In September 2021 it was announced that in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions emerged a new military bloc composed of Australia, the United States and Britain. This event caused a resounding international response, marking a milestone in the ongoing restructuring of international relations.   Many analysts saw the new military bloc as a prototype of an Asian NATO directed against China, while others said that the new alliance shows that the “old” NATO is no longer of much concern to the United States and they are shifting their efforts from the Atlantic to the Pacific.  This version also looks quite convincing because, as a result, the Australians turned down a multi-billion dollar contract to buy submarines from France, and “following the advice” of the Americans decided to build eight nuclear submarines based on US designs.  France’s protests went nowhere and, according to a White House spokesman, the emergence of AUKUS is in the strategic interest of the three countries “to promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.” It was also stressed that the creation of a new military bloc was not directed against “any particular country.”

It is clear that all these words are void of any significance and only cover up aggressive plans, not only against China, but also against Russia. Incidentally, ASEAN also risks becoming another victim of the new military bloc, which was left out of the decision-making process on the new military alliance, when the member countries of the Association were simply confronted with a fait accompli. Their reactions to the emergence of AUKUS have at times been diametrically opposed, which could pose a real threat to the unity of the bloc.

On the one hand, there is a restrained but clearly negative reaction from Indonesia. “It is of concern that the new cooperation allows Australia to possess submarines as well as Tomahawk missiles,” said Abdul Kadir Jailani, director general for APAC and Africa at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. He also pointed out that this circumstance fuels the anxiety of neighboring countries, and this, in the end, may increase the risk of an arms race in the region. In his view, AUKUS also ignores the obligations of the respective states (meaning the United States and the United Kingdom) related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is about the existing gaps in the Treaty, which does not stipulate the use of nuclear fuel for military purposes other than weapons themselves, the Indonesian diplomat said. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has stated that AUKUS could cause IPR tensions, an arms race, and lead to a Cold War.

Vietnam has taken a slightly different stance than Indonesia on the military bloc. For example, Vice President of the Vietnam Diplomatic Academy Nguyen Hong Son noted that the US, Britain, and Australia should have discussed the AUKUS partnership with ASEAN, since the agreement of these three states is relevant to Southeast Asia. “The immediate effect is the sense that the US and even the UK have a long-term commitment in IPR,” he stressed, and also pointed out that “ASEAN on the other hand should ask itself why this agreement arose in relation to ASEAN territory and without the knowledge of ASEAN.” At the same time, the Vietnamese diplomat made a “curtsey” towards the US and admitted that “AUKUS is a tool of the three countries to strengthen their influence in Southeast Asia against the threat of China’s aggressiveness”.

The generally negative attitude of Indonesia and Vietnam toward AUKUS was also supported by Malaysia, whose Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob voiced his concern that AUKUS might provoke other forces to act more aggressively in the South China Sea. Singapore, on the other hand, believes that the agreement can contribute to peace and stability in the region. The Philippines also believes that this agreement can balance China’s power in the IPR. Philippines Foreign Minister Teodoro Locsin noted that strengthening the capabilities of the closest foreign allies should restore and maintain the balance of power rather than upset it. He welcomed the strengthening of the military power of ASEAN’s close friends and allies to counter threats to the region or attempts to disrupt the status quo.

From all of the above, we can conclude that the emergence of a new military bloc was unexpected for ASEAN. No one there expected the situation in the region to change so quickly.  There is still no common ASEAN position on AUKUS, and it is unclear whether such will appear at all.  The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that ASEAN unity is becoming increasingly phantom, and that Russia should not expect to be able to rely on the Association in the struggle for peace and stability in the region, despite all the assurances of local leaders.

Dmitry Mosyakov, Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Director of the Centre for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The events occurring in Burma, where numerous street demonstrations have not subsided against the military, which took power into its own hands on February 1, 2021, continue to attract intense attention. The fact is that although a change from civilian to military power has taken place, it is absolutely unclear how events will further develop: whether the military will be able to retain power or, under the pressure of mass demonstrations and a split in its own ranks, Aung San Suu Kyi and her party members will return to power.

So far, the situation has been characterized by the fact that President Win Myint and Aung San Suu Kyi, the president of the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) party who served as both minister of foreign affairs and state counselor, as well as hundreds of functionaries and activists with the ruling party, remain under arrest. But on the other hand, the scale of, and bitterness marking, the protests against the military are only increasing.

Many of those observing the Burmese political process believe that the situation is reoccurring which developed after the so-called democratic revolution of 1989, when, after the impressive victory the NLD had had in the general elections, the party was banned and removed from power by the military, and all public speeches in support of it were suppressed extremely brutally.  The military, led by Senior General Than Shwe, either arrested, exiled to isolated, hard-to-reach places, or even simply shot almost all those who were disaffected, and for decades made sure that they had complete power.

But the similarity between the current coup and the one back then is actually purely superficial, since Burmese society has changed a great deal over the time since 1989. This has been particularly noticeable recently, when the military agreed to cede power to the civilian government. Western countries and the United States repealing the sanctions that the military regime lived with for decades paved the way for foreign investment and technologies that poured into the country from Japan, the United States, China, and ASEAN countries. A real economic boom began in Burma, one in which the growth rate for national GDP over the last several years has remained at the level of 5-7%. Due to the increase in the level of the country’s national wealth, small- and medium-sized businesses started to spring up, new industrial organizations appeared, and trade turnover, the standard of living, and the level of consumption have risen noticeably. Since 2011, per capita income has grown from 900 to 1,600 USD. Riding on the wave of the economic changes, the position held by the NLD has become reinforced, and it attributes all these successes to how correct its policy is. This party, having become dominant, managed to create its own cells throughout the country, and its activists were fully prepared for the struggle for power with the support of the most educated and prosperous among the population.

So in contrast to 1989, when the NLD had no other resources apart from the enthusiasm of the masses, today everything is different – it has a powerful organizational structure, opinion leaders, authorities in many provinces, media outlets – newspapers, radio, television, the sympathies of journalists and even lobbying power – all on its side. This means that the Burmese army and its generals are facing a serious adversary that may well continue to fight for power, notwithstanding arrests and even executions.

Even now many people, seeing the inability of the army to suppress the resistance from the NLD by military force, are beginning to express doubts about whether the army, which has always been viewed as the core and organization that backs the Burmese state system, will be able to retain power. Indeed, to accomplish this goal the military took control of the situation in the country into its own hands, since they knew that a program was already on the table for the NLD leaders to change the constitution – setting up a so-called “democratic transition” – that means sidelining the army and its representatives from the real government for good. Within the country for quite a few years opponents of the military have created so-called “fields of tension”, when under the influence and with the direct participation of Western non-profit organizations (NGOs) a “civil society” was formed in the country as an alternative to the military in power.

Starting to revise the constitution and removing the military from power was supposed to be a convincing victory for the NLD in the elections. In the November 2020 elections, the ruling party managed to achieve that. But the military, closely following the course of the election campaign and the voting, stated that the most serious violations, rigging, and falsification were committed in the process, and therefore the election results should not be deemed legitimate.  NLD supporters naturally disagreed with this, and refused to accept the validity of what the military was asserting. In the situation that has arisen, the army’s leadership only had two paths: to challenge the elections in court, and prove that numerous violations and fraud had occurred, or to take power into their own hands to prevent from being removed from power and the “democratic transition” from taking place.

It is worth noting that the military did not put forth any groundless allegations, but collected a mountain of evidence attesting to the violations, and expected that the court would be on their side. But that did not happen, which only serves to validate just how popular the NLD and its ideas are among the ruling civilian elite. In response to the failure to satisfy its statement of case, army leadership was forced to seize power. As current events show, the longer the army stays in power, the more fierce the internal political struggle gets, and the more unachievable the compromise becomes that should be reached among the ruling elite.

It is obvious that today the situation in the country is at an obvious dead end, and the military, headed by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, is running up against an extremely urgent issue: what should it do next, in the face of stiff resistance from the Burmese society that absolutely does not want to do a U-turn back to the reality present from 1980s to the early 2000s? For most people, this time is associated with poverty, incompetence, the omnipotence of the military bureaucracy, and subordination to the strict rules imposed by the military.

