support from dedicated neoconservatives.  This is precisely why Mr. Chalabi’s return to the public eye in Iraq is so dangerous during this period of the ISIS crisis.  There are few, if any, Iraqis with the money, foreign support, hubris and sense of invulnerability to dare put themselves forward as an alternative to Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki.  Mr. Chalabi is one of a very few Iraqis who meet all those criteria and this crisis offers him the best chance in decades to seize power in Iraq with US backing.

If the Iraqi people truly want this man as their leader, they should be allowed to elect him.  Life is so dangerous and chaotic in Iraq that perhaps any alternative to the present regime is acceptable, no matter how unsavory.  But before anyone sets foot near a voting booth, Iraq and the world should be aware of Mr. Chalabi’s background, neoconservative backers and financial and criminal misdeeds of the past.

This is one situation in which the international community, not merely the United States, has an opportunity to ensure that Mr. Chalabi does not bilk the Iraqi people out of what little they have left.  Perhaps the recent direct Iraqi assistance from Russia, along with the realization by Iraq’s Arab and Iranian neighbours of the threat posed by ISIS to their own existence, will open the door for a fresh face to step into the breech and toss out the Chalabi bad penny permanently.

The alternative option of putting Mr. Chalabi in charge of Iraq will likely result in more death, destruction and tragedy, not just for Iraq but for the region as a whole.

Gwenyth Todd a former Adviser to President Clinton, expert in international security policy, she hold M.A from Georgetown University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“ 

The policy of the US in the five years leading up to Mr. Erdogan’s election in 2003, was to “muddle through”, a euphemism for not having a policy. Additionally, the US lobbied heavily for Turkish membership in the European Union (EU). EU membership required diminishing the power of the military and improving Turkey’s human rights record and policies regarding freedom of religion. Mr. Erdogan leapt at this approach and benefitted greatly. In the name of supporting Turkish EU membership, Mr. Erdogan had US and European support for neutralizing the internal threat posed to an Islamist government. Whether Mr. Erdogan ever planned, or even wished, to have Turkey join the EU is debatable. But the process involved in meeting EU requirements allowed Mr. Erdogan to dismantle the already crumbling role of Turkey as a staunch Western secular client.

Perhaps the most obvious turning point in Turkey’s role in NATO came when the Turkish parliament refused to allow the US-led coalition to base operations out of Turkey. Perhaps the Turkish military chose to teach the West a lesson out of anger over the restrictions on military sales and a general atmosphere of criticism and disrespect. Or perhaps the military was already so weakened by that time that it was powerless to determine the vote’s outcome. Whatever the reason, it did tremendous damage to Turkey’s military importance in Western eyes. Once the US realized it could operate in the Middle East without Turkish support, it took away the argument, long-used by US and European critics of Turkish military-to military relations, that the Turkish military played a vital role in all military activity in Iraq. As soon as the invasion of Iraq went ahead without Turkish involvement, the West wrote off the Turkish military as a critical ally. From that point onward, the Islamists had free rein to weaken the Turkish military’s role inside Turkey without risking objections from the United States and NATO.

The continuing destruction of Ataturk’s legacy can be observed by anyone looking at Turkey from within or without. Mr. Erdogan has managed to change the Turkish constitution, imprison, banish or kill his opponents, pay off private lobbyists around the globe to encourage the US and Europe to look the other way and engage in obvious, egregious corruption affecting everything from his personal wealth to his party’s election victories.

Still Mr. Erdogan has most of the world fooled. He has ensured that Israeli atrocities are well-publicized among Turks. He has presided over the process of undoing the close Turkish-Israeli relationship. He staged the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010, which united global public opinion against the Israeli government, then he sowed the seeds of and fueled the civil war in Syria.

His Syrian efforts have backfired, as is evident from the recent kidnapping of 49 Turkish citizens from the Turkish Consulate in Mosul by ISIS, a group Mr. Erdogan did not oppose until September 2013. ISIS has labeled Mr. Erdogan an “apostate” and is now a declared enemy, but there was a time when ISIS could count on backchannel Turkish support in Syria.

At some point, Mr. Erdogan may find he has nowhere to turn to for support in combating threats from the Islamist groups he has helped to grow and thrive. Mr. Erdogan has defanged his internal secular military threat for the time being, but as Turkey becomes more of an Islamic backwater, incapable of even protecting its own officials in neighbouring Mosul, even religious Turks may turn against him.

So what do relations between Turkey and its NATO allies look like in Mr. Erdogan’s Turkey today? The phrase “walking on eggshells” comes to mind, in spite of efforts to pretend otherwise. Any Turkish official who has genuinely close ties to the secular West risks firing or imprisonment. Turkish businessmen are only free to negotiate deals with foreigners if they show their support for Mr. Erdogan’s party through payments and other political support to AKP officials and their surrogates. And as Turkey’s standing in NATO declines, so do its prospects for EU membership.

