For several years now, the world economy has been showing signs of a global crisis, affecting not only underdeveloped economies but also fully developed states such as the US or the EU. One of the signs of instability and unease increasing around the world is the rapid growth of the arms trade.

Data on arms transfers are often concealed, and so there are several versions of how they have evolved over the past few years. In March 2022, for example, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published its report on the global arms trade. According to its data, the global arms trade declined slightly between 2017 and 2021, primarily due to lower deliveries to Latin America (LA). This news could be to the advantage of the US, as many blame Washington for the extrajudicial killings of Colombian and Mexican drug traffickers, which led to a struggle between the surviving drug lords for vacated spheres of influence. This struggle has turned into a real war, which claims thousands of lives every year in LA. The decline in arms shipments to Latin American countries suggests that this war may have been on the wane. Probably until the next US force actions.

However, as mentioned above, according to SIPRI, arms trade declined only marginally between 2017 and 2021, as the decline in shipments to LA was almost entirely offset by a rapid increase in arms exports to East Asia, Europe and Oceania.

But there are other data as well. For example, the Russian Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade (CAWAT) gives the following picture for 2018-2021: in 2018, global trade in “conventional weapons” (that is, all weapons and military equipment not related to weapons of mass destruction) was over $76 billion. In 2019, this figure was $79.7 billion, and in 2020 it was over $85.4 billion. In 2021, according to various sources, the global arms trade was about $100 billion. It is believed to be the largest volume since the Cold War.

Given the secrecy of the subject, it is hard to say who provides more reliable information: the pro-Western SIPRI or the pro-Kremlin CAWAT. It is much more interesting to see where they agree. SIPRI and CAWAT are unanimous on the following points:

As always, the US topped the list of arms suppliers, accounting for about 40% of all arms exports by the end of 2021.

Russia comes next in the top ten arms exporters. It should be recalled that the Russian defense industry, established back in Soviet times, was originally “geared” primarily towards national defense and aid to friendly states, with commercial interests being a secondary consideration.

France, Italy, China, Germany, Spain and Israel are next in the top ten according to CAWAT. Interestingly, there has been a movement in this group between 2018 and 2021, with China moving from sixth to fifth place. As for SIRPI, as of the end of 2021, it gives the Celestial Empire an even higher, fourth place after France. Thus, despite significant differences in information from SIRPI and CAWAT, both organizations agree that the PRC has been very successful in the arms trade.

Having developed into a superpower with the world’s second largest economy, in recent years China has been actively building up its military might by developing and producing modern weapons and military equipment in large quantities sufficient for both the Chinese army and for exports. According to some estimates, China’s arms exports are growing faster than those of other countries, and a new reshuffle of the top exporters’ rankings is not long in coming.

It should be noted that, despite all the negative elements that are associated with periods of growth in an economy sector such as the military trade, it should be recognized that arms production is a very high-tech, knowledge-intensive industry that stimulates scientific and technological development and generates large revenues. Therefore, military technology and its exports are not only means of competition between states, but also spheres of that competition.

Of course, to win in arms export competition, the quality of the arms produced and their price are important: every state that cares about its security wants to provide its troops with effective weapons in the right quantities. However, the relationship between the purchasing state and the arms supplying country also plays a significant role. No one understands certain types of weapons better than the manufacturer, and by purchasing weapons, especially high-tech ones, the importer makes his defense dependent on equipment whose characteristics are all known to the exporter. Therefore, arms are usually bought from countries with which, at the very least, one is not in conflict. Often the purchase of arms is a friendly gesture on the part of the importer towards the supplier, a demonstration of trust, and so arms are often bought from those countries with which they want to maintain friendly relations, sometimes even if the weapon is not the best in terms of price/quality ratio. Thus, arms exports can be used to assess current international relations.

In 2020, for example, the main purchasers of weapons from the PRC were from the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East. China is competing with the US for influence in both of these regions, and the success of Chinese sales suggests that its struggle with America is also going well. The situation in South Asia is also revealing: India is the most powerful and wealthy state in the region. It does not buy weapons from China because it is its old and bitter rival. Instead, the People’s Republic of Bangladesh has acquired many Chinese weapons, which is interesting: for a long time it was considered a zone of Indian influence, then there was a competition between India and China for it, and now it seems that China is prevailing. Pakistan, another South Asian state, also purchases a lot of Chinese arms. On the one hand, this is not surprising, as Pakistan has very strained and even hostile relations with India. On the other hand, in past years, the US was considered Pakistan’s main military and technical partner. Now, Pakistan prefers to cooperate with Beijing.

It can be concluded that the state of the arms market clearly reflects the situation in international relations: China is steadily gaining weight on the world stage, gradually overtaking its competitors, and its arms exports serve both as a means of increasing Chinese influence and as an indicator of it.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

As might be expected, after the start of the Ukrainian special operation by Russian troops, Russia was hit by international sanctions, primarily from the West. Of course, permanent members of the “collective West” such as Australia and New Zealand have joined these sanctions. This is not surprising – as former British colonies, they are an indispensable part of the Anglosphere, a group of countries united by the English language, past membership of the British Empire, common culture and traditions. Australia and New Zealand have been important and consistent allies of the US and Great Britain, and could be said to be at the core of what we call “the West” in general. It is not surprising that they almost always join all major initiatives of Washington and London.

For example, in 2014 Canberra and Wellington immediately joined anti-Russian sanctions over Russia’s reunification with Crimea.

Basically, Australia and New Zealand are rarely in the news when it comes to global political processes and events. Geographically, they are, one might say, “on the periphery” of the civilized world, in the South Pacific region, far from both Eurasia and America, and Australian-New Zealand geopolitical interests are mainly concentrated in this remote region. Nevertheless, Australia and New Zealand are highly developed economically, and their economic sanctions could seriously harm any country that engages intensively with them economically.

However, it is difficult to rank these countries among Russia’s most important economic partners.

For example, although Australia is a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum with Russia, their mutual trade turnover only slightly exceeded $849.5 million in the last “pre-COVID” year of 2019. Given the wealth of both countries, this small figure suggests that there is little mutual interest in economic cooperation between them. Of course, after the COVID-19 pandemic struck the world, even that modest figure began to dwindle, with trade between Australia and Russia reaching just over $787 million in 2020. The following year, however, Australia’s trade with the Russian Federation suddenly showed strong growth, resulting in an even higher figure than in 2019: in 2021, Russian-Australian trade exceeded $975 million. But still the figure is relatively small, and so it is difficult to see how Australia, at the cost of reduced economic cooperation, could deal a tangible blow to the Russian economy.

After the outbreak of hostilities, Canberra banned Australian financial and lending companies from working with certain Russian financial companies, state organizations and defense enterprises. However, as was to be expected, this had little effect.

The rest of Australia’s sanctions have been limited mainly to demonstrative action and lashing out at individuals.

Thus, on February 28, 2022, four days after the start of the Ukrainian special operation by the Russian armed forces, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced that his country had imposed personal sanctions against Russian President Vladimir Putin and other high-ranking Russian officials: Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev. A total of 350 high-ranking Russians, both politicians and military officers, were sanctioned. Also, the sanctions list includes Minister of Defense of Belarus, Russia’s ally, as well as 12 other Belarusian individuals and entities. All of these people and entities are banned from entering Australian territory. However, it is difficult to imagine why any of them would need to visit Australia at such a time.