In order to somehow reassure the country’s population, the military has already announced that parliamentary elections will definitely be held in the country in a year. However, it’s not yet clear which parties will make it to them. In the meantime, the new regime is trying in every possible way to block access to the Internet, and to shut down news channels and social media networks. It is doubtful that it will succeed at doing this, and most likely the military will agree to once again officially ban the NLD. But then nobody would recognize the upcoming elections in a year as legitimate, and various sanctions from abroad would immediately ensue.

However, on the other hand, a sensible politician and military leader like Min Aung Hlaing understands that he should not hand power over to the liberals, even on terms that have been agreed upon. There is no doubt that the NLD, without the support of the military, will not be able to cope with the long-established armies fielded by numerous ethnic minorities like the Chin, Kachin, Mon, Shan, and Karen peoples, who are just waiting for right time to resume the civil war. In addition, it is not clear whether the democrats will be able to keep the drug lords in check and prevent the next “golden triangle” from being reincarnated in the Burmese northeast.

So both the military who came to power and the democrats who were ousted from power face a very difficult choice – one on which the country’s future depends. The chance to reach a compromise has not been lost yet. In addition, to resolve the conflict, a third force has to be involved, and namely representatives of the reputable Buddhist sangha in the country. The main thing now is to revive the dialogue among Burmese in society that has been lost, and allow both sides to find a way to save the country.

Dmitry Mosyakov, Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Director of the Centre for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The US-China standoff in South-East Asia threatens to turn into a more dangerous, on the brink of an open war, confrontation: The US has announced that it intends to deploy “high-precision missiles with enhanced survivability” along China’s eastern maritime border.  This project, prepared by the US Indo-Pacific Command, provides for the deployment in the coming years of short- and medium-range land-based high-precision missiles without nuclear warheads on Taiwan, the Philippines and the Japanese island of Okinawa.

Pentagon officials explain the need for this step by saying that “without a thorough and credible conventional deterrent, China will have the courage to take action in the region and on the international stage to supplant US interests”. In order to prevent this, the US military, in addition to high-precision missiles, is going to deploy the so-called second echelon of deterrence — install air defense systems in the western Pacific Ocean — on islands stretching from southeastern Japan to Guam and Indonesia. The US military is also planning a radical change in the way it deploys troops, moving toward a strategy of dispersal in active cooperation with allies and partners. This would allow the US military presence in the Indo-Pacific region to be deployed everywhere, rather than concentrating it on a few key bases as it is now. Large forces clustered in one place are vulnerable to a preemptive missile strike in the event of an open conflict with China.

To implement all these plans, the Pentagon is asking the US Congress for additional funding, and the cost of the entire “deterrence” program is now estimated by the US military at more than $27 billion.  Without this money, as Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, said in a speech at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington think tank, “within the next six years, China could try to change the status quo in the region”.

It is hard to doubt that US lawmakers will remain deaf to the Pentagon’s pleas, especially given the fact that Joe Biden’s first major foreign policy document, the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, identifies China as the principal global adversary of the United States.  This document states that China is “the only rival that can combine its economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to erect sustainable obstacles to a stable and open international system”. On the basis of this document, the administration of Joe Biden plans by the end of this year to prepare a new US National Security Strategy, which will replace the one that was developed under President Donald Trump in December 2017.

But already today we can say that not all of Trump’s “legacy” will be thrown into the “trash dump of history”.  A key project such as the construction of the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) with a core of four countries – the United States, Japan, Australia and India – proposed by the US administration back in 2017 to “contain the PRC,” is now experiencing a “second birth”.   On March 12, 2021, the leaders of the United States, India, Japan and Australia had their first-ever video conversation. Prior to that, the so-called Quartet met regularly only at the working level and at the level of foreign ministers, and the March 12 talks were evidence that, despite the departure of President Trump from the political arena, the project he founded continues to develop. And with the same goals and in the same direction as before — strengthening military cooperation between the four countries in order to “contain China.  Jake Sullivan, assistant to the US President for National Security, said this frankly at a briefing for journalists at the White House after talks between the four leaders. He noted that “the four leaders did discuss the challenge that China poses”. And they made it clear that none of them have any illusions about China”.

All of this implies that threats to China’s security will inevitably increase in the coming years, which will naturally cause Beijing to retaliate, which in turn will be forced to further strengthen its position, build new bulk islands in the South China Sea and deploy missile systems and air force and naval bases there.  This will inevitably trigger a new arms race in East and Southeast Asia, and the region itself will increasingly become a potential new “hot spot” divided by the “red lines” drawn in Washington and Beijing.

In such circumstances, the plan for the integration of ASEAN countries into the Indo-Pacific space is of particular relevance. It was adopted in June 2019 at the summit in Bangkok and is aimed at expanding not military but economic ties, at the need to develop primarily economic cooperation, to form a new global free trade zone, to include in its membership states that wish to participate in it, including China.  However, it is very doubtful that under current conditions, the ASEAN initiatives will be able to reverse the trend towards the formation of a military-political bloc in the IPR, directed against China. In this regard, Russia, which is also strongly opposed to the formation of a new military bloc based on the IPR, can support the efforts of ASEAN countries to reformat the IPR project from a military and anti-Chinese one to an economic and global one. This will strengthen Russia’s authority and credibility throughout the region.

Dmitry Mosyakov, Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Director of the Centre for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

“We see that, with the changing world order, the rivalry between the current centers of power continues to intensify and so does the battle for leadership in the future.  Unfortunately, the threat posed by the novel Coronavirus has not reduced these geopolitical tensions, exacerbating them instead. We would like to reiterate that, from our point of view, the COVID-19 pandemic has become an additional catalyst speeding up these changes…”

The aforementioned statement, made by Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergei Ryabkov, describes very accurately the way the situation is shaping up in the South China Sea (SCS). And even during the spread of the novel Coronavirus throughout the world, which, to some degree or another, has had an impact on all the nations of the SCS, the situation in the region is becoming more volatile and tense. Washington’s actions are especially alarming as US Navy ships, in great numbers, sail throughout the South China Sea.  Recently, clearly with the aim of provoking China, amphibious assault ship USS America, guided-missile cruiser Bunker Hill and destroyer USS Barry sailed in the SCS. They were accompanied by Royal Australian Navy’s frigate HMAS Parramatta. According to the US Department of Defense, the American vessels and their Australian ally were not flexing muscles but conducting “combined exercises”.

Amid tensions that have arisen as a result of the confrontation between the two global powers, the United States and China, which is also unfolding in the South China Sea, policies that Vietnam, the most influential nation in the region, is following and its response to the ongoing events are all of the utmost important.  After all, the stance that Vietnam, with its powerful military, decides to take will have a substantial impact on the way the conflict will proceed and whether it will lead to a new full-blown war.

Naturally, there is no point in comparing the might of Vietnam People’s Navy with that of People’s Liberation Army Navy or of US naval forces, nevertheless, it is clear that Hanoi is certainly capable of defending its interests and of inflicting considerable losses on its enemy during an armed conflict. As for the policy in relation to the South Chine Sea confrontation, the Vietnamese leadership has decided to act responsibly and preserve peace and stability by attempting to resolve the ongoing confrontation by peaceful means only.

In fact, the chosen path forms the basis of Vietnam’s foreign policy. Another important aspect of its external policy course is Hanoi’s willingness to depend on partners from afar in order to confront foes closer by, a strategy that has worked for it in the past. During the war against the United States, Vietnam’s ally “from further afield” was the USSR, which, later on, in 1979, fully fulfilled its obligations towards Vietnam.  At present, Washington is seeking to partner with this Southeast Asian country, which it has been actively collaborating with in the economic and defense spheres. Still, Vietnam clearly understands there are limits to such cooperation, which, nonetheless, from the perspective of maintaining a certain balance of power and interests as far as Hanoi is concerned, plays an important role. The nation needs to exercise caution as it develops closer ties with the US. After all, Washington is capable of using the current situation to its advantage, in particular, by pressuring the Communist party and government leaders to adopt a tougher stance towards the PRC and to cooperate even more closely with Washington in the defense and security sphere.