Another telling sign that the US and NATO no longer value Turkey as geostrategically as they once did is the lack of concern over a corrupt, anti-Western Turkish government overseeing the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. When the United States hurls accusations of Russian annexation of Crimea, few seem concerned over Mr. Erdogan’s corrupt cronies controlling Russian access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. If Russian control of Crimea were a serious US concern, control of the Bosphorus by a formidable pro-Western Turkish government and military would be necessary. Instead, the US seems content to have the Bosphorus in the hands of an Islamist Turkish dictator whom everyone with access to social media has heard discussing bribes, manipulating the media and plotting false-flag attacks in neighbouring Syria.

Turkey remains a member of NATO and its relations with the West have not been severed. It is unlikely that those relations would ever be completely cut off, if for no other reason than potential geostrategic interests. Still, with the level of corruption and unrest inside Turkey and growing chaos in Syria and Iraq, it is possible that Turkey’s government will face an existential crisis down the road. If so, Turkey may well find that NATO support will be its only hope. And while various individual power players in NATO may have benefitted from Mr. Erdogan’s pay-offs, the conditions needed to justify NATO forces coming to Turkey’s defense will be decided by nations, not individuals, and certainly not by Mr. Erdogan.

For the first time in almost a century, the situation in Turkey is beginning to look like the final days of the Ottoman Empire, when civil unrest and regional war made it seem unlikely that Turkey could rise from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk created the Turkish phoenix from those ashes. As Mr. Erdogan continues to weaken the very identity of the Turkish state as a secular, Western NATO ally, who, if anyone, will be waiting in the wings to resuscitate Turkey if necessary?

At this point, it would seem that the once formidable Turkey is becoming increasingly untrustworthy, problematic and, by extension, irrelevant.

Gwenyth Todd a former Adviser to President Clinton, expert in international security policy, she hold M.A from Georgetown University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“ 

Then, on June 11 2014, members of the terrorist army Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (“Sham” referring to what the West knows as “The Levant” or “Greater Syria) or ISIS swept into the Iraqi city of Mosul, taking hostage 49 employees of the Turkish Consulate. Mr. Erdogan has done little on the surface to secure their release and are limiting reporting on the situation in the Turkish media.

The Mosul crisis is simply the latest in a string of security crises resulting from Mr. Erdogan’s ill-fated efforts to establish himself as a great Muslim regional, neo-Ottoman leader while eroding longstanding ties between Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s secular, pro-Western Turkey and the West. Mr. Erdogan’s government has been fomenting unrest in Syria for two years and indeed supported ISIS’s rebels until as lately as September 2013. Turkey still supports other extremist rebel groups in Syria, even as it becomes clear that these groups could pose an existential threat to every country in the reason. The question we should be asking is “Why are Turkey’s traditional allies staying silent?”

For over 60 years, Turkey stood as the highly valued, staunch NATO ally on NATO’s southeastern-most flank. Its shared border with the Former Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq and Syria kept it relevant to US and European interests over the years, prompting its allies within NATO to continue supporting Turkey’s role as a key player, even as war broke out between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, and Turkish governments were repeatedly toppled by military interventions.

In essence, Turkey’s problems with Greece and its historic conflict with the Kurds and the Armenians always “took a back seat” to Turkey’s key role in NATO.
This special status of Turkey in NATO has since diminished. During the 1990s, Turkey’s military became increasingly aware of diminished US and European support following the break-up of the Soviet Union. The secular Turkish establishment went to great lengths to draw NATO attention to Turkey’s continued pivotal role in Europe, first through failed attempts to keep US officials focused on the threat from Russia. When then that did not sway the US and the West in their increasing criticism of Turkey’s human rights record, the Turkish government sought to play a key role in helping resolve the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Neither concern over Russia nor even the turmoil in the former Yugoslavia were sufficient to sustain long-term, unconditional support for Turkey from its NATO allies. In fact, the Turkish military came under increasing pressure from the US and UK over the continued Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus, as well as for undemocratic domestic policies regarding freedom of religion and Turkey’s Kurdish population. In fact, had it not been for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent UN sanctions and “No-Fly Zone” over northern Iraq, the end of the Cold War would arguably have had an immediate impact on Turkey’s relevance to the West.

As it turned out, coalition operations over Northern Iraq and the Bosnia conflict bought Turkey another 13 years of relevance to US and European security interests. The writing was on the wall, however, and the Turkish military leadership made clear that it was acutely aware of the downward spiral in military-to-military relations with its NATO allies. As fears were increasingly realized, the secular Turkish government, civilian and military, tried to offset dwindling Western support by establishing ever closer relations with a fellow pariah, Israel, in what the Turks referred to as “a bad neighbourhood”.