It has also been reported that Australia has participated in disconnecting a number of Russian banks from the SWIFT payment system. However, it should be recalled that SWIFT is a community of banks around the world headquartered in Belgium, and the decision to disconnect a bank from SWIFT can only be made by the EU Parliament, and then this decision must be approved by the Belgian government. And so, although some Russian banks have been disconnected from SWIFT, Australia’s role in this is certainly minimal.

On March 3, the Australian government, represented by Minister for Communications Paul Fletcher, called on information giants such as Apple, Google, Microsoft, Meta, Reddit, TikTok and Twitter to fight the spread of messages from Russian state media. However, judging by their practices in recent years, these companies themselves know how to limit the dissemination of undesirable information, not only Russian information, and Australia’s calls seem redundant.

On March 8, 2022, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne announced new Canberra financial sanctions against the Russian Armed Forces, as well as a ban on a number of Russian military leaders from entering Australia. These sanctions do not appear to be painful for Russia either.

Three days later, Payne indicated that Canberra intended to ban imports of Russian hydrocarbon energy, and that the ban would take effect once the last of the paid shipments had arrived in Australia. However, as mentioned above, the volume of Russian-Australian trade is generally small and the cessation of hydrocarbon trade is unlikely to cause appreciable harm to either side.

However, it should be remembered that when announcing the February 28 sanctions, Prime Minister Morrison said, inter alia, that his state was working with its partners to start supplying weapons to Ukraine. It should be recalled that Australia has a well-developed arms production industry and is among the top 20 arms exporters.

For now the Australian sanctions have done Russia little harm and have not closed the way for the two countries to normalize relations in the future. However, if Australia puts its plan to supply arms to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and armed formations into practice, and if these supplies result in the deaths of Russian citizens, it will permanently tarnish Russian-Australian relations and affect their future development.

As for New Zealand, it did not even have specific legislation at the outbreak of hostilities that would allow the country to impose its own, individual sanctions on the Russian Federation. All New Zealand had to do was participate in the general international sanctions approved by the UN. Of course, it also banned V. Putin and the other individuals mentioned above from entering the country. However, Wellington appears to need to demonstrate its loyalty to Washington, especially after New Zealand has made some rather unexpected swings between Washington and Beijing over the past few years, which have even led the media to talk about its breakaway from the core of the Western community. On March 7, 2022, the New Zealand leadership announced that it was introducing a sanctions bill against Russia in Parliament. If passed, Russian ships and aircraft would be banned from New Zealand waters and airspace, and Russian accounts in New Zealand would be frozen. It should be recalled that there have never been any direct flights between Russia and New Zealand, and the connecting flights between Moscow and Wellington were operated twice a week. When was the last time Russian ships made an official visit to New Zealand, the media do not report. Which New Zealand banks have Russian accounts is also unknown. However, it is unlikely to be large. The trade turnover between Russia and New Zealand in 2020 was just over $534.6 million.

It is to be hoped that by participating together with the US, Great Britain and Canada in the anti-Russian sanctions, Australia and New Zealand can strengthen their unity with the Western world and show their commitment to its values. Now, with the shadow of mighty China already looming over the South Pacific, they need this unity more than ever. In any event, Australia and New Zealand have so far failed to pose any significant challenge to Russia. However, it should be remembered that Russia is not the only country to be sanctioned by the West, and that mindlessly following Washington’s lead could put Australia and New Zealand in a very difficult position in their relations with Beijing. Unlike Russia, the PRC is not far off for Australia and New Zealand, and the anti-Chinese sanctions and the Chinese response to them could be a real problem for these countries.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Internationally, Russia has traditionally been seen as one of the leading suppliers of technology, especially in such areas as the arms and military hardware markets. Many countries, all over the world, purchase Russian-made military equipment, including anti-aircraft missile systems, fighter jets battleships, etc. But, globally, the most widely sold and well-known Russian weapon is the Kalashnikov automatic rifle, known as AK, with its various modifications. More than 100 million of these guns have been sold to customers around the world.

This iconic automatic rifle has been copied, both under license and illegally, in many countries, including both China and the USA, the Russian-made ones are still considered the best, and Russia remains the main supplier.

The various Russian companies involved in the manufacture of these guns have now merged to form the Kalashnikov Concern.

In addition to firearms, the Kalashnikov Concern now manufactures a range of other items. These include military boats, unmanned aerial vehicles, rocket systems and missiles and a wide range of civilian goods. But, naturally, Kalashnikov automatic rifles remain the Concern’s most well-known products.

In modern business practice, one of the most effective ways for a company to extend its international presence is through licensing production in the customer’s country. This helps to minimize transportation costs, allows the manufacturer to supply goods to its customers an attractive price, and establish a long-term position in the customer’s market. Among other manufacturers, the Kalashnikov Concern has adopted this approach.

For example, back in 2011 the licensed manufacture of AK-74M guns began in Azerbaijan. By the middle of 2019, more than 100,000 units had been made in the country.

And in 2018 a licensing agreement was signed with India for the local production of Kalashnikov automatic rifles.

In terms of arms sales, India is known to be Russia’s most important trading partner. It has been purchasing Russian-made military hardware for its armed forces for many years. But for many years rifles – first British-made, and then Indian-made – were the weapon of choice for the Indian soldier. But by the 2010s the Indian army leadership decided that these weapons were outmoded and in 2016 it decided to replace them en masse. The Russian Kalashnikov was seen as the best option.

March 2019 saw the formal opening of Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited, a Russian and Indian joint venture licensed to manufacture AK 200- series automatic rifles, starting with the AK-203.

But production did not begin immediately, as the two countries had not yet agreed on the terms of the license.

And then in June 2020 a plant licensed to manufacture Kalashnikov automatic rifles (model АК-103) was officially opened in Armenia.

In December 2021 Russian President Vladimir Putin, together with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu made an official visit to India. During the visit they discussed a wide range of issues relating to cooperation between the two countries and their shared interests. The visit also resulted in the conclusion of a new agreement between Russia and India on military and technical cooperation until 2031. And it was also during that visit that the Indian Ministry of Defense finally signed an agreement with Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited for the supply of more than 500,000 Indian-manufactured AK-203 rifles. So, after a long wait, it appears that production of Kalashnikov automatic rifles will begin in India later this year.

But, in addition to organizing the manufacture of its rifles under license abroad, the Kalashnikov Concern is still exporting its Russian-made rifles, and its exports in 2021 were 70% greater than in 2020. These exports were primarily of small arms, including the AK-100 and AK-200, as well as rifles forming part of the Ratnik combat system.

Naturally, as a partially state-owned concern (25% of its shares are owned by the Russian State Corporation Rostec), Kalashnikov prioritizes government orders for the Russian Armed Forces, and under its commitments to the Russian Ministry of Defense it supplied tens of thousands of the latest AK-12 to the Russian Army in 2021. In 2021 Kalashnikov also supplied the Russian Armed Forces with ZUR 9M333 anti-aircraft guided missile systems able to destroy various different types of airborne target at a range of up to 5,000 km in any weather conditions.

2022 also promises to be a good year for the Concern, with reports of good international sales figures in the first two months of this year.

