The first one lies in the sphere where we speak about the past civilizations and monuments left from the distant epochs and which have by far survived the bearers of ancient cultures and long-forgotten traditions. They have survived the people who worshipped their long-forgotten gods, who defended their motherland in the fights with enemies who have also fallen into oblivion. Such types of cultural objects appear to us as some kind of exhibits not designed for use, not to mention their cultural reproduction.

Nevertheless, these objects, whether they be architectural monuments, household items, manuscripts or anything else, serve the needs of the people whose heritage they are, being a strong foundation for their cultural self-identification and simultaneously the substance uniting the whole nation. Though the people who presently inhabit those lands have not much in common with the ancient ethnic groups which have left the heritage for them, the land itself, as well as its history, serve as the basis for the culture of the present-day generations. It is the land and the history that make it possible to consider representatives of different religions and bearers of distinguishing traditions as a single nation. In this sense, the cultural monuments of the ancient Palmyra (Tadmur) are an element of distant history, and if somebody believes that this art is prohibited in Islam, this is by no means present-day art, it is not reproducible and of course it is not reproduced by the contemporary Syrians, meaning that this art cannot in any way threaten Muslims’ spiritual life and the integrity of Muslim culture. The same refers to the religious “load” of the monuments being destroyed by ISIS: even if at some moment of time they served as temples for the gods overthrown by Islam, this happened about 1,400 years ago, and since then these cults have remained non reproducible.

The second aspect lies where we try to understand the motives of the militants by which they are guided in their large-scale acts of vandalism – the destruction of recognized objects of global cultural heritage (for the time being, we do not speak of the well-established illegal trade in the stolen valuable museum pieces). The chain of these events consists of numerous links, each of them is of dramatic significance for the culture of the Middle East. For example, in Iraq these were collections of sculptures and bas-reliefs and other exhibits from the Mosul Historical Museum (February 2015), the remains of the Assyrian city of Nimrud-Calah (March 2015), funeral mounds, architectural monuments and excavation sites of the ancient Babylon, which have been partly destructed or fully destroyed. In a strange manner, most of these actions were committed much later than the beginning of the active phase of the fight of the “international coalition” headed by the USA against the Islamic State.

We get the impression that neither the Islamists themselves nor their patrons actually are concerned with the issue of non-compliance of the artefacts and local cultural symbols with Sharia. Nor does anybody recall the confrontation (or the “clash of civilizations”): “the interested parties” are not interested with abstract confrontation of civilizations. The goal of confrontation with unacceptable local customs – the political, ideological, religious, cultural ones – acquires a new meaning as the fight with the things that, in any case, must be changed or – even better – destroyed. Then these foundations are given a new interpretation: political dictatorship, anti-humane ideology, religious sectarianism, cultural backwardness. On most of such points, the approaches of radical Islamists and the American warmongers are astonishingly close. The issue is transferred from the sphere of cultural philosophy, political philosophy and geopolitical speculations to the sphere of military and strategic goals.

Both aspects of the thesis regarding cultural heritage, when associated with the facts of their barbarous destruction, lead up to the idea that the offenders and the “commissioners” of the crimes perfectly understand the utmost importance of “the war against the monuments”. One can imagine what will remain of the Syrian people’s self-awareness if such element as the historical monuments is removed from their culture, and a religious ban is imposed on their cultural memory.

Meanwhile, in many countries of the Middle East the underestimation of political steps for the preservation of their own culture is evident now. Its unification as per a certain “Western” mould, dilution and neglect of peculiar features of national traditions, to put it simply, the decay in reproduction of culture, is mostly neglected on the part of state power. But, as we can see, it is not considered unimportant by those who confront these states and societies. Both the correction of historical memory and regulation of relevant cultural and religious traditions are among the most important strategic priorities of the fight that is conducted by ISIS militants in the territories of Iraq and Syria and that they are attempting to conduct in Lebanon, on the Sinai and in many other African regions and Middle East countries.

Apart from the monuments of Palmyra (the temple of Baalshamin, the temple of Bel, the Funerary Temples, etc.) which were exploded within a week’s interval, and later on – with an interval of two weeks, in August and September 2015 the militants indirectly attacked an international organisation – UNESCO. The systematic and thorough destruction of monuments of global cultural heritage, alongside with the brutal murder of the director of the museum complex, a world-known scientist Khaled al-Asaad must probably demonstrate complete failure of the idea of protection of both the cultural objects themselves and their related administrative and institutional structures by the international community. Obviously it is not quite accidental that the acts of barbarism were committed on the eve of the opening of the milestone session of the UN General Assembly (September 15, 2015) – the site at which the issues of preservation of the global culture and peacemaking are discussed.