The Turkish military relationship with Israel was useful in many ways for the Turkish secular establishment. Israel could often supply spare parts and upgrades of US equipment when the US Government blocked export of necessary items. Israel also had the latest intelligence gathering technology which Turkey required to keep its large Kurdish population in check. It also served Israel’s interests to have a true friend in the region, a friend offering the backing of Turkey’s enormous army as well as access to Turkish airspace when necessary.

The US Government encouraged the Turkish-Israeli alliance. After all, the US Executive Branch was hobbled by the US Congress from exporting arms and technology to Turkey. Israel’s powerful lobby, AIPAC, was able to twist the arms of reluctant Members of Congress on Turkey’s behalf and, when that failed, Israel could directly act as a middleman to ensure the Turkish military received its required support.

The US Government became increasingly vocal about the need for Turkey’s military to stay out of politics. Under the Turkish Constitution at the time, the military were the guarantors of secularism in Turkey and were empowered to step in at the first sign of religion entering politics.

The US went along with global sentiment and in almost every high-level bilateral security meeting stressed the importance of Turkey’s military staying out of politics. Yet when domestic Turkish legislation that NATO considered important came up for parliamentary vote in Turkey, the US would contact the Turkish General Staff to request that they pressure the Turkish Parliament to vote as the West desired. The Turkish seemed to see this as a game being played by the US Government to keep Armenian, Greek and human rights activists at bay with a wink and a nod. It was this misplaced trust that prevented the Turkish military from stepping in to stop the growth of political Islamist leaders.

In July 1996, an openly Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, became Prime Minister to the shock of many inside and outside Turkey. On the day of Mr. Erbakan’s first official meeting with top US officials, he had a shadowy adviser by the name of Abdullah Gul presdent. The atmosphere in the Prime Minister’s office was jubilant among the Islamists while secular civil servants stood by in apparent shock.

On the day of that first meeting, top US officials also met with Turkish military leaders. For the first time, the US made clear, in no uncertain terms, that the Turkish military could no longer count on US support unless the matter was in direct US interest. The reaction in that small meeting was emotional and explosive, with shock and even tears dominating the atmosphere. That meeting was a watershed moment in the US-Turkish military relationship and from that point on, there was no longer the sense of camaraderie and shared purpose in high-level defense relations. It should also be noted that two of of the Turkish generals in that meeting, both close friends and allies of the US, have since been imprisoned by the Erdogan government.

The Chief of the Turkish General Staff told me privately at the time that, in his opinion, the trust was gone between the Turkish military and the West. His anger was palpable. There was nothing I could say: he was correct.

(to be continued…)

Gwenyth Todd a former Adviser to President Clinton, expert in international security policy, she hold M.A from Georgetown University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“ 

ISIS has been growing for the past decade.  Initially, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan seemed to welcome the support of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) into the fray of the Syrian civil war.  ISI was originally a group composed of dispossessed Iraqi Sunnis, bolstered by extremist Sunnis from other countries, to seek redress for those have lost family, influence and property as a result of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Many Iraqi Sunnis were forced to flee into Eastern Syria.  There they became increasingly radicalized against both the West and the Shi’a branch of Islam, represented in national form by the Government of Iran and, more recently, in the Government of post-2003 Iraq.

When Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan decided to try to unseat the Syrian political regime led by President Bashar Al-Assad, Turkey and others offered full support to ISI and other Sunni Muslim rebel groups with varying agendas.  In the process, an untold amount of arms and funds were provided to shadowy extremists.

It was only early in 2014 that Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan seemed to realize that the ISI fighters would not make good allies in Syria, as it became clear that they included violent extremists.  By then, it was too late.  ISI now added another letter “S” for “Sham (meaning “Levant” or “Greater Syria”).  ISIS thus became officially a militia-style, angry, Islamic fundamentalist group,with a transnational,agenda.  A monster was maturing.

While Turkey pulled its support for ISIS in 2014, Gulf Arab states appear to have allowed their citizens to step into the breach and arm and fund ISIS.  The goal seems to be to accomplish what the US and the West refused to do: force the Shi’a from power in Syria and Iran while creating a new, credible threat to Israeli expansion into the occupied territories.  Members of ISIS are ready to die for their fundamentalist Sunni beliefs, something that most wealthy Gulf Arab states appreciate but want someone else to actually carry out.

The result is becoming increasingly clear.  ISIS militants, armed to the teeth with US military hardware, have mounted a thus successful, brutally violent and cruel attack on the Iraqi city of Mosul and beyond.  Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki is begging the US for military assistance which Obama is loath to provide.  Iranian military units are reportedly already deployed within Iraq and may be all that stands between Baghdad surviving or falling to ISIS forces.