In January 2022 the Concern announced that it is ready to export its new KUB-E drone, which is, in effect, a guided bomb (or, in modern parlance, a kamikaze drone). The KUB-E flies silently and can reach a speed of up to 130 km/hour. It has undergone all the necessary tests, and, according to Kalashnikov, has already been used in combat situations. Now an official export permit has been issued for the system.

In February 2022 it was reported in the media that under an agreement between Rosoboronexport and a foreign customer in the Asia-Pacific region, the Concern has manufactured and supplied a large consignment of automatic rifles at short notice. The identity of the customer has not yet been revealed.

Also in February, it was announced that in 2022 Kazakhstan’s Tynys Arms Plant will begin manufacturing Kalashnikov AK-12 and AK-15 rifles under license. Both models form part of the latest version of the Ratnik combat system.

In conclusion, it is clear that the Kalashnikov brand is in great demand all over the world, just as it was several decades ago. The Concern currently exports its products to 27 different countries – and there is every likelihood that this list will continue to grow. In addition to the significant revenue that they bring to the Russian state budget, these sales are also important at a political level, reinforcing the high esteem with which Russian technology is held in dozens of countries around the world and further strengthening Russia’s prestige and reputation in the international community.

It is also worth remembering that the AK automatic rifles for which the Concern is best known have long been something of a cultural or even civilization icon. Ever since the USSR began to supply AK automatic rifles to regimes and movements fighting for independence from the Western imperialist yoke, this weapon, with its universally recognized silhouette (it is even depicted on a number of national flags and crests) has become a symbol of the struggle for freedom and of resistance to the unipolar world order that the USA and its allies have been trying to impose for well over half a century. And that symbol is closely connected to Russia. That level of renown is worth a great deal and it is still too early to assess its present and future value to Russia in her relations with the rest of the world.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

It is well known that countries of the African continent are mostly poor and need the support of major world powers who in exchange for access to the African nations’ rich natural resources. The US and the PRC are considered the main players vying for influence in Africa these days: media mention them particularly often in relation to international African issues. Other actors, such as France, has much less resources and less influence. Against the backdrop of Chinese-American confrontation and the activities of former European colonizers, it is not very obvious that another party, Russia, is present and gaining strength in Africa.

Russian-African relations date back to Soviet times, when the USSR actively supported the decolonization movement that was launched after World War II and started providing all kinds of assistance to all the young African states that wanted to free themselves from the colonial powers that kept trying to maintain an economic grip on their former colonies. It’s commonly understood that war is the invariable companion of poverty and political unrest. It is therefore not surprising that in addition to actively developing economic ties with local states, and the assistance it provided in the construction of a large number of industrial and economic projects, the USSR exported military hardware to local players, which brought the Soviet-African relations on a new level.

Since the 1950s, various types of Soviet military equipment, such as tanks, aircraft and warships, as well as Soviet military trainers, have appeared in Egypt, Algeria, Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia, and there have even been Soviet military bases in Angola. By the early 1980s, the USSR was cooperating with no fewer than 10 states on the Dark Continent in the field of defense. It should be stressed that we’re talking about cooperation in the defense sphere, while the overall list of African countries that received Soviet economic, scientific and technical assistance was much broader.

In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed and its successor, the Russian Federation, was for a long time preoccupied with various domestic and regional issues that forced it to minimize its presence in Africa. At the time, the main players in the region were the US and China.

In time, however, Russia resolved its problems, strengthened itself and began to take a renewed interest in global politics. In the 2000s, the Russian Federation began to restore cooperation with African countries. Given that Russia has one of the most powerful armies in the world, that the defense industry is one of the strongest pillars of the Russian economy and that Africa is still a highly unstable region, it is not surprising that defense and military-technical cooperation have taken again a special place in the new Russian-African relations. The greatly increased threat of international terrorism, for which Africa is one of the main springboards, has also played a part.

By the early 2010s, the Russian Federation had re-established close cooperation with Angola, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Ethiopia and several other African states.

In the decade that followed, the Russian Federation also signed defense cooperation treaties with Zambia, Cameroon, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, the Republic of Chad and Eswatini. Many treaties involved the supply of arms, others involved the training of qualified military personnel.

Russia’s roles in the assisting the Central African Republic (CAR) has been widely discussed in the interinational media. This country has been embroiled in civil war for many years, it is riddled with terrorist groups and in dire need of a combat-ready government army. Russia’s cooperation with the CAR intensified after a meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadéra in 2017. The Russian Federation began supplying small arms to the CAR and sent specialists to train government troops, including the president’s personal guard.

In October 2019, the Russia-Africa Summit was held in Sochi (a resort located in the Russian Federation), attended by leaders or heads of government of 39 African states. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who chaired the event together with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, announced that Russia was forgiving some $20bn in debts accumulated by African countries over the years of cooperation. Writing off debts that many African states simply could not physically pay, removed their fears of incurring more debt by developing cooperation with Russia and ushered in a new era of Russian-African relations.

As a result, in just five months after the forum, from October 2019 to March 2020, African countries made new orders of military equipment from the Russian Federation worth about $1bn.

At the end of 2020, 300 military trainers from the Russian Federation were sent to the CAR. Also, more than a hundred instructors arrived in the country in the summer of 2021. During their years in the CAR, the Russian military has achieved outstanding success in training local troops and providing security in their areas of deployment. The contribution of Russian specialists to the fight for security in the CAR is evidenced by the fact that in November 2021 a monument was unveiled in the CAR capital Bangui: a sculptural composition depicting CAR army fighters and their Russian colleagues together.

Meanwhile, in August 2021, Russia signed a military cooperation agreement with Nigeria that includes military equipment and training. The country also has serious security concerns: it is home to the powerful and violent Boko Haram terrorist group (banned in Russia), which in 2015 swore allegiance to the Daesh terrorist group (banned in Russia) and thus significantly strengthened its links with the international terrorist underground. To solve this problem, Nigeria also needs a strong, modern army, which Russia will help to train.

In January 2022 it was reported that Russian trainers are now also training troops of the Republic of Mali.

In conclusion, Russia’s positions in Africa are not yet as strong as that of China or the West, but there are strong preconditions for expanding them. The Russian Federation seems to place too much emphasis on defense cooperation, while the PRC is conquering Africa with huge financial investments in areas of daily necessity, thus tying African countries to itself. But it should be noted that financial injections without control over the use of funds and loans without guarantees of repayment are a great risk, and large-scale investments always need to be protected by force. And when the PRC began its penetration of the Dark Continent back in the 1960s and 1970s, not yet expecting to soon match the West or the USSR, Chinese activity in Africa also consisted of supplying arms and military specialists to struggling regimes for independence. And already in 2017, the PRC achieved the opening of a naval base in the African country of Djibouti, on the coast of the Gulf of Aden. According to some reports, up to 10,000 Chinese troops are stationed at the base, and although the official version of their task is to provide security for navigation in the Gulf of Aden, such a force is quite sufficient for operations deep in the African continent, where Chinese nationals work and where expensive Chinese projects are underway. In addition, it is not known what percentage of Chinese professionals working in Africa may be members of the security forces that provide security for fellow citizens and PRC assets.

