Between February 5 and May 12, 2014, 6 vessels from non-Black Sea nations have entered the Black Sea: 4 of them were American naval ships (the ill-fated American USS Taylor entered the Black Sea twice). Incidentally, the American USS Vella Gulf cruiser is scheduled to enter the Black Sea sometime around May 25, 2014 (Presidential elections in Ukraine). The Americans themselves do not hide the fact that the passage of their ships in the Black Sea carries a rotational character. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Europe and United Air Force General Philip Breedlove stated that he “has been tasked with setting up ‘reassurance measures’ for their eastern allies”. Breedlove has said that since February of 2014, American vessels have been in the Black Sea “periodically, on a regular basis” and each American vessel leaving the Black Sea is immediately replaced by another or several. Russian experts claim that apart from exerting political pressure, the latter measures are also linked with American efforts to bring the naval component of their Missile Defence System as close to Russia as possible. Tensions in the Black Sea are also further strained due to the recently launched training exercises conducted by American and other NATO forces in the Eastern Mediterranean as part of Operation Active Endeavour. France has ordered two of its vessels to head to the Black Sea for these drills (Alizé and Dupuy de Lôme). Turkey is also conducting its own naval drills for seven frigates, one corvette, two submarines and several other vessels, which, admittedly, were planned in advance. In addition to this, there has been a wave of rumours published in various media recently that Turkey plans to close the straits to the so-called “Syrian express”, the technical and humanitarian aid being sent to the Assad government by Russia through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. This information is especially noteworthy during a time when several Turkish media sources believe that the Turkish government intends to depart from its previous orientation towards partnering with Black Sea nations to provide for the security of the sea region and instead turn towards more extensive cooperation with NATO.

Let us closely consider NATO’s rotational policy in the Black Sea. Can the lack of a “Turkish filter” in terms of allowing the passage of NATO vessels be considered a change in Turkish policy in the Black Sea region, or, at the very least, can it be said that Ankara has started to cave to Washingtonian pressure as compared with its strait policy of 2008? Ankara’s actions on the matter already caused a diplomatic argument between the foreign ministries of two countries in April of this year, which has once again demonstrated that there is a serious gap between how Moscow and Ankara interpret Turkey’s controlling function over the straits. However, how problematic is the situation in reality?

The main cause of concern is the ease with which NATO vessels are passing through the straits, but it is unlikely that this can be blamed on Turkey as all vessels belonging to non-Black Sea nations scrupulously observe their allowable deadlines for being in the Black Sea. The only exception here is the American frigate USS Taylor, which exceeded its permitted time in the sea by 12 days due to broken propellers. The Russian side was also irritated by the long-term presence of the American USS Donald Cook guided missile destroyer, which led the Russian Foreign Ministry to doubt that Turkey is duly monitoring compliance with the Montreux Convention. Despite the fact that the Russian ministry’s statement “surprised” the Turkish side (according to official information from Turkey, USS Donald Cook did not exceed its allowable time of 21 days at sea), this kind of routine clash can hardly be called deteriorating relations between Russia and Turkey, as these complaints were well-founded during the conflict between Georgia and Southern Ossetia as well and did not lead to any significant repercussions. Furthermore, Russian diplomats also periodically and frequently remind Turkey that she is not the sole sovereign of the straits. Russian military specialists also believe that American naval vessels that have appeared in the Black Sea do not pose any serious threat to Russia’s Black Sea coast.

The “Syrian express” which is shipping military technical goods aboard the Russian navy’s large landing craft is also continuing its operations. On April 29, the large landing crafts Georgy Pobedonosets and Novocherkassk left Syria and passed through the Bosphorus strait en route to the Black Sea. On April 30, the vessels Yamal and Saratov returned to Syria from Novorossiysk through the Bosphorus.