Meanwhile, the Gulf Arab states do not appear to comprehend just how existential a threat ISIS could pose to the monarchies of the Gulf, whom ISIS views as completely corrupt.  ISIS will accept Gulf Sunni money for now but will turn on them as soon as practical.  ISIS first wants to take back Iraq, topple the Iranian regime, topple the Syrian regime and then focus on bringing a more Islamic lifestyle to those Sunni states left standing. This lifestyle would be unacceptable to most Gulf businessmen and leaders, even in conservative countries like Saudi Arabia, but the Gulf states do not seem to understand the danger ISIS may pose in the long-term.

This is one conflict where both Israel and the US can sit back and observe, at least for now.  It is flushing out extremists on all sides and, in the short term, this is not seen as a bad thing by outsiders.  Similarly, the Gulf Arabs are basking in the glow of victory emanating from the fall of Mosul and the reported massacre of Shi’a residents, and are not looking ahead.

What can be done to avert further disaster?

The first step is to convince the Gulf Sunnis that ISIS is dangerous to them as well as everyone else.  This will not be easy.  The Gulf Sunnis have lived in fear since the toppling of Saddam in 2003 brought Iran to their borders.  The perceived betrayal by the US suggests that the Gulf Sunnis are not going to trust the US to advise them objectively.  Still, as more footage is released of the atrocities committed by ISIS, the Gulf Sunnis may become more open to dialogue.

The second step is to find out precisely how much support has already been provided to ISIS by regional actors so the international community can assess the scope of the military threat.  This is a delicate task.  Ensuring the Arabs do not “lose face” for having backed the extremists in ISIS since its inception may be impossible, but unless the Gulf Sunnis address the matter, the supply chain to ISIS of funds and armaments will continue unchecked.

Thirdly, if the Gulf Sunnis can accept that this ISIS monster must be destroyed, the reality that Iran is likely to be part of the effort will be very painful for them to accept.  It is a dangerous proposition for Sunni monarchies to cooperate with Shi’a groups when the Sunnis continue to treat their own Shi’a populations as second-class, unwelcome heretics.  That said, cooperation between Sunni and Shi’a will likely be critical in stopping the spread of the ISIS militia’s campaign.

For once, this is truly a regional war that the West, East and even Israel can likely watch play out as Sunnis and Shi’a fight each other to the death.  Yet from a Western and Israeli perspective ISIS cannot be allowed to actually win, any more than Iran can be allowed to win. Still, as long as oil continues to flow, it is unlikely the West will intervene in a meaningful, military manner, even though the civilian casualties are mounting exponentially.  The West would prefer to let Iran bear the burden of fighting ISIS, trusting that eventually the Gulf Sunni states will panic and stop supporting ISIS.  Until then, there will likely be a lot of sitting back and observing the conflict unfold.

Clearly, the ISIS genie is out of its bottle and its masters have yet to order it back inside. The question is, do its masters still have the authority to contain it if the situation worsens? At this point, it seems highly doubtful that the key Sunni players in the region are thinking that far ahead.

Gwenyth Todd a former Adviser to President Clinton, expert in international security policy, she hold M.A from Georgetown University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“ 

The steady stream of embarrassing scandals has led to a frantic, effort by Mr. Erdogan to quash the source of the leaks.  In his panic, he appears to be playing the political equivalent of “Whack-A-Mole”, an arcade game popular throughout the world.  In this game, the player is presented with 5-10 holes and a hammer.

Objects pop-up randomly out of the holes and the player must hammer them back down as quickly as possible. It is never ending: the faster the player hammers the objects, the faster they pop-up from other holes, until the player gets tired and stops playing.

The name of the game is particularly apt in this case because, in English, a “mole” is also an expression for a spy within an organization.  Mr. Erdogan clearly has more than one mole in his inner circle, but each time he takes action to silence the source of a damaging report, another embarrassing revelation pops up somewhere else.

The scandals appear in various formats, including recorded private phone conversations on YouTube, Twitter, newspaper articles citing anonymous sources and Facebook postings.  Mr. Erdogan is lashing out to restrict access to Internet sites, as well as penalizing any news source that publishes such stories about him, but the scandals keep appearing.

The most logical sources of these leaks are (1) secularist political opponents(2) victims of Mr. Erdogan’s military purges, (3) persecuted journalists (4) angry businessmen, (5) supporters of Mr. Erdogan’s Islamist rival Fethullah Gülen, (6) Israel, (7) Iran, (8) Russia or (9) the United States.