In view of military, terrorist and other threats in the African countries, which Russia faces, it is quite reasonable that the Russian Federation seeks to provide military support to friendly governments. Once their stability has been achieved, peaceful and mutually beneficial projects, such as uranium and gold mining, the construction of nuclear power plants, etc., can be launched, and the plans for Russian-African cooperation are numerous.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Southeast Asia (SEA) is a vast territory surrounded by warm oceans and located in the equatorial, subequatorial, and tropical climatic zones. This geographical position provides suitable conditions for beach holidays and the creation of resorts. In addition to the warm climate, beautiful landscapes, exotic nature, and sea beaches, the countries of Southeast Asia have an ancient culture, a unique folk flavor, and numerous historical monuments. All this makes Southeast Asia a desirable destination for tourists from all over the world. It is not surprising that tourism has developed actively and steadily in recent decades in the region.

Southeast Asia is of interest to vacationers from all over the world, including Russia. The most popular destinations in Southeast Asia among Russians in 2019, before the start of the coronavirus crisis and the massive closure of borders, were Thailand and Vietnam.

Thailand can be called the tourist capital of Southeast Asia. Foreign tourism began to develop in that country as early as the 1960s when civil wars raged in many other countries of the region and regimes succeeded each other that could not find a common language with wealthy states – suppliers of tourists. For a long time, internal conflicts, economic crises, and sanctions pressure from abroad prevented many Southeast Asian countries from developing tourism.

Now tourism for Thailand is one of the most important sources of income. In 2019, the tourism sector brought the country more than $62.2 billion, about 20% of Thailand’s GDP. Almost 40 million foreigners visited the country with a population of 70 million. It is noteworthy that among the states, whose citizens visited Thailand in 2019, Russia took fourth place: more than 1.4 million Russians came to Thailand.

According to forecasts made by the Thai government in 2019, tourism revenues should amount to 30% of the country’s GDP by 2030. However, life made its own adjustments that cast these forecasts into doubt: at the end of 2019, an epidemic of the COVID-19 virus began, which soon turned into a pandemic, covering the entire globe. In January 2020, Thailand became the first country after China to report a case of the disease.

Due to the quarantine measures that various states began to take from the beginning of 2020, the tourist flow to Thailand started to decline. The Thai government has also restricted citizens’ and visitors’ movement to slow down the spread of infection. In April 2020, all commercial flights to Thailand were canceled, and soon the level of revenues from the tourism business in the country was close to zero. Thailand’s tourism revenues remained at this zero level in the second and third quarters of 2020. It was not until October 2020 that the country received its first batch of foreign tourists In the fourth quarter of 2020, tourism brought about $30 million to Thailand, which, of course, cannot be compared with the revenues of previous years.

This massive decline in foreign money inflows has clearly dealt a heavy blow to the Thai economy. In 2020 and 2021, the country was racked by people’s clashes who lost their earnings due to epidemic control restrictions. Realizing that it could not do without restoring the tourist flow, Thailand, however, accepted tourists with several conditions in 2021: even those vaccinated against COVID-19 were required to provide health certificates and serve in their hotels for a lengthy quarantine. Only at the end of June 2021 did the Thai leadership approve a list of countries whose citizens can visit Phuket without quarantine if they are fully vaccinated. Non-quarantine visits to other parts of Thailand by vaccinated citizens of several countries were allowed only in November 2021. So, there is still no reason to talk about restoring Thailand’s pre-coronavirus income.

However, the tourist flow is gradually growing. It is known that only on January 1-4, 2022, more than 32,600 foreign tourists arrived in the country. It is noteworthy that most of them were Russian citizens,

and as mentioned above, another Southeast Asian country popular among Russian tourists is Vietnam. That country does not have such a developed tourism infrastructure as Thailand. Still, it also has a warm climate, extensive sea beaches, natural and cultural attractions, and in recent decades, the tourism business in Vietnam has shown active and stable growth.

In 2016, for the first time, more than 10 million foreign tourists visited Vietnam with nearly 100 million people.

In 2018, more than 15.4 million tourists visited the country, and tourism business revenues amounted to 7.5% of Vietnamese GDP, more than $18.3 billion. It is worth noting that more than 600,000 foreign tourists who visited Vietnam in 2018 were Russian citizens. Thus, Russia ranked 6th in the list of the top countries supplying tourists to Vietnam, after China, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, located very close to Vietnam and after the United States.

This prompts a conclusion that Russia is one of the leading partners for Vietnam in the tourism sector among countries located far from the region. Not surprising since the two states have decades of fruitful cooperation in many other areas. At the end of 2018, when a delegation of the State Duma of the Russian Federation visited Vietnam, the parties, among other things, agreed to make efforts so that in 2020, the year when Russia and Vietnam were celebrating the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations, at least 1 million Russian tourists should visit Vietnam.

However, this plan was not destined to come true due to the pandemic.

Saving the lives of its citizens, the Vietnamese leadership made a wise and challenging decision: to close their country’s borders to foreign tourists. This was done at the end of March 2020. Before the closure of the borders in 2020, only slightly over 244,000 Russian citizens managed to visit Vietnam (at the same time, Russia took 3rd place in terms of the number of tourists who visited Vietnam in the first months of 2020). The total number of foreign tourists visiting Vietnam in 2020 was less than 3.7 million, almost five times less than in 2019.

Of course, due to the closure of the borders, the country’s tourism business has experienced a severe crisis. If Vietnam’s tourism income exceeded $32 billion in 2019, it amounted to just over $13.4 billion in 2020. Government programs to develop domestic tourism helped save at least some income and support Vietnamese small businesses.

However, from the beginning of the coronavirus crisis, it was clear that it would be difficult for Vietnam to do without restoring the tourist flow from abroad. The primary purpose in this situation is to quickly find a cure for COVID-19. While remaining one of Vietnam’s closest partners, the Russian Federation resolved this issue. In 2021, Russia and Vietnam launched the production of the Russian anti-covid vaccine Sputnik V on Vietnamese territory. The Russian Federation also pledged to supply Vietnam with another 40 million doses of Sputnik V produced in Russia by June 2022. By the end of 2021, more than 50 million people out of more than 97.5 million Vietnamese citizens have been vaccinated with Sputnik V and other vaccines in Vietnam.

On December 26, 2021, a passenger aircraft with Russian tourists landed at Cam Ranh Airport in Vietnam for the first time in two years. All Russians had a COVID-19 vaccination certificate. Only two tourist flights a week will be operated from Russia to Vietnam in the coming months. Still, even this rather modest volume of travel suggests that the victory over the pandemic and the tourist flow restoration to Vietnam are not far off.

The tourism business has been and, apparently, will soon become one of the essential sources of income for Southeast Asia, and Russians are largely contributing to this. It can be expected that this factor will play its role in the further development of partnership between Southeast Asia and the Russian Federation.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

There has been global confrontation between the US and China for many years. Against this background, the regional confrontation between China and India continues. The two mighty neighboring Asian powers have long been competitors, having territorial issues and vying for influence in neighboring states. Fortunately, the struggle is mainly in the economic sphere, but to be sure that it will remain there, the countries are building up their defense.

Pakistan is another long-standing and strong adversary of India, which shares a common  border with it. Pakistan has worked closely with China in recent years. Considering Chinese activity in other neighboring countries of India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka, it could be said that India is gradually finding itself in a “hostile ring”. It should also be borne in mind that, in addition to those countries that are unfriendly to India or pro-Chinese regimes, there’s agents of international terrorism operate in neighboring countries that are not averse to using those conflicts between Muslims and representatives of other religions that reignite in India for their own purpose. Tterrorists are particularly strong in Pakistan, which, as you know, shares a border with Afghanistan. Their activity has been observed in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Bangladesh for some time now. In recent years, the terrorist threat in the region has multiplied in connection with the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. In such conditions, India needs outside support.

