New Eastern Outlook » Elena Dunaeva

Results of the Astrakhan Summit of Caspian States

Елена Дунаева — Thu, 09 Oct 2014 01:00:38 +0000

The fourth summit of Caspian states, which ended with the signing of the Joint Declaration by the Presidents of the 5 countries, as well as communiques and three agreements governing interactions between Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan on the Caspian Sea, was a significant step towards the development of the legal status of this body of water.

Attempts to develop a five-nation Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea as a basic document defining issues of jurisdiction over the water area and the bottom, principles of the production of hydrocarbon resources, their transportation routes to world markets, as well as issues of navigation, the use of biological resources of the sea, environmental protection, security, the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking, have been underway for over 20 years now. The process of conciliation has been slow. And here at the Astrakhan Summit they managed to formulate the basic principles that will form the basis of the Convention, which could be signed as soon as 2015, stated the Russian President. The Heads of States, due to increasing security threats in the region in the areas of military, politics, economy, and ecology have shown a willingness to compromise in the search for joint solutions.

Iranian leadership considers the Caspian area one of the priorities of its foreign policy. Nevertheless it is still the Iranian position on the division of the sea that has been the stumbling block in the way of the agreements, Tehran was actively involved in the negotiation process and on a number of matters its approaches to the problems of security, navigation, fishing, protection of biological resources, strengthening of information and cultural humanitarian contacts were close to Russian.

Iranian President Rouhani, summing up the meeting in Astrakhan, as achievements of the summit stressed the importance of the principles enshrined in the policy statement of equal treatment of the security of all the states and their compliance with the principle of “reasonable sufficiency” in the performance of military operations. Iran has been supporting the demilitarization of the Caspian Sea and the agreements reached are considered a step towards curbing the arms race and achieving stability. Iran gives particular importance to the absence of extra-regional forces in the Caspian Sea.

Iran’s interests correspond with those enshrined in the statement of the principle of free access from the Caspian Sea to other seas and oceans.

The Iranian leadership believes that an important step towards the development of the Convention is an agreement by the states on the allocation of 15-mile zones of national jurisdiction and the 10-mile national fishing zones, while maintaining most of the water surface for common use. It is known that Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan reached an agreement on the division of the northern part of the sea on the basis of a modified median line. Turkmenistan as a whole is ready to support this position. Iran has repeatedly stated that it is strongly against such a principle of the division, as it does not meet its national interests, and has proposed dividing the Caspian Sea on the basis of equal shares. Iranian leadership has stated that it is also ready to support the idea of sharing the sea. The idea of fair, equitable access to all the riches of the sea, with full freedom of navigation and decision-making by all countries and reliance on international law was voiced by the president of Iran.

The Head of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in order to achieve greater interaction suggested the establishment by the five states of joint structure that would coordinate information activities involved in the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism, and also conducted many activities aimed at the development of the Caspian region. This idea is correlated with the proposals of Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, who declared the need to create common structures for economic cooperation or a free trade zone. However, the Iranian side proposes that the solution to all the most pressing issues in the region, including environmental ones, be combined in a single center. Tehran, as the initiator of the signing of the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea, constantly raises the question of the real environmental security in the development of the industrial resources in the sea. It expressed support for the idea of developing a mechanism to monitor compliance with the ban on sturgeon fishing and step up the fight against poaching.

The Government of moderate liberal H. Rouhani appears ready to implement all the agreements reached and to move towards further rapprochement. Iran’s expert circles are talking about the possibility of departing from the idea of percentage shares on the condition of adhering to international standards in the division and taking into account the specifics of the passage of the shoreline. However, in Iran the parliamentary rostrum has expressed other opinions, which seriously hampers the works of the diplomatic corps. Some political forces demand that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seek control over 50% of the bottom and water area. H. Rouhani’s opponents fear that during slowing nuclear talks with the G5+1, the president may get carried too far in the “Eastern” direction and be pressured by Russia, which is willing to conclude with Iran important economic agreements, into principal concessions on the Caspian Sea.

Over the past year, Russia and Iran have stepped up cooperation in the political sphere and are making efforts to expand economic and mutually beneficial contacts, which was noted by the Presidents of the two countries at a meeting on the sidelines of the summit. Opportunities for their co-operation include the Caspian region, and it is likely that the joint efforts for the implementation of development projects can be an incentive to adjust their positions and move toward further rapprochement.

Elena Dunayeva, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Pakistan Institute for Near and Middle East Studies, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Iran: Government Course on Foreign Policy and Concerns about the Opposition

Елена Дунаева — Fri, 23 May 2014 20:30:40 +0000

While the IRI delegation continues the consultation with group 5+1 on the settling of an agreement on the universal regulation of the Iranian nuclear programme and the removal of sanctions, forces within the country have mobilised against these negotiations.