(1) Secularist Turks have a strong motive to oppose Mr. Erdogan’sattempts to integrate Islam into Turkish politics.  They see the real threat of losing the social freedoms enjoyed by Turkish citizens that were bestowed upon them when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the modern secular Turkish state from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.

This “mole” has one key vulnerability:  he or she needs others inside the Turkish government tohelpeavesdrop and record the many sensitive and private conversationsand disseminate the information without incurring suspicion.  This group has motive and means but would have difficulty operating alone, without assistance from an outside player.

(2) Hundreds of Turkish military officers have been imprisoned by Mr.Erdogan’s over spurious coup-plotting conspiracy charges and have strong motives to expose the corruption of top AKP officials.  These officers have silent supporters within the Turkish military, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Intelligence Service (known by the acronym “MIT” in Turkish).

Those supporters could gain access to secure conversations, but leaking that information in the way it has been linked does not fall under usual Turkish military behavior.  Like civilian “moles”, Turkish military moles would most likely need to rely on an outside power for cover in exposing scandals.

(3) Many journalists and media outlets have a very strong motive to expose Mr. Erdogan’s corrupt circle but they are also especially vulnerable.  Mr. Erdogan’s government routinely seeks out, harasses and slaps ruinous fines against any media personality or source who dares to print unflattering depictions of Mr. Erdogan’s AK party.

Since the AK swoops in to punish those responsible at the moment a news organization reveals a scandal, it would be very difficult for any media outlet to report on more than one or two scandals without being silenced by Mr. Erdogan’s cronies.  Thus, while the media has strong motives to undercut Mr. Erdogan, each outlet’s cover is blown as soon as they publish their first article, making a sustained attack impossible.

(4) Turkish businessmen who see the threat posed by Mr. Erdogan’s policies to Turkish business dealings in Europe have a strong motive to drive the AK party from power.  These days, it seems impossible to conduct lucrative business in Turkey without paying off AK party officials.

Top businessmen also have the means to pay informants, but the risks of being detected and prosecuted by AKP-influenced courts, or beingassassinated, are so high that it seems unlikely any businessman would engage in such a dangerous game.  Therefore, the business community also effectively lacks the means to undermine AK party leadership.

(5) Supporters of self-exiled Islamist Fehullah Gülen have motive and means to expose scandals involving Mr. Erdogan.  Gülen’s supporters helped bring Mr. Erdogan to power through Gülen’s wide group of supporters in the Turkish police and judiciary.  Gülen understands how to put Mr. Erdogan in a tough political situation by linking him and his closest advisors to Iran.

If Mr. Erdogan publicly rejects Iran, he creates tension for himself at a time when he needs to avoid repudiating Muslim neighbors.  Gülenists have a strong motive and some means to expose such scandals involving Mr. Erdogan, but they have their own specific Islamic agenda that does not appeal to most secular Turks, the military or Westerners.

(6) The State of Israel has strong motive and means to gather and publicize recordings of secret AK party meetings.  Turkish-Israel military and intelligence cooperation throughout the 1990s have given Israel a clear understanding of Turkey’s intelligence sources and methods.  Israel can easily secretly record secret meetings and private phone conversations of AK party members.

The allegations that Mr. Erdogan’s inner circle includes agents of an Iranian terrorist group known as Tawhid Salam, put Mr. Erdogan in the awkward position of having to address the thorny issue of Iran and Shi’a Islam.   The AK party views Shi’a in general as inferior Muslims.  Also, these allegations come at a delicate time. as the AK party leaders plan to stage “false flag” attacks in Syria, which risks pitting Turkey against Iran due to close Syrian government links to Iran.

Tensions between Iran and Turkey are a source of major concern to Mr.Erdogan and these accusations must be handled very carefully.  These leaks create a major distraction for the AK party leadership and serve the Israeli foreign policy agenda on more than one level by not only undermining the AK party but also dragging Iran into the mix.

(7) The Government of Iran also has a strong motive to distract Mr. Erdogan and his party.  Iran is facing Turkish intervention in Syria, which poses a threat to one of Iran’s key client states. Additionally, Mr. Erdogan has publicly shown his total disdain for the Shi’a, most recently when he mocked the family of a young Shi’a boy killed by Turkish police during protests.

In spite of  the possible desire to see Erdogan removed from power as a motive, however, Iran would be unlikely to link the AK party to an Iranian terrorist group.  Additionally, it is highly doubtful that Iran could gain the means to access private meetings and telephone conversations inside Mr. Erdogan’s cabinet.

(8) The Government of Russia has motive and means to obtain secret and private information inside Turkey.  Possible motives include Turkey’s interference in Syria, distracting the Turkish government from focusing on the Turkic Tatars of Crimea, concern over the AK party’s future policies regarding the Russian access to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, or even simply the rise of an extremist Muslim government in a country of such geo-strategic importance.