Vietnam’s complex policy in the South China Sea also entails full involvement of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member states in order to encourage stability and reduce volatility in the SCS region.  In this regard, much hope rests on the signing of the South China Sea Code of Conduct in the future. Drafting of the document has taken a long time, clearly due to difficulties encountered in the process. Still, Vietnam has consistently advocated for its completion and adoption.

Hanoi deems it crucial to cooperate with other powerful nations in Asia and outside of the region, which can also help ease the tensions in the South China Sea.  The author is referring to India, Australia, Japan and Russia, countries that Vietnam is currently enjoying a high level of cooperation with.  Their political and economic involvement in the SCS state of affairs can tip the balance towards peace and stability.

As we can see, Vietnam’s policies in the South China Sea are in many ways aimed at the internationalization of the conflict and its resolution via a collaboration with regional and global powers as well as international organizations. All of these efforts, in large part, are playing a decisive role in preserving peace and preventing a full-blown war from breaking out in the region.  It is impossible not to commend the Vietnamese leadership for its perseverance as it continues to follow a path towards peace despite all the challenges, such as pressures from within and provocations from without.  Key provisions of this policy course are included in many documents. They are described in especially great detail in the famous joint statement, issued at the end of the visit by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam to Russia in September 2018. According to this document, both parties were united in their belief “that every dispute, including territorial, border and other ones in the Asia-Pacific region” had to be “resolved peacefully without resorting to force or the threat of using force, including through the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to support peace and stability as well as free and safe sea and air navigation in the region”. The joint statement also said that Russia and Vietnam supported and advocated “the full observance of the Declaration on Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea”, and spoke in favor of a prompt adoption of this Code of Conduct of the parties as a legally binding document. In addition, both sides agreed that international security had to “be comprehensive and indivisible, based on the principle that a country” could not achieve security with acts detrimental to that of others, and “that maintaining peace, stability” and mutual trust were “the basic factors in securing stability and development in the Asia-Pacific region”.

Since the release of the statement, events that greatly increased volatility in the South China Sea and made a full-blown conflict, at times, seem inevitable have occurred in the region.  Despite facing the toughest challenges, the Vietnamese leadership has managed to stay true to its core policy of promoting peace and stability, thus demonstrating their full commitment to preventing conflict, easing tensions and finding a just resolution to existing disputes.  Such a stance makes Vietnam one of key guarantors of peace and stability nowadays in the South China Sea region.

Dmitry Mosyakov, Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Director of the Centre for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“.

At present, we are carefully studying all the aspects of the global responses to the Coronavirus pandemic, the biggest challenge facing humanity in the 21 century.  In our analysis of the current situation, we would particularly like to focus on the way some Southeast Asian nations have responded to and have been fighting the COVID-19 outbreak.

It is important to highlight that initially, practically all the countries in Southeast Asia managed to fairly effectively beat back the first wave of infections spreading from China. Isolated cases of COVID-19 were handled successfully, and for some time, it appeared as if the outbreak was stopped in its tracks.  Regional media outlets began to report that measures taken to tackle the potential epidemic were effective because the most developed nations in this part of the world, such as Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, had well-prepared epidemiological centers at the time the outbreak began. In fact, governments of these countries have been forced to spend considerable amounts of money on mitigating threats posed by potential epidemics or pandemics.

The rapid spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) from 2002 to 2003 pushed these nations to purchase modern medical equipment and to train epidemiologists. At the start of the Coronavirus outbreak, all these preparations had been sufficient.   For instance, in Vietnam, despite its extensive land borders and numerous trade links with China, the spread of COVID-19 was quickly halted. During the first wave of infections at the end of January 2020, the government managed to quarantine infected individuals and isolate their closest contacts, and to also restrict travel from China and other regions affected by the Coronavirus crisis. In the middle of February, in spite of concerns about a widespread outbreak in the country, Vietnamese health authorities managed to limit the spread of the Coronavirus. Altogether, there were 16 infected individuals at the time and, in the end, they all recovered.

However, the dangerous virus was back in March, right when Vietnam was preparing to announce that it had beaten COVID-19.  And strangely enough, the second wave of infections in Vietnam was not from the PRC but from Europe, i.e. from individuals who had returned from Italy and Great Britain. The Vietnamese government once again took decisive measures and created “containment areas” in neighborhoods where those who had come back resided. But then one person who had arrived in Vietnam from South Korea tested positive for the Coronavirus. Afterwards, the situation quickly worsened and by the end of the week, Vietnam, in spite of the government’s best efforts, confirmed that there were 41 new cases within its borders. In order to stop this second wave of infections, the authorities ordered anyone entering the country to stay in containment areas and individuals arriving in Vietnam starting on 8 March to pass a medical exam.

Despite these measures, soon there were more than 21,000 people within the so called “concentrated quarantine zones”, residing mainly in military barracks, which had been converted for this purpose, and approximately 30,000 people had been ordered to self-isolate.  The living conditions in the barracks are spartan but, according to local officials, there were no other options at the time.

Unlike Vietnam, Thailand did not immediately enact severe measures to fight the Coronavirus.  Officials in Bangkok seemingly assumed that the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), which had undergone reorganization after the SARS outbreak in Thailand in 2003, would be able to handle the pandemic.  Owing to the measures taken in 2003, the center was viewed as one of the best in the world by health experts. Based on the 2019 edition of the CEOWORLD magazine independent Health Care Index, which ranks “countries according to factors that contribute to overall health”, Thailand ended up in 6th place and was considered to be one of the nations best prepared for a widespread outbreak of infectious disease. Thailand was the only developing nation in the top ten.

According to health experts, Thailand is exceptionally well-equipped to handle an outbreak by detecting infectious disease threats and dealing with them.  At the very beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak, such an assessment appeared to be justified.  Although Thailand was the first nation where health officials confirmed the first COVID-19 case outside of China and the “first human-to-human transmission of the Coronavirus” after an individual “was apparently infected by a traveler” in January, the situation in the country remained more or less under control.  Until mid-March, the Centers for Disease Control in Thailand had managed to contain the outbreak.  Still, the number of cases of COVID-19 gradually increased and remained under 100 for almost two months. But the Thai government did not take measures similar to those in Vietnam.

The situation changed in mid-March with the second wave of infections. The number of individuals who had tested positive for the Coronavirus increased from 82 on 14 March to 721 on 23 March, which is why the Thai leadership decided to change its strategy. The government immediately postponed all large scale events scheduled to celebrate one of the biggest national holidays, Songkran (Thai lunar New Year), and closed schools, shopping centers and other public places. Fearing that the Coronavirus could spread outside of Bangkok, officials appealed to people who had arrived in the Thai capital not to return to their provinces.

The outbreak in Malaysia and Indonesia followed a similar progression to that in Thailand.  It started gradually and there was hope that few COVID-19 cases would be registered. The first individuals to test positive for the virus in Malaysia took part in a large-scale religious ceremony that had not been cancelled, but they were then successfully quarantined. However, these measures did not stop the pandemic.  The exponential growth in the number of cases then began just as in many other countries, with dozens and then hundreds infected. The rapid spread of the disease that started in mid-March shows that the gradual but still manageable increase in infections still resulted a serious outbreak. In response, severe measures were taken to stop COVID-19 from spreading further.

We can thus conclude that several Southeast Asian nations were only partially successful at handling the crisis by delaying the outbreak. Nowadays, Thailand and its neighbors from ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) are facing a bigger challenge than at the onset of the pandemic, as, in the opinion of numerous analysts, these countries were late in enacting strict quarantine and self-isolation measures in order to try and slow the spread of the disease. Their experience and that of China suggest that the only effective means of fighting COVID-19 is to take severe measures and isolate and quarantine infected or potentially infected individuals. There is no other viable alternative at the moment.