Therefore, New Delhi is developing cooperation with its long-standing strategic partner, the US. And the US is now trying to unite its main allies, such as Great Britain, Australia and Japan, and regional competitors of China, such as India and South Korea, to build a joint anti-Chinese front. To this end, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) was created in 2007, formed with the USA, Australia, India and Japan. In 2021, the AUKUS defense alliance was established, included with the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom.

India actively purchases American weapons and regularly participates in the Malabar joint naval exercise with the United States and Japan, and Australia has also participated in them since 2020.

However, excessive rapprochement with America and full participation in American military blocs is hardly a factor in the Indian plans, which is a long-term and consistent participant in the Non-Aligned Movement. Participation in military alliances implies an obligation to other members to act on their side in the event of an armed conflict. It is unlikely that such a powerful and, at the same time, peace-loving player like India would like to participate in any war not related to the defense of Indian territory, which is not in line with Indian interests and initiated by third countries.

Even though New Delhi and Washington are pursuing a common goal to weaken China’s influence, or at least prevent its further growth, the Indian leadership cannot but understand that the United States and India are in different conditions: India lies next to China and has a common border about 4,000 km long, and America is located across the ocean. In addition, the United States is known to have a propensity to fight “by someone’s hands.” Considering the worst-case scenario, a military conflict between China and its anti-Chinese forces, in the event of India being forced to participate, India will take on the most difficult blows of the Chinese Armed Forces. Therefore, in its cooperation with Washington, New Delhi prefers not to go too far and maintain a reasonable distance.

One may say that India is in a bit of a pickle: it is too vulnerable to China without collaborating with Washington. India can be drawn into a destructive conflict with China even when it does not correspond to Indian interests.

To maintain a balance in relations with the United States, India needs to cooperate with a third force comparable in power to the United States or China and, at the same time, not take an active part in their confrontation. Russia is such a force.

India and the Russian Federation are long-standing and reliable partners who have cooperated for many decades in various fields, including military and technical. Back in Soviet times, during the Cold War, the Indian strategy took shape: following the Non-Aligned Movement rules, maintaining good relations with both the USSR and the United States, and, if possible, using their support in its confrontation with China and Pakistan. This strategy is as relevant for India today as it used to be.

In 2018, an agreement was signed on the supply of five sets of S-400 air defense systems by Russia to India, which caused great discontent and threats of sanctions from Washington. The American threats were ignored.  In the same year, during a visit to India, Russian President Vladimir Putin recalled that Russian-Indian relations have a “particularly privileged strategic partnership” nature.

2021 was not an easy year for all states, especially for India: it was among the countries most affected by the COVID-19 virus at the beginning of the year. The deaths of many people and the closure of production due to quarantine measures have dealt severe blows to Indian society and the economy. However, India’s military-technical cooperation with Russia continued to develop.

At the beginning of 2021, the amount of Indian military and technical orders from the Russian Federation exceeded $ 14 billion.

In February 2021, in the Indian city of Bengaluru, Aero India 2021 took place, which is an international event dedicated to the achievements of the aviation, space and defense industries. As usual, one of the largest expositions was presented by Russia. India has decided to buy 12 Russian Su-30MKI aircraft worth more than $ 1.4 billion and 21 Russian MiG-29 fighters.

In August 2021, India-Russia joint training exercise INDRA 2021 took place. The event, held in the Volgograd region of the Russian Federation, was attended by 250 Indian and Russian military personnel, armored vehicles, multiple launch rocket systems and aviation were involved.

At the end of August 2021, the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan was complete, and now this country is officially under the rule of the Taliban terrorist group (banned in the Russian Federation). This is a common challenge for India, which may now face a manifold increase in the terrorist threat from Pakistan and Russia, whose security sphere includes the Central Asian states bordering Afghanistan. Let’s recall that even if the Taliban have not yet demonstrated hostile intentions towards neighboring states, there are many other terrorist groups in Afghanistan whose interests go far beyond the borders of this country.

In connection with this situation, on August 24, 2021, a telephone conversation took place between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin. After that, a Russian delegation headed by Nikolai Patrushev, Director of Russia’s Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, was sent to New Delhi to discuss cooperation issues in security and combatting terrorism. On September 9, 2021, Patrushev met with Narendra Modi. They discussed further development of Russian-Indian relations and interaction on regional security issues, including Afghanistan. In the opinion of both sides, Russia and India must coordinate their actions to prevent an escalation of violence.

On December 6, 2021, Vladimir Putin arrived in New Deli. During his discussions with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, all aspects of Russian-Indian cooperation were touched upon, including security issues and the situation in Afghanistan. It was decided to provide humanitarian assistance in the near future. On the same day, a Russian-Indian intergovernmental agreement was signed on a program of military-technical cooperation until 2030. The signing of the document was attended by the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and  Defense Minister of India, Rajnath Singh. All details of the agreement have not yet been disclosed. Still, it is already known that, among other things, licensed production of 600,000 new Russian AK-203 assault rifles is planned in Indian territory.

According to Sergei Shoigu, India is one of the key partners of Russia in the defense sphere.

Military and technical, and defense cooperation between Russia and India is still developing firmly and steadily. Continuing to maintain contacts with Washington for the sake of their national interests, New Delhi understands that the Russian Federation is a country with which India has neither ideological contradictions nor territorial issues. At the same time, it is on the same continent and, accordingly, is much more interested in common Eurasian security than the United States. In addition, considering Moscow’s friendly relations with Beijing, Russia can assume the role of mediator in some disagreements between India and China and contribute to their mutually beneficial outcome to a greater extent than Washington, which prefers the language of threats and sanctions. In conclusion, relations with Russia are of particular value to India and will be strengthened in future.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The history of relations between Russia and Vietnam goes back to Soviet times when the USSR supported the Vietnamese communists in their war for creating their state, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). After that, the Soviet Union became a major partner of the SRV for many years. The common ideology, joint opposition to the West, and the need to contain China, with which both the USSR and SRV had very tense relations in the second half of the twentieth century, contributed to the convergence of the two states in all major spheres. Thus, the USSR had its own military base in the SRV, and the SRV had up to 70% of its foreign trade with the USSR. Friendly relations between the two countries lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

When its successor, the Russian Federation, replaced the USSR, it maintained friendly relations with Vietnam. In 1994, the countries signed the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Friendly Relations. However, practical cooperation has been dramatically reduced, including in the trade and economic sphere. But after the economic crisis of the 1990s passed, the Russian Federation has been restoring economic cooperation with the SRV since the beginning of the 21st century.

In 2001, Russia and Vietnam signed a Declaration on Strategic Partnership. In 2012 this partnership was declared comprehensive, and in 2015 an agreement on a free trade zone between Vietnam and the Eurasian Economic Union was signed, in which Russia plays a key role. In 2016, the agreement came into force, and the volume of Russian-Vietnamese trade began to grow rapidly. In 2020, the mutual trade turnover between Russia and SRV exceeded $5.6 billion.

All this time, there has also been interaction between the two states in the political sphere. Vietnam supports the Russian Federation on significant issues of the international political agenda. There is an active Russian-Vietnamese dialogue at a high level, high-level visits are exchanged, and negotiations on new agreements are underway.