We can say with regret and pain that the events happening in Palmyra were quite predictable and constituted a naturally determined and well-thought-out step of the force whose actions are being watched (for now – just watched) by the whole world. It would be wrong to underestimate the marked tendency of the toughening of ISIS’ “cultural policy”, and the possibility of similar actions in the future cannot be excluded. In any case, undoubtedly, the “cultural war” occupies a significant place in the strategy of merger and re-formatting of the lands conquered by ISIS. It is also evident that there is a certain logic in these actions, which were well planned. Therefore, the issue of who exactly is surprised by the barbarism in Palmyra turns out to be a merely rhetorical one.

Alexey Sarabyev, PhD in history, head of the Research and Publications department of the Institute of Oriental Studies, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

The events surrounding Lebanon in the first two months of 2015 have revealed three things which give cause for alarm regarding the internal political situation in Lebanon. Furthermore they cast doubt on the possibility of successfully mounting an opposition to the arrival of terrorist groups in Lebanon from war-stricken Syria.

The first is the Lebanese authority’s blatant underestimation of both the population’s exhaustion from the country’s political instability and the resultant potential for unrest and protest. This potential is particularly relevant given that the number of refugees from Syria has reached 1.5 million, around a third of the country’s native population, while not forgetting about the Palestinians in Lebanon – numbering around 400,000. The current crisis in Lebanon is underlined by Lebanese society’s loss of faith in the country’s democratic institutions. The Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev has observed that in the last five years, amid falling voter participation in populations across the world, there were protest movements recorded in over 70 countries. With this in mind, Krastev puts forward that practically all of these protest movements were organised from below, not by political parties or by trade unions, support for whom seems to have collapsed. It isn’t worth linking this phenomenon directly with the problems of inter-ethnic and inter-faith relations; the problem here lies in the authorities’ lack of social responsibility, their mistakes or inaction in the economic sphere, and politicians’ carelessness in the face of external threats.

Secondly, on the other hand, the Lebanese government does have a clear understanding of the pressing need to strengthen the Lebanese army. However any attempts to relay this understanding to global sponsors of the war on terror have yet to yield any fruit. Fighting between armed groups, recognized as terrorists, has been going on in Lebanon for a long time, but it wasn’t until February 8, 2015 that help promised to Lebanon to re-equip her army was delivered, when it was announced that such support would be provided by the Americans. Lebanon, who isn’t a member of the Anti-Terrorism Coalition, asked for weapons, ammunition, and equipment at a meeting of the Coalition’s leaders in Washington in October 2014. They were asking for help in order to fight IS and the al-Nusra front. Included in February’s delivery from the USA were air to ground missiles for army planes and helicopters, heavy artillery, and ammunition. At the same time the help promised to Lebanon by Saudi Arabia, $3 billion in French military technology and other military necessities has yet to be delivered. It was back in August of last year that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia voiced its intent to extend help to Lebanon, but by December 12, France and Lebanon had only agreed upon the technical details of the equipment’s delivery. Thus, the question of military help for Lebanon has been unforgivably drawn out for reasons that are unclear. The most plausible reason offered is dissatisfaction from the Saudi side at some of the behaviour of Lebanese politicians, but to say specifically what the problem was would be guesswork. Either way it took around half a year since the spilling over of fighting into Lebanon for the urgently required military assistance to be delivered. It was the Lebanese premier Tammam Salam that unequivocally insisted on the necessity of the delivery of military assistance. He did so on every level while at international meetings; for instance while giving a speech at the 69th session of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2014, or when talking in front of the French National Assembly on December 10, 2014. The head of the Lebanese cabinet also talked at the Munich Security Conference on February 7, 2015 where he drew the participants attention to the successes of the Lebanese army, who were fighting an unequal war against terror amid a humanitarian crisis caused by the influx of refugees, not to mention the deteriorating internal security of the country. It is clear that Lebanon is in dire need of financial and military help in order to stand against regional terrorism, and the Lebanese leaders will continue to draw the attention of the international community to this question. It is also clear however, that the transfer of anti-terror operations onto Lebanese soil is undesirable; indeed it could be disastrous for Lebanon. This goes some way to explain why Lebanon has not joined the Anti-Terrorism Coalition and why the Lebanese army has refused the chance to conduct joint training with foreign army units on its soil.

