His position undercuts completely the regional scenario for peaceful regulation in the country following the withdrawal of the majority of the US and NATO’s coalition forces from Afghanistan in Dec. 2014. Currently, after 14 years of combat operations against the Afghan National Army and foreign forces, the TMA once again underscored that it represents a military and political power to be reckoned with in Kabul, the region, and the world community.

His statement also stressed that the Afghan Taliban operate only within the borders of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. That means that foreign insurgents, waging war on Pakistan’s soil and in Afghanistan, for a number of reasons, will be pushed out by the Taliban from Afghanistan into Central Asia, China’s Xinjiang, the Mideast, Iran, etc.

The timing of the IMA leader’s address was not chosen at random: it was heard also on the eve of the first anniversary of President Ashraf Ghani’s ascension to power (Sept. 28, 2014), and has been read in world capitals as the answer to Kabul’s endeavors, and mediation by Pakistan, China, and the US to bring members of the Taliban Movement and Kabul’s administration to the negotiating table.

The turbulence of events in the AfPak region over the last 3 months has dropped. One of the reasons has been that very same Mullah A. Mansoor, the new regional player. His “sudden” appearance on July 30, 2015 in the media arena coincided with the Pakistani Foreign Service’s announcement of the death of Mullah Omar (founder of the TMA, Emir of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001), right on the eve of the second round of negotiations between the TMA and central government of Afghanistan, planned for July 31 of this year. The dialog was set aside, and each of the parties busied itself with reconciling internal conflicts.

According to reports by the Afghan and Pakistani press, Mullah Omar, leader of the Afghan Taliban passed away back in April 2013, and likely within Pakistan. The fact about his death was held in secret for a long time. It would appear that in both Kabul and Islamabad, it was decided to wait until the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, and on behalf of the Afghan Taliban’s long-ago deceased leader, “agree” to negotiations.

The first round took place in the beginning of June this year, not far from the Pakistani capital. In those days, the media presented this event as a triumph of Pakistani diplomacy. But Islamabad’s active role, first and foremost its army’s top brass, which handle a series of conditions to Kabul (in particular, handing over the leader of Pakistan’s Taliban Movement, who was hiding in Afghanistan, access to Pakistani insurgent captives, reform of the intelligence service, etc.) in exchange for organizing a dialog with the Taliban, evoked discontent within the ranks of the Northern Alliance, Afghan insurgents, the US, etc. The only trump card that could be played to halt the dialog was to announce the death of Mullah M. Omar.

Recognition of the Taliban’s new leader came with extremely mixed reactions. Often, information would turn up in the media about the latest failure of negotiations with Mullah A. Mansoor, about decisions by groups to conduct combat operations independently against NATO forces and the central government in Afghanistan. Mullah M. Omar’s family initially refused to swear allegiance to anyone, giving precedence only to his heir, his son, Mullah Yaqub. The insurgent groups insisted on an election, and not designation by Rahbari Shura or the new Emir’s Supreme Council. In time, after more than two months, differences were successfully settled. Pakistani media wrote that, under pressure in the middle of September of this year, M. Omar’s family recognized the leadership of Mullah A. Mansoor.

At the same time, criticism by the political opposition toward A. Ghani sharply intensified over betrayal of national interests, primarily from the chief executive director, Abdullah Abdullah (second in command in the government), who is supported by the Northern Alliance.

Insurgent groups spoke out against actions of the President, who entered into a dialog, according to them, with “imposter” emissaries from the Taliban Movement. Once again, terrorist acts resounded in Afghanistan, in government institutions and public places. Attacks against bases of foreign forces became more frequent, etc. This, in turn, brought forth sharp statements by A. Ghani himself, who accused Islamabad of support for terrorists and providing them cover on its own territory. Afghan media unleashed a fierce anti-Pakistan campaign.

The media storm of criticism of Islamabad was successfully calmed only in the beginning of September of this year. The basis was the Pakistani head of Foreign Service, S. Aziz’s visit to Afghanistan. Under the framework of the trade and economic conference, Afghanistan was provided a significant aid package and easing of trade regulations. In particular, a promise was announced to increase the volume of cross-border trade, three times, from the current 1.6 billion to 5 billion dollars in 2017. At the same time, Islamabad would decline support from the Afghan Taliban in the event that, as they worded it, “this threatens Afghanistan.” But, in changing tactics during the negotiations with Kabul’s leadership, Islamabad would not deviate from its strategy towards its northern neighbor. Pakistan will always consider Afghanistan among its political priorities, and will not lessen its influence there.