That said, Turkey is simply too weak and disorganized to pose an immediate threat to Russia, which has its own crises in the Black Sea region.  It is also unlikely that Russia would want to involve itself in Turkey while dealing with the situation in Ukraine.  Russia has the means to engineer this sort of operation against the AK party if it sensed an immediate threat to Russian interests, but there seem to be other well-positioned players wiling to take care of the problem for now.

(9) The United States Government also has the means and motive to undermine Mr. Erdogan and his party.  In terms of means, the US helped install much of the intelligence gathering equipment in Turkey and has close, longstanding ties with secular Turks who see Mr. Erdogan as a threat to NATO interests and regional stability.  Additionally, the US special relationship with Israel puts the US at odds with many of Mr. Erdogan’spolicies.  It would not be the first time the US government spied for Israel.

At the same time, the US is so caught up with other crises of its own making, including meddling in Ukraine and advertising the endless and doomed Middle East Peace Process, that it really has no time to focus on Turkey.  The US has already devised policies to work around Turkey and various US media outlets are referring to Turkey as “already lost”.  At this point in time, it is unlikely the US would want to waste its resources attacking Mr. Erdogan when there are others, like Israel, who can do it instead

Of all these possible sources, I believe that Israel, working with Turkish officials concerned over Mr. Erdogan’s Islamist dictatorial ambitions and his Syria policy, is likely to be the main culprit behind these leaks. I cannot completely rule out sporadic opportunistic involvement from the US, Russia or Fethullah Gülen, but Israel arguably has the strongest motive and impressive means to carry out a sustained operation designed to create continuing unrest and problems for the Islamist AK party..

I base this in part on discussions with serving Turkish officials. I witnessed the iron-clad security cooperation between Turkey and Israel until relatively recently, and many Turkish officials and businessmen retain discreet ties to Israel.

Also, the very strange accusations linking AK party officials to an Iranian terrorist group seem beyond what the Obama administration would do in the current climate of seeking to reduce tensions with Iran.  In any case, Israel is the one player with enough understanding of Turkish security systems, sufficiently trustworthy friends and informants inside the Turkish government and driving motive to conduct a sustained media attack on Turkey’s AK party government.

Watching Mr. Erdogan try to hammer down each new scandal just in time to have another one pop up is almost as tiring as playing the Whack-A-Mole game in an arcade.  If Mr. Erdogan does not succeed in ending this game soon, he will face increasingly severe problems with Eastern and Western allies alike, not to mention a dire domestic backlash.

The trouble is that in the actual game, the only way to stop new “moles” from popping up is to unplug or destroy the game console itself.  In this case, let us hope that the game console represents the AK party, not the entire Turkish government and the citizens it represents.

Gwenyth Todd a former Adviser to President Clinton, expert in international security policy, she hold M.A from Georgetown University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“ 

We have seen relatively little coverage concerning important events in Turkey, Israel and Gaza, Egypt, Syria, Libya and the Persian Gulf that have barely reached the public long enough for them to even notice, let alone analyze.

In the midst of this shift in focus, there have been cunning efforts in the United States Congress to pass new sanctions against Iran, hoping that no one will notice because of Ukraine.   We have a saying in English: “While the cat’s away, the mice will play”, similar to the Russian phrase “Без кота мышам раздолье”.

It is no secret in any situation that the best way to accomplish something controversial or illegal is to create a diversion and then rush to commit your objectionable act while your opponents are looking away.  That is a ploy used by everyone from children trying to sneak candy while no parent is around, to criminals and terrorists who seek to get away with crimes and terror attacks.  It is also used so frequently by governments that those working on contentious issues frequently lie in wait for their opponents to become distracted, and then move quickly to take action.

I know from personal experience at the White House and Pentagon that even seasoned officials are sometimes caught off-guard by these brazen diversions.  Even after seeing this strategy used repeatedly, it still often works.

The most obvious diversion in which I was personally involved was during the 1998 Impeachment deliberations over President Clinton’s private dalliance with an intern.  Over the course of six weeks in the Autumn of 1998, while the US Congress and media spoke non-stop about bringing down President Clinton, I was ordered to create a diversion twice.

The first order was to oversee the coordination of an attack on Iraq over its non-cooperation with the United Nations weapons inspectors.  I did my job, everything was in place and everyone was “on board” so to speak.  Then suddenly I was informed, 15 minutes before the scheduled operation was to begin, that we were standing down.  Many US military officials and regional allies were furious at the sudden cancellation of the operation, and it required a lot of domestic and international diplomacy to calm everyone down.