As for those Turkish analysts connecting the potentially greater NATO presence in the Black Sea with closer ties between Turkey and the U.S. to jointly secure the Black sea region, a significant portion of the Turkish political science community does not agree with this opinion. For example, the influential Turkish magazine C 4 Defence writes on the necessity of the Montreux Convention to toughen transit regulations for non-Black Sea nation warships, while the Yeni Safak (New Dawn) newspaper that is close to the Turkish authorities advocates for limiting access to the sea for non-Black Sea nations.

NATO’s increased presence in the Black Sea is unfavourable for Turkey due to other reasons as well. The Istanbul Channel is scheduled to be completed in 2023, which should diversify the possible exit points out of the Black Sea. In the event that the project is fully implemented, it may cause a new question to arise about regulations on entering the Black Sea. In this case, the increased presence of non-Black Sea nations in the sea is completely disadvantageous for Turkey.

Turkey’s actions in the Black Sea have not changed significantly in light of the western rotational policy as compared with prior periods. Turkey is not obstructing NATO ships from entering the Black Sea mostly because Alliance members are not formally violating existing strait regulations and are not posing a real threat to Russia. Despite any attention-grabbing announcements, NATO itself is not hurrying to forcibly increase its presence on the Black Sea. There are presently no NATO vessels in the Black Sea that belong to non-Black Sea nations, while the much-touted arrival of France’s Dupleix anti-submarine vessel did not take place.

In the present environment, Turkey’s disinterest in the events on the Black Sea is Ankara’s real policy in the region, which allows it to preserve its loyal relations with Russia while exerting minimal pressure on NATO through its allies. How long will this last? Seemingly until Turkey’s interests force it to clearly define its policies.

Andrei Boldyrev, Ph.D. in History, research fellow at the Turkish Department in the Eastern Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The Montreux Convention was of strategic importance for both Russia and Turkey since it suggested that in the nearest future the status quo between the two will remain unchanged. When Crimea joined the Russian Federation some analysts assumed that it can change the balance of forces in the region in favor of Russia, making a closed “Turkish- Russian pond” even more closed, leaving little place for Turkey to play the Black Sea – Caucasus card in NATO talks.

On the other hand, one cannot disregard Turkey’s own interests in the Ukrainian crisis. In the 90s and especially in the 2000s the political and economic ties between Ankara and Kiev evolved incrementally, reaching in this decade to a level of strategic partnership. Crimea occupied a special place in Turkish-Ukrainian relations, by being the first best bet for Turkish investors and by providing Turkey with a foothold in the region through the Crimean Tatars. Over the last two decades Ankara has provided them with substantial financial support, by promoting cultural and educational projects. Important role here was played by the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) .

The importance of the Crimean Tatar factor can hardly be overestimated. The reputation of the Crimean Tatars in Turkey is high, since the Turkic identity developed trough the famous Tatar thinkers such as Ismail Gasprinski and Yusuf Akchura, who are respected by not Turks alone, but well across the Turkic world . One can also name a lot of Crimean Tatar among the Turkish authorities. Finally, the very possibility of the creation of a geopolitical conflict zone near Turkey ‘s border is an extremely unpleasant surprise for Ankara, that is forcing Turkish authorities to seek ways to minimize the consequences of the “Crimean incident”. This was the thinking behind the negative attitude of Ankara towards the Crimean referendum and the loud statements made by the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in March in Kiev, when he promised to provide “political, international and economic support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine”.

It is doubtful, however, that anything of the above mentioned would have a negative impact on the Russian-Turkish relations, largely due to Turkey’s position that some foreign analysts qualify as “an observer’s”. The official Turkish standing is so indistinguishable due to the fact that Ankara is simply unable to take sides on the Crimean issue. Turkey’s role as a patron of the Crimean Tatar population along with NATO membership ticket implies that Ankara should hop aboard the anti-Russian sanctions ship. However, even before the referendum Erdogan received guarantees from Putin that the rights of the Tatar minority would be observed.