The third and final cause for concern is the question raised by the Lebanese army’s courageous resistance to terrorists on Lebanese territory (in the region of Ras-Baalbek and in other regions of Beqaa, including the area just 20km away from the valuable Beirut-Damascus highway). The question is what forces are obstructing the official union of the Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah, as well as establishing cooperation with the Syrian Armed Forces of Bashar al-Assad? Surely this should be done for the sake of the success of resisting terrorist threats? The question is basically a rhetorical one. Curiously enough it is the same Lebanese politicians, those who advocate for the security of the country, who will not permit autonomous action from the armed wing of Hezbollah and at then at same time support the forces of the Syrian opposition. Such is the behaviour of world states, who, while accepting the goals of the Anti-Terrorist Coalition, will at the same time strive for different goals which bear no relation to those originally proclaimed.

In December 2014 Lebanese politicians set in motion a very positive process, which allowed one to view the current administration’s handling and growing control over the crisis with optimism; the announcement of new presidential elections, the adoption of a new electoral law, and parliamentary elections. There have been fruitful meetings between representatives of Hezbollah, al-Mustaqbal, the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Lebanese Forces. Was it accidental that in January Hezbollah had to demonstrate its fighting capabilities and thus become a target for attacks for both its “aggressive actions” and for ignoring UN resolution 1701 (2006)? On January 18 of this year many Hezbollah members were struck by Israeli airstrikes around Quneitra (in Syria), whereby key figures in Hezbollah’s military wing were killed: the son of Imad Mughniyah (killed in February 2008), his uncle Mustafa Badr al-Din, Mohammad Ahmad Isa, and others. Hezbollah replied by attacking Israeli positions at the occupied Shebaa Farms (Lebanon), from which that same UN resolution 1701 required the full withdrawal of Israeli troops in the first place. Of course Hezbollah’s actions sparked an outcry of criticism that brought, what had seemed to be on March 14, a burgeoning reconciliation with the Coalition to an abrupt end.

An indirect result of Hezbollah’s manoeuvre was that the question of elections for the president of Lebanon returned to prominence. Thus things came full circle. On February 18 the 19th attempt to vote for a new president failed in parliament (the next session was scheduled for March 11). Consultation between politicians from different political camps continues; discussion is particularly active between S. Hariri and M. Auna. Thankfully there isn’t the feeling that certain regional interests stand on the route to achieving some kind of internal Lebanese consensus; such regional interests would go completely against any kind of recognition of Hezbollah as a constructive political force.

The recent visit this January to Lebanon by the head of the Iranian Special Forces (Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution) Qasem Soleimani served to fan the flames of fear of a Shia crescent. The fearful include members of the Anti-Terrorist Coalition. It was plain to see that the visit was intended to increase and strengthen ties, and the meetings themselves with Hassan Nasrallah and the party’s leadership featured discussions regarding tactical steps and corrective strategies for the current world climate. The meeting was intensely irritating for the pro-Sunni regional alliance, and the consequences of this irritation remain to be seen.

As one can imagine the most important thing for the Lebanese people is not to permit the deepening of a crisis in government; the dissolution of a session of parliament because of differences of opinion regarding questions of procedure represented an alarming example of this. It is important that forward momentum is maintained in strengthening all branches of governmental power in Lebanon which would then allow for the development of positive developments in the country.

Alexey Sarabyev, PhD in history, head of the Research and Publications department of the Institute of Oriental Studies, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

It is doubtful that a significant part of these fighters really sympathise with the IS’ aims: erasing the boundaries of present “artificial” states in order to create a “true” Islamic state. Most of the militants are Lebanese whose purpose is to defend Lebanese Sunni interests, preserve Sunni identity in the northern areas, and oppose the Shiite opposition’s “expansion”. They seem to believe that the small pro-Shiite armed groups that appeared relatively recently in the area of ​​Tripoli and the Lebanese army are acting in concert, and consequently, opposing the army becomes, ultimately, a “matter of honour” for these people.