Since the earliest days of H. Rouhani’s arrival, the government has revealed a firm intention to refuse the aggressive policy of M. Ahmadinejad and to follow a more measured, realistic course of action, named “heroic liberalisation” . Foreign policy authorities, having received a mandate from their leader to activate negotiations with the West regarding the lifting of sanctions with the aim of improving the economic situation, have successfully started this task off in several directions at once: via negotiations with the 5+1 group and MAGATE, tentative establishment of contacts in the US, the rebuilding of links lost during M. Ahmadinejad’s term in power with the Gulf States, the consolidation of relations with Russian and China, participation in the regulation of the Syrian issue and the activation of Iran’s role in Afghanistan.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. J. Zarif, who succeeded in bringing the “nuclear question” out of the control of the Supreme National Security Council, led the negotiation process himself and managed in a very short time to get an agreement signed in Geneva i., much to the delight of the Iranian people as a whole. However, representatives from a radical conservative wing who previously controlled practically all branches of power and still retain a strong position within the countrys power structure have openly expressed their dissatisfaction with the development of events. These forces, based around the IRGC and security organs, have received significant dividends from the sanctioned regime and under the former president had control over a considerable part of the country’s economics. Naturally, the new government’s policy, directed towards the de-escalation of relations with the West, attracting foreign investors and returning European firms, and at the same time limiting the action of companies linked to the IRGC, represents a threat to the political and econimical elite formed under M. Ahmadinejad. Having understood that the success of negotiations will lead to the strengthening of the position of measured and pro-reformative powers, the radicals have embarked on a mission to discredit the new president.

Immediately after the signing of the Geneva Agreement, which in radical circles they are calling the Turkmanchay Contract ii., the government was reproached by radical forces for its readiness to concede to the West, its rejection of the country’s achievements in the nuclear sphere and its legal right to the accumulation of uranium, and also of its betrayal of national interests and abandonment of the prinicipals of the Islamic Revolution. M. J. Zarif has become an object of constant attack from the conservative wing within the Majlis. They regularly call him to account and accuse him of exceeding his authority, of excessive compliance, of leading non-transparent negotiations, of recognising the “holocaust”. The radicals are undertaking attempts to once again seize control of the negotiation process, increase the number of negotiators at the expense of representatives of other organs of power, and to return the “nuclear dossier” once more into the hands of the Supreme National Security Council. Their goal is not to allow any cut-backs to the nuclear and military programme which, in their opinion, could be a consequence of negotiations with 5+1.

The organisation “The Front of Fidelity to the Islamic Revolution” (Paydari), created in 2001, has become the organisational structure for the radical wing, having its own faction in the Majlis. Within its ranks are former ministers, leaders of higher and middle rank – associates of M. Ahmadinejad, who rely on the support of one of the representatives of the higher Shiite clergy from an extremely radical sect; Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi. The head of the Supervisory Committee Ayatollah A. Jannati is also an active leader of the radical line. This political spectre still controls the radio and television organsiation IRI and a whole host of central newspapers, which gives it plenty of opportunity to criticise the government and propagate its own views.

The radicals find support in the traditional circles in towns and villages. However, their main driving force comes from members of the “Basij” movement acting under the leadership of the IRGC. “Basiji” organise acts of protest, demonstrations, and distribute information and cds which are criticial of the government. Members of the “student Basij” in Tehran have initiated a new group “Worried about the Geneva Agreement”, the formation of which was announced at a conference on May 3rd held on the territory of the former American Embassy. Participants announced that the negotiations had led to “Iran’s centrifugal forces beginning to spin in the opposite direction”, and that H. Rouhani “is suspending the process of accumulating uranium every ten years” iii and is creating “scientific apartheid” iv. Although the spiritual leader clearly spoke out in support of the negotiators, such slogans as “Death to the Сompromisers” have been heard. The organisers of the protest movement have actively implanted the idea that the Geneva negotiations are aimed at the weakening of the country and should be viewed as attempts to sabotage the foundations of the Islamic regime.

It is without doubt that the radicals, seeking to retun to power, are beginning a fight for votes in the elections for the Majlis and the Council of Experts due to take place in February 2016. First of all they will strengthen criticism of the government, then seek to turn the Parlament and other governmental and religious structures against H. Rouhani’s moderate political line, and furthermore put pressure on the spiritial leader to limit the power of the negotiators.

However, any delay to the negotiations or backing out on the part of Iran from its accepted responsibilities will impede mutual understanding between the parties, strengthen the worries of the West about the possibility of the radical circles return to power and lead to the increase of mistrust towards Iran among the international community and to the refusal to lift sanctions. It could maybe even summon a return to the days of forceful means to solve problems such as these. Such a development of events is not in Russia’s interests, having invested itself not insignificantly in the achievement of progress in these negotiations and demonstrating an interest in increasing cooperation with the IRI, especially in the economic sphere, which will lead to the strengthening of the two states in the region.

i. According to the agreements; the responsibilities, which the Iranian party is taking on will not be declared until the binding document has been signed.

ii. A contract drawn up in 1827 at the end of the second Russo-Iranian war by which land formerly belonging to Kadzhar Iran was transferred to Russia. It is still viewed in Iran today as the most enslaving of all contracts. Even the word ‘Turkmanchay’ in Persian is associated with collapse and ruin.

iii. In 2003 H. Rouhani, future leader of the Supreme National Security Council, led negotiations with representatives from Great Britain, France and Germany about the IRI joining the additional protocol of the NPT, during the course of which Iran took on the resposibility of stopping the process of accumulating uranium.

iv. For more details follow this link: http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930213001435

Elena Dunaeva, doctoral candidate of historical science, former member of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Science (RAN), written on request for the internet journal “New Eastern Outlook”.