As for joint efforts to fight the Coronavirus pandemic in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world, President of Indonesia Joko “Jokowi” Widodo recommended actionable steps for handling COVID-19 during the G20 online summit. First of all, he proposed “increasing social protection for vulnerable groups including the elderly, micro, small and medium enterprises and low-wage workers”. Secondly, he recommended supporting and ensuring “the safety of medical personnel in accordance with World Health Organization standards”, and urged “ease of access to medical supplies and personal protective equipment (PPE)”. The Indonesian government “also raised the issue of affordability and availability of vaccines and other medical supplies”. Indonesia requested that each G20 country “be able to [better] facilitate trade and mobility of drugs and other medical needs, including through the relaxation of export-import procedures”. The fourth proposal was to ensure that all forms of global financial contributions still took into account “national conditions and priorities” of countries affected by the outbreak. Finally, Indonesia also called on leaders of the G20 countries “to commit to creating stronger cooperation to prevent a deeper global economic recession as a result of a prolonged pandemic”.

Since potential epidemics and pandemics are a constant threat to Southeast Asian nations, Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) modernized its facilities after dozens of confirmed cases of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) were registered in the nation in 2015 and quite a high number of patients died as a result. At the time, the South Korean leadership realized that there could be more outbreaks caused by deadly germs and all available resources would have to be mobilized in order to protect the population. Hence, South Korea’s Centers for Disease Control set up a special department to prepare for epidemics and pandemics, which has been at the center of the fight against the COVID-19 outbreak. Research into the Coronavirus and efforts to develop a test kit by South Korean firms and the government began as soon as Chinese scientists had first published the COVID-19 virus’ genetic sequence on 13 January “well before the country had its first case”. KCDC was quick to approve one company’s unlicensed COVID-19 test that appeared on the market on 4 February. And in a matter of weeks, several South Korean companies were able to produce up to 130,000 test kits per day. In fact, testing became one of the key tools used to fight the spread of the Coronavirus in South Korea.

Dmitry Mosyakov, Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Director of the Centre for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“.

The latest events in the South China Sea show that the long-standing conflict has still smoldered here, and it occasionally flares up. Recently we have got used to seeing such events take place when the Americans send another destroyer assigned to deliberately cross the border of the forbidden waters designated by China around the artificial islands in the South China Sea. The whole world at such moment literally stands still afraid that one accidental shot can start a conflict between the great superpowers.

However, lately, there has been another reason for increased attention to the South China Sea: China sent a research vessel assigned to establish the availability of oil and gas in the water area that, according to all international regulations belongs to Vietnam. And it was made quite unexpectedly, approximately following the same scenario as in 2015.

Back then, China sent a drilling rig to the Vietnamese territorial waters, which caused a huge international resonance and a long-standing conflict. In its course, the Vietnamese and the Chinese vessels watered each other from fire pumps, rammed one another and held precariously on the verge of a military collision for several weeks.

At the time, Vietnam even saw a rise in spontaneous anti-Chinese rallies began, and the tension in the relations of the two countries reached the limit. It took a great deal of diplomatic effort to avoid most serious consequences at the time.

In 2019, everything began as last time, but developed in an absolutely different way. The Chinese vessels appeared in the Vietnamese waters and left them quickly enough. No fire pumps, journalist crowds or demonstrations this time around. The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry submitted an official protest, specifying that “over the last several days, the Chinese survey ship, Haiyang Dizhi 8 and its escorts conducted activities in the southern area of the East Sea that violated Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.” The statement emphasized that this site is located within the territorial waters of Vietnam, and it was demanded that the Chinese vessel stop its illegal activities and left the Vietnamese waters.

The Chinese MFA Spokesperson Geng Shuang, in response to this statement, said that Beijing “hopes that the Vietnamese party will be able to respect the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of China over the corresponding waters and will take no actions that could exacerbate the situation.” After making this statement and thus preserving the national prestige, the Chinese ships were ordered to leave the Vietnamese waters. Thus, in August 2019, the possible conflict between Vietnam and China that the Americans had counted so much on was over.

Washington did not even try to hide its disappointment with this outcome, as it sought to kindle this conflict in every possible way. It gave numerous leaks to the press with reference to certain analytical centers that the Chinese and the Vietnamese ships “had clashed” for several weeks. The interest of Washington to triggering the conflict is quite clear: the worse the relations of Vietnam and China, the more chances the US gets to exploit the conflict of the two neighboring countries to its own advantage.

Thus, the US is obviously disappointed that both Hanoi and Beijing showed patience and common sense and acted quite differently from the situation in 2015.

It is most likely that the leaders of the two countries, without involving the press, spontaneous rallies and general excitement, simply had a quiet discussion of the current situation via the interparty channels closed from the press and reached a certain compromise. As a result, the Chinese research vessel entering the Vietnamese waters caused neither a long-standing opposition, nor international attention, and, by now, it has become one of the historical moments, which there have been plenty of throughout the history of the conflict in the South China Sea.

The conflict has not been resolved, both parties retain their positions. But we see now that there is a new efficient way to avoid armed confrontation, however strong the desire of Washington to see action might be.

Dmitry Mosyakov, Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Director of the Centre for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

Последние события в Южно-Китайском море показывают, что уже много лет продолжающийся здесь конфликт все еще тлеет, иногда вспыхивая ярким факелом. В последнее время мы привыкли, что такие события происходят, когда американцы отправляют очередной эсминец, который должен намеренно нарушить границу запретных вод, введенных Китаем вокруг искусственных островов в ЮКМ. Весь мир в этот момент буквально замирает, опасаясь, что один случайный выстрел может развязать конфликт великих держав.

Но в последнее время причина повышенного внимания к ЮКМ оказалась другая – Китай направил в воды, которые по всем международным правилам должны принадлежать Вьетнаму, свое исследовательское судно, которое должно было установить наличие нефти или газа на этой территории. Причем сделано это было довольно неожиданно, примерно по тому же сценарию, как это происходило в 2015 г.

Тогда Китай направил свою буровую установку во вьетнамские территориальные воды, что вызвало огромный международный резонанс и длительный конфликт. В его ходе вьетнамские и китайские суда неделями поливали друг друга водой из брандспойтов, шли на взаимные тараны и балансировали на опасной грани серьезного военного столкновения.

В это же время во Вьетнаме начались даже стихийные антикитайские митинги, а напряжение в отношениях двух стран достигло своего предела. С огромным трудом удалось тогда избежать самых серьезных последствий.

В случае 2019 г. началось все как раньше, но дальше все произошло совершенно по-иному. Китайские суда появились во вьетнамских водах и довольно быстро их покинули. Никаких брандспойтов, толп журналистов и манифестаций. Вьетнамский МИД заявил официальный протест, указав, что «в последние несколько дней китайское гидрографическое судно «Хаянь Дичжи 8» и сопровождающие его суда осуществляли деятельность в южной части Восточного моря, нарушая вьетнамскую исключительную экономическую зону и посягая на континентальный шельф. В заявлении подчеркивалось, что этот участок находится в пределах территориальных вод Вьетнама и выдвигалось требование, чтобы китайское судно прекратило бы «незаконную деятельность» и покинуло вьетнамские воды.

Представитель МИД Китая Гэн Шуан в ответ на это заявление сказал, что в Пекине «надеются, что вьетнамская сторона сможет искренне уважать суверенные права и юрисдикцию Китая над соответствующими водами, и не будет предпринимать никаких действий, которые могут осложнить ситуацию». Сделав такое заявление и «сохранив лицо» китайские корабли получили указание покинуть вьетнамские воды. Так в августе 2019 г. возможный конфликт, между Вьетнамом и Китаем, на который так рассчитывали американцы, оказался исчерпан.

В Вашингтоне даже не скрывали своего разочарования таким исходом, так как стремились этот конфликт всячески разжечь. Они постоянно давали утечки в прессу с ссылкой на некие аналитические центры о том, что китайские и вьетнамские корабли «вступили в противостояние», продолжавшееся в течение нескольких недель. Интерес Вашингтона разжечь конфликт вполне понятен: чем хуже будут отношения Вьетнама и Китая, тем больше шансов у США использовать конфликт двух соседних стран в своих интересах.

Так что США явно разочарованы тем, что и в Ханое, и в Пекине проявили терпение и здравый смысл, действовали совершенно иначе, чем это было в 2015 г.