The TMA’s leadership was able to settle internal conflicts among insurgent groups, frequently breaking their resistance in order to restore its own balance of forces, not allowing separate field commanders or groups in the country, which support the “Islamic Government” organization, to break up the country from within. Kabul’s administration also understands this. For its part, Islamabad will undertake all measures to resist the splitting up of Afghanistan.

A. Mansoor’s position coincides with the position of Afghanistan’s ex-president, H. Karzai, who, in 2014, refused to sign any military or political agreements with the US. And, in his person, the TMA’s leaders received powerful support. It would seem that, under current conditions, President A. Ghani would make certain concessions to the TMA: he has isolated himself; neither the Taliban nor the political opposition in country supports him. Islamabad is pursuing exclusively its own national interests.

In recent days, Pakistan once again adjusted its position on the Afghan question. The indirect pretext was the US President, B. Obama’s address in Sept. of this year. In answer to the media campaign, criticizing the Administration in Washington for its policies’ failure in the Middle East, and collusion with Islamabad’s government, the head of the American Administration warned, “But what’s happened with this radical, violent extremism is that it’s metastasized and it’s spread to other areas. And right now, ground zero for those activities is in Syria with ISIL.”

The accusation toward the AfPak region of extremism, as in a few years ago, hurt Islamabad deeply. Fears that the US would support insurgent groups in Afghanistan, who swear loyalty to ISIL, to break up this country, convinced Pakistan’s top brass, which is well known for its old sympathies for the Afghan Taliban, to support its new leader, who called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan, preferring to operate independently on its own turf.

Alexei Abramov, political commentator and special contributor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

The reason for the heated discussions was the Supreme Court of Pakistan’s decision, of August 5, 2015, which confirmed the legitimacy of the military tribunals. They have the right to try cases of civilians suspected of being about to commit or having committed an act of terrorism, and waging war against the state.

The practice of previous years shows that military tribunals operating in a single legal field with the civil courts is one of the indicators of the military coming to power (the suspension of the Constitution, the restriction of civil rights and freedoms, etc.) or the approaching reign of the generals.   So it was in 1953, 1958, 1969, 1977, 1998, 1998, when military administrations were in power or military units were directed to major cities (Lahore, Islamabad, Karachi) to suppress anti-government, sectarian, ethnic clashes, etc on the orders of civilian governments.

The summer-autumn events of 2014, a protest camp in the heart of Islamabad, and the SOS of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, his appeal to the generals with a request to resolve the political crisis in the country are still fresh in the memory. Nobody gave an order on the formation of military courts against civilians in those days, but the army, together with the rangers, was ‘guarding’ the demonstrators in the Red zone, thus maintaining the security regime in the capital. Taken together, these events had already testified to the failure of the civilian central government to adequately respond to domestic calls and deter the protest movement.

The introduction of tribunals – an extremely strong-willed decision of the generalship, which “pushed” it through parliamentary hearings within the shortest possible time – twenty days after the tragedy of December 16, 2014 at the Army Public School in Peshawar.

The moratorium on the death penalty by hanging was simultaneously revoked, prompting harsh criticism from the EU and the US for alleged violation of democratic rights and freedoms.  Soon after began the process of enforcing the death penalty on persons who had been convicted, for example, in 2006, that is, prior to the introduction of a moratorium on the death penalty. One gets the impression that the military were waiting for a pretext for increasing the punishment for terrorists. Every decision of the military court on the death penalty is ratified by the Chief of Army Staff General R.Sharif.

The military courts and the  Pakistan Army (Amendment) Act (PAA), 2015 were restored in the country on January 7, 2015. The 21th Amendment to the Constitution enshrines the legitimacy of the tribunals for a term of two years. In practice, this meant the incorporation of the military in the management of public institutions such as the judicial system.

Parliamentarians gave only 24 months to the authorities to eliminate terrorist groups in the country.

The issue on military courts in 2015 has one distinctive feature – their functioning is enshrined by the constitutional amendment. This means that it would be illegitimate to suspend or prohibit their activities by any decree of civil authorities, with the exception of the abolition of the amendment to the basic law of the country.

