Japanese mass-media would one day scream about the Russian army ‘acting with impudence’ in Donbass and about illegal invasion in Crimea, and the next day about the purely formal nature of sanctions by Tokyo, adopted solely in solidarity with Western colleagues. In fact, all this mess with sanctions put the S. Abe Government in a rather awkward position: on the one hand they don’t want to mar the relations with Moscow improved in the past two years, and on the other, deviation from Washington’s strategy line can lead to ‘gloomy implications’. As the saying goes: ‘honey is sweet, but the bee stings’.

Russia’s market is huge making plenty of room for Japanese goods, and at the same time it is possible to bargain on gas and oil, all the more so that 86% of all Russian import consists of mineral fuel. And truly, in the face of China’s increased influence in the South-China and East-China Seas, Tokyo could be easily satisfied with Russia’s neutral position in relation to Beijing. But the Obama Administration jogs the Japanese Prime Minister’s memory, reminding whose money the post-war economy was built on and to whom Japan is indebted for its prosperity. So now, willing or not, they have to play by someone else’s rules.

Throughout last year the Japanese would say one thing and do something absolutely different. For example, during the G-7 summit in Brussels Mr. Abe urged the European colleagues to conduct a constructive dialogue with Moscow, as one of the key players in the international arena. Last September the Japanese, with the wave of a magic American wand, jumped on board with a fresh load of sanctions directed at Moscow. At the same time, Japanese politicians, together with the representatives of Japan’s business community, who are lined up with them, continued to affirm their goodwill towards Moscow.

At this point we would like to say a few words about the position of Japanese business in relation to economic sanctions against Russia, which, as might appear at first sight, should primarily hurt their interests. Many a time did Japanese businessmen claim that the restrictions of their country’s government are of most soft nature. For example, Chairman of the Russian-Japanese Economic Committee, Deputy Chairman of the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Nippon Keidanren) Norio Sasaki repeatedly said that the sanctions did not influence the business environment. Besides, it is confirmed by the results of an annual survey of the above mentioned Federation’s members, in accordance with which 57% of Japanese businessmen are already investing in Russia’s economy, and 20% contemplate joining the first. But in fact, in 2014 no foundation stones were laid into large-scale bilateral projects. Even Hokkaido Bank, which planned to put the land in the Amur region under soya in spring 2015, suddenly decided to extend, for an indefinite term, the stage of assessing financial risks, associated with the new project commencement. When it comes to the arrangements which were already in their final stages of realization at the moment of the imposed Japanese sanctions, their construction continued, and sometimes they even assert themselves as successful and almost brought to life examples of fruitful cooperation between economic circles of the two countries. All the above mentionedharmoniously fits itself into the Japan Government’s long-established behavioral pattern, which has escalated after the Second World War, when political interests prevail over economic ones. That is why it is not in reason to expect excessive activity from business that would be inconsistent with the country’s foreign policy course, even if it is soft, as Japanese businessmen keep insisting. One obvious example stands out. Tokyo recognized the project of ‘Sakhalin – Hokkaido’ power bridge construction, which could to a large extent satisfy Japan’s needs in electric energy due to the NPS putting out and energy sources deficit, to be over expensive.

But let us get back to the theatrics of Japanese authorities’ political games. In September 2014 after the friendly visit to Moscow from the former Prime Minister of Japan Y. Mori, ‘Kyodo Tsushin’, a large Japanese information agency, informed out of the blue about the withdrawal by the Head of the Japanese Government of the invitation to the President of Russia, at Washington’s request. In order to soften the straightforward speech in the shocking report, it was said that Mr. Abe planned to meet with V.V. Putin on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Beijing in November 2014. Also, the possibility of advancing the Russian leader’s official visit to Japan for spring 2015 was left open. But who has left this possibility open: Washington or Tokyo?

The Summit took place, the leaders of the two countries met, discussed the situation in the Ukraine and came to an agreement that the visit shall take place, but later, ‘at the proper time’, as Japanese mass media reported.

On returning home, the Japanese Prime Minister, during the meeting with the Governor of the Hokkaido island declared his intention to continue the dialogue with the Russian party in relation to resolving the ‘Northern territories’ dispute, as four southern islands of the Kurile Ridge are called in Japan. Tokyo does its best to prove itself as an independent player in the international political arena, capable of resolving geopolitical issues on its own. Mr. Abe made it clear that the Ukrainian crisis has a negative impact on ‘the key task of his whole premiership’ – conclusion of a peace treaty with Russia. But is everyone in the world ready to accept such ‘independence’ from the Japanese?