Скорее всего, руководящие лидеры двух стран без привлечения прессы, стихийных митингов и общего возбуждения просто спокойно обсудили сложившуюся ситуацию по закрытым от прессы межпартийным каналам и пришли к определенному компромиссу. В результате заход китайского исследовательского судна не повлек ни длительного противостояния, ни международного внимания и уже сегодня превратился в один из исторических моментов, которых за всю историю конфликта в ЮКМ было немало.

Конфликт не разрешен, обе стороны остаются на своих позициях. Но мы видим, что появился эффективный вариант избегать вооруженного противостояния, как бы этого не хотелось в Вашингтоне.

Дмитрий Мосяков, профессор, доктор исторических наук, руководитель Центра изучения Юго-Восточной Азии, Австралии и Океании ИВ РАН, специально для интернет-журнала «Новое Восточное Обозрение».

Today, the realities of the South China Sea have changed so drastically that we’re dealing with a whole new reality that is nothing like what we used to analyse or discuss. The tensions within this region were purely local in their nature and concerned China and its immediate neighbors, but now it’s obvious that they have evolved into a matter of global security. All the previous evaluations professing a swift settlement of all issues on the back of the cultural unity and common mentality of the parties involved in the conflict turned out to be absolutely wrong. What transpired here is unlike anything that we could have anticipated.

In recent years, the Indo-Pacific region has become a major attraction for all sorts of investors due to its economic potential. After all, it’s the region of some of the world’s most crucial sea routes stretching from China, Japan, South Korea, Russia to the west coast of the United States. An unparalleled number of commodities are being shipped along these routes every year.

On one hand, the lack of firm boundaries within the region and vast expanses of water facilitate trade and connect peoples, countries and continents, but on the other, these routes remain exposed to all sorts of meddling, which means that one has to invest an extensive amount of effort to protect them. This is the common goal of all the countries of the Indo-Pacific region and, above all, the countries of ASEAN and India, which are located at critical junctions of these trade routes. India and the ASEAN member-states share a common reliance on these oceans and their connecting seas, and a common perspective that supports openness, inclusion, sharing and peaceful cooperation. Their common goals are the maintenance of peace, stability and security, unimpeded lawful commerce, freedom of navigation, along with the preservation of marine resources. All of these are the base of India’s and ASEAN’s policy towards maritime security and connectivity and stable peace and development. 

Another important point that is that the Indo-Pacific region is one of historical, cultural and political interpenetration, as a number of local states derived their governing principles from Indian heritage and culture. Even if it creates additional difficulties, it just as well creates preconditions for mutual cooperation and integration within this region. Not only historical, but also cultural traditions that we can see in almost all ASEAN member states now show us that India for centuries was the main political, trade and cultural partner of Southeast Asia. So there’s an inherited common approach to the question of maritime security and connectivity.

But does the regional security in Southeast Asia play such an important role in global affairs these days? To a larger extent the security of the region amounts to maritime security. All but one of the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states are coastal states; two of these are the world’s largest archipelagos on earth. At its narrowest conception, maritime security involves protection from direct threats to the territorial integrity of a state, such as an armed attack from a military vessel. Most definitions would typically add protection from high seas crimes, such as piracy, armed robbery, vessel hijacking and terrorist acts. However, intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment, including from illegal dumping and the discharge of pollutants from vessels, and depletion of natural resources, such as from illegal fishing will also constitute a threat to the interests of coastal states. 

Most of these points are acute in the Indo-Pacific region but can be resolved by mutual actions of regional states. But we can see that for India and especially for the countries of Southeast Asia, the most sensitive point is the ongoing aggravation of the situation in the South China Sea. This ongoing dispute poses an area of challenge to maritime security in several ways. First, competing territorial and maritime claims can lead to incidents at sea as states seek to assert or defend sovereignty or their claims to natural resources.

Second, the lack of clarity over the status and maritime entitlement negatively impacts all states involved. This issue has caused considerable tension between the United States and China. This problem has manifested itself in Washington’s assertions of maritime rights in the South China Sea under its Freedom of Navigation Program as well as China’s objections to this course of action.

The US uses this conflict to strengthen its military-political ties with ASEAN to make some countries of this bloc their allies in a bid to turn them against China. America seeks to show that only their fleet can pose as the guarantor of maritime security in this region and prevent the transformation of the South China Sea and its islands into China’s inland sea. With incredible perseverance they send their warships to the zones around the bulk islands in the South China Sea, which China has declared a forbidden area, to demonstrate their determination to defend the principles of freedom of navigation. This is a highly dangerous undertaking for maritime security, as it’s plain to see that a shooting war between the two superpowers can erupt at any given moment. 

Last May, two US military ships passed near the Spratly archipelago in the South China Sea. The American destroyers Preble and Chung Hoon passed within 12 nautical miles of the Gaven reefs and Johnson reefs. The commander of the Seventh Fleet of the United States, Admiral C. Doss, stated that this was an “innocent passage” intended to challenge China’s “excessive maritime claims” and aimed at maintaining free access to the sea lanes in accordance with international laws and norms. Prior to that, at the end of May 2018, the US  destroyer Higgins together with a rocket cruiser Entitem would sail past the disputed islands in the South China Sea, approaching them by 12 nautical miles. Under these circumstances, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that Beijing was forced to send its ships and aircraft to demand that the American ships leave Beijing’s territorial waters. The ministry has also called on the United States to abstain from any such demonstrations in the future. In response, the Pentagon would defiantly send a strategic bomber, a B-52 Stratofortress to patrol the area near the disputed islands in the South China Sea.

According to a statement by the Pacific Air Force, falling under the US Air Force, the aircraft took off from Anderson base on Guam on March 4. Тhe representatives of China have again sharply condemned these hostile actions against their security.

Given the ongoing tensions, there is a question of how long China will endure all this and not open fire. The answer is not entirely clear. Moreover, an honest mistake can be made, bringing down the entire existing system of relations in Asia and the world. The stakes are very high. That is why some of the leaders of ASEAN countries such as Rodrigo Duterte or Mohathir Mohamed have asked the Americans to either stop these military incursions or turn them into a purely symbolic action without using heavy warships.

The regular excursions of American warships is hardly the only way to aggravate the situation in the South China Sea. Washington has yet another tactic at its disposal that is being advanced, predicated upon the same pretext of boosting maritime security efforts in Southeast Asia. This involves various manifestations of US maritime security assistance on the bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral levels, ranging from Washington’s improving its engagement with local coast guard units in Southeast Asia through the Maritime Security Initiative (MSI).

This initiative was launched in 2015 with the goal of boosting the region’s capacity to resist a range of maritime challenges – including China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea. It is comprised of such means as improving regional maritime domain awareness, expanding exercises, and leveraging senior-level engagements.

Today, the results of this program can be seen in supplies of military equipment to Southeast Asian countries and the development of military cooperation with them. One can see the sale of vessels to Vietnam as well as the long-mulled ASEAN-US Maritime Exercise (AUMX), or an announcement by the Pentagon that the United States would sell drones to several Southeast Asian states.

Americans make no secret that it’s all directed against China’s maritime assertiveness. American politicians are making increasingly harsh statements about China’s actions in the South China Sea. For example, at the recently concluded annual conference on military-political issues – Shangri-La in Singapore, former US Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan said that the United States will no longer “tiptoe” around China’s behavior in Asia. He said that Washington “consistently warns Beijing against the militarization of man-made objects in disputed waters.” In addition, P. Shanahan accused China of “sabotaging the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea”.

We can see that the Americans are obviously heightening tensions, trying to divide a huge region into opposing blocs. The goal is understandable to preserve and, if possible, strengthen its influence and position in the Asia Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. They want to advance the logic of confrontation that would eliminate any possibility of a peaceful solution, or compromise. After all, if the development of events proceeds along a non-confrontational channel, they will have to compete with China economically , and most importantly, any idea of a military anti-Chinese bloc will be history. Therefore, they are urging both ASEAN and India to expand military cooperation with them, explaining this as a joint struggle for democracy against the dangerous actions of China, which they are trying to transform into a pretext for reestablishing primacy in the region through military means.

It is clear that some of China’s steps in the South China Sea in a number of other areas in Asia can be described as controversial, but it should be resolved through the logic of peace. The logic of war will lead to the appropriate answer.