I was thus left speechless when, two weeks later, I received the second order and had to inform the US military to prepare the whole operation again.  The senior military officials to whom I had to deliver these orders thought I was joking the second time around.  I wasn’t, and the final result was Operation Desert Fox.

It is difficult not to laugh when I read detailed, elaborate articles on what Operation Desert Fox was really about and what it accomplished.  I invite you to consider these writings: this one and that one.

I do not know these authors personally, but their articles demonstrate that the diversion worked, in that I see no mention of how this fabricated military crisis affected the public’s views with regard to President Clinton’s impeachment proceedings.

If I had not been responsible for coordinating the operation, I would have never believed a government would go to such lengths to distract attention intentionally from other problems.  The simple reality is, however, that it is a tried and true tactic that frequently succeeds, so no one should be surprised to see it being used today with regard to Ukraine.

 The events in Ukraine are clearly of interest to the US, Russia and the rest of Europe (in spite of the US Assistant Secretary of State’s widely publicized statement “f%#k the EU”).  The debate is genuine among global leaders who rightly see the potential for developments in Ukraine to affect their own interests.

The reality that very little can be done by outside players other than Russia only adds to the frenzy of rhetoric and meetings as the situation unfolds, with few actually expecting this frenetic activity to alter the future course of events.

The objective is to register displeasure and not be seen to be doing nothing, regardless of whether it changes events on the ground.  Thus the US Congress has been working frantically to show their concern by passing a Ukrainan relief bill.  What such a bill would actually accomplish is immaterial.  It simply needs to be passed as a public token of US support.

 The real problem is that, while everyone is focused on watching events in Ukraine, those who should be closely monitoring other areas of interest and potential conflict are distracted.  I recently commented to a serving Middle East adviser in the USG on matters involving the Middle East that I found it appalling that the only thing anyone, including those who were supposed to be monitoring the Middle East, is focused on is Ukraine.  Here is part of the reply I received:

 “You may think there are all manner of issues going on in the region and you are right these issues don’t change.  Egypt is having an election, and people are being arrested. The Syrian war goes bloodily on.  The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are failing, as expected by many.

Problems in Bahrain are arguably worsening, and perhaps the only new development is this spat between Saudi, Bahrain and UAE and Qatar which seems to be advertising a rift within the Gulf Cooperation Council.   Those who expected the GCC to unite against Iran may be proved wrong.  At least the problem in Ukraine gives us something new to think about, other than the depressing sameness.”

 Clever Israeli lobbyists in Washington realize that US Middle East specialists are weary and easily distracted by a a crisis like the one involving Ukraine.  These Israeli lobbyists have been quick to seize the moment to try to slip additional contentious new Iran sanctions past lawmakers through adding them to an attachment sponsored by Senators Kirk and Menendez.

If Israel can somehow slip this language past the public by adding it quietly onto an unrelated bill, the new sanctions could become law before anyone noticed.  The most odious of these recent attempts occurred when those supporting new Iran sanctions attached those sanctions to a bill which provides for the funding of US veterans’ benefits.

The callousness and cruelty of holding US veterans’ interests hostage to the anti-Iran agenda of the powerful lobby American-Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC) crossed the line as far as what most Americans will tolerate and was even satirized in the widely-watched, US political comedy program “The Daily Show With John Stewart.”

 There were still plenty of other bills to which the Kirk-Menedez anti-Iran language could be attached.  But  then there was a new development:  the US Congress proposed a Ukraine relief bill, a bill that few if any anti-Russian Republican hawks in the US Congress would dare try to block.  Suddenly,  AIPAC’s previously unquestioned support for its plan to attach Iran sanctions to every bill possible faced opposition from its strongest advocate, Senator John McCain, and others seemed to be wavering.

 Al Monitor summed up some of reactions to this attempt among key Republican AIPAC supporters to add the anti-Iran Kirk-Menedez language to the Ukrainian relief bill:

 “I would do anything we can do to get Iran sanctions, so I would say almost every vehicle that’s out there should include that,” Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla., the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services panel, told Al-Monitor. “I think it’s a good idea. The discussion [among Republicans] is going on right now.” (Al-Monitor)

 “I’ve tried to attach [Iran] sanctions to every bill; yes, it does make sense,” said Sen. James Risch, R-Idaho, the No. 2 Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations panel.”  Still, he worried about the possibility of derailing aid to Ukraine by forcing an unrelated issue.   “I don’t know how bad it’s going to throw a wrench in the works,” he said. “I’m not ready to see yea, nay or where we are.” (Al Monitor)

 Then AIPAC discovered that it really had gone too far when right-wing hawks Senator John McCain and Senator Lindsay Graham spoke:

 “I want to get it [the Ukraine relief bill] done,” said Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., the second-most senior Republican on the Armed Services panel. “If somebody has IMF, Iran sanctions or anything else as a higher priority, then they’ve got their priorities badly skewed.” (Al-Monitor)

 “Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who has taken the lead in pushing for a vote, agreed. “I don’t want to give anybody a reason not to support the Ukraine … bill,” he said.” (Al-Monitor)

 Those, like AIPAC, who bank on passing controversial legislation and undertaking other dubious actions while decision makers are distracted, are frequently rewarded.  In this case, however, it appears that being seen to counter Russia is far more important than challenging Iran or blindly supporting Israel.  This is likely no surprise to Russia, but in Israel’s case, it would be enough to send many key players into a panic.