In April 2015 the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) filed a petition with the Supreme Court, demanding its abolition, i.e. the abolition of military courts. While the lawsuit was under consideration, the carrying out of punishment on those convicted and sentenced to death was suspended … until August this year.

The Trial Division of the Supreme Court of Pakistan controversially responded to the filed suit. The media accused the boards of the military tribunals of holding the legal proceedings in secret, in the absence of lawyers and promised legal support.

The majority of judges of the board of the Supreme Court assumed that the newly formed Military Tribunal guarantees a fair trial and the sentences issued by military courts will be judicially reviewed by higher courts and the Supreme Court. In practice it proved otherwise.

The Pakistani media have written a lot about pressure on the members of the Judicial Board, and Chief Judge of the Supreme Court N.Mulka Chief Justice Nasirul Mulk, and his ambiguous position on this claim. The case was reviewed for five months, and it was only in the beginning of August 2015 that the 21th Amendment to the Constitution 1973 was upheld by the decision of the Supreme Court by a majority of votes (eleven to six).  The Chief Justice announced it … a few days before he reached the retirement age.

Looking back to the end of the political crisis in Pakistan in 2014, which was settled by the military; the Prime Minister demonstrated a non-constructive stance towards political opponents. Help in resolving the conflict should be regarded as one of the first victories of the generals over the executive power. The second victory was won over the legislative branch of the government – by parliamentarians, who (despite the tough opposition of Islamist parties), bowed their heads and agreed to the military tribunals. The generals’ third victory – over the judiciary power in August 2015 – was the introduction of military tribunals into the civil legal field.  The foreign policy and its main vectors – American, Afghan, Indian, Russian, Chinese, etc. are also largely governed by generals.

There are not many public institutions in Pakistan, where the military’s influence (direct or indirect) is insignificant. But it’s a matter of time and national security requirements.  All of these components need to be considered when building economic ties and political relations with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Alexei Abramov, political commentator and special contributor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

Pakistan welcomed the lifting of political and economic barriers against Iran and expressed its confidence that after the sanctions are removed, Iran will once again be integrated into the regional and global economic markets.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad is tying the commencement of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline’s construction in with plans to reinforce their own energy security. The chronic deficit of gas in the country is one of the main reasons for the low economic growth rate. A day after the signing of the deal in Vienna, Pakistan’s Minister of Petroleum & Natural Resources Shahid Khaqan Abbasi confirmed that gas supplies from Iran will be possible within the next two years.

The 1,800 km-long project was first talked about as far back as 1955; negotiations then gained pace in the early 1990s; a feasibility study put the cost of the project at 1.25 billion dollars.

Pakistan has officially announced the start of the gas pipeline’s construction several times over the last few years but owing to a number of reasons, the project has thus far failed to materialise. Technical documentation was updated, the tariff policy was reviewed. The political administrations of Islamabad replaced each other, their position changed, but each one declared there would be an energy “breakthrough” in relations with Tehran.

At the peak of international sanctions against Iran, on March 11, 2013, as part of its program of restructuring its energy sector, Islamabad signed an agreement with Tehran about the construction of a gas pipeline on its territory. The then Foreign Affairs Minster of Pakistan, Hina Rabbani Khar, announced that “US sanctions against Iran were connected to oil resources, not gas. Therefore, these sanctions do not hinder the gas pipeline project…”

“Pakistan will import 21.5 million cubic metres of Iranian natural gas on a daily basis,” declared the then President, Asif Ali Zardari. Pakistan’s leader made an official visit to Iran to attend a ceremony marking the laying of the first stone in the project’s foundation in the Iranian town of Chabahar, at the Gabd border crossing which is the central point between the two states. The terms of the agreement foresee 20 years of work with a possible future 5-year prolongation.  Iranian gas was planned to produce a 4,000 Megawatt yield of electrical energy for use by the internal market of Pakistan. According to the Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Resources, “the completion of construction and the commencement of operation of the gas pipeline will facilitate a rise of up to 5% in Pakistan’s GDP.”  In 2013, the Iranian part of the gas pipeline had practically been finished.