At the end of 2018, a delegation of the State Duma of the Russian Federation visited the SRV. Representatives of the Russian parliament met with Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyễn Xuân Phúc and Chairperson of the country’s National Assembly Nguyễn Thị Kim Ngân. Discussing trade, economic and humanitarian cooperation between the Russian Federation and SRV, the sides noted that Russian education is still valued in Vietnam, just as in Soviet times. At that time, about 5 thousand Vietnamese citizens were studying at Russian universities. It was also stated that tourism is an up-and-coming field for Russian-Vietnamese cooperation. Thus, a record number of tourists, more than 600,000, from Russia visited Vietnam in 2018. The negotiators decided to increase this figure to 1 million by 2020.

In honor of the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Friendly Relations, which was celebrated in 2019, as well as the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations, which was celebrated in 2020, 2019 was declared the Cross Year of Russia and Vietnam. About 600,000 Russian tourists revisited Vietnam in 2019.

At the end of 2019, Nguyễn Thị Kim Ngân, Chairperson of the country’s National Assembly of the SRV, visited Russia to attend the first meeting of the Inter-parliamentary Commission of Russia and Vietnam on Economic and Political Cooperation. The parties discussed plans to increase trade between Russia and Vietnam to $10 billion a year and also voiced the idea of switching to local currencies instead of the US dollar in Russian-Vietnamese trade. This was due to the threat of American economic sanctions, which Washington never stops preparing against both Russia and Vietnam.

Unfortunately, the above-mentioned plan to bring the annual number of Russian tourists in Vietnam to the level of 1 million people has not yet been implemented. The reason for this is the coronavirus pandemic that began in late 2019 and would spread across the globe in 2020.

In March 2020, Vietnam closed its borders to foreign tourists. As a result, only 192,000 Russian citizens visited the SRV instead of the usual 600,000. Of course, it dealt a powerful blow to the Vietnamese tourism industry. However, these were necessary losses that the Vietnamese government was forced into to save its citizens’ lives and health.

Fighting the spread of the disease has become another essential area of Russian-Vietnamese cooperation.

In late March 2021, the media reported that the Ministry of Health of Vietnam had registered the Russian Covid-19 vaccine Sputnik V.  And the registration was carried out in an accelerated way during the EUA (emergency use authorization) procedure. Vietnam is one of the most developed countries in Southeast Asia and has one of the largest populations in the region, about 97.3 million people. The fact that the Vietnamese leadership has entrusted the protection of its citizens to a Russian drug shows the high level of confidence of the SRV in both Russia and its medical technology. Also of note is the fact that, with over 90% efficacy and minimal allergenicity, Sputnik V is moderately priced, which is also vital for less affluent countries with large populations.

However, Vietnam did not stop at registering and purchasing the Russian vaccine. It decided to set up its licensed production on its territory. In July 2021, the media reported that thanks to the joint efforts of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and Vabiotech, one of the leaders in the Vietnamese pharmaceutical industry, the first test batch of the drug was produced in the SRV. The vaccine was sent to Moscow to be tested at the Gamaleya National Research Center for Epidemiology and Microbiology to ensure that the vaccine, produced using Russian technology in Vietnam, is not inferior to the Russian-made vaccine. The quality control test was passed successfully.

In September 2021, the first regular batch of Sputnik V was ready, which was also checked by Russian specialists and made a positive conclusion.

However, Vietnam can’t supply the vaccine to its entire population; therefore, it has to purchase a certain amount of the vaccine from Russia. The country received the first 739,000 doses of Sputnik V purchased from Russia at the end of September. Under the existing agreement, Vietnam will receive 40 million doses until June 2022.

Finally, the mass vaccination of the Vietnamese population with Sputnik V began in October 2021. To begin with, the drug was delivered to three vaccination sites in Ho Chi Minh City, the country’s largest city with a population of about 8 million people.

Thus, despite the global economic downturn caused by the pandemic, which has also affected Russian-Vietnamese cooperation, the two countries continue to actively cooperate, develop trade and scientific and technological links and thus strengthen their strategic partnership.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the newly independent states discovered many threats to their security that were not as visible when they were still part of the Soviet Union. In particular, the young Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan faced many dangers. The more significant threat to these countries came from neighboring Afghanistan, engulfed in a civil war between numerous groups professing radical Islamism. Many of them had no intention of limiting their activities to Afghan territory.

Realizing that it was better to fight all these menaces together, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and many other countries signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992.

However, in 1999 several states, including Uzbekistan, withdrew from the Treaty. One of the reasons was Tashkent’s desire to get closer to the West. That same year, in 1999, Uzbekistan joined the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development established in the post-Soviet space by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova under the auspices of the Council of Europe. Uzbekistan’s accession to GUAM was announced at the NATO summit in Washington, where the leaders of the GUAM countries adopted the Washington Declaration, which embodied the desire of these countries to cooperate with the EU and the United States.

In 2001, when US and allied forces entered Afghanistan, Uzbekistan made its Karshi Khanabad military airfield available to the Americans. Cooperation with the US, the presence of the US military in the country, and a hope for their early victory over Afghan terrorists probably led the Uzbek leadership to believe that it could ensure national security without participation in the Collective Security Treaty. It was then that the USA began to refer to Uzbekistan as “one of its key partners.”

In 2002, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was established based on the Collective Security Treaty, which included Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. One of the main tasks of the CSTO was the protection of the Tajik-Afghan border, a long stretch of rugged mountainous terrain through which not only terrorist groups but also drug caravans could sneak in from Afghanistan.

US-Uzbekistan relations soon soured. In May 2005, there were anti-government protests and riots in Andijan in which protesters and several officers of security forces were killed. The authorities brutally suppressed the riots, and many civilians lost their lives. After Washington, as always concerned about human rights violations, demanded an independent investigation, the Uzbek authorities, in turn, insisted that the Americans leave Karshi Khanabad, which they did in November 2005.

Having ceased to be a “key partner” of the USA, Uzbekistan moved closer to former regional allies and joined the CSTO in 2006. However, its membership in the organization had more of a formal character. For example, Uzbekistan has not participated in CSTO joint anti-terrorist exercises, and Uzbek military personnel have not served in the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces or peacekeeping units. Apparently, Tashkent was hoping for promptly reestablishing relations with Washington. Indeed, the United States needed Uzbekistan to transport its cargoes to Afghanistan, so much that the Asian Development Bank allocated $165 million to build a railroad from the Uzbek city of Termez to the Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif (most of the shares of the Asian Development Bank are owned by Japan, a US ally, and the United States).

In 2011, the United States decided to reduce its military presence in Afghanistan. A reduction in the number of foreign military personnel on Afghan territory has meant a proportional increase in the activity of Afghan terrorist groups. However, this did not seem to bother Tashkent, as its relations with Washington were improving. In the autumn of 2011, an Uzbek-American business forum was held in the American capital, to which Uzbek Minister of Foreign Affairs Elyor Ganiyev arrived in Washington. At the time, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said there were “signs of improvement in Uzbekistan’s human rights record.”