What is the way out of the current intense situation and how is it possible to preserve both maritime security and develop connectivity between countries and, above all, between India and the ASEAN countries? Creating a military bloc within the framework of Trump’s famous plan to transform the Indo-Pacific region into a kind of anti-Chinese bastion is an extremely dangerous idea and most likely a futile venture. It will not give calm and stability to the countries of the region, nor will it ease tensions but rather divide the whole Asia-Pacific region into several hostile blocs. This will be the worst possible future for the region. Only the US will benefit from this development.

Another option is to increase the supply of weapons to ASEAN countries so that they can counter possible threats. But this path is also flawed, since any such action gives rise to countermeasures. China will not calmly look on amid a shifting balance of power. An arms race may start, which will only weaken the ASEAN countries, failing to lead to a qualitative change in the existing situation. In this case, we may face a maritime arms race and the tension and distrust associated with it. All of this will not improve the security situation at sea, nor will it lead to new trade routes and infrastructure projects.

In such a situation, Russia’s position is really important. Not because of the power of its naval forces but because of the fact that Moscow is not directly involved in any disputes in the South China Sea, in Asia or Indo-Pacific. Russia’s best interests are to preserve the status quo to develop trade and economic projects. One can see that all development plans for the Russian Far East are directed towards this goal.

In this regard, the Russian position is aimed at a principled resolution of the conflicts in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions through peaceful means. Moscow does not reject the idea of Indo-Pacific, it opposes the notion that it should be turned into a military alliance, against the division of countries for ideological reasons, some into a democratic camp and others into a totalitarian or populist one. This position was persuasively stated by Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel General A. Fomin in Singapore at the Shangri-La conference. In his presentation he said that “some colleagues tell us that the system of closed exclusive military alliances existing in the Asia-Pacific region is the “cornerstone” of regional security. But we are convinced that the narrow-bloc model cannot be a universal tool, since it does not guarantee the security of those countries that are not part of these alliances. And given the threats that have changed since the Cold War, a natural question arises about the ability of such structures to respond effectively to modern regional and global challenges.

Russia seeks to ensure that existing contradictions are resolved by the countries of the region themselves without external resistance. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova has repeated many times that “Russia is not a party to territorial disputes in the South China Sea and will not be drawn into them. We basically do not take sides. We are firmly convinced that the inclusion of third forces in these disputes will only fuel tensions in the region.”

Russia cannot allow itself to be friends against anyone in its regional policy and must be extremely careful and sensitive in its attempts to find a delicate balance in approaching various regional actors, seeking to maintain at least the fragile status quo in the region. Russia understands participation in situational blocs and coalitions on territorial disputes is fraught with the risk of engaging in a conflict, which at any time may develop into an armed confrontation.

All of this shows that Russia is looking for the foundations of maritime security not in creating new military structures, not in fueling an arms race, not in deepening confrontation, but on the path of mutually acceptable compromises, growing confidence on the basis of common business interests and common benefit. Russia’s approach to territorial conflicts is based on the principles of respect for state sovereignty and the national integrity of states, the inviolability of borders, as well as reliance on international law. Russia adheres to the position of strict neutrality in relation to those territorial and border problems in which it’s not involved directly. Its approach is in line with that of the ASEAN countries and India who claim that Indo-Pacific should be inclusive and promote peace and cooperation, instead of military tensions. This common position should be used to resolve the most acute problems of maritime security and connectivity.

Dmitry Mosyakov, Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Director of the Centre for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

Сегодня ситуация в Южно-Китайском море самым существенным образом отличается от той, с которой мы имели дело еще в сравнительно недавнее время. Конфликт в этом регионе носил сугубо региональный характер и охватывал Китай и его соседей по Южно-Китайскому морю. Но за последнее время в этом конфликте произошли довольно радикальные перемены, которые свидетельствуют о том, насколько неопределенными бывают контуры будущего и насколько они могут быть опасными для глобальной безопасности. Все прогнозы аналитиков о благоприятных контурах будущего в этом регионе, о вполне вероятном компромиссе, основанном на близости культур и менталитета участвующих в конфликте сторон, оказались абсолютно ошибочными. Контуры будущего оказались совсем другими, чем предполагали.

Первое событие, влияние которого ощущается ныне и, как представляется, будет только усиливаться в будущем, это решения Постоянной палаты третейского суда в Гааге. Как известно, этот суд, принявший свои решения еще в июле 2016 года, не признал за Китаем юридического права на 80% акватории Южно-Китайского моря, отверг идею исторического права, на основе которого строились доводы Китая относительно законности его действий, и постановил, что единственным путем юридического урегулирования конфликта может быть только путь на основе современного международного права. Хотя Китай и некоторые другие страны, в том числе Россия, не признали решения этого суда, посчитав их не вполне объективными, юридические обоснования и основные принципы, сформулированные им, также как и известная Конвенция по морскому праву 1982 г., остаются единственным, основанным на международном праве, фундаментом для урегулирования конфликта.

Уже понятно, что если и пойдет процесс мирного урегулирования, то он не будет основан на историческом праве, а только на современном международном праве, что сразу же заметно упростит процесс урегулирования конфликта.

Другим, не менее, а может быть, и более важным, событием, которое как раз и привело к тому, что качественно изменилась вся архитектура существующего конфликта, а прогнозы аналитиков не оправдались, явилось фактическое превращение США в полноценного его участника. Это произошло не сразу, я еще прекрасно помню, как на встречах с лидерами АСЕАН в начале 2000-х годов американские представители указывали им на то, что они сами должны искать компромисса с Китаем, что Америка не намерена участвовать в разрешении противоречий, сложившихся между Китаем и странами АСЕАН в ЮКМ.

Более того, серьезные трения возникли между США и АСЕАН по поводу перспектив председательства Бирмы в этой международной организации в 2006 г., предусмотренным принятым в ней порядком ротации. В этой связи Вашингтон, обвинявший военный режим, правивший в этой стране в диктатуре и терроризме, подавлении демократических свобод, выступил с рядом резких предостережений, граничивших с прямой угрозой. В США указали, что подобное решение серьезно осложнит американский подход и контакты с АСЕАН. Подтверждая это, в мае 2005 г. тогдашний государственный секретарь США Кондолиза Райс демонстративно бойкотировала ежегодное совещание регионального форума АСЕАН по проблемам безопасности (АРФ). Далее последовала новая угроза со стороны американцев, что если АСЕАН будет упорствовать и военное правительство Бирмы все-таки займет председательское кресло, Вашингтон откажет АСЕАН в экономической помощи.

Но этот жесткий подход к АСЕАН претерпел изменения в 2009 г., когда тогдашний Госсекретарь США Хиллари Клинтон приняла участие в постминистерской конференции АСЕАН и саммите Регионального форума АСЕАН по безопасности на острове Пхукет (Таиланд). Тогда, в ходе пресс-конференции, она жестко заявила, что США «вернулись в Юго-Восточную Азию». Было объявлено о намерениях Штатов открыть постоянное представительство при АСЕАН во главе с послом-резидентом. По итогам встречи был сделан первый важный шаг навстречу новым отношениям США с АСЕАН – подписан документ присоединения США к Договору о дружбе и сотрудничестве в Юго-Восточной Азии (TAC), что до этого всегда являлось негласным и необходимым правилом для тех, кто желал установления более тесных отношений с АСЕАН.

Главной причиной, которая заставила американцев изменить свой подход к АСЕАН, стала все более независимая в определенном смысле экспансионистская политика Китая на островах и в акватории Южно-Китайского моря. Примерно 80% акватории этого моря он объявил своей территорией, начал строить насыпные острова, вооружать их, патрульные китайские корабли стали нападать на местных рыбаков, которые исторически всегда ловили рыбу на тех акваториях, которые Китай объявил своими. В результате ситуация в регионе резко обострилась и американцы вмешались в ход происходивших событий.