Speculation on the issue of Sunni presence in so-called larger Tripoli and Akkar governorate already has serious consequences: the number of people who doubt that the Lebanese army is truly nondenominational is growing. Under conditions where caliphate emissaries are acting in the areas where Syrian refugees are located, and also where antipathy towards the Syrian regime is dominant among refugees (about a quarter of the entire population of Lebanon), these sentiments are fraught with tension.

It is no secret that some of the Syrian refugees’ sympathies for the so-called armed Syrian opposition are gradually being transformed into sympathy for the Islamists of the IS. This was openly declared by the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament Nabih Berri, and these sympathies have already been seen during fighting for Arsal in August and September of this year. So far, 43 Syrian citizens were being investigated for participating in the attack on Arsal in early August. Lebanese Prime Minister Tammam Salam also spoke about the strengthening sympathy of Syrians located around Arsal (more than 47,000 people). The acuteness of this problem was emphasized at a meeting in Germany on October 28 this year at the conference on the problems of Syrian refugees.

Military operations by the Lebanese Armed Forces, together with Hezbollah forces, were able to defend Arsal, but forays by militants in the northern and eastern parts of Beqaa continue. The Islamists are using the captured soldiers as bargaining chips, for example, promising not to reinforce military units stationed in the area, and also demand prisoner exchanges for Islamists held in prisons (for example, in Rumia). To confirm the seriousness of their threats they carry out demonstrative executions of POWs.

Traditional Lebanese communities are already accustomed to try to assert their rights by assembling in armed militias during critical times for the country. So, another sign of the times was the intensification of the Druze paramilitary organization “Dai Ammar”. It already has a few hundred fighters and is ready to defend the Druze lands in the Shouf governorate, south of the capital.

The revival of time worn ideas about the possibility of self-defence by religious communities is, in fact, a desperate attempt to do something for the safety of their fellow believers. It actually appears to be an act of desperation and frustration, not just devoid of common sense, but bizarre in general in light of the tremendous efforts aimed at strengthening the role of the army and the rise of its prestige among the population. During his time, ex-president Michel Suleiman did a lot to enhance this, and despite this being a very delicate task – his attempts to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces were not opposed by the so-called Resistance (i.e. Hizbullah, et al.).

Current calls for donor countries to strengthen financial assistance for the Armed Forces seem to be successful. Back in August, Saudi Arabia pledged US$1 billion via S. Hariri to upgrade the Lebanese Army. At the meetings of the UN General Assembly in September, the head of the Lebanese government brought up Lebanon’s need for aid in the fight against the Islamists. The same theme was among others at the meeting of T. Salam in Berlin on 28-29 October, where aid of US$650 million was promised. Similar requests for aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces were made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Gebran Bassil and Speaker N. Berri.

Help really is coming to the Lebanese army. Nevertheless, the various Lebanese confessional communities can sense the grim prospect of a direct clash with the threat of the caliphate. The issue has not induced panic among the Lebanese, but what really makes them worry is the current unforgivable political turmoil.

What happens in the political arena in such circumstances? It would be logical to expect attempts to consolidate the political in-crowd and find common interests represented by the policies of communities and clans. Instead, there is a completely misplaced intransigence, an unwillingness to compromise. Since May of this year the presidency remains vacant. The term of office of the Board of Deputies expired in June 2013 and was extended for 17 months. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for November of this year and the country is not ready because it has not adopted a new electoral law that was prescribed for this additional period. Moreover, a number of the leading parties from the March 14 coalition are not ready to set a date for parliamentary elections earlier than the next presidential elections, the latest (14th!) attempt at which was foiled by parliamentarians.

Hope for the election of a president has dawned: a number of key politicians allegedly agreed on a compromise figure, the ex-Foreign Minister Jean Obeid. But it is unclear whether the leader of the “Change and Reform” block, which is part of the “March 8″ coalition, would finally concede, and whether the founder of the Free Patriotic Movement, Michel Aoun would compromise on this issue.

In any case, the uncompromising style of interactions chosen by leading Lebanese politicians, the rate of response to external threats, and the development of programmes to address the enormous political problems cannot be called adequate. Circumstances clearly dictate the need for timely Lebanese reform and a rapid response to current challenges. Otherwise it will be too late.

Alexey Sarabyev, PhD in history, head of the Research and Publications department of the Institute of Oriental Studies, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.