In 2012, Uzbekistan again suspended its membership in the CSTO but retained the opportunity to return. Tashkent attributed the move to poor relations with other CSTO members, its neighbors Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. And rumors have emerged in the press about the possible establishment of an American military base in the country. By mid-2012, US investments in the Uzbek economy exceeded $2 billion. So, although the US military base had never been established on Uzbek territory, it is obvious that Washington had its leverage on Uzbekistan. And Tashkent had its own benefit from its non-participation in the CSTO. For billions of American dollars, it could establish its own defense system without the participation of its neighbors. At least, as long as NATO troops stood in neighboring Afghanistan and kept terrorists in check.

All these years, the Americans talked about withdrawing their troops from Afghanistan, but this did not happen because there was no way to leave the country so that in a few weeks, it would not fall under the complete control of the Taliban (a movement banned in the Russian Federation). The pro-American government of Afghanistan was too weak. By 2018, the USA seemed to have realized that if it stayed in Afghanistan, it would be at war in Afghanistan forever. As a result, Washington began talks with the Taliban in 2018. The parties agreed that the USA would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, and the Taliban would stop terrorist activities and fight for power by legitimate means. In the summer of 2021, US troops withdrew from Afghanistan, and the Taliban dispersed Kabul’s government forces, quickly crushing the remnants of resistance. As early as September 2021, they took over the entire country. It was hard to expect any other outcome.

The CSTO met the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan fully prepared to respond to a threat to any of its members in accordance with its protocols. The CSTO leadership met in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, September 15-16, 2021, to discuss security measures required because of the situation in Afghanistan. A plan for additional military exercises near the Tajik-Afghan border was outlined. However, CSTO forces already conduct such exercises in those dangerous places on a regular basis.

As for Uzbekistan, it has become unclear whether it should expect US support in the near future. While the American military forces were in Afghanistan, they needed Uzbekistan to transit goods. It brought good money to the budget of the Central Asian country, giving hope for American protection in case of danger. However, now that the USA has left Afghanistan, the situation has changed dramatically. The USA might be interested in the rare metals (including gold) that Uzbekistan is rich in, but as of mid-2020, the USA ranked only ninth among Uzbekistan’s trading partners.

It may be time for a new agreement with the CSTO and Russia for Uzbekistan. However, there was no “rupture” between Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation: Unlike the United States, Russia is one of Uzbekistan’s top three trading partners. It is interested in the security of the entire Central Asian region, which adjoins its southern borders and Moscow has continued to supply arms to Uzbekistan at CSTO prices and trained the Uzbek military all these years. Of course, if a threat to Uzbekistan’s security arises, Russia will provide it with the necessary support as a close partner and part of the common geopolitical space. In an interview on the current situation in Afghanistan, one Uzbek expert said: “Uzbekistan, as a country brotherly to Russia, expects that the republic will not be left in harm’s way.” There’s no doubt about that.

The problem is: Uzbekistan is one of the most economically developed countries and has relatively powerful armed forces. Therefore, even in the worst-case scenario in Afghanistan, an attack on Uzbek territory is unlikely. If Afghan terrorists decide to engage in external aggression, it is far more likely to be Tajikistan, a poor country with a small army that will be a target. According to the Collective Security Treaty, in the event of an attack on Tajikistan, it would have to be defended at the risk of death by Russian military personnel. For this purpose, the Russian 201st Military Base is located near the Tajik-Afghan border and military personnel from other CSTO countries is also deployed there. Will Uzbekistan, not being a member of the CSTO and having no corresponding obligations, help these countries fight a common enemy?

So far, the picture is encouraging: In July 2021, the Uzbek military participated in exercises along with their Russian and Tajik counterparts on the Tajik-Afghan border. It is reported that similar exercises will be held in the fall of 2021. Of course, exercises and actual military operations are different matters. But we can hope that with good-neighborly relations with Russia and an understanding of the strategic situation in the region, Uzbekistan will contribute to the strengthening of regional security even without CSTO membership. Nevertheless, if it were to resume its membership in the CSTO, coordination of joint actions would be easier.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 demonstrated to the international community that Washington’s sphere of influence is shrinking and that the US army is not as all-powerful as it pretends to be.

As in Afghanistan, Washington planned to establish a pro-American regime in the Syrian Arab Republic, but these plans were never destined to be: Bashar al-Assad, with the active participation of the Russian Armed Forces, was able to retain power. Various groups supervised by the United States continue their activities on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. Still, their followers are becoming less and less, and their potential is decreasing. Circumstances are such that Washington will sooner or later have to give up its claim on Syria.

In September 2021, Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mikdad called on the USA to order its troops to withdraw from the Syrian Arab Republic. According to the head of the Syrian Foreign Ministry, Washington’s military presence in Syria violates international law and destabilizes the already tense situation in the country. Previously, representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic have repeatedly stated that they have a strong negative attitude towards the presence of American troops in Syria, as the US does not take into account the position of the Syrian authorities and acts solely for its own benefit. This assessment by Syrian officials of Washington’s detrimental actions is supported by more than a few countries that condemn US policy towards the Syrian Arab Republic.

Currently, the US army, supported by rebels, has occupied northern and northeastern territories of Syria in Ar Raqqah, Al-Hasakah, and Deir ez-Zor Governorates, where the largest oil and gas fields of Syria are located. The Americans are there illegally extracting Syria’s natural resources, thereby undermining its economy. As of October 2021, about one thousand US soldiers are in Syria against the will of the Syrian leadership, implementing Washington’s expansionist, de facto neo-colonial policy.

It is imperative to note that the US military is intensively engaged with anti-government groups that want to overthrow Syria’s legitimate government. Such actions are undoubtedly unacceptable from the point of view of international law. Therefore, the leadership of the Syrian Arab Republic protests against the American military presence, including the UN, stating that such actions by Washington are unacceptable.

However, despite this, the USA does not lose hope of turning Syria into its satellite state. In its actions, Washington is also actively seeking to weaken Russia’s role in Middle Eastern politics. The primary purpose of the American leadership’s policy notoriously is to create conditions for the uncontrolled extraction of natural resources worldwide. The Syrian Arab Republic is no exception. While continuing its unsuccessful effort to topple Bashar al-Assad today, Washington is trying to get Syria’s natural resources for its own use.

Over the decades, Middle Easterners, mainly Iraqis, have lost faith in the US to bring them freedom and democracy, so the average Middle Easterner associates the American soldier with something dangerous and untrustworthy. In the age of information technology, it is not easy to hide the facts of numerous war crimes. The whole world has witnessed the US atrocities in Iraq and Afghanistan and in other countries where US troops are deployed. As a consequence, many nations view the US with apprehension.

On September 26, 2021, US military aircraft landed troops in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor Governorate on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River for an anti-terrorist operation. According to media reports, the operation took place in Al-Shuhayl village. As they landed, American paratroopers opened fire on residences and outbuildings. At least three civilians were killed as a result, according to local media reports.

During September, similar “anti-terrorist operations” were conducted in al-Jasmi and Busaiteen villages north of Deir ez-Zor Governorate, where the US military took groups of prisoners to an unknown destination. The US military command saw no need to explain its actions to either Syrian authorities or the international community.

The actions of US authorities to actively support the Syrian Kurds and promises to help them achieve independence can violate the territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. Not to mention Washington’s disruption of the political equilibrium throughout the Middle East region.

In September 2021, Turkish President Recep Erdoğan said he believes the US should leave Syria and Iraq the same way it recently left Afghanistan. Erdoğan is convinced that Washington does not need to maintain military contingents in these countries because the situation in the world has drastically changed. The Turkish leader noted that these states have the right to make their own decisions and control their destiny.