The tragic story related to the taking hostage of two Japanese journalists this January and their subsequent deaths at the hand of ISIL terrorists, dramatically illustrated that it is yet too early for Japan to demonstrate it’s ‘image’ in political games where it is traditionally left the role of the US’s younger sister. Of course, a hypothetical terrorist threat frees the hands of the Japanese authorities to revise the infamous Article 9 of the Constitution that prohibits the state to participate in military international missions. At the same time, even with the existence of the ‘official’ army, Tokyo will not manage on its own with the aggression of Islamic extremists who, as one of the terrorists’ video-messages says, are going to avenge for something. Like it or not, but the samurai have to sheathe the sharp blade of their political arrogance and get back under the wing of Washington.

Thus, it becomes crystal clear that in the near future one shouldn’t expect any radical changes in Russian-Japanese relations. Tokyo will follow the US-selected course of action even at the price of their personal interests, bearing in mind the threat that might arise with deviation from this course. Looking ahead, we can say that experts will discuss the Russian leader’s possible visit to Japan for a long time, but whether this visit really takes place – it is necessary to pose these questions not to Tokyo, but to Washington, where they know better what is good for the Land of the Rising Sun.

Bakhtiar Usmonov, Doctor of Political Sciences, political scientist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

Since the beginning of 2015 Pakistan’s press, both printed and electronic, together with independent blogs, have been reporting

There is much fertile ground in Pakistan for IS representatives: according to various reports there are around 50 radical Sunni groups in the country which are close to IS in both spirit and intention. Included amongst these groups that help comprise the Taliban in Pakistan are the odious Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and in particular Tehrik-E Taliban (TTP). These groups, together with a host of other radical organisations, are fighting to turn Pakistan into a Sunni theocratic state which would function solely under Sharia law. IS is trying to create the same kind of state in Syria and Iraq. By using the aspirations of the Pakistani radicals, IS emissaries are hoping to lay the groundwork to penetrate into Pakistan (as well trying to start a similar process in Afghanistan) and to then expand into the Iranian province of Khorasan, the countries of Central Asia, and the Xianjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China.

The success of IS recruiters is reflected by the number of Pakistani Islamists who have changed sides and joined the Islamic State. The group Tehrik-e-Khilafat (linked to the Taliban) have announced that detachments of fighters from the Momand, Orakzai, Khyber, and Bajaur agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan have declared their adherence to the goals as laid out by the leader of IS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Judging by social media correspondence and on the blogs and sites of various Jihadi organisations, around 1.5 thousand militants from the groups named above are fighting for IS in Syria and Iraq. What’s more leaders of radical groups in Pakistan are prepared to send hundreds of additional militants to fight for the Islamic State’s cause.

The growth in the attractiveness of the Islamic State for Pakistani Islamists is facilitated by the skilful propaganda dispersed by IS ideologues, (which appears to be more effective than the ageing Taliban leaders, especially amongst the young), by the successes of Jihadist units in Syria and Iraq, and also by the Islamic State’s sheer spending power. The Islamic State’s ranks are also being significantly increased by young and unemployed people in Pakistan, the majority of whom come from poor families. They are radicalised in numerous madrasas and after their studies they go on to fill the ranks of armed Islamist units. Pakistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs calculates that out of 24 thousand madrasas, roughly 10% of them are preparing ideologically motivated fighters.

At the same time, despite the support that Pakistani radicals have for the Islamic State, there are some differences between them and the Jihadists from IS. In particular this difference is noticeable when talking who is considered the leader of the movement by each side. Pakistani Islamists still defer to the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, Emir of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, thus rejecting any claims to leadership of the Islamic caliphate by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

The activities of IS represent a real threat to the security of Pakistan. It is thanks to the Pakistani media, and its efforts to alert the international community, that we now know about the recruitment of several thousand volunteers by Jihadi recruiters, flying the IS flag, in the tribal agency of Kurram.

According to experts at the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies it is most likely that the Islamic State, relying on its supporters, is planning to set up bases in Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan. The Islamic State’s intentions in this regard are bad news for Islamabad. An additional influx of trained fighters from Syria and Iraq will seriously undermine any efforts to preserve the internal security of the country.

Bakhtiar Usmonov, Doctor of Political Sciences, political scientist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

The question of royal succession is one of the most pressing problems for the monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula. In the wake of Saudi Arabia, which has recently just gone through its own change of leadership, the Sultanate of Oman is facing a similar problem; since July 2014 the Omani leader Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said has been undergoing medical treatment in a clinic in Germany. Both Arab and Western media have claimed that the Sultan is being treated for colorectal cancer. The fact that the Sultan was neither present in the country on his birthday (November 18), a day which is considered the country’s largest national holiday, nor present at the funeral of Abdullah, king of Saudi Arabia, compounds rumours that the leader is in a bad way.

The situation regarding the 74-year-old monarch is especially delicate as he has no direct descendants. The Sultan came into power in 1970 as a result of the overthrow of his father with the help of British Special Forces and in 1976 married his cousin, the daughter of his uncle Sayyid Tariq bin Taimur Al Said. The marriage yielded no children and the couple divorced in 1979; the Sultan did not remarry.