Сегодня США самым активным образом участвуют в конфликте в Южно-Китайском море, их корабли бороздят объявленные Китаем закрытыми для других судов зоны в районе искусственных островов, возведенных Китаем за последние годы, подвергая мир опасности прямого столкновения двух великих держав. Американские политики выступают со все более резкими заявлениями относительно действий Китая в ЮКМ. Так, например, на завершившейся недавно ежегодной конференции по военно-политическим вопросам – «Шангри-Ла» в Сингапуре исполняющий обязанности министра обороны США Патрик Шанахан заявил, что США больше не будут “ходить на цыпочках” вокруг поведения Китая в Азии. Он сказал, что Вашингтон «последовательно предостерегает Пекин от милитаризации искусственных объектов в спорных водах». Кроме этого, П. Шанахан обвинил КНР «в саботаже свободы судоходства в Южно-Китайском море». Ответ на эти обвинения был также очень жесткий. «Мы размещаем необходимые оборонные объекты в соответствии с ситуацией в области безопасности, с которой сталкиваемся на островах и рифах Южно-Китайского моря. Это абсолютное право суверенной страны и необходимый ответ на провокационные действия», — заявил там же китайский адмирал Шао Юаньмин.

Развернувшееся американо-китайское противостояние в ЮКМ изменило архитектуру безопасности всего региона и превратило вялотекущий конфликт государств-соседей, который долгое время мало кого интересовал в мире, в противостояние современных сверхдержав. Причем, что интересно, события развивались так, как будто были списаны с учебника по политологии, когда конфликт зарождается на основе мало кому понятных мелких противоречий, а потом, если его не купировать, начинает развиваться, получает собственную логику, и, в конце концов, втягивает в себя все новые страны и народы. Конфликт в ЮКМ прошел уровень двусторонних споров и столкновений между Китаем и Вьетнамом за мало кому известные безводные крошечные острова и рифы, затем перешел к стадии регионального конфликта, в который втянулись Китай и страны АСЕАН. В первую очередь Вьетнам, Малайзия, Филиппины, Бруней, а позже и Индонезия. На этот уровень конфликт перешел после того, как в 2009 г., как мы уже отмечали, КНР объявила чуть ли не 80% Южно-Китайского моря своей территорией, вызвав ответную реакцию со стороны государств АСЕАН.

Сегодня, с втягиванием в конфликт в ЮКМ американцев, конфликт перестал быть региональным и превратился в глобальный, угрожающий миру и безопасности не только в ЮКМ и не только в Азии, но и всему миру. Дело в том, что любое военное столкновение китайских и американских сил может вызвать большую войну между ведущими мировыми державами. Угроза такого развития событий происходит регулярно, так как раз за разом либо американский самолет пролетит под прицелом китайских ПВО в объявленном КНР запретном районе, или эсминец США пройдет под дулами китайских пушек в зоне насыпных островов, которая также объявлена Китаем запретной. Достаточно привести только последние данные о том, что в мае 2019 г. два корабля Военно-мирских сил (ВМС) США прошли вблизи от архипелага Спратли в Южно-Китайском море, Американские эсминцы Preble и Chung Hoon прошли в пределах 12 морских миль от рифов Гавен и Джонсон. Командующий Седьмым флотом США адмирал К. Досс заявил, что этот «невинный проход» имел целью оспорить «чрезмерные морские претензии», а также сохранить доступ к морским путям в соответствии с международным правом.

До этого в конце мая 2018 года эсминец «Хиггинс» и ракетный крейсер «Энтитем» ВМС США также проплыли в 12 морских милях около спорных островов в Южно-Китайском море. В связи с этим в МИД Китая заявили, что Пекин был вынужден направить свои корабли и самолеты, чтобы потребовать от американских кораблей покинуть территориальные воды. В министерстве также призвали США прекратить подобные действия. В ответ американский стратегический бомбардировщик B-52 Stratofortress демонстративно пролетел вблизи спорных островов в Южно-Китайском море. Как говорится в заявлении Тихоокеанских ВВС, которые входят в командование воздушных сил США, 4 марта он вылетел с базы Андерсон на Гуаме.

Все эти враждебные действия против своей безопасности Китай резко осудил. Об этом на межправительственном форуме по безопасности «Шангри-Ла Диалог» в Сингапуре заявил министр обороны КНР Вэй Фэнхэ.

Как мы видим, ситуация складывается таким образом, что любой несанкционированный и случайный выстрел одной из сторон конфликта может кардинально все изменить. Напряженность в регионе еще больше возрастает в связи с тем, что военное противостояние в ЮКМ развивается параллельно торговой войне, когда президент Трамп вводит все новые и новые пошлины на китайские товары, грозит новыми санкциями, а в ответ Пекин вводит свои ответные меры против товаров США. Вашингтон явно идет по пути обострения ситуации и вот уже появились сообщения, что «Сенаторы США от обеих политических партий подготовили законопроект, обязывающий правительство наказать китайских физических и юридических лиц, причастных к так называемой “незаконной и опасной” деятельности Пекина в Южно-Китайском и Восточно-Китайском морях. Этот законопроект, сообщает  китайская газета South China Morning Post, потребует от госсекретаря США представлять конгрессу каждые шесть месяцев отчет с указанием любого китайского лица или компании, которые участвуют в строительных или девелоперских проектах в районах Южно-Китайского моря, оспариваемых членами АСЕАН. Мероприятия, предусмотренные законопроектом, включают мелиорацию земель, создание островов, строительство маяков и инфраструктуры мобильной связи.

Обостряется и культурно-политическое соперничество, когда Пекин и Вашингтон апеллируют к странам региона в поисках поддержки. И здесь, надо сказать, «мягкая сила» американцев, основанная на хорошо развитом культурном мифотворчестве о мессианской роли Америки в мире, явно переигрывает мифологему китайцев относительно исторической и культурной общности, способности лучше других понять друг друга и разрешить мирным путем существующие противоречия. Приход американцев с их энергией, агрессией, мощной культурной мифологией буквально все поменял. Альтернатива китайскому политико-культурному доминированию активизировала в странах ЮВА разнородные модернистские силы, которые стали активно пропагандировать американский культурный стереотип, как бы готовя национальные сообщества к более близким отношениям с США.

На наших глазах, под влиянием этого конфликта и борьбы внешних по отношению к странам Юго-Восточной Азии сил, происходит определенный надлом единства АСЕАН, когда одни страны больше склоняются к американскому союзнику, другие – к китайскому. В этой связи перед АСЕАН стоит важнейшая задача сохранить свое единство, несмотря на все вызовы, которые сегодня существуют.

Но как этого добиться – вот в чем вопрос. Можно как Филиппины согласиться на признание существующего статус-кво и искать на этой основе сотрудничества с Китаем. Но с таким подходом явно не согласится Вьетнам, а также Индонезия и Малайзия, которые имеют вполне законные основания претендовать на спорные морские акватории в ЮКМ. Поэтому контуры будущего, несмотря на все возможные уступки региональных государств друг другу, остаются для стран Юго-Восточной Азии опасно неопределенными, вроде черной тучи, которая только ждет своего часа, чтобы превратить окружающий мир в неуправляемую и опасную стихию.

В такой обстановке растущей неопределенности важна позиция России, которая недвусмысленно заявила, что все споры в ЮКМ должны решаться только мирным путем и только на основе современного международного права. Это долгий и трудный путь, но он единственный, способный сохранить мир и относительное спокойствие в этом регионе.

Дмитрий Мосяков, профессор, доктор исторических наук, руководитель Центра изучения Юго-Восточной Азии, Австралии и Океании ИВ РАН, специально для интернет-журнала «Новое Восточное Обозрение».

Several important events have occurred in Southeast Asia very recently, which shed a new light on the evolution and the current state of the conflict between China and the USA.