The very fact that representatives of Turkey, a NATO member and one of the most active participants in Washington’s big geopolitical game in the Middle East, say that the USA needs to withdraw its troops from Syria clearly demonstrates that the US position is weakening.

On September 29, 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Erdoğan met in Sochi, Russia. The Turkish leader attaches great importance to Russian-Turkish relations because he believes that order to the region largely stands on them. Recep Erdoğan said Turkey had sent its military contingent to the Syrian Arab Republic to speed up its reconstruction process. The Turkish President also expressed hope that the world’s leading powers will work together to achieve stability and peace in Syria. Vladimir Putin praised the dialogue between Russia and Turkey. For his part, the Russian President said that Russia will continue to help de-escalate the conflict situation in Syria.

Summarizing the above, it can be assumed that the American leadership will be forced to announce the withdrawal of troops from Syria in the foreseeable future. According to analysts, Washington’s initial goals to replace the official authorities in Damascus are currently unrealistic. American leadership needs to realize this. At some point, acute domestic political problems and a growing annual national debt should force the United States to stop interfering in the life of independent Middle Eastern states.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The armed forces guarantee the preservation of a country’s independence and sometimes the survival of its people. Every more or less independent state is compelled and obliged to allocate budgetary funds for manning, training, and arming of its security forces. However, the Armed Forces are required not only to create and equip. They also need to be periodically displayed to other countries to show their power, inspire allies, and curb the enthusiasm of a likely adversary. Fortunately, it is possible to demonstrate military power without actual combat operations, but during exercises, parades, etc. All this, as well as various military exhibitions, helps, among other things, the countries producing military equipment to demonstrate new achievements of their military-industrial complex and to attract foreign buyers and investors. There are also various military-sports competitions, which have been gaining popularity among spectators in recent years.

The International Military Sports Council (IMSC) is the world’s second-largest multidisciplinary sports organization after the International Olympic Committee. IMSC is headquartered in Brussels.

Of course, the major military powers want to have their own military sporting events to demonstrate their successes more often and in more comfortable conditions. That is why, for example, Russia organized its own competitions for the military.

Since 2013, the Tank Biathlon World Championship has been held in the Russian Federation. As the name implies, tank crews have to show their driving skills and accuracy of firing their guns during this competition, hitting targets in different parts of a challenging route.

In August 2015, Russia hosted the First International Army Games (Armygames 2015) Then the Tank Biathlon World Championship became part of these games, and since then, it has been held as part of the Armygames.

For the first time, the Armygames was held at 11 Russian training grounds, with teams representing ground forces, navy and aviation competing. Teams from 17 countries came to the Games. In addition to Russia and its fully expected CSTO allies (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), Angola, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Kuwait, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Serbia, and Venezuela sent their athletes. The participation of such giants as India and China added to the scope of the event.

In addition to the Tank Biathlon, servicemen from the listed countries have competed in such spectacular competitions as Aviadarts. Pilots of aircraft and helicopters showed their skills, Competition of anti-aircraft missile troops units (Confident Reception) for anti-aircraft gunners, Masters of Artillery Fire, Caspian Derby for the Marines, and others.

Since then, the Armygames has been held annually in Russia.

Military personnel from 19 countries, including Greece, which, as you know, is a member of NATO, participated in Armygames 2016. The Russian side has repeatedly invited countries from this military bloc to the Tank Biathlon, including the United States. However, it seems that the leading NATO states prefer to compete in their own close circle and away from competitors such as the Russian Federation or the PRC. So Russian invitations were not accepted. However, in 2016 the US Army European Command and the German Army Land Forces Command organized their analog of the “Tank Biathlon” – the annual tank competition for NATO countries “Strong Europe,” which has since been held in Germany.

The Third International Army Games were held in 2017, and this time, 28 countries participated, including militarily advanced nations like Iran and Israel. Moreover, Armygames 2017 was organized not only in Russia but also in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and China.

Armygames 2018 was held on the territory of seven countries: Armenia and Iran were added to the previous list. Thirty-two nations participated in the Games. Importantly, in 2018, Vietnam, Russia’s strategic partner in Southeast Asia, with whom Russia has long-standing defense cooperation dating back to Soviet times, joined the Armygames. Vietnam’s participation in the Games could be another small step towards restoring this cooperation to its previous scope. It is also interesting that a traditional US ally (with whom things have not gone smoothly for Washington lately), the Philippines took part in Armygames in 2018.

In 2019, the number of countries participating in the Armygames had traditionally increased: there were 39 of them. Among the new arrivals was Cuba, a longtime partner of the USSR and an adversary of the West. The Games were already held in 10 countries, including India, with which Russia also has long-standing and sound defense cooperation.

Obviously, throughout the whole period of the Armygames’ existence, the international interest in this military and sports event and the number of its participants have been steadily increasing. This would probably have continued, was it not for the COVID-19 pandemic that swept the world in 2020. Because of this scourge, the number of countries participating in the 2020 Armygames decreased from 39 to 32, and the Games were held on the territory of only five countries: Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan.

The 7th International Armygames were held in August-September 2021. The development and mass introduction of new vaccines reduced the risk of coronavirus spread, and the event was able to take revenge for 2020. More than 5,000 military personnel from 42 countries participated in Armygames 2021, and the Games were held on the territory of 11 countries. So it could be said the Armygames has successfully recovered from the downturn due to the pandemic and has continued to “gain momentum.”

“The International Army Games are not only a demonstration of military power but also a full-fledged training for the Armed Forces, comparable to an actual military exercise. At the same time, the Armygames helps develop cooperation between the militaries of different countries to maintain global security,” said Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu at the Closing Ceremony of the Armygames 2021 on September 4, 2021.

And already, on September 16, 2021, the World Military Boxing Championship started in Moscow, which is the international competition held under the aegis of the above-mentioned International Military Sports Council. In its 74 years of existence, this Championship was held in Russia for the first time. Given Russia’s current relationship with the West, fully demonstrated by the Tokyo Olympics in the summer of 2021, IMSC’s decision to hold such an event in Russia seems unexpected. Perhaps, looking at Russia’s successes associated with the Armygames, the IMSC leadership has concluded that “weaning” Russia from world military sports is more detrimental to the sport than to Russia. Alternatively, while less popular than “civilian” sports, military sports may be less politicized. Being military rather than politicians, the people associated with it understand that global security cannot be achieved without cooperation with Russia.

Athletes from 36 countries came to the Championships, and they gave Moscow viewers and TV audiences around the world a whole week of exciting, uncompromising, and beautiful fights. Russian boxers won seven gold medals, demonstrating to the world not the work with combat equipment but the personal strength and endurance of Russian army fighters.

The strength and prestige of the armed forces are some of the most critical factors that help any state achieve success in the international arena, which has a significant impact on diplomatic negotiations and economic relations between countries even in the absence of military conflict. Moreover, contrary to the widespread misconception, the presence of powerful and globally respected armed forces in a country with a competent foreign policy reduces, rather than increases, the likelihood of its involvement in a military conflict. It is hoped that more and more military sporting events around the world will be held. The militaries of different countries will mainly use them, rather than in actual combat, to improve the skills and prestige of their armies, jointly enhancing the level of global security.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.