The flow of crude hydrocarbons was to be conducted from South Pars gas field, piped onwards along the gas distribution system through Iranian territory to the crossing point on the Iranian-Pakistani border, then the 781 km flow would continue into Pakistani territory through the Western Province of Balochistan into the Sindh Province to the town of Nawabshah to the North of the metropolitan city and seaport Karachi. The cost of constructing the Pakistani part of the gas pipeline was estimated at 1.5 billion dollars, which proved unaffordable for Islamabad. Tehran provided one of the loans (500 million dollars) in 2013, which Islamabad was obliged to repay after the gas pipeline would begin operations.

In 2013, Washington strongly opposed the planned deal to buy liquefied gas from Iran, threatened Pakistan with economic sanctions, offered gas supplies from the USA and simultaneously supported the TAPI project.

In May 2013, the Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PML N) came to power with the Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (a long time political opponent of the Bhutto Zardari clan). Under pressure, mainly from the USA and Saudi Arabia, N. Sharif took a “keep silent” position on the gas pipeline project, despite the strict fixed penalties outlined in the agreement (3 million dollars a day in case of a breach of contract.) The country’s opposition took the reversal of the foreign policy regarding Iran as submission to Washington and as a crippling blow to the country’s energy security.

Trade between the two countries started to dramatically decline in 2013. Until the UN introduced sanctions against Iran in 2012, the volume of bilateral trade between Islamabad and Tehran had reached 2 billion dollars, by mid-2015 it had decreased to 300 million dollars.

In May 2014, Prime Minister N. Sharif asserted his official visit to Tehran would mark a new era in bilateral relations. In fact, the Cabinet Head inquired about another postponement in the construction of the pipeline and requested that the regime’s financial penalties be dropped. Tehran once again met them halfway.

Pakistan, taking advantage of its neighbour’s loyalty, put together another package of “requests” as part of their updated negotiation process, of which one of the priorities remained the reviewing of the gas tariffs. “In accordance with the contractual clause, the gas tariff can be reviewed a second time once a year before the recommencement of gas supplies. Thus we are determined,” announced the Federal Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources, S. Abbasi, “to discuss the contractual clause about the gas tariff again.”

The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline also has a Chinese component.  The Pakistani part of the project is connected to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Beijing is currently financing the construction of the gas pipeline from Nawabshah (Sindh Province) to the deep-sea-port of Gwadar, not far from the Iranian border. As soon as this part is built, Pakistan should build a further 80km of pipeline to connect it with Iran’s gas distribution system. In turn, the gas flow from Nawabshah is to be extended to the Northern border with China.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif completed a Central-Asian tour in May 2015. Alongside a large number of memorandums of mutual collaboration, talks were held about the most important thing – energy sources.  In August, diplomatic-level negotiations between the Ministries of Oil and Gas took place in Ashgabat.

Four countries (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) decided to resume work on the project and announce their joint-ownership of the project. The State Company of Turkmenistan, TurkmenGaz looks set to become the main investor, as it is already the consortium leader of TAPI.

The 1,800 km of pipeline, currently under construction, is to be put into operation in 2018 for a 30-year period, with a capacity to carry 90 million standard cubic metres per day. TAPI will transport natural gas from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh Gas Field, more famously known as the South Yolotan-Osman Field. The pipeline will then continue through Afghanistan’s Herat and Kandahar Provinces, cross the Afghanistan Pakistan border, onwards to Quetta, then through inland areas to Multan, cross the border again and travel onwards to the Indian town of Fazilka in the Punjab Region.

However, let’s go back to Iran. After the sanctions are lifted, Tehran will not only reinstate the export of crude oil and get access to its assets in foreign banks, but it will rebuild its partnerships with the region’s countries afresh. President Hassan Rouhani approached Indian Prime Minister, N. Modi, requesting an investment of 8 billion dollars in infrastructure projects and most importantly, in the strategic development of the port of Chabahar. New Delhi has long set its sights on the port with the aim of circumventing its main competitor (Pakistan) and opening a sea-land access route to Afghanistan.

The Iranian-Indian project in Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman near the Pakistani border will be a serious competition to the Pakistani-Chinese project in Gwadar (Strait of Hormuz), which will define the hydrocarbon and trade policies of the region.

On Prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s political decision – which project he will give preference to – IP or TAPI – hinges not only Pakistan’s energy security, but also his fate as a politician (after all, he had sworn under oath to solve the country’s energy problems) and also Islamabad’s general foreign policy direction in the near future.

Alexei Abramov, political commentator, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”