Outside observers are paying very close attention to Oman’s future leadership change. This is primarily because of the potential power that the Sultanate could yield; Oman’s geographical position grants the country the possibility to exert control, together with Iran, over the shipping that passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Indeed, 30% of the world’s oil passes through the Strait; therefore the whole world is concerned about the peaceful transition of power in the country.

Over the last ten years Oman has been an important link between Iran and the Arab monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. Oman has also repeatedly helped organise meetings between Iran and the West in regard to Tehran’s nuclear programme. According to the online newspaper Al-Monitor, Oman only very recently hosted secret talks between America and Iran. Experts predict that the possible loss of Qaboos would be a serious stumbling block in the ongoing nuclear talks with Iran; for all sides involved, the Sultan was a convenient and neutral link in the negotiations between Iran and the West.

Oman’s achievements also include the successful negotiations which facilitated the return of Al-Qaeda hostages from Yemen, the release of American tourists accused of espionage in Tehran, and also the release of British sailors captured by Iranian soldiers in 2007. On top of this, Oman has its own seat on the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, a position even Saudi Arabia has to respect. Judging from the Sultanate’s rhetoric and actions, Muscat does not officially intend to interfere in regional and inter-Arab disagreements and instead it works to support dialogue with its neighbours. The country’s policy in this regard seems to be connected with the fact that around 75% of Omani citizens are Ibadi Muslims, an Islamic denomination which is considered to be the most moderate. Both conservatism and tolerance are considered inherent characteristics of Ibadism; Ibadi Muslims renounce killing for religious and political reasons and they preach patience to other Islamic denominations.

Discussions about the Sultan’s successor have been going on for a long time. In 1997 he officially declared that he had written two names down on paper in descending order and put them in sealed envelopes which were then placed in two separate parts of the country. The envelopes are to be opened after his death. Since 1997 there has been much speculation regarding possible candidates for the Omani throne. The most probable candidates mentioned by the Arab and Western media are the sons of Qaboos’ brother on his father’s side, the former Prime Minister of Oman: Sayyid Tariq bin Taimur.

The eldest son, Sayyid As‘ad bin Tatiq, is 60 years old. He graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, as did Qaboos in his youth, and he is currently the personal representative of Sultan Qaboos.

The second candidate is the stepbrother of Sultan Qaboos, Sayyid Haitham. He is also 60 years old and was educated in Paris in the Sorbonne. He is the former head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and since 2002 he has been the Minister of Heritage and National Culture.

The third candidate is Haitham’s brother- Sayyid Shihab. He will turn 60 this year. He holds the title Vice-Admiral, he used to command the Omani Navy, and since 2004 he has been advisor to the head of state, while simultaneously heading the Research Council of Oman.

The three potential candidates number amongst some of the richest people in Oman, they hold practically all of the country’s important assets in their hands. However, is one of these men ready to shoulder the burden of taking responsibility for a sovereign nation, and is Omani society ready for the arrival of a new leader on the throne?

Let’s not forget that when Qaboos wrested control of the country from his father a civil war was blazing, Oman had only 10 kilometres of modern roads, and there was a complete absence of national industry, an education system, or even a healthcare system. The Sultan managed to not only halt the country’s decline but to also set up (in a very short time historically speaking) one of the most stable and well managed states in the Middle East. Thanks to him Oman stepped from the middle ages into the 20th century.

The majority of Oman’s population of 4 million people have never known a ruler other than the current Sultan. His role and achievements as a reformer are lauded across the country, even in the once-mutinous Governorate of Dhofar. With this in mind, every action of a new Sultan will be closely compared with the policies of his predecessor. Indeed in recent times, especially since the beginning of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, Oman’s problems have been building up and they will require attention sooner rather than later.

Let’s take for example the Omani economy’s reliance on oil. In this respect Oman is like the other monarchies on the Persian Gulf, in Oman’s particular case it receives 79% of its income from the sale of oil. However the country’s oil reserves, unlike its neighbours, are not overly significant. With less ‘Black Gold’ being extracted, amidst a significant fall in the price of oil and limited financial reserves, there may be serious consequences for the internal political and social stability of the country, not to mention the future of large scale infrastructure projects. Thus, with a budget deficit, it will be increasingly difficult for a new leader to maintain the material wellbeing of Omanis.

This problem is further compounded by the expectations of the Omani populace (56% of whom are under 25). There are expectations that the government will lift restrictions on the development of a civil society, that there will be more efforts to fight protectionism, favouritism, and corruption, and furthermore that the government will work to reduce unemployment levels in the country and to free political prisoners.

The state of chaos in neighbouring Yemen also poses a serious threat to the internal stability of Oman. Muscat has expressed its deep concern about the possible destabilisation of the Sultanate’s western border. According to Omani and British experts, in the event that fighting spills across onto Omani territory, it is unlikely the small national army will be able to independently and completely guarantee the safety of the country.

Bakhtiar Usmonov, Doctor of Political Sciences, political scientist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

The Central Election Committee has cleared 26 political parties to take part in the election. According to public opinion polls the main fight for votes appears to be between the party currently in power, the centre-right Likud led by Binyamin Netanyahu, and the Zionist Union bloc of centre-left parties. The Zionist Union is made up of the Labor party which is led by Yitzhak Herzog, and the party Hatnuah with Tzipi Livni as its leader.

It should be pointed out that there are no particular ideological differences between platforms of Israeli political parties. Those parties that oppose territorial concessions to the Arabs are considered to be on the right, while those that support such concessions are considered to be on the left.

According to the polls, both Likud and The Zionist Union could potentially receive a broadly similar amount of seats in the new parliament. The gap between the two parties may be small, but neither of the leaders is able at the moment to form a government by themselves. This means they will have to open negotiations with other parties in order to form a coalition, the potential make-up of which is impossible to foresee; even Israeli experts shy away from trying.

Likud could have the support of Naftali Bennett’s party The Jewish Home; Bennett serves as Minister of the Economy in the current parliament. In the current pre-election race Bennett’s party is closing the gap on the frontrunners. The party Yisrael Beiteinu, led by Avigdor Lieberman, is ready to join a government on the political right, however the party is currently going through hard times after a spate of corruption scandals. Opinion polls show that Yisrael Beiteinu, founded as the so called “Russian speaking” party has lost around 40% of its voters. It isn’t out of the question for them to give their political support to other parties or to withdraw altogether from active campaigning.

Judging from pre-election rhetoric a serious fight for the “Russian speaking” vote has already begun with The Zionist Union assuming the most active role so far. On the February 22nd its leaders organised an official presentation of the party’s pre-election programme especially for a Russian speaking audience. It took place at Beit Sokolov, the home of the Israeli Journalist’s Association in Tel-Aviv.

A lot rests on which side the religious parties Shas and United Torah Judaism choose to make their stand on. Their leaders have declared their readiness to support a right government; however it wouldn’t be the first time they make their selection based on which party offered them the most favourable terms.

It is also possible that the left camp could have the support of the Israeli Arab parties. Four of these parties, The United Arab List, Ta’al, Balad, and Hadash, have formed their own voting bloc. According to weekly polling results this bloc stands to receive 11-13 seats in the next parliament.

Israelis of Arab origin comprise 20% of the country’s population. Around 55% of them vote in national elections. Specialists propose that the Arab parties should take a more active role in raising voter attendance in the time remaining before the elections, since currently the majority of Israeli Arabs don’t believe that regular elections can change their situation for the better.

Judging by the polls, it appears at the moment that Binyamin Netanyahu will be the head of the next Israeli government. Following quite closely behind is Yitzhak Herzog. However, seeing that a significant part of the electorate has still not decided who they would like to see as prime minister, neither Netanyahu nor Herzog can lay claim to the title just yet.

Experts say that the balance of power in the election race could quite literally change even during the last week before the elections. This wouldn’t be the first time for this to happen in Israel. Things will mainly depend on what compromising material will be unearthed in the pre-election fight, primarily in relation to the parties’ leaders, and the situation on the country’s borders.

Indeed the campaign to discredit Netanyahu has already started. It has even affected his wife, who has prompted condemnation from even the moderate parts of Israeli society.

Netanyahu is also hampered by the souring of relations between himself and Barack Obama. The American president intends to successfully conclude talks with Iran, but Netanyahu sees Tehran as a threat to the very existence of the Jewish state.

 The Israeli prime minister plans to visit Washington on March 3 to talk in Congress about this issue. He was invited by the House Speaker John Boehner but Democrats have already said that they consider the invitation to be inappropriate and some Democratic congressmen have declared their intention to not attend Netanyahu’s speech. Vice-President Joe Biden has said he will be on a state visit to Latin America at the time. As announced by the White House, a meeting between Obama himself and Netanyahu in the run up to the upcoming Israeli elections of March 17 would be a breach of diplomatic protocol.

Bakhtiar Usmonov, Doctor of Political Sciences, political scientist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Officially, Ankara opposes the idea of the creation of an autonomous Kurdish region in North-East Syria, similar to that in Iraqi Kurdistan. This was stated by Turkish President, Recep Tayyir Erdoğan, in the newspaper

According to Erdoğan, Turkey does not need “a second Northern Iraq.” In his opinion, the emergence of another Kurdish enclave may lead to serious problems in the region in the future. Turkish authorities are seriously concerned about the fact that the success of the Iraqi Kurds and of the Syrian Kurds may provoke Turkish Kurds to strive for the creation of their own autonomy, or even for achieving independence. Therefore, Ankara has been doing and will be doing everything not to allow it happen. Earlier, Erdoğan repeatedly stated that he will not allow terrorists from the Kurdistan Worker’s Party to establish their camps in Northern Syria.

Erdoğan’s attitude towards the Kurds became clear during the exacerbation of the situation in Kobanî last fall, when Erdoğan pointedly refused to help the besieged city. Moreover, under his direction, Turkish security forces, army, and police brutally suppressed large-scale Kurdish protests in October 2014, and did everything possible to make crossing the Turkish-Syrian border difficult for Kurds wishing to support their countrymen in the fight with IS militants.

The Kurds are convinced that Erdoğan was interested in prolonging the hostilities in Kobanî. In their opinion, he was quite satisfied that both the Peshmerga and militants from the Jihadist groups suffered serious losses.

The only thing that Turkish authorities did was allowing Iraqi Kurds’ peshmerga units to pass through their territory, at the same time refusing to allow weapons and ammunition to the fighters in Kobanî. Journalists of the newspaper Hürriyet admit this is their country’s only contribution to the fight with IS.

In opinion of several American and European experts, this was a necessary symbolic step taken by Turkey, apparently in order not to “fall out” from the international coalition organized by the US to fight with IS. In addition, Erdoğan was forced to take such steps, taking into account the political landscape in the country, in anticipation of the upcoming parliamentary elections in June 2015.

If the Kurdish parties support the opposition or, as they did during the presidential elections, once again decide to unite with left-wing parties, then it is not clear whether the ruling party, Justice and Development, will win a constitutional majority in the new parliament (376 seats out of 550), and help Erdoğan rewrite the fundamental laws of the country to transform Turkey from a parliamentary republic into a presidential one. Therefore, it is not without reason that analysts are increasingly talking about how the Kurds may become key players in the fight for seats in parliament.

Denying the Syrian Kurds the right of autonomy, ingratiating with the Kurds, citizens of their own country, but not completely solving their problems, Ankara at the same time considers the Iraqi Kurds as allies, actively developing economic ties with them. It gives the opponents of the Turkish president cause to accuse him of carrying out a policy of double standards.

Judging by discussions taking place in Turkish society, the opposition is already using Erdoğan’s mistakes to their benefit. In social media and in some on-line publications, accusations against him have already appeared both for not fulfilling previous promises to Kurds and for unwillingness to seek mutually acceptable compromises.

Amid this situation, one of the January issues of the Al-Monitor newspaper featured information about the allegedly possible withdrawal of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party from the ceasefire agreement which came into effect in March 2013, if the Turkish authorities do not fulfill their promises. The fact that this may occur indirectly supports the credibility of statements made by several American Kurdistan specialists about the Turkish security forces’ plan to amass large supply of tear gas in canisters, about 1.9 million units, and ready-to-use gas grenades. Experts regard this as preparation for the suppression of large-scale protests in anticipation of the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Bakhtiar Usmonov, Doctor of Political Sciences, political scientist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The 25

The most interesting figure is the deputy crown prince. For the first time since 1953 after the death of the dynasty founder his grandson became deputy crown prince – Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, son of the crown prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, who died in 2012. Thus, in the near future the representatives of the third generation of the House of al-Saud will succeed to the throne.

It is also significant that the new sovereign ruler and keeper of two relics, and deputy crown prince both belong to the powerful clan of Sudairi. Traditionally its members take the leading positions in the authoritative elite of the kingdom, controlling the main sources of power: oil and power structures.

According to several experts from the Arabian countries of the Middle East, in fact king Abdullah passed away much earlier than the officially declared date. They consider, that his going to a better world was not declared until the leading members of the ruling house had reached consensus regarding the candidature of crown prince and his deputy.

The struggle was between the supporters of Prince Mutaib, son of the deceased king Abdullah, and the supporters of Prince Mohammed. It is stated that the USA was interested in promoting the latter. It is considered that Mohammed, as his late father, sticks to the strict direction of alliance with Washington. It is no coincidence that his visits to the USA in 2013 and 2014 were organized to the higher standard.

On December 31, 2015 the new king will be 80. His age and health problems will hardly let him fully perform the duties of the head of state. The necessity of solving internal problems, reaction to the developments in Syria, neighboring Yemen and Iraq, battle with the Islamic State promising to overthrow the regime of the al-Sauds, and rivalry with Iran for the regional leadership made the powerful members of the royal family appoint energetic, ambitious and purposeful grandson of the dynasty founder to the position of deputy crown prince, not one of his sons. As some experts from the Arabian countries of the Middle East consider, the next king of Saudi Arabia will be Mohammed, not Muqrin.

On August 30, 2015 Prince Mohammed will be 56. He studied in the USA, where he received a Bachelor degree in Political Science. Besides, he trained at the anti-terrorism courses in the FBI and Scotland Yard. Since 2004, he’s worked in the Ministry of Interior which he has headed since July 2012 after his father’s death.

At one time, he together with his father was responsible for the Yemeni direction. Since February 2014 Mohammed has been responsible for the Syrian direction. In the middle of 2000s he carried out a successful campaign to defeat al-Qaeda on the territory of Saudi Arabia. He survived several assassination attempts.

For his activity in the Ministry of Interior and the policy of “iron fist” against terrorists, he has been highly appreciated by his colleagues from western intelligence agencies. It is no coincidence that after his appointment to the position of the Minister of Interior, US diplomats called him the most pro-American member of the Saudi Ministry.

Mohammed is married to the daughter of his uncle Sultan, former crown prince in 2005-2011. He has two daughters.

Unlike other princes, Mohammed actively communicates with media. He has social network accounts. He is considered to be less corrupt as compared to other members of the royal family.

Arabian experts characterize king Salman as careful, pragmatic and successful manager, who has been one of the pillars of state power for over half a century. He was called “right hand” of king Fahd and “reliable shade” of king Abdullah. Nevertheless, the time of Salman has already gone. After some time, in order to maintain stability in the country and succession in transition of power, he will gradually start to transfer his functions of the head of state to prince Mohammed.

The latter will undoubtedly take into account opinions of the authoritative members of the House of al-Saud. He will hardly allow any high-handedness. The system of check and balance in the higher echelons of power, created by the late Abdullah and strengthened by the recent decisions of the supreme ruler, will not allow this to happen either. This in particular refers to the appointment of the son of king Mohammed bin Salman to the position of the Minister of Defense and at the same time the head of the Royal Court.

Bakhtiar Usmonov, Doctor of Political Sciences, political scientist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

According to a survey by private Afghan television station “Tolo”, after 100 days as president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani’s rating is significantly declining. Residents of the capital and central areas of the country have expressed the most dissatisfaction with the President’s policies.

Those who are dissatisfied with the head of state blame him for delaying the process of appointing ministers of the central government, governors and key officials in the provinces, establishing the dialogue with Pakistan, attempts to negotiate with the moderate Taliban and outbreak of terrorist activity in the country. Afghan print and online publications assert that virtually from the very beginning of the presidential campaign of 2014 the majority of the ministries have not worked. Persons appointed to temporarily perform the duties refuse to make decisions. It is alleged that it got to the point that at one of the government departments, office workers bored of nothing to do organized a dance, recorded it on video and then made it public.

The president’s opponents believe that in a country with a weak political system now more than ever there is a need for strong and competent managers, capable of making independent decisions and ensuring the daily management of subordinates. The most concerning for the public is the fact that, given the escalating Taliban activity, a number of decision making positions in key ministries like the Ministry of Defense, Internal Affairs and the Security forces remain vacant.

Ashraf Ghani has also been accused that working 18 hours a day he tries to do everything himself. He is seen at a military hospital in Kabul, then he visits the Pul-i-Charkhi prison, then he makes a surprise visit to Herat which results in the resignation of officials who, in the president’s opinion, either deceive him or do not fulfill their functional assignments. However, in most cases the dismissed civil servants are not replaced and as a result problems only increase. According to his opponents, the president has no long-term strategy. They believe that instead of reforming the existing system, the president acts ad hoc.

At the same time, some Afghans see Ashraf Ghani’s 100-day presidency as a kind of “breath of fresh air” after the reign of Hamid Karzai. They believe that the situation should change after the announcement of the list of candidates for the posts of ministers on January 12, 2015. Now it is up to the Lower House of Parliament, which must approve the proposed candidates.

The president’s supporters believe that after the approval of new Cabinet of Ministers, the president and his team will have to convince ordinary Afghans of their determination and ability to restore order in the country. According to them, it will be necessary to start a dialogue with moderate Taliban. The Pakistani armed forces should provide assistance with this. Western political scientists note that unlike Karzai, Ashraf Ghani has established normal relations with Pakistani armed forces who in fact rule their country.

The new Afghan president has visited Islamabad but has not visited India yet. The Pakistanis appreciated this. They also appreciated the fact that after the terrorist attack in Peshawar, which killed more than 140 people, mostly school students, the Afghan army at the request of the Pakistan armed forces launched an operation to eliminate the Taliban bases in the Kunar province. Both sides have started to monitor the situation on the common border. The military and special security officials have started to meet more frequently to coordinate their activities. There has been a significant reduction in shelling of the respective territories.

As noted by some experts in Kabul, Ashraf Ghani would like to establish contacts with the leaders of the Afghan Taliban entrenched in Peshawar and Quetta, and organize a dialogue with them. The expectation is that after the terrorist attacks in Peshawar and Paris, Islamabad’s policy on Afghanistan will change dramatically, and the Pakistani armed forces and interagency-governmental intelligence will be interested in maintaining as the Afghan leader such a capable negotiator as Ashraf Ghani, ceasing to secretly support his opponents.

Another important task is to stop the further decline of the Afghan economy. So far, ordinary Afghans argue that currently there are no conditions for safely conducting business. Criminal gangs can confiscate the business at any time and kill the owner. The state itself does not clarify what it expects from entrepreneurs and so consequently does not finance the development of its own production. At the same time, it introduces new business taxes. As a result, those who voted in the presidential election for Ashraf Ghani say they regret it now.

Bakhtiar Usmonov, Doctor of Political Sciences, political scientist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

On January 6, 2015 the heir to the throne, Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud at the opening of the Advisory Board of the Shura tried to reassure citizens and dispel rumours surrounding the health of the king. According to Salman, the cause of the monarch’s hospitalization was pneumonia. He has been temporarily connected to a respirator.

According to the Israeli agency Debka, the state of 90-year-old Abdullah is critical. He is ill with lung cancer. Currently, two American experts are trying to help him.

The problem of succession has long been one of the most pressing issues facing the Saudi elite. Under the laws of the KSA, the sons of the founder of the Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud dynasty inherit the throne, not the children of the current monarch. Only then can the grandsons of Ibn Saud start to fight for the crown.

In the case of the abdication or death of Abdullah, Crown Prince Salman will assume the duties of the supreme ruler, the 25th son of the founder of the dynasty of King Abdul Aziz Al Saud. Since August 2012, due to the illness of the monarch, he has been practically running the country.

As of December 31, 2015 Salman will be 80 years old. The Qatar, Kuwait, and Israeli media say he is also burdened with a list of chronic diseases. Consequently, soon the royal house will again have to solve the problem of succession.

The Crown Prince could theoretically be Mukrin bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the youngest (born in 1945) of the living sons of the dynasty’s founder. For a long time, from 2005 to 2012, he headed the intelligence service of the KSA. Since February 2013 at the request of King Abdullah with whom Mukrin had a close relationship he was appointed second deputy prime minister. At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that Prince Salman, as head of the house of Saudis, wishes to see someone else in the office of his future successor.

David Hearst, specialist on the Middle East and journalist for the British newspaper “The Guardian”, says that Mukrin’s figure is likely “passing.” According to Hearst, he must at some stage (his mother is a Yemenite, and according to the tradition established by the founder of the dynasty, he may not claim the crown) create conditions for the transfer of power to the second son of King Abdullah – Prince Mutaib, who since 2010 has been commander of the KSA National Guard. The main rivals in the fight of Mutaib in the battle for the crown are Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, son of Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, who died in 2012, and another son of ibn Saud – Prince Ahmed, the former interior minister. But the latter is also not young. According to some sources he was born in 1940, according to others in 1942.

Many fear that the next generation of Saudi princes, who have been educated in the West, differ in mentality from the older generation and could instigate conflicts amongst the various branches of the royal family in a struggle for power. In the region’s current situation, this risks the serious destabilization of the country’s political situation. According to some Western experts, members of the royal family are most likely aware of the danger to their well-being and will likely try to negotiate “without digging too deep”.

Bakhtiar Usmonov, Doctor of Political Sciences, political scientist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The first allegations of Israeli intelligence “moles” not only in the ranks of Hezbollah but in its holy of holies – the secret service, surfaced in December of last year. The newspaper The Jerusalem Post, referring to publications in Lebanon and Kuwait, even mentioned the name of one of the detainees, Mohammed Shawraba, the head of the so-called secret services unit 910 of Hezbollah, which is responsible for operations abroad. Previously, he allegedly was even a member of the security detail for the organization’s leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Together with M. Shawraba, four of his colleagues were also detained.

The publication suggested that the reason for his detention was his alleged involvement in the five unsuccessful attacks by Hezbollah saboteurs on Israeli targets and Israeli citizens abroad. Suspicions of counter-intelligence by Shawraba emerged after the terrorist attack in 2012 in the Bulgarian city of Burgas, which killed five Israeli tourists and injured more than twenty. The reason was the public disclosure by the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior of the names of the two Hezbollah fighters indicated as the main suspects. They were known to a strictly limited number of people, which included M. Shawraba. His guilt was also implicated by the submission to the Israelites of the names of Hezbollah operatives acting illegally abroad and arrested in a number of countries by local security forces.

It has also been reported that M. Shawraba is 42 years old. He was born in southern Lebanon in a family of religious leaders sympathetic to Hezbollah. He lived in Beirut and was considered quite the successful entrepreneur. Doing business was apparently a good cover for his trips abroad. According to one statement in 2008 he offered Mossad his services, having become disappointed in the ideology and activities of Hezbollah, according to another he was recruited by Israeli intelligence and periodically received dividends for his work. Over several years, the total amount of payments amounted to 1 million USD. This supposedly was uncovered during the interrogation of Mohammed Shawraba.

According to the English-language edition of the Lebanese publication Daily Star, the counter-intelligence operation to identify Israeli intelligence moles in the ranks of Hezbollah, which has been in progress for 7 months, actively involved security officials in Iran. In their missives to M. Shawraba’s group, they began to convey false information. Particularly on the delivery to Hezbollah formations of weapons from Iran through Syria. As a result, the Israeli Air Force struck at the decoys, thus confirming Hezbollah’s suspicions of M. Shawraba’s involvement in counter-intelligence.

This was the third discovery of spies in the ranks of Hezbollah in the last three years. In June 2011, its leader H. Nasralla announced the elimination of two CIA agents in the ranks of the movement. Just a year later, in June 2012, three people were arrested who worked for the US intelligence service and Israel.

In this latest unmasking, there are many questions to which there are no clear answers. According to one version that appeared on January 6, 2015 in a number of online resources, Shawraba since the mid-2000s until his arrest was the manager of a group of companies founded by Hezbollah in Italy and Spain. Through them weapons were bought for the organization, money was laundered, and high-tech equipment that would fall under Western sanctions was acquired for Iran. In 2005 he met a beautiful girl in Europe. In 2007 he allegedly secretly married her without informing his superiors. In fact, she turned out to be an employee of a foreign intelligence agency, with all the ensuing consequences. After the arrest of Mohammed Shawraba, his companion disappeared without a trace.

The latest event is more resonant in its consequences than all previous unmaskings. If Mossad actually managed to have an agent penetrate into the special operations unit of one of its dangerous enemies and obtain first-hand information about its plans and intentions for 6 years, then for the Israeli intelligence service this was an undoubted success. For Hezbollah the collusion of the employees of its secret service, even if not voluntary, with its main opponent means that all is not perfect and safe in this movement. Probably not by chance, to replace the disbanded secret services unit 910 of Hezbollah, a new secret department was created, to be administered directly to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran, and in this movement, according to Sheikh Naim Kassem, measures will be taken to preserve the purity of its ranks.

Bakhtiar Usmonov, Doctor of Political Sciences, political scientist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The conflict was solved with Kuwait playing a mediating role. As a result, the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani, was forced to take a conciliatory stance, saying that the summit in Doha would be a “signal for new relations”. One of the results was the accession of Qatar, along with the rest of the Gulf States, to supporting Egyptian President A.F. Al-Sisi and the course he has taken. Whether Qatar truly intends to follow its stated obligations, time will tell. One indicator could be the level of terrorist activity in Egypt, the main sponsor of which most analysts believe to be Qatar, with good reason.

Another result of the GCC summit was the decision to create a unified police force. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar Khaled bin Mohammed Al-Attiyah, it is planned to assign to it the functions currently overseen by Interpol. Its headquarters may be located in the capital of the United Arab Emirates – Abu Dhabi. The regional police will coordinate law enforcement agencies of Member States of the GCC in the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, and cybercrime.

Meeting participants also discussed the establishment of a joint Navy based in Bahrain. As conceived by the leaders of the GCC, they must present a deterrent to Iran, which has disputes with Qatar over gas fields in the Persian Gulf, and also protect the routes of transportation of hydrocarbons to world markets and offshore platforms. Information in the media about plans to create a joint Navy appeared in October 2014. This is discussed, in particular, by the newspaper “Al-Sharg al-Awsat”.

The specific time of the beginning of the formation of a unified police and Navy was not mentioned by the Gulf states at the summit. As some experts believe, its implementation is being hindered, especially by serious differences between the Member States of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf themselves on the Syrian issue, relations with Iran, the opposition in Libya, and the Palestinian question.

In addition, the integration plans as part of the GCC affect substantial losses from the sale of oil, which yields 90 percent of the Gulf’s government revenues. The Emir of Kuwait Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah warned of this at the summit. The Gulf monarchies were forced to spend heavily on social programs in order to prevent an explosion of popular discontent. If, due to a further reduction in the price of oil, money will be insufficient, then programs for the creation of new power structures are likely to be relegated to the best of better times. To act otherwise would be to act suicidally, without a sense of self-preservation.

Thus, at the next GCC summit no breakthroughs were actually achieved. It proceeded like another routine meeting, on the one hand allowing the forum host, the Emir of Qatar to save face, on the other hand showing the whole world that the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf states are united in the face of common threats.

The next GCC summit will be held in Saudi Arabia. Initially, it was reported that the next host would be Oman, but it refused the honour due to disagreement with the ideas on the transformation of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf into a more integrated inter-state union.

The fact that the meeting in Doha was of a more symbolic character is indirectly supported by the composition of its participants. Three of the six members states of the Council were represented by their monarchs – the King of Bahrain, the Emirs of Kuwait and Qatar. From Saudi Arabia came Crown Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, from the UAE Prime Minister and Vice President Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktum, from Oman Deputy Prime Minister Fahd bin Mahmoud Al-Said.

Bakhtiar Usmonov, political scientist and PhD in political science, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.