Turkey could express solidarity with the United States if it didn’t fear that the United States would use the Straits as a means of pressuring Russia, bringing naval forces on a “rotating basis” and thus creating a permanent grouping of NATO naval forces in the Black Sea region. In this sense, an example of the USS  “Truxtun” that arrived in early March 2014 in the Black Sea for a one-day exercise with Bulgarian and Romanian ships and stayed there for an indefinite time can be demonstrative. According to the commander of  the USS “Truxtun”, its mission was extended due “to the situation in Crimea”. On April 10 the USS missile destroyer “Donald Cook” entered the Black Sea, on April 11 a French spy ship F.S. “Dupuy de Lome”. From late March to mid-April a French diving support ship FS “Alize” was stationed in the Black Sea and in the nearest future it is expected to be replaced by a French anti-submarine frigate F.S. Thus, we can talk about the fact of attempts to apply political pressure against Russia, however, it is unlikely for Turkey to support its allies in this matter as it provokes an unnecessary confrontation with Russia and reduces the value of Ankara as a regional military leader .

There’s a handful of different opinions in Turkey towards the Crimean situation. First of all, Turkish media outlets don’t see the joining of Crimea to Russia as an act of annexation . Turkish newspapers urged their government to properly evaluate the country’s capacities in determining its policy towards Russia , pointing out to the need to address the systemic crisis in the country firsthand. Foreign observers also note that the corruption scandals and failures of Turkey on the Syrian front dictate caution to Turkish diplomacy in relations with Russia.

Secondly (and most importantly), Turkish economists are predicting Turkey to suffer serious economic consequences, should Ankara join the pro-sanctions camp. Turkish economy is relying heavily on the supply of Russian hydrocarbons. Moreover Russian-Turkish turnover exceeds $33 billion annually, around 4 million of Russian tourists are visiting Turkey every year, leaving behind at least $4 billion. There’s little wonder that Turkish media outlets underline the fact that the value of Ukraine and Russia for Turkey’s foreign policy is not comparable .

Third, the pragmatists in the Turkish government warned the Turkish Foreign Ministry against any harsh actions and statements against Moscow. Turkish Minister for EU Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu has called the EU approach towards Ukraine a mistake, underling the fact that by presenting Ukrainians with a choice between Europe and Russia — Europe has committed a political mistake. Immediately after the visit of Ahmet Davutoğlu to Kiev, his deputy Feridun Sinirlioglu informed his Russian counterpart Grigory Karasin about the outcome of negotiations in Kiev. The parties stressed that they “will continue their joint efforts to normalize the socio-political situation in Ukraine.”

There is a reason to believe that Turkish analysis of the situation in Ukraine is pretty close to the Russian one. This conclusion can be drawn from from the words of Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, that accused Brussels of provoking a civil conflict in Ukraine. Thus, it is possible that Turkey itself tends to blame external forces of interfering in its internal affairs, fearing the execution of the Kiev scenario on its own land.

Thus we can conclude that Turkey will not join the anti-Russian sanctions. Under these circumstances, it is likely that Turkey will encourage the parties to engage in a dialogue and will be trying to maintain the integrity of Ukraine. It saves face for Turkey as a NATO member but will not spoil relations with Russia, as the latter itself is not interested in further disintegration of this country. Such balance between Russia and NATO is the most convenient option for Turkey, as its influence on the Crimean Tatars in any case remains unchanged, and its relations with Russia will be maintained at the same level. And since Crimea has now joined Russia, the role of Turkey in NATO as a regulator of the straits may increase, however, in this case Turkey, as it was during the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict in 2008, would have to “filter” the passage of NATO ships trough the Black Sea, in order to preserve the naval balance of forces in the region. While frequent visits of NATO warships in the Black Sea may complicate Russian-Turkish relations, the events of 2008 show, that such complications will not last for long.

Andrei Boldyrev , Ph.D, Research Fellow in the Turkish Department of the Institute of Oriental Studies RAS, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.