 After hearing the above quotes from Senators McCain and Graham, AIPAC is likely relieved that President Obama even renewed existing Iran sanctions for another year during the past week.  And yet still, while Israel may have had its efforts to ratchet up sanctions against Iran derailed by events in Ukraine, they will not give up.

Anti-Iranian, pro-Jewish pundits have already begun sounding the alarm trying to link Iran to the tragic and mysterious disappearance of Malaysian Airways Flight 370.  But at least Israel now knows that even its staunchest supporters in the US Senate can no longer be relied upon unconditionally, even when they are distracted.

Gwenyth Todd a former Adviser to President Clinton, expert in international security policy, she hold M.A from Georgetown University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“ 

Perhaps Mr. Erdogan really thought he could help the Palestinians, but the flotilla debacle seemed to fall neatly into a pattern of broader efforts to attract attention to himself as the only Muslim leader ready to take real action to challenge the Israelis’ disgraceful treatment of the Palestinians.  If so, it was an effective start, but it needed a follow-up beyond merely repeating the flotilla disaster.  That particular drama played out to Mr. Erdogan’s advantage in terms of burnishing his anti-Zionist, Islamic credentials, even if the Palestinians gained little or nothing from the action-packed, high-seas Mavi Marmara drama.

Mr. Erdogan needed to place Turkey in a position of power along Israel’s land border if he was going to progress in the eyes of the Islamic community as a true savior of the Palestinians.  This required finding a government among the “confrontation states” along Israel’s border that would be willing to forget the dreaded Ottoman legacy and ignore the perception of Turkish discrimination against and sense of superiority over Arabs.  The problem was that given Turkey’s widely perceived disregard for Arabs, it would be political suicide for any sitting Arab government to allow Mr. Erdogan and Turkey that much credit, access and power.  Therefore, Mr. Erdogan needed to find a sitting Arab government to replace with a regime loyal and indebted to Turkey.  Enter Syria.

Unfortunately, just as the USA did not consider the welfare of Iraq’s people in deposing Saddam Hussein in Iraq and attempting to establish a base from which to harass Iran, Mr. Erdogan’s government seems prepared to fight Assad’s regime to the last innocent Syrian, of any religion, ethnic group or sect, in order to establish a base on Israel’s border.  Over 140,000 have died thus far, by some estimates, and the carnage continues.  Mr. Erdogan, meanwhile, has also caused a small crisis in Saudi Arabia.  The world has watched a panicked Saudi government try to prevent Mr. Erdogan’s meteoric rise as a Muslim leader by seeking to take over as the lead champion of the Syrian rebels after the fact.   The result has not only failed miserably in terms of the Saudi image but may well have helped further strengthen radical terrorists in Syria who could eventually become a threat to even the Saudi regime.

Amidst all this, while the Saudis look alternately feckless and extremist, Mr. Erdogan is being touted as the savior of Syria’s populace.  In light of the positive press portraying Mr. Erdogan as a peacemaker, it should come as no surprise that Mr. Erdogan seems bent upon secretly undermining peace talks that do not favor his intended future Syrian candidates.  If Mr. Erdogan were to succeed in convincing the West to do his dirty work for him and replace Assad with a Turkish-backed puppet regime on Israel’s border, it would be the ultimate triumph for Mr. Erdogan as a true modern-day Muslim Caliph.

The irony of the threat Mr. Erdogan poses to established Arab Muslim leaders in Saudi Arabia might be excusable, or even ridiculous, if so many Syrians were not suffering.  Mr. Erdogan’s egomaniacal ambition to triumph as The Muslim Leader already has caused over 140,000 deaths and risks pitting Europe and the US against Russia and Iran, and destabilizing Saudi Arabia while distracting attention from continuous Israeli annexation of Palestinian land.  It is a sad state of affairs for all concerned, except Mr. Erdogan, who is basking in the attention and, most appallingly, for hard-core, anti-Arab Zionists, who have carte blanche to act as they please amidst the Syrian chaos.

Gwenyth Todd a former Adviser to President Clinton, expert in international security policy, she hold M.A from Georgetown University, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“