The first aspect worth focusing on is the fact that President Donald Trump did not attend either the East Asia Summit (EAS, based on ASEAN + 6 mechanism) in Singapore or the APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Summit in Papua New Guinea. Instead of him, the US Vice President, Mike Pence, participated in these meetings, crucial for the countries of the region. And he was not simply present at these events. In the interview with the Washington Post, he preemptively appeared to have threatened Beijing with a cold war scenario unless China changed its policy. According to Mike Pence, Donald Trump was willing to normalize relations with China, but PRC, in turn, had to be prepared to radically alter its current course, first and foremost in the economic and military spheres. As he stated, Beijing needed to have accomplished this by 1 December, when the leaders of the two nations were to meet at the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires. Mike Pence also accused China of interfering in US domestic affairs, manipulating “American democratic processes”, and practically striving to replace the President of the United States. As for Asia, Mike Pence constantly pointed out that China was a dangerous foe to Asian countries, while the United States was a friendly nation, which pursued peaceful policies and impeded Beijing’s conniving plans that threatened democracy and sovereignty of the Asia Pacific states.

At the EAS (based on ASEAN + 6 mechanism), Mike Pence actively promoted the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific, which was articulated a year ago by Donald Trump at the APEC Summit in Vietnam. During the summits it became clear that besides Washington, Australia, India and Japan also support this idea.

Mike Pence used the following persuasive language in Singapore: “We will continue to ensure that all nations, large and small, can thrive and prosper in a free and open Indo-Pacific. Authoritarianism and aggression have no place in the Indo-Pacific. In all that we do, the United States seeks collaboration, not control.” Mike Pence addressed the ASEAN leaders by promising “to uphold the freedom of the seas and the skies” in Southeast Asia, and to ensure security within sovereign land and maritime borders, as well as in cyberspace.

This combative anti-Chinese stance, expressed by the official representative of the White House, culminated with his speech at the APEC Summit, which followed straight after the talk by the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping.

Mike Pence stated “We don’t offer” our partners “a constricting belt or a one way road,” using an ironic play on words to refer to China’s One Belt One Road initiative. “Do not accept foreign debt that could compromise your sovereignty. Protect your interests. Preserve your independence. And, just like America, always put your country first,” Mike Pence advised the APEC participants. Obviously, in his opinion, only a partnership with Washington would yield benefits.

The US Vice President also constantly admonished China for its unfair trading practices and talked about the tariffs imposed on Chinese goods. “The United States though will not change course until China changes its ways. We’ve taken decisive action to address our trade imbalance with China. We’ve put tariffs on $250 billion in Chinese goods and we could more than double that number,” promised Mike Pence.

To summarize the analyses of Mike Pence’s speeches during his official trips, it is safe to say that the United States has not demonstrated any willingness to compromise towards China. Instead he showed, in every way possible, who enforced the rules of the game in our modern world and in Asia.

Naturally, such a US stance was literally met with open hostility by the representatives from China. This was especially noticeable during the APEC Summit. Disputes and arguments were so heated that it was impossible to agree on a joint formal statement at the end of the summit. And the document, which was issued in the end, turned out to be full of meaningless words and wishes, which did not include any mention of the tariffs and trade issues.

The Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, Peter O’Neill’s comments on the fruitless attempts to agree on the statement, made at the concluding press conference, included an explanation for the difficulties encountered. When “The two big giants in the room,” were unable to agree (referring to China and the United States), it was difficult to get anything done. Incidentally, according to some sources, it was the Chinese delegation that objected to the first version of the joint statement, as the drafted document included several points which were unacceptable to the PRC. As, for instance, the fact that it mentioned China’s violation of the World Trade Organization’s rules pertaining to fair trade practices. According to eye-witnesses, in Trump’s absence the Chinese felt a great degree of confidence. Based on unofficial sources, they even attempted to muscle their way into a local government’s conference hall, where work on the end-of-the-summit joint statement was ongoing in order to influence the document’s content. The delegates were so persistent that the police had to be summoned for help. But the truth is that there was no official confirmation of the incident taking place.

The confidence, exhibited by the Chinese during the past summits, is quite justifiable. After all Asian partners and PRC’s neighbors did not hide their disappointment about Donald Trump’s absence, and the resulting lack of interest by Americans in Southeast Asian affairs. Mike Pence’s statements clearly did not inspire them and failed to instill any optimism about US policy’s goals and approaches.

Hence, on the very first day of the ASEAN Summit, Singapore’s leading newspaper, The Straits Times, published some excerpts from a discussion, whose participants included representatives of the US Department of State and of the US Embassy in Singapore, as well as a veteran in Singapore’s diplomatic circles and the Ambassador-at-Large for the city-state, Tommy Koh.

During the discussion, one diplomat asked “”If Asia matters to America, why is your leader President Trump not here?” He also added “I’m not comfortable with the US abandoning a concept that we know and have used for many years – the Asia-Pacific.” “Is the Indo-Pacific purely a geographic concept or is it also ideological?” asked the diplomat, especially considering the fact that the US has given the Indo-Pacific an ideological spin with its prefix “free and open”. The diplomat then asked whether its strategic intent was targeted at excluding China («Straits times» – 13 November 2018.)

The President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, took an even more anti-American stance. During his speech he said that the United States and its allies needed to accept the fact that “”China is already in possession (of the South China Sea)”. Rodrigo Duterte also called on the US to stop its military drills and vessel movements aimed at provoking a response from Beijing. According to his statements, it would be better for all the disputes in this region to be resolved by ASEAN members and China without involving the USA and its allies. In addition, Rodrigo Duterte stopped using the term the West Philippine Sea (the name used for the South China Sea in Manila up until then).

Another anti-American sentiment was expressed, surprisingly, by the veteran of regional politics and the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Bin Mohamad. He told Washington to stop sending “warships” to the South China Sea and instead use small patrol boats to avoid sparking conflicts. In response, Mike Pence later stated that Washington would continue to exercise its lawful right to sail ships and fly planes in any regions in the US national interests. And the South China Sea, according to his statements, cannot belong to anyone.

The fact that the US influence in Southeast Asia continues to diminish is readily apparent to Americans, despite their bellicose rhetoric. They can see that they are not in control of key processes shaping the current state of affairs in Southeast Asian. For example, they have no influence on a South China Sea Code of Conduct, being prepared by Beijing and ASEAN member-states. This crucial document will determine the code of conduct during disputes and include means of resolving them. The possibility that China will be able to convince its partners and neighbors (and it does have a lot of leverage at its disposal) to include a clause in the Code of Conduct requiring any military drills, conducted with countries located outside of the region, to be approved ahead of time by the nations with direct access to the South China Sea is especially unpleasant for Americans. And if concerns are voiced by any of these countries, the military exercises will not be allowed. In this manner, China will have a legal basis for blocking naval exercises conducted by the USA, Japan and other nations in the South China Sea. This will noticeably strengthen its position in the region and bring it closer to its long-cherished goal to oust the United States (and especially its military) from the region.

Another Chinese project, which the USA is not a part of and has no influence on, has the same aim. We are referring to the creation of the largest trade bloc here, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). New life was breathed into this initiative after the United States pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Both Prime Ministers of China and Singapore jointly announced that an agreement on this partnership would be signed the following year. It is expected that, aside from ASEAN member-states, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea will become pat of it.

It is extremely important that, today, not only China but also Indonesia (the biggest nation in terms of land area and size of economy among Southeast Asian countries) is playing an active role as the RCEP organizer. Indonesians explain their stance to support this initiative simply and logically. An editorial in the newspaper, the Jakarta Post, reported that China, the largest economy in the region, was on the rise, and it was committed to finalizing the agreement on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that year, which would strengthen the ASEAN partnership. When the new trade bloc is established, it will comprise 16 nations, including the ten ASEAN member-states as well as China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. “The trade agreement will account for 50 percent of the world’s population and 30 percent of the world’s gross domestic product.” The newspaper points out that for ASEAN members and China “cooperation is the wisest choice” despite unresolved problems. For ASEAN, China is no longer a critical threat, in spite of its economic might. ASEAN member-states have the necessary leverage to act as a counter-weight to their giant neighbor. One Indonesian scientist once joked that ASEAN had mastered the skills of a tamer in order to conduct negotiations with other countries.

It is without a doubt that ASEAN will part with its illusion of being China’s tamer very soon. However, the state of affairs is such that, whether we like it or not, today and for the foreseeable future China is a priority for the ASEAN member-states. And not only for them. This indeed is a pithy conclusion by Indonesia’s leading official newspaper. And it is difficult to add something worthy to it.

Dmitry Mosyakov, Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Director of